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2VBSTRACT 
This thesis examines the relationships between business and 
the regional State in the development of Queensland's trade 
with Japan from the end of World War II to the late 1970s. 
The analysis has been organised around case studies of four 
of Queensland's principal export industries and the major 
decisions involved in the establishment and management of 
their trading relationships. The study acknowledges the 
minimal influence of a small State such as Queensland on the 
international forces which determined the pattern of trade 
opportunities and concentrates its attention on the 
interaction of State and business in making the economic and 
political adaptations necessary to develop Queensland's 
strong natural advantage in the production of agricultural 
arid ipining products into a flourishing and long-teim trade. 
Queenr;land tradition demanded and economic necessity urged 
an active ro].e for the State in the growth of industry and 
trade, acting in response to the demands of business, but at 
the same time having rea], though limited, autonomy to 
pursue interests of its ov/n. The thesis seeks to clarify 
the nature of State-business interactions and to define more 
precisely the role of the State in the development of 
relations with Japan. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the thirty five years between the end of World War II and 
the early 1980s the Queensland economy was transformed. Its 
rural base remained, but became more diversified and capital-
intensive as producers were increasingly aware of the need for 
production to be determined by reference to the wants of a 
variety of marketplaces. The mining industry became the most 
dynamic and productive sector of the economy, regaining the 
important position it had enjoyed in the late 19th century 
before it degenerated, with few exceptions, into a series of 
small scale enterprises of doubtful financial viability. 
Underpinning and stimulating these developments was the growth 
of Queensland's relationship with Japan which marked a change 
in the State's economic orientation. Major sectors of the 
economy ceased to be inward-looking, relying primarily on 
domestic sales or markets in the southern States of Australia 
or in Britain; instead they developed an aggressive commitment 
to production for export and looked outward to Japan and to 
the United States and elsewhere for markets, capital, partners 
and technology. 
The history of Queensland's relationship with Japan extends 
back before Federation, with contacts in the pearling and 
sugar industries and attempts by government and business to 
develop trade in the years around the turn of the century. 
During the 1920s and 30s a vigorous and extensive commercial 
relationship developed, including the beginnings of an export 
trade in mining products as inputs to Japan's growing 
industrial sector. After World War II, trade resumed with 
many of the same products, actively promoted by some of the 
same individuals and organisations involved in the prewar 
years. Many of the prewar issues and problems arose again, 
and it may have seemed that the war years were a short break 
in a continuing trade pattern. Yet for Queensland, World War 
II was more than a temporary interruption to long-established 
patterns and institutions of trade; it was a decisive turning-
point in the relationship. In the postwar period, new goods 
were traded which by their nature involved Queensland in wider 
political and strategic issues, with Japan's domestic 
policies, and with that country's concern for resource 
security. New personalities and enterprises were involved, 
new institutions and networks developed. Japan came to 
provide the principal market for a number of important 
Queensland industries, the stimulus for much of the State's 
economic development, and the mainstay of significant towns 
and regions especially in the northern and central areas. 
Governments recognised more clearly than they had done in the 
prewar years the importance of the trade for the Queensland 
and Australian economies. 
After World War II the relationship between Queensland and 
Japan re-emerged slowly, with great caution and considerable 
uncertainty even among its promoters, based not only on 
wartime experiences, but also on memories of prewar trade 
problems. There was a pragmatic acceptance of the likely 
revival of trade, though with substantial reservations even 
from those most likely to benefit. As early as 1946 a Gallup 
Poll found that 51 percent of respondents favoured the 
resumption of trade with Japan, and the Queensland government 
was interested in efforts to resume sales of wool. At the 
same time there was opposition to Japanese involvement in the 
trochus, pearling or fishing industries, calls for government 
to ensure that Near East trade did not go back into Japanese 
hands, reluctance to purchase even limited quantities of 
Japanese goods to help overcome shortages in building 
materials and expressions of concern from some sections of the 
wool industry that Japan might seek to manipulate the auction 
system to regain the dominant market position she had enjoyed 
4 
prewar. 
Yet the relationship did resume, based almost completely on 
trade, and dominated by many of the same products which had 
been important in the 1920s and 30s. Imports, principally 
textiles and manufactures, had less impact on the economy of 
Queensland than they did in the southern States because of 
Queensland's comparatively small secondary sector producing 
essentially for a limited local market. Questions of 
protection, tariffs and import controls were therefore less 
significant; the focus of the trade relationship for 
Queensland lay in the products it was able to sell in the 
Japanese market. Exports for Queensland, as for Australia as 
a whole, were initially principally of rural origin such as 
wool and wheat, though the trade was widened and deepened by 
the addition of "new" agricultural and mining products such as 
sugar and coal and by the growth in the volume and range of 
traditional exports. 
By the end of the 1950s, Japan was already Australia's second-
best overseas customer, taking 17 percent of exports in 1960-
61, with agricultural commodities accounting for over 80 per 
cent of their value. Queensland was an important part of the 
agricultural trade as a major supplier of wool and beef and 
the only supplier of sugar. By 1959 Japan took 15 per cent of 
Queensland exports, with the principal commodities being wool, 
sugar, and hides and skins. By the early 1980s Australia's 
main agricultural exports to Japan had not changed 
significantly from their rural base, and were wool, wheat, 
sugar and beef. Queensland supplied 100 per cent of sugar and 
sorghum exports, 56-67 per cent of frozen beef and 85 per cent 
of chilled beef, 10.6 per cent of wheat and 7-8 per cent of 
wool. She also supplied 80 per cent of edible tallow, 58.7 
per cent of hides and skins and 16 per cent of cotton. 
Queensland provided a significant proportion of Australia's 
exports of resources as inputs to Japan's expanding industrial 
production, especially coal, copper, bauxite, rutile and 
zircon. During the 1960s and 70s agricultural exports formed 
the basis for substantial and continuing trade, while the 
spectacular growth of mining exports was the catalyst for a 
change in the pattern of Queensland's economic growth and the 
basis for a wider and deeper relationship with Japan. 
The growth of the Queensland-Japan trade relationship and the 
changes it wrought in the State's economy saw a continuous 
evolution in the range and volume of production, the size and 
structure of industry, the nature of technology and production 
methods and the quantity and direction of exports. Taking 
advantage of the opportunities for trade required the 
assumption of risk, overcoming technical and financial 
obstacles, developing appropriate products at internationally 
competitive prices and establishing and maintaining required 
levels of quality. At the political level, the development of 
the relationship with Japan cut across traditional ways of 
thinking about policy and across the compartmentalized 
structure of government departments and agencies through which 
policy was developed and implemented. The complex 
requirements of new industries developed primarily to serve 
the Japanese market necessitated not just new policies, but 
new structures and practices and new ways of thinking. The 
processes of this change involved an intricate and extensive 
web of interactions between business, governments and other 
sections of the state. These occurred within the framework of 
the federal system and in the context of Queensland's 
traditions, institutions and structures which together limited 
the range of possible strategies and policy responses to the 
opportunities for the growth of the relationship with Japan. 
The aim of this thesis is to examine how and why Japan became 
a focus for policy in Queensland in the period between 1946 
and 1980 and how the Queensland State government came to have 
a vital interest in promoting the relationship. The thesis 
studies the sorts of processes involved, the ways in which 
political and economic forces came together and how 
encouragement of Queensland-Japan relations became a "settled" 
policy. It seeks to identify the key political decisions 
associated with the growth of the relationship, how a 
"Queensland" policy towards Japan developed in the context of 
the federal system, and the ways in which the interests of 
Queensland and the Commonwealth conflicted or coincided. The 
central focus is the way in which Queensland dealt with a 
major area of economic policy and how government and business 
interaction contributed to the development of Queensland's 
relations with Japan. Ultimately the thesis is concerned with 
the respective roles of capital and government in a regional 
State within a federal system, and in the context of a modern 
capitalist economy. 
The foundations of the study lie in the concepts of the 
extensive body of literature which analyses the role of the 
modern state in market-based economic systems. These analyses 
identify a multiplicity of motivations, purposes and processes 
involved in the relationship between the state and significant 
sectors and interests in society. This diversity makes it 
difficult to define or categorise particular systems, though 
analyses fall loosely into two main groups - neo-marxist and 
liberal. Neo-marxists focus on the way in which state actions 
serve the interests of domestic or international capital, 
although Tsokhas, for example, has documented the importance 
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of other influences or of the state's own interests. Liberals 
emphasise the interactions among competing groups in society 
and the role of the state in processing, articulating and 
responding to the group demands. Of particular relevance to 
this thesis is Lindblom's argument that in a modern economy 
government and business exercise a "duality of leadership" in 
which businessmen are "functionaries" performing roles 
essential to government. Government is active in supporting 
business, offering whatever inducements it needs to fulfil its 
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role m the market system. 
But other studies in the United States, Europe and Australia 
suggest the interactions between state and business are more 
intricate and variable than Lindblom indicates. The 
diversity of interests and organisational structures within 
the business sector, the multiple agencies of the state 
apparatus and the international political and economic 
dimensions of policy formulation lead to complex relationships 
even within a single industry or section of the economy. 
Different sectors of business may have competing or 
conflicting interests or different opinions on specific 
issues. State agencies themselves have an institutional power 
base which allows them to develop a policy perspective 
independent of the stance taken by business, although some 
agencies are so closely related to sectors of capital that 
separate views are difficult to determine. Business 
enterprises themselves are ambivalent about the appropriate 
relationship between state and capital; there is a very fine 
line between supportiveness and excessive regulation and a 
tendency for more, rather than less, intervention to be sought 
in difficult economic times. The relationship cannot be 
reduced to a simple statement that the state performs a 
specific role whose nature is determined by the interests and 
demands of business. The interactions of state and business 
are rather an array of different and slowly shifting 
relationships including consultation and cooperation between 
independent units, close interlinking and interdependence, or 
formal sharing of authority as embodied in corporatist-type 
structures. 
Separate but related studies of regional States indicate that 
they also play an active role in a market system, although 
constrained by their small size and the arrangements of the 
larger unit of which they are a part. In Australia, studies 
of specific States and industries argue that States such as 
Queensland have the power and scope to foster the exploitation 
of favourable market opportunities, to capitalise on the 
State's economic advantages and to take an assertive role in 
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promoting a particular pattern of economic development. In 
so doing, however, the States are essentially responding to 
rather than creating economic conditions which have their 
origin in national and international forces. Such studies 
emphasise the real but limited autonomy of the regional State 
to be active in pursuit of its own interests, interacting with 
business and other sectors of society and economy in a range 
of processes similar to those identified at national level. 
This thesis takes the propositions of the theoretical and 
empirical literature as a starting point from which to study 
the role of Queensland as a regional State in the development 
of the relationship with Japan. It will argue that 
comparative advantage and complementarity between the 
Queensland and Japanese economies pointed to the possibilities 
for bilateral trade. These possibilities were enhanced by 
changes in the international trading environment and in 
international political arrangements and by political and 
economic factors in Japan itself. But the processes involved 
in taking advantage of these opportunities, of developing and 
continuing the trade, provide another example of the ability 
of a regional State to act, albeit within a limited framework, 
to influence the pace and pattern of an area of economic 
development. The patterns of State involvement and of 
State/business relations do not conform exactly to one 
specific theory of the political economy of nation states, nor 
are they identical with those in other sub-national units 
since they reflect the particular characteristics of the 
Queensland context in which they occurred. The 
interrelationships do, however, bear out the proposition that 
regional States can and do take an active and decisive role in 
matters affecting their own development, though within the 
limits of opportunities and structures determined at national 
and international level. 
Clearly, as economic theory suggests, trade between Queensland 
and Japan was based on complementarity between the two 
economies and on patterns of comparative advantage, though 
modified by non-economic considerations such as traditional 
ties and protectionist policies. In the immediate postwar 
period, Queensland supplied foodstuffs needed for subsistence 
and materials such as wool which were inputs to those Japanese 
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industries permitted to redevelop, while Japan supplied 
products such as nails, wire and galvanised iron essential to 
Queensland's housing, industrial and public infrastructure. 
From the mid 1950s as Japan's heavy industry began to grow and 
incomes and lifestyles changed, Queensland was an abundant and 
geographically close source of a range of raw materials for 
the rapidly expanding Japanese industrial sector and of 
primary products such as beef and sugar for which demand rose 
as Japan's affluence grew. By the mid-1970s, changes in 
Japanese economic structure hastened by the oil crisis opened 
markets for steaming coal and energy-intensive products such 
as alumina, but created what were to be ongoing difficulties 
for resources such as coking coal tied to industries which 
were declining or moving offshore. Complementarity and 
comparative advantage were important pointers to the 
possibilities for trade, but turning possibilities into 
reality required action to make resources known and 
accessible, long-term strategies of technological innovation 
and capital investment to enhance the advantages of natural 
endowment, and adaptations in production and marketing in the 
light of changing international circumstances. Comparative 
advantage and complementarity do not explain why postwar trade 
was so much richer and fuller than it had been prewar or what 
the processes were which turned possibilities into reality. 
Part of the explanation lies in the radical changes in the 
international political and economic environment in the 
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postwar compared to the prewar period. The decline in 
British power and influence and Britain's eventual entry to 
the European Community helped to redirect the attention of 
Australian governments and business away from reliance on 
markets in Britain and the Commonwealth. The rising 
importance of the United States and her strategic significance 
for nations of Asia and the Pacific associated Australia with 
American politico-economic thinking. The United States' 
concern with the consolidation of a Western coalition against 
the communist bloc and the need to incorporate Japan within 
this group hastened the signing of the Peace Treaty in 1951, 
the return of Japan to a normal pattern of full industrial 
production and her entry into GATT. The desire of the United 
States to minimize economic tensions which might undermine 
Western solidarity, coupled with the general prosperity of the 
world economy, allowed the expansion of world exports and 
helped to sustain a system of freer trade from which Australia 
was able to benefit. As the perceived immediacy of the threat 
from the Communist bloc retreated during the late 1960s and 
1970s, economic issues emerged on to the forefront of 
international relations when serious domestic problems beset 
Western industrialised nations, especially after the 1973 oil 
embargo. The United States became much less tolerant of the 
export policies of allies as domestic and politically 
significant industries exerted pressure for protection or for 
more reciprocity in trade. Subsequent bilateral arrangements 
and protectionist sentiments in major trading countries 
significantly affected the nature of opportunities for small, 
open economies such as Queensland. 
In Japan itself, the interaction of political and economic 
factors delineated the market niches which Queensland business 
had the opportunity to fill, modifying the possibilities 
suggested by comparative advantage and making more precise the 
general range of opportunities created by changes in the 
international environment. In the immediate postwar years, 
controls exercised by SCAP effectively determined the volume 
and nature of trade, but by the mid 1950s new industrial and 
political directions set the scene for trade expansion as 
Japan embarked on a program of rapid growth based on capital 
intensive industrialisation. The need for markets and for 
access to reliable supplies of resources as inputs to industry 
underlay the start of the slow process of trade 
liberalisation, beginning in the early 1960s, and capital 
liberalization from 1967 which opened opportunities for 
Australian exports and for Japanese investment in resource 
development. Worldwide shortages and the high prices of 
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resources in the early 1970s curtailed this rapid growth and 
evoked from Japan a range of policy responses which dampened 
the opportunities for some Queensland products, increased the 
demand for others, and created pressure for trading 
arrangements which ensured security of supply. Particularly 
important were Japan's relations with major trading partners 
such as the United States and the way in which Queensland's 
small economy was affected by Japan's efforts to accommodate 
political and economic pressures at home and abroad. 
International factors established the opportunities for 
Queensland-Japan trade within a framework of structures 
negotiated bilaterally or multilaterally by national 
governments. The response in Queensland to those 
opportunities depended on the actions and interactions of 
individuals and companies and of the State and Commonwealth 
Governments. 
The principal hypothesis to be examined in this thesis is 
that, in responding to the opportunities in the Japanese 
market, Queensland was an active and interventionist State, 
fostering, supporting and promoting the growth of trade. The 
initiative and entrepreneurship essential in promoting entry 
to the Japanese market and the impetus for domestic changes 
necessary for the long term development of trade came from the 
business sector. But at significant points in the development 
and management of Queensland-Japan trade. State decisions and 
State actions influenced the ability of business to respond to 
the market and the way in which conflicts and issues were 
resolved. State and business could be regarded as semi-
autonomous, each with its own interests and resources, making 
its own efforts to develop trade and thus the bilateral 
relationship. At the same time, for specific industries and 
policy questions there were areas of overlap where State and 
business were participants in loose partnership through which 
their efforts were concentrated in ways which facilitated the 
changes necessary to take advantage of opportunities in the 
Japanese market. Over this range of issues. State and 
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business were mutually supportive, working towards common 
goals whose roots lay in Queensland's traditions and 
institutions as well as in contemporary conditions. Within 
the partnership, the respective roles of the participants were 
fluid and ill-defined. Goals and priorities were often vague 
and imprecise, with areas of competition and conflict as well 
as the shared base of a commitment to decentralised and rapid 
development, preferably with minimal reliance on southern 
States or the Commonwealth. The result was a tangled network 
of interactions, varying with time, with the specific issues, 
the nature of the industry and market and the historical and 
contemporary contexts. Queensland's approach to the 
development of trade with Japan cannot be reduced to a single 
role, but rather to a series of roles along a continuum from 
formal partnership to arms-length support. 
The nature of Queensland-Japan trade itself contributed to the 
diversity of interactions between State and business. Rural 
industries relied on Queensland and Commonwealth Governments 
for essential infrastructure such as irrigation works, beef 
roads and the opening up of new lands for production. Much of 
the research on which enhancement of natural advantage 
depended was conducted by Departments of Primary Industry or 
by government instrumentalities such as the CSIRO. Marketing 
and promotion were supported or controlled by a wide variety 
of government, industry, or combined organisations. However, 
as Head has pointed out, the needs of multinational capital 
crucial to the development of mining products required 
different forms of State participation. The enactment of 
legislation was necessary to ensure security of tenure for 
potential mine developers and to establish the terms of access 
to resources and the conditions governing their exploration 
and exploitation. Arrangements had to be put in place for the 
provision of port and rail infrastructure, for the provision 
of services such as water and electricity and for the 
coordination of separate projects within the overall framework 
of the State's fiscal and developmental priorities. New 
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regulations, policies and administrative machinery were 
required to deal with emerging issues such as land use, the 
impact of projects on the environment, the demands imposed on 
Local Authorities and the wider implications of regional 
development for the provision of government services. 
Governments became involved in discussions about contracts 
where government policies on such matters as franchises and 
infrastructure were themselves an integral part of the 
contract negotiations. In the longer term, government 
policies such as encouraging expansion in the number of mines 
and maximisation of output, and the security deposit system 
for the provision of infrastructure, had a major impact on 
problems of costs, pricing and contracts which arose when 
world recession and Japanese economic restructuring led to an 
excess of supply over demand. The precise details of State 
involvement varied widely from industry to industry, 
influenced by the nature of the product, but also by factors 
such as the strength of inter-regional and inter-state 
competition, geographical location, and the changing 
priorities imposed by international circumstances. 
However, as the central hypothesis suggests, much of the 
success of trade initiatives and of export-oriented projects 
can be attributed to the far-sightedness, enthusiasm and 
expertise of entrepreneurial individuals and company 
executives who had to recognise opportunities, conceive 
projects, marshal resources, innovate, assess and accept risks 
and ultimately make the decision whether a particular project 
would proceed. It was private enterprise which discovered 
bauxite at Weipa and coal in Central Queensland and found 
markets for them in Japan, individuals and firms who developed 
the trade in frozen and then in chilled beef, the sugar 
industry itself which initiated and funded bulk handling and 
reorganised its methods of production to deal with the quality 
issues on which continued trade depended. 
There were characteristics of entrepreneurship evident also 
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among some Cabinet Ministers and senior bureaucrats. This is 
not to suggest that the State itself was entrepreneurial. 
Rather, there were among Ministers and senior public servants 
key personnel who exhibited the risk-taking, forward-looking 
characteristics of entrepreneurs. They were instrumental in 
inducing at the political level a change in the vision of 
Queensland's development, an assertive approach to trade 
opportunities and an image of a progressive State attractive 
to customers and long-term investors. They were prepared to 
take risks, to persuade their colleagues of the potential 
benefits of Japanese trade and to act at crucial points to 
overcome obstacles to its development. 
This view of entrepreneurship within the public sector is at 
odds with the idea expressed by some writers that Queensland 
was a conservative State with a distinctive brand of State 
paternalism directed towards the maintenance of traditional 
patterns of economy and society. The thesis will argue that 
there were key characteristics of the Queensland context which 
promoted a positive response to the opportunity to look 
outward for trade and investment by both business and 
government and contributed to the shared vision and close 
relationship necessary to achieve the economic changes this 
trade would impose. Both State and business were active in 
developing the trade with Japan, but neither could have 
succeeded without the other. The active collaboration which a 
partnership implies was essential to the development of the 
relationship. 
To test this hypothesis, the concepts of the theoretical 
studies and the lessons of the State's historical experience 
are combined to derive a "Queensland approach" to the issues 
of trade with Japan. The prewar experience of Queensland-
Japan trade is analysed to draw out the significant influences 
on and lessons from trade as a basis for postwar development. 
Two specific policy areas are analysed - the trade in rural 
products, especially beef and sugar, and trade and investment 
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in the mining sector, with emphasis on coal and bauxite. They 
represent the major areas of trade which had a specifically 
"Queensland" dimension, made a significant impact on the 
Queensland economy, and were a focus for the interaction of 
the major determinants of the relationship. The analysis 
examines these key areas from the point of view of the 
appropriateness of the "Queensland approach" and how the 
environmental, political and economic factors interacted to 
promote the growth of Queensland-Japan trade. 
The primary sources used have been archival material, 
newspapers and journals and Parliamentary records. These were 
supported by a series of interviews with individuals and 
representatives of organisations involved in trade and with 
politicians and key bureaucrats. The perceptions of these 
participants in the processes of trade development provide an 
insight into the way in which key decisions were reached and 
the interactions of State and business at crucial turning 
points in the development of the relationship. 
The analysis is organised around the themes discussed above. 
Chapter 1 outlines the historical and theoretical contexts 
which provide a frame of reference within which to examine the 
development of the relationship and the respective roles 
played by the state and capital. The chapter examines the 
major theories of the state, and of the role of the regional 
State in a federal system. It argues that Queensland has a 
tradition of active State involvement in economic life, 
despite the constraints and conflicts of the federation. 
Chapter Two sets the scene historically, arguing that there 
were continuities in the pre-and postwar links with Japan and 
that the prewar interactions represented the first tentative 
steps towards the wider postwar relationship. The chapter 
emphasises that basic complementarity in economic structures 
encouraged trade, although neither business nor government 
recognised opportunities beyond a narrow range of goods which 
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acquired a small proportion of market share. The dichotomy of 
the views and interests of exporters and of Australian 
industry was evident in the prewar period as were some of the 
major postwar issues such as Japan's reputation as a tough and 
opportunistic trader, the difficulty of devising stable 
marketing arrangements satisfactory to both parties, and the 
pervasive influence of government policy on the progress of 
trade. 
Chapters Three and Four examine two areas of rural trade -
beef and sugar, emphasising the efforts of rural entrepreneurs 
to develop trade within the boundaries imposed by the 
political control of markets and the effects of international 
arrangements. The first represents the archetypal rural 
industry with a multiplicity of individual producers, widely 
dispersed geographically, often in inhospitable and difficult 
conditions, producing a range of products for different 
markets. The second is a uniquely Queensland industry, 
tightly controlled from planting to sale, with title to the 
crop residing in the Queensland Government which is 
responsible through the Sugar Board for disposal both at home 
and abroad. The interactions between State, business and 
Japanese interests in these two industries illustrate very 
different, but active, roles for the regional State. 
Chapters Five and Six cover two aspects of Japanese trade and 
investment in the mining industry - bauxite and coal. Here we 
see the importance of entrepreneurial initiatives, and the way 
in which the development of trade depended on government 
support for and collaboration with private enterprise. 
Bauxite is of particular interest as it was discovered in 
commercial quantities only in the 1950s and is one of the few 
minerals in Queensland where business and State combined to 
give a comparative advantage in the processed product rather 
than just in the raw natural endowment. Its discovery and 
development marked the start of the world-class mining 
industry and a change in the perception of the State's role in 
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development. The coal industry had been established in the 
nineteenth century and there were long-held views about its 
prospects and structure and the appropriate relationship 
between the industry and the State. The growth of the coal 
trade with Japan required the overturning of all these 
preconceptions as it became of major significance to both the 
Queensland and Japanese economies and a focus for the 
redefining of Commonwealth and State roles within the federal 
system. 
The analyses of these four trade areas serve to elaborate the 
themes and theoretical issues on which this thesis is based. 
The studies develop the argument that international factors 
determined the setting in which the growth of trade became 
possible, and that business and the State were active in a 
variety of ways, both separately and in collaboration, in 
taking advantage of the opportunities afforded by political 
and economic circumstances. What emerges from the studies is 
that the role of the regional State is not easily described by 
a single model. Rather there are a series of roles varying 
with time, the nature of the industry and the issue and with 
the changing priorities of the State itself. The interactions 
may be viewed as being along a continuum - on one end the 
formally defined roles of an official partnership, on the 
other the loose association of two groups - State and business 
- working within a common framework towards separate, but 
related goals more readily achieved by the cooperation of the 
two parties. 
The analysis is grounded in the principal theories of the 
role of the state in economic life which identify key aspects 
of state/business relations, in the understandings of the 
nature of the federal system, especially in relation to 
foreign trade, and in the wider experience of the role of the 
State in Queensland's economic life of which relations with 
Japan are an important part. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
STATE AND ECONOMY 
A QUEENSLAND CASE STUDY 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces the theoretical and historical 
contexts which provide a frame of reference for the study of 
State/business interactions and the role of Queensland as a 
regional State in the development of Queensland-Japan 
relations. 
The focus is firstly on contemporary views of the main 
problems and issues involved in understanding the 
relationships between state and business in a capitalist 
society, concentrating on the principal varieties of 
liberal and neo-Marxist thought and on studies of small 
economies open to the influence of world markets. The 
central question is whether, in its extensive participation 
in economic life, the state is simply responding to demands 
and pressures from within society or whether the state has 
autonomy to pursue interests of its own, providing some of 
the dynamic of the system. Writers ask whether the state is 
just a regulator and supporter in the interests of the 
community as a whole or of a particular class, or whether 
the state, particularly in Australia, is simply the "client" 
of the international business community. 
The chapter then turns to examine a number of key aspects of 
federalism to determine how we need to modify the 
theoretical propositions about the role of the state in 
applying them in the Australian context. Miliband defines 
the state as "the government, the administration, the 
military and the police, the judicial branch, sub-central 
18 
government and parliamentary assemblies". But Australian 
sub-central units are not merely "an extension of central 
government and administration"; they are, constitutionally, 
"power structures in their own right". Certainly regional 
States are constrained in their scope and power by the 
limits of the Constitution and by the way in which the 
increasingly complex relationships within the domestic 
economy and between the domestic and international economies 
tend to emphasise national rather than sub-national issues. 
However, the regional States retain a wide range of powers 
which enable them to respond in their separate ways to 
economic opportunities, even where these prospects lie in 
international trade which is the responsibility of the 
national government. 
Consideration of the economic activities of a regional State 
such as Queensland must, however, first be placed in the 
wider context of the political economy of the nation of 
which it is part. Before developing the notion of a 
Queensland approach, we therefore examine how Australian 
political economists have viewed the role of the state in 
Australian life in the light of the main theoretical 
positions, though modified by the structures and practices 
of the federal system. 
Finally, we develop a concept of State/economy interactions 
in Queensland as a framework for the analyses which follow, 
and consider this approach in terms of historical patterns 
to draw from Queensland's experience those characteristics 
which impinge on the nature of relationships that may be 
argued from theoretical perspectives. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present an overview of the 
important themes from theoretical and empirical studies 
which are most relevant to the central question of this 
thesis and to develop from them a "Queensland approach" to 
be used as a basis for the analyses of State/business 
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interaction in four specific industries as they developed 
their trade with Japan. 
THE ROLE OF THE STATE - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
There is no single theory of the role played by the state in 
the context of a capitalist economic system. There is a 
general acknowledgment that, since World War II, State-
economy relationships have become more complex and the scope 
of State activities more extensive. However, there is 
considerable disagreement about whether there has been a 
fundamental change in the political process, and hence in 
the form and character of the role of the state in the 
modern economy. 
There has certainly been in the postwar period a trend 
towards the extension of state functions, for example by 
the adoption of techniques of Keynesian economic management 
and the promotion of economic development. Consequently, 
public objectives, strategies and activities have become 
intermingled with those of the private sector, leading to 
debate about the precise nature of the interrelations 
between state and economy and the respective roles of state 
and business in economic life. Debate was further 
stimulated in the 1970s by the search for a solution to the 
problems experienced by advanced Western economies. The 
failure of the management of monetary and fiscal policies to 
achieve macro-economic stability or to stimulate economic 
growth in the face of global pressures called into question 
the role of the state and its relationships with other 
actors in the economic process. In some countries such as 
Japan, whose large economy has a major influence on the 
world economic environment, a long period of consistent 
growth has been attributed, at least partly, to the statist 
nature of its political economy. The apparent adaptability 
and economic success of countries such as Singapore and 
Switzerland led to a consideration of the role of the state 
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in small countries or regions in evoking a positive response 
4 
to international events and promoting economic growth. On 
the one hand, it was argued that the complexity of 
structures and functions of the modern state and the growing 
importance of transnational corporations diminished the 
state's ability to take autonomous initiatives. On the 
other hand, evidence from studies of particular countries 
suggested that the state's capacity to promote change and to 
harness and direct economic forces was central to 
contemporary economics. 
Writers from both main strands of social and political 
thought - marxism and liberalism - attempted to develop an 
explanation of the role of the state consistent with 
empirical evidence from modern capitalist societies but 
firmly anchored in historical and theoretical frameworks. 
A liberalist reassessment 
A reassessment of the role of the state in the context of 
postwar economic experience rejected the "diffusion of 
influence and power and mutual adjustment" of conventional 
pluralist theories as a realistic and adequate model of the 
role of the state in modern capitalist economies, although 
pluralist processes remained an important part of the 
political life of liberal democracies. The state could no 
longer be regarded as passive, and its role merely 
administrative as it executed "the expressed demands ...[of] 
organised bodies". Writers acknowledged that the state was 
at times able to resist or transform demands from the 
environment, to pursue interests of its own and to use its 
powers to initiate and direct particular aspects of policy. 
Some liberal writers argued that policy was not determined 
by the open, fluid interaction of diverse groups, but was 
largely in the hands of elites - groups occupying leading 
positions in public or private organisations, sometimes with 
a partial monopoly in a particular field, official 
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recognition, or the right to take part in institutional 
consultation. The state as an institution was merely one of 
the groups forming the central core of strategic decision-
makers. Other writers from both the liberal and marxist 
traditions proposed more state-activist models which 
necessarily called into question the political relationship 
between business, organised labour and governments. 
Within the liberal tradition, Lindblom argued that in a 
modern economy the state is a partner in a "duality of 
leadership" with business. Business occupies a privileged 
position alongside the state because business has a 
political role in providing the essential dynamic of the 
system. The role of the state is to ensure the provision of 
whatever is needed as a condition for business to take 
risks, engage in enterprise and expand production so as to 
perform its economic function. The state is active, 
supplementing market with political inducements, nurturing 
market demands, supporting business, providing 
infrastructure and creating "a good business climate". 
Structures for formal consultation allow for active and 
frequent negotiation between business and the institutions 
of the state and may involve a sharing of some authority 
through regulatory Boards and Committees. Critics have 
pointed out that the relationship between state and business 
is not as straightforward as Lindblom suggests. Neither 
business nor the state constitute a homogeneous unit. 
Business consists of a variety of sectors with diverse 
interests and organisations, while the state apparatus 
includes a range of different boards, departments, 
commissions and authorities which may pursue opposing 
objectives or seek to represent particular segments of 
"business". This diversity makes it difficult to determine 
the general interest of business, to arrive at the consensus 
about social, economic and political goals essential for a 
successful partnership, or to argue that business interests 
are an ever-present and potent motivation for state 
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decisions. Nevertheless, Lindblom's argument draws 
attention to the likelihood that state and capital will have 
a common interest in the success of business and business 
projects, irrespective of political party, the pattern of 
relationships in a particular industry, or the specific 
national or subnational context. 
The marxist view 
Modern writers disagree with the older marxist position that 
the state is a parasitic institution which has no economic 
role in its own right, but exists merely as a tool of the 
9 10 
capitalist class. Writers such as Poulantzas, Miliband 
and Tsokhas emphasise that the state has an important role 
in reconciling and mediating between competing sections of 
capital so that social cohesion will be maintained and 
capital accumulation allowed to proceed unhindered. The 
state has relative autonomy from the dominant class; state 
action is not simply a response to the needs of capitalists, 
though it acts to serve the interests of capitalism within a 
partnership of state and class interests. 
This "dual and contradictory" role of the state in both 
fostering social harmony and complementing the activities of 
private enterprise to sustain the process of capital 
accumulation has led to a "fiscal crisis" caused by 
escalating demands on state expenditures, especially for 
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social and technical infrastructure. It is argued that the 
result of attempts to resolve this crisis has been the 
growth of state planning and regulation, a stronger central 
government, and an increasing need to assert the legitimacy 
of the state through its ability to ensure material rewards 
and the resolution of economic crises. 
Neocorporatist consensus 
The role of the state is central to the concept of neo-
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corporatism, defined by Schmitter as 
a system of interest representation in which 
the constituent units are organized into a 
limited number of singular, compulsory, 
noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories, 
recognized by or licensed (if not created) 
by the state and granted a deliberate 
representational monopoly within their 
respective categories in exchange for 
observing certain controls on their 
selection of leaders and articulation 
of demands and supports. 
In this system the state is not an arena for the conduct of 
group struggle, but 
a constitutive element engaged in defining ... 
encouraging, regulating, licensing and/or 
repressing the activities of associations -
and backed in its efforts ... by coercive action 
and claims to legitimacy 
Policy is the outcome of negotiations between economically 
defined groups in government, business and, sometimes, 
labour who share an ideology of social partnership which 
enables them to integrate different demands with "vague but 
firmly held notions of public interest" and who are able to 
secure the compliance of their members in the implementation 
of agreements reached. 
As Zysman has pointed out, there are many variations 
within the bargain-adjusted model, depending on the 
particular state's historical experiences, its beliefs and 
objectives, economic circumstances and political and social 
structures. In countries such as Japan and France which 
have been termed "statist" or "state corporatist", 
governments have "built on a tradition of state authority 
and intervention ... to become full participants in 
strategic decision - making". Governments have been able to 
"orchestrate a range of powerful political instruments" to 
translate their own preferences into authoritative 
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actions. In other countries, different areas of state 
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activity exhibit different patterns of interest politics and 
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political processes, so that both pluralism and 
corporatism may be present at the same time. There will 
therefore be both formal interactions between acknowledged 
representatives of economic and political organisations and 
informal relationships between individuals, voluntary 
organisations and government. 
Each of these theories throws light on the relationships 
between state and economy from a particular perspective and 
suggests important questions to be addressed in analysing 
substantive issues in the development of Queensland's 
relations with Japan. These include the way in which the 
growth of trade created demands for supportive or 
facilitative policies, whether the State's responses 
reflected only the interests of business, and the extent to 
which diverse groups were able to influence policy outcomes 
and at least partly displace the pressures from capital. It 
is also relevant to ask how important in Queensland was 
economic growth as a criterion in establishing the 
legitimacy of government. Given the significance of 
Japanese trade as a stimulus to growth, was there a 
commonality of interest between the State and those 
businesses developing the trade which formed the basis for a 
"duality of leadership"? Did the processes of policy 
development follow a single pattern, or were there a variety 
of processes in which the institutions of the State 
interacted in different ways with businesses, individuals, 
and interest groups in society ? 
Any adequate analysis of the role of the state in Australian 
economic life at national or sub-national level must take 
into account the way in which federalism fragments the power 
of the state and permeates the fabric of the politico-
economic system. 
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THE IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
The growth of a substantial trade relationship between Japan 
and the peripheral States of Queensland and Western 
Australia brought into debate a number of issues related to 
the nature of Australian federalism and its impact on 
economic decision-making. These issues included the 
division of powers between the States and the Commonwealth, 
in particular the extent to which the Commonwealth could 
negate or frustrate State decisions about economic 
development, the adequacy of Federal-State financial 
arrangements and the significance of bilateral and 
multilateral treaties and obligations for the States. These 
issues have arisen because for Australia, as for most 
federations, the classical definition of federalism is a 
theoretical construct rather than a realistic description. 
The central and regional governments are not in their 
respective spheres "coordinate with the others and 
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independent of them". Rather, while the national and 
State governments maintain a degree of autonomy, 
interdependence and interaction are essential features of 
the federal system. The functions of central and regional 
governments are closely interwoven, with significant areas 
of overlap, intermingling and blurred responsibility. On 
particular issues. State and federal governments may be co-
operative, complementing one another to achieve a common 
goal; at other times they have opposing views or approaches 
which are unable to be reconciled. There is no clear cut 
division of jurisdiction; power and administrative 
activities are shared, with neither tier of government 
subordinate to the other. Decision-making in the federal 
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system thus has a "multiplane dimension" in which outcomes 
depend "on the balance of power among various federal, state 
and corporate players and the political economy dynamics at 
any particular time". 
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Divided sovereignty 
The tension between federal and regional governments 
concerning their respective powers originates in the 
formation of the Australian federation from pre-existing 
regional units which agreed to share their sovereignty with 
the new national level, retaining for themselves those 
powers not exclusively vested in the Commonwealth or 
specifically removed from the States. The States did not 
relinquish their sovereignty; on the contrary, as Wiltshire 
argues, it is jealously guarded and "entrenches the position 
of the States in relation to Australian priorities", 
constituting "the whole foundation" of their bargaining 
position within the federation. ^^ There are very few 
exclusive, or effectively exclusive. Commonwealth powers, 
and in many fields State and Federal Governments exercise 
powers concurrently, while there are others where the 
legitimacy of authority is contested. 
In principle, the functions of Federal and State governments 
are divided so that national or international issues are 
assigned to the Federal level and matters whose effects are 
confined within a State are assigned to the State level of 
government. Thus the Commonwealth was given or has acquired 
over time a range of powers such as macro-economic 
management, external and interstate trade, and foreign 
affairs. In addition, determinations of federal authorities 
and agencies such as industrial tribunals have established 
benchmarks which, in practice, have been closely adhered to 
even within State jurisdictions. The States exercise 
extensive influence over local and regional development 
through their control over resource ownership, their 
residual powers over infrastructure and services essential 
to industry such as power and transport, and over the 
provision of urban and regional facilities. But in the 
twentieth century, external and internal, national and local 
concerns are so interwoven that almost every activity has 
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become the subject of national interest and of federal/State 
politics. In reality the relationship is a "vast crisscross 
of formal and informal transactions, traversing both the 
areas demarcated within the division of power' and areas 
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untouched by and unknown to the original division". 
Demarcation lines are both fluid and ill-defined. 
The division of powers and functions between the tiers of 
government has important effects in shaping the decision-
making process. Constitutional provisions and their 
subsequent interpretation by the High Court have made the 
national government effectively supreme over the States in 
many areas. This dominance is reinforced by Commonwealth's 
effective control over State revenues through the 
centralised taxation system and the Commonwealth-State 
financial arrangements, and by the fact that the States have 
little or no input into "bodies which allocate powers, 
resources and values" such as the Industries Assistance 
Commission, the Reserve Bank, the Industrial Commission or 
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the Australia Council. The existence of the separate 
State and Commonwealth legislatures, bureaucracies and 
publics gives issues multiple points of access to the policy 
agenda and raises the possibility of interest groups' 
playing one agency or tier of government against another in 
ways not possible in a system of undivided responsibility. 
Wiltshire has pointed out that achieving a workable 
accommodation of so many competing interests over a range of 
policy spheres requires concerted action among separate 
governments on a regular basis. This tends to result in a 
proliferation of executive federalism through 
intergovernmental machinery established to mediate and 
coordinate these interdependencies. This machinery itself, 
from the Premiers' Conference and the Loan Council to 
Ministerial Councils and meetings of administrators, may 
become an avenue for power plays between State and federal 
governments. ^« 
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Friction may be generated over fields of jurisdiction or the 
conflicting demands of particular regional issues, 
industries or interests or because of different policy 
objectives pursued by State and Federal governments. 
Export-oriented resource development is one area of 
considerable jurisdictional overlap and conflict of interest 
where States stress rapid development, while the 
Commonwealth may pursue other objectives such as resource 
conservation or naturalization of foreign investment which 
it deems in the national interest. Such disagreements can 
be escalated beyond their natural significance - "catapulted 
to the centre of attention by being coupled with an outbreak 
of direct state-commonwealth confrontation" in which a State 
leader can "mobilise strong sentiments of state patriotism" 
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under the banner of "states' rights". Queensland's 
campaign against Federal guidelines for mineral export 
prices and its use of export controls is a classic example. 
Although such disputes may be aggravated by partisan 
differences between political parties, regional loyalties 
often supersede Party ties and make possible alliances 
between State Premiers of very different political 
persuasion or bitter disputation between State and Federal 
governments of the same political party, though sometimes 
for political purposes rather than for substantive 
divergences of interest. 
Recfional differences 
The divided structures and responsibilities of the federal 
system elsewhere in the world are often the expression of 
major cultural, social or religious differences within the 
nation. Although there are no similar cleavages within the 
Australian society, it has nevertheless been argued that 
there are differences between regions of Australia 
sufficiently great to be better served by a federal rather 
than a unitary system of government. Such differences, 
whether perceived or real, have become institutionalized and 
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entrenched by the existence of regional States and 
reinforced "by policy singularity, by emphasising heterodox 
rather than orthodox views and issues". This is especially 
true of Queensland where mistrust of "the south" is part of 
political orthodoxy and political leaders make a virtue of 
asserting that Queenslanders really are different. 
Certainly the States differ in many ways such as their 
geography, climate, resource base, history and social 
composition, economic structures, and the laws and 
administrative arrangements built up over time to cope with 
the particular demands of their residents. In addition, the 
natural differences have been exaggerated by politicians 
such as Premier Court in Western Australia and Premiers 
Hanlon and Bjelke-Petersen in Queensland for their own 
purposes. Within each State, the relationship between 
groups, elites and government forms a unique political 
pattern that in some way is seen to represent the demands 
and preferences of its particular citizens. 
The complexities of divided functions, and disputes 
regarding "the distribution of competence between the centre 
and the regions" led to the establishment of the High 
Court to interpret and police the operation of the 
Constitution. Its decisions have generally supported the 
steady accumulation of power in the hands of the 
Commonwealth, and have been one method of adjusting the 
balance of power within the federation to accommodate "the 
shifting balance of common and disparate values, interests 
and beliefs" that are "reflected in more differentiated or 
more integrated relations". 
Federalism and International Relations 
Of particular interest in the postwar period has been the 
way in which the changing nature of international relations 
relates to the Constitutional division of powers between 
State and Commonwealth Governments. This has proven of 
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especial significance to Queensland. 
Section 51 of the Constitution clearly gives the Federal 
government concurrent powers over external affairs 
{S.51(xxix)} and over trade and commerce with other 
countries{s.51(i)}. But the nature of external affairs is 
changing from the "classical agenda" of "boundaries, spheres 
of influence, national security and balance of power" as 
many issues impinge on both international relations and 
internal politics, and patterns of international economic 
dependency involve both national and regional economies in 
global issues. As foreign and domestic policies have become 
more intermingled, there has been difficulty in determining 
the extent of federal powers and the boundaries of State and 
federal responsibility, especially in matters on which there 
is no consensus and where previously the Commonwealth seemed 
constrained by the federal system. 
One of these areas has been the application of the external 
affairs power to a range of issues, including many which 
would otherwise fall within the jurisdiction of the States. 
Some of these matters are the subject of bilateral or 
multilateral treaties, many of which are readily agreed to 
by the States because of their coincidence with State 
priorities, because pressure of sectoral interests ensures 
State cooperation, or, more rarely, because affected States 
have been involved in treaty negotiation. In addition, 
formal cooperative arrangements were established in 1977 so 
that the implementation of treaties is a highly consultative 
and democratic process, with States closely involved. 
Nevertheless, the broadening scope of treaties and the 
tendency for High Court interpretations to extend the 
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth have caused concern in the 
States that they are unable to prevent the steady erosion of 
their authority since they do not possess a residue of 
exclusive powers which are beyond the reach of superior 
Commonwealth legislation. In Queensland, such concern led 
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in 1974 to the establishment of a Treaties Commission to 
assess the effect of international treaties on the State and 
make recommendations about the extent of cooperation with 
the Commonwealth in their implementation, and Queensland, 
together with Tasmania, suggested to the Constitutional 
Convention that the Constitution be amended to limit the 
application of S51(xxix) and the intrusion of the 
Commonwealth into their affairs. 
The most protracted and bitter disputes between the 
Commonwealth and the States related to external trade have 
centred around natural resources and their development, 
often for export. Residual power over resources lies with 
the States, but the Federal Government is able to intervene 
indirectly through the use of its authority over such 
matters as foreign investment, taxation and external trade. 
The use of these powers, for example to effectively end sand 
mining on Eraser Island, has been the focus of State-Federal 
conflict and of wide disagreement among conservationists, 
miners, the legal profession and the States on the costs and 
benefits of Commonwealth intervention. Essentially these 
disagreements relate to differing interpretations of the way 
in which trade, economy and resources can be managed in the 
light of the sometimes conflicting interests of the 
Australian community as a whole and those of the particular 
State in which development occurred. 
International relations and economic well-being are 
inextricably linked in a State such as Queensland where 
economic growth is heavily dependent on production for 
export to Japan. Federal responsibility for external 
affairs and the ability of the Commonwealth to extend the 
application of this power to previously purely domestic 
issues created a barrier limiting the State's ability to 
encourage particular kinds of development within its own 
borders according to its own priorities. 
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Federalism and the role of the state 
Wiltshire argues that features which are inherent in 
federalism such as fragmentation, diversity, multiple 
centres of power, and complexities in law-making, 
administration and co-ordination extend beyond the formal 
structures of State and Federal governments to underpin the 
many organisations of social and economic life. Trade 
unions, political parties, agricultural and business 
organisations, for example, embody the federal structure, 
having a significant State orientation as well a national 
interest. This exaggerates the opposing tendencies for 
political and economic developments on the one hand to 
centralise national life and on the other to allow the 
States, especially those with strong international links, to 
pursue their own interests. The relationships between a 
State and business within its borders are made more complex 
because they involve not just the national level of 
government and its agencies, but the national level of 
economic, business and political organisations as well. 
Substantive questions of policy and policy implementation 
may generate cooperation among the different parties and 
organisational levels or a pulling in many directions. 
Policy formulation and implementation may become entangled 
in other issues dividing the parties, in the general climate 
of interrelationships, or in a struggle between the 
participants over their respective powers. The segmented 
pattern of policy-making and the variety of organisational 
structures inherent in the federal system restrict the 
State's influence over its own development and set the scene 
for a diversity of State-business relationships varying with 
the Constitutional division of responsibilities, the 
structure and functions of the organisations involved, as 
well as the policies and priorities of the State itself. 
Federalism thus has a profound bearing on the role of the 
state in Australian economic life and particularly on the 
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role of a regional State such as Queensland with an outward-
oriented economy. 
THE STATE IN THE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY 
Until the late 1960s there was very little interest among 
political writers in seeking to analyse the role of the 
state in Australia at either national or regional level. 
Studies concentrated on the machinery of government 
administration, the institutions of the politico-economic 
system, and on the ways in which diverse groups sought to 
take advantage of the numerous foci of decision-making power 
in a federal system. Galligan argues that interest in the 
role of the Australian state was revived by a combination of 
international and domestic events. These included the 
resurgence of nationalism, the decline of British influence, 
the rising economic and strategic importance of Asia, 
together with the changes in style, attitudes and policies 
at national and State level after the retirement of Menzies, 
the revitalization of the ALP and the election of the 
Whitlam government in 1972, and the defeat of long-standing 
State governments such as Labor in Queensland in 1957. In 
the economy, by the 1970s, the postwar period of relatively 
constant economic growth with low inflation and unemployment 
gave way to stagflation. Seemingly intractable economic 
problems precipitated in Australia, as in other Western 
economies, a debate about the efficacy of Keynesian economic 
policies and the role of the state in stimulating economic 
growth, especially in an economy increasingly vulnerable to 
movements in international investment, dependent on volatile 
patterns of international trade and influenced by the 
decisions of transnational companies. Economic development 
based on secondary industries in the southern States gave 
way to resources-based, export-oriented growth in the 
formerly less-developed States of Queensland and Western 
Australia. 
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These structural changes "upset the settled patterns of 
state politics and affected the established balance" between 
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the States. New tensions were created among the States and 
between the States and the Commonwealth over issues such as 
resources policy, environmental protection and foreign 
investment, as well as over broader questions such as the 
impact of regional developments on Federal-State financial 
arrangements and the extension of Commonwealth power into 
areas integral to economic development in the States and 
where State control of policy had not previously been 
questioned. States such as Queensland led a vigorous 
opposition to Commonwealth policies which appeared to 
threaten their interests, often escalating the dispute into 
an issue of "States' rights", utilising the Senate as the 
States' House in the Parliament, together with the State-
oriented sections of the media and the State councils of 
political parties. It was obvious that the States were very 
much alive, despite the contentions of earlier writers such 
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as Laski and Greenwood that they were obsolescent and 
the fears of contemporaries such as Stevenson, Crough and 
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Wheelwright, and Patience and Scott that those States 
which had been the main beneficiaries of the resources boom 
had become tied to international markets and international 
capital in ways which drew them apart from other States and 
which could lead to the fragmentation of federalism. 
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Hancock and Eggleston had much earlier recognised the 
active role of the States in providing the framework of 
economic infrastructure, and to some extent in stimulating 
and diversifying economic development. For the average 
citizen, it was the regional state rather than the remote 
government in Canberra that was "a vast public utility whose 
duty it is to provide the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number". In the pattern typical of new settlement 
or frontier societies such as Australia and Canada, 
substantial state intervention was required to create the 
conditions for economic growth in a hostile physical 
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environment with little community infrastructure. Hancock 
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called this a type of "state socialism" which had arisen 
not for ideological reasons, but as the only practical way 
of responding to the needs imposed by the circumstances of 
the time. 
When serious discussion about the role of the state in 
Australian life resumed in the early 1970s, neo-marxist 
writers such as Connell and Irving questioned whether, in a 
capitalist society, the state was manipulated by elites of 
the dominant class seeking to preserve or enhance their 
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privileged position. As a particular case, Crough and 
Wheelwright argued that the penetration of Australian 
business by international corporations and the dependence of 
the economy on international trade condemned the Australian 
state to a "client" status whose function was "to shape the 
future development of the economy" for the benefit of 
foreign corporations. This exaggerated view of the 
impotence of the Australian state was modified by later 
writers such as Tsokhas who acknowledged that the major 
sectors of capital had a significant input into politics and 
considerable power within the decision-making process. On 
the other hand, Tsokhas showed that, even in mining where 
foreign ownership is very high, Australian company officials 
and Australian governments have been able to act 
independently, sometimes despite opposition from parent 
companies abroad. Tsokhas found that the Australian state 
was not a tool wielded in accordance with the desires of a 
homogeneous, economically dominant class, nor was it a 
perfectly integrated system. Policies adopted by branches 
of the state were influenced by business, but also by 
political parties, alliances or conflicts with other sectors 
of the state or were motivated by their own interests. 
Galligan rejects both the "doctrinal limitations of Marxist 
class analysis" and "the emasculating assumptions of 
pluralist ^interest group' theory" as a basis for 
36 
understanding "the modern state in principle, and the 
Australian state at both national and regional state 
levels."^^ He calls for a more ^state-centred' explanation 
that takes account of the dependence of Australia's economy 
on the international marketplace, the ^settled' national 
policies and institutions that are only occasionally 
politicised, and the special arrangements between the state 
and business that are made away from the political 
limelight. He further suggests that the assertiveness of 
States such as Queensland and Western Australia shown, for 
example, in key decisions concerned with the management of 
resources development, justifies the extension of the 
"state-centred" approach to the relationship of subnational 
as well as national units to the economic system. 
Recent studies have investigated the close association of 
government and industry, but pointed to the difficulties of 
regarding the state in Australia as a partner in corporatist 
negotiation. The adversarial nature of Australia's 
industrial relations system, the fragmented structure of the 
organisations representing employers and their inability to 
agree on a common position on issues such as taxation and 
tariffs, and the inability of employer and employee 
organisations to guarantee policy implementation by their 
members are obstacles to corporatism. Further, the ability 
of interest groups to take advantage of the multiple points 
of power afforded by federalism makes corporatism unlikely 
at the national level over an extended time period. 
Tripartite union, business, government negotiations did 
occur in establishment of the Accord in the 1980s and 
through the proliferation of advisory boards and committees. 
Gerritsen calls this "consensual corporatism", sustainable 
only in the face of national economic crisis, while the 
Opposition is weak and business is convinced it must work 
with a Labor Government, and while the ACTU is able to exert 
moral authority over strong unions in industries which could 
^1. • . 5 6 
otherwise pass on wage increases. 
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Studies of the regional States reveal a pattern of 
interventionism in which the State role varies with the 
peculiar local history and social and economic contexts 
which underlie it. In South Australia, Sheridan has 
identified the facilitative role of government through 
infrastructure investment, the establishment of public 
corporations, the regulation of manufacturing, service and 
labour markets and above all, the deliberate public 
connection of "growth policies to welfare and distributional 
benefits widely understood and shared by the community". 
In Western Australia, Head describes "a significant 
entrepreneurial element" in State intervention, particularly 
for development in remote areas, and a "partnership" with 
private capital in which the State provided ad hoc support, 
together with overall policies designed to attract capital 
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and enhance the profitability of private enterprise. In 
Victoria, the Cain government went beyond the traditional 
facilitative role of the State to provide more direction to 
the economy. The State became directly involved in 
providing some of the dynamic of economic growth through 
planning mechanisms that allowed the efforts of public and 
private sectors to combine and through government bodies 
such as the Victorian Economic Development Corporation which 
provided both financial assistance and equity capital for 
joint government-private sector enterprises. 
Queensland's experience also suggests that interventionist 
economic goals are relevant at the subnational level and 
that the relationships between State and economy in 
achieving them may be viewed from the general theoretical 
perspectives, although modified by local conditions and 
history. We turn now to examine key aspects of Queensland's 
historical experience which form, with the theoretical 
considerations, the foundation for an understanding of 
state/economy relations in Queensland. 
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THE QUEENSLAND CONTEXT 
Considered in conjunction with the wider array of 
contemporary and historical relationships with business, 
Queensland's role in the development of trade with Japan is 
seen to be an extension of traditional patterns of active 
involvement in economic life. Historical studies suggest 
that involvement has been characterised by the priority 
accorded to development and decentralisation, by a 
preference for indirect influence rather than direct 
participation, by the belief that the dominance of southern 
financial and goods markets restricted the achievement of 
Queensland's potential, and by the attempts of successive 
Governments and Premiers to propel the State into rapid 
growth through their support for large-scale, speculative 
ventures heavily dependent on outside capital and foreign 
markets. 
Shared ideoloqv of development 
The growth of Queensland's relations with Japan occurred 
firmly within the context of well-established and widespread 
commitment to "development" as the primary interest and 
objective of the State. Queensland politics was "the 
politics of development; concerned with things and places 
59 
rather than people and ideas". The broad traditions of 
how that development should proceed had their roots "in the 
very beginnings of the State and permeate(d) its history". 
They comprised four essential elements:- an emphasis on 
primary industries, active promotion of decentralisation in 
all areas of the State, recognition of the need to obtain 
and accommodate southern and/or foreign capital, substantial 
government involvement. These attitudes and patterns 
provided a background of support for the resumption of trade 
with Japan in primary products, the import of Japanese 
manufactured goods especially for works and housing, and for 
the growth of mining in central Queensland. 
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When Hanlon took office in 1946, the general shape of 
development and the government's role in achieving it had 
long been entrenched. The State's priorities lay in the 
growth of primary production - "the natural occupation of 
mankind" - and the government insisted on planning for the 
settlement and development of even marginal rural land 
despite postwar Commonwealth plans to give priority to 
secondary and tertiary industries. Very little came of the 
hope of the Secondary Industries Commission that wartime 
manufacture, though largely confined to Brisbane, would form 
the basis for a "surge of industrialisation in centres away 
from the capital cities" through a mixture of public and 
62 
private initiative. Little heed had been paid to the 
advice of Professor Brigden (Director of the Bureau of 
Economics and Statistics) in 1933 that a "planned and 
stable" economy would need "large combines", and such 
industries as did develop were mostly small scale processing 
or branch industries making products too expensive to 
transport interstate. According to Wiltshire, the 
commitment to a rurally-based economy, to traditional ways, 
and to equality of treatment for all regions was 
sufficiently widely held to be a major factor inhibiting the 
development of secondary industries in the late 1940s and 
50s. "There were simply no votes to be gained" from 
encouraging particular large-scale projects or encouraging 
specific sectors or regions to lead the way towards economic 
growth. 
Under both Labor and National-Liberal Coalition Governments, 
the importance and urgency of developmental works overrode 
many other considerations. Faced with chronic shortages of 
materials, Hanlon was willing to import supplies from Japan 
despite the probability of strong anti-Japanese sentiment in 
the community. The State Electricity Commission obtained a 
permit to import insulators, the import of Japanese steel 
and cement was proposed, especially for the Burdekin and 
Fitzroy bridges, and galvanised iron obtained for the 
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Department of Works and Housing. Similarly, Fitzgerald 
argues, twenty years later, the Bjelke-Petersen 
government, buoyed by prospects of economic growth based on 
developments in mining and tourism, ignored sustained, 
widespread and popular opposition to allow oil drilling on 
the Great Barrier Reef, sand mining on ecologically 
important sites such as Fraser Island and the development of 
the Iwasaki tourist resort at Yeppoon. Opponents were 
pilloried as "ratbags" and Environmental Impact Statements 
regarded as bureaucratic nonsense invented by southerners 
with little understanding of the needs of resource 
development and used by them in an attempt to deprive 
Queenslanders of opportunities for growth and prosperity. 
The single-minded pursuit of "development" and the societal 
values associated with rural conservatism made it extremely 
difficult for the countervailing power of pluralist 
interest-group activity to operate effectively in 
Queensland. At the same time, the pursuit of development 
and the understanding of its nature served to unite the 
disparate goals of government and business and provide a 
basis for shared effort towards taking advantage of trading 
opportunities in Japan. 
Indirect and piecemeal intervention 
In the main, post-war governments in Queensland, whether 
Labor or Country-Liberal, did not involve themselves 
directly in business. The prewar Labor ventures with State 
ownership of or participation in business firms were 
rejected even by the ALP itself, although the socialisation 
of the means of production, distribution and exchange 
remained part of the Labor Party platform for many years. 
The Liberal and National Parties believed there should be 
planning for specific purposes, but thought that government 
activity should support and stimulate, but not replace, 
private investment and personal effort. Even after the 
State became more actively involved in economic life in the 
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1970s, the Queensland government did not invest directly or 
take equity positions through semi-government bodies to 
enable it to be involved in commercial projects. 
Instead, expenditure on public works and infrastructure was 
relied on to stimulate overall economic growth and to 
encourage or facilitate developments of particular kinds or 
in specific locations. Under Premiers Hanlon and Gair, the 
Government Works programme was centred on basic 
infrastructure - water, electricity and communications - to 
promote decentralised development. Serious efforts were 
made to plan for the future growth of the coal industry as 
the basis for electricity production and industrial 
development. Grandiose entrepreneurial schemes for a State-
wide hydro-electric grid, huge irrigation works, and the 
development of large farm areas to supply food for export 
were intended to encourage the expansion of rural production 
and the growth of closer settlement. Industries attracted 
by plentiful coal, cheap electricity and raw materials were 
to be the means of ending the industrial inferiority complex 
fostered by industrialists in the south. 
Both the Gair and Nicklin Governments undertook a series of 
ad hoc measures lacking any particular direction or plan to 
encourage and induce the establishment of secondary 
industries throughout the State. Industrial estates were 
developed, firms such as Bitumen Oil given technical advice 
and assisted in finding suitable sites, and businessmen 
encouraged to form local branches of the State Development 
Association to bring forward proposals to a Development 
Advisory Committee. Premier Gair himself tried to interest 
overseas firms such as F.H.Lloyd and Co. of the UK in 
building an iron and steel works in north Queensland and to 
encourage resource development. But the state did not take 
a pro-active or leading role in promoting industrial 
expansion through private enterprise as the South Australian 
government had done, for example, during the late 19 30s. 
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Business generally had to struggle along as best it could in 
the face of large, well-established southern firms with 
their bigger markets and easier access to capital. Many 
small industrial operations and the main local retailing 
firms were subsumed within larger southern-based 
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organisations. 
The way ahead was pointed out by the Economist Intelligence 
Unit of London, retained by the government to prepare a 
survey into the State's economic development, to determine 
the most suitable industries and the methods of attracting 
investment. Its Report outlined the problems to be overcome 
- a gross shortage of all-weather roads, a pattern of rail 
freight rates favouring primary rather than manufactured 
products, a shortage of capital, and a lack of technical 
facilities. It identified "the basic triangular pattern of 
Queensland trade" with imports consisting "largely of 
manufactured goods from other States and exports of raw 
materials and foodstuffs, predominantly overseas". What was 
needed was to "break through the existing web of circular 
causation and thus increase the tempo of activity". This 
could be done only by the government or some private 
enterprise with sufficient capital to provide infrastructure 
of optimum size, well ahead of the time when it would be 
used to its capacity, involving a substantial element of 
risk and a long time span before recoupment of outlay. 
Prospects, initially in the United States market for beef, 
and in the Japanese market for sugar, coal, bauxite and 
alumina provided the stimulus for this kind of change and 
for investment by private enterprise, supported, facilitated 
and influenced by government. 
A new vision 
The election of the Nicklin Country-Liberal Party Coalition 
in 1957 did not of itself provide a break with the 
traditional concepts of the nature of development and the 
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State's role in achieving it. The four basic elements 
remained, although the balance between them began to change 
as the new government endorsed secondary industry as the 
primary objective, while retaining primary production as the 
core of the economy. The Coalition promised to break away 
from the stagnation of an economy based on rural industries 
and small-scale processing. This economic pattern had 
historically been supported by all political parties, but by 
the 1950s it had become identified with the ALP Government. 
Philosophically, Labor Party policy embodied support for 
closer settlement, decentralised development and rural 
industries; realistically, the Party depended for financial 
and electoral support on the dominant section of the Party 
organisation, the AWU, whose core membership derived from 
unions representing workers in craft-based industries and 
rural occupations. The new government wanted to distance 
itself from previous policies and to emphasise the change 
from Labor to Country-Liberal rule. The political desire 
for change was reinforced by the poor condition of the 
Queensland economy which had not fully shared in the postwar 
economic boom and was severely affected by the recession of 
1960-61. 
But the encouragement of secondary industries as envisaged 
by the coalition parties was not the catalyst for the change 
in the concept of development. That was provided by 
opportunities in the international market, especially in 
Japan, identified by private enterprise, but requiring more 
than general infrastructure support to be translated into 
viable development. A series of discoveries and 
opportunities associated with oil, coal, bauxite and 
processed zinc and copper held out the prospect of 
"unparalleled" development^" with decentralisation based on 
resources rather than on closer-settlement farming.^^ 
Some projects such as the oil discovery at Moonie did not 
fulfil their original promise, but many others were 
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successful, and collectively they changed the perception of 
nature of Queensland's resources and how they could be used. 
Developments in resource industries were reinforced by 
prospects for greatly increased sales of agricultural 
products to Japan and, to a lesser extent, the United 
States. The most important of these were beef and sugar, 
but they included products such as cotton and tallow which 
had been exported to Japan before World War II, as well as 
"new" exports such as bone meal, sorghum and wheat. 
Queensland developed a type of dual economy, with a base of 
small-scale, decentralised local enterprises supplying 
domestic markets, and a superstructure composed of sections 
of rural industries together with large-scale resource-based 
enterprises producing for export. It was this latter 
segment which was to become the linchpin of Queensland's 
economic development. 
At first there was no clear idea of where these separate 
resources projects would lead. Overseas advice was sought 
from a Canadian consultant, Charles R. Hetherington and Co. 
on how to make the best use of the energy resources of the 
State. As the extent of those resources and the level of 
overseas demand became clearer, the government began to take 
a wider view of potential industrial growth and the 
possibility of exporting "the products of our cheap power, 
our virtually inexhaustible raw materials and our proven 
72 
skills". Mining came to be regarded almost as a secondary 
rather than a primary industry and the government's 
commitment to industrial growth was thus extended to 
resources development and to processing industries and 
industrial diversification which were expected to follow. 
The Governor's Speech at the opening of Parliament in 1964 
reported the beginnings of many such projects indicative of 
the State's industrial expansion including automotive, 
chemical, gas, oil, cement and mineral extractive 
74 . . . . 
industries. As industrial growth became increasingly 
entwined with mineral production, the government realised 
45 
that developments in mining, supported by the growth of 
rural industries, and made possible by export opportunities, 
could form a viable platform for decentralised economic 
development. 
In 1962 the Government introduced three major development 
Bills - the Beef Roads Scheme, the Brigalow Scheme, and the 
Thiess Peabody Coal P/L Agreement Bill. These Bills formed 
the legislative basis for developments that would lead to 
the export of beef and coal to Japan and were the first 
projects in which the government was involved from the 
earliest stages of planning, government requirements and 
decisions had a major influence on costs, and the 
infrastructure which was provided as an integral part of the 
project often extended in time and scope well beyond the 
initial undertaking. They marked a break in what the 
Economist Intelligence Unit had called the "safety-first 
protectionist attitude" of holding fast to what had been 
achieved without looking ahead at what might be in the 
future. 
By the end of the Nicklin premiership there had been a 
change in traditional attitudes about how development should 
occur in Queensland. Agricultural and pastoral growth 
continued in customary ways, but the apparently random, 
unplanned and often tardy support given to basically small 
industries began to be replaced by a conscious policy of 
emphasising large capital projects, with substantial 
government involvement and assistance. Concentration of 
effort around mining and resource-based industrial complexes 
had begun and a new set of relationships between State and 
business developed beside traditional structures. There was 
no complete break with the past, but rather a revitalization 
of the long-held belief in Queensland as a land "holding 
promise of economic potential eclipsing any other Australian 
State", which would one day lose its "Cinderella state" 
image and assert its rightful place politically and 
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economically. 
Patterns of State involvement 
Large-scale, high risk, economically complex projects 
provided the dynamic of Queensland's take-off into economic 
growth and underlined the legitimacy of the Liberal-National 
government. This sector of the economy thus occupied, in 
Lindblom's terms "a privileged position" in carrying out 
some of the functions of the state. It was supported by "a 
set of governmentally provided inducements", although the 
magnitude and extent of the benefits shifted over time 
between State and business interests. 
The precise forms of State involvement varied widely from 
one industry and project to another, particularly at the 
outset when there was no real policy and each proposal was 
dealt with as a single entity. Small-scale projects such as 
the proposal to combine the output of small copper gougers 
into saleable quantities to meet Japanese demand received 
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little support. Interest was concentrated on large 
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proposals forming the superstructure of the dual economy. 
In traditional areas of regulation and assistance, 
essentially agriculture and pastoral industries, the State 
and Federal governments provided infrastructure such as 
water and roads to enhance natural advantage, and assisted 
industries to compete in volatile world markets. For the 
most complex and large-scale projects the State collaborated 
with business in defining the needs of the enterprise and 
devising and co-ordinating ways of meeting them. This did 
not necessarily mean that business interests prevailed over 
those of the State where the two were in conflict. The 
Government's refusal to excuse oil companies from the 
requirement to process the more expensive Moonie crude as 
well as imported oil is a case in point. Mining and mineral 
processing were to provide the raw materials and energy on 
which Queensland's industrial growth would be based, and it 
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was inconceivable that the local product would not be fully 
utilised. 
The commitment of many branches of the state to the ideology 
of development was essential to the pace and success of 
agricultural and resource-based projects. Local Authorities 
in shires and towns such as Blackwater and Gladstone had to 
be willing to move well outside their previous experience to 
plan community facilities for the workforce associated with 
developments in Queensland-Japan trade. Harbour Boards co-
operated in the development of new ports and facilities, 
Queensland Railways planned new lines and rolling stock and 
the upgrading of existing track, the Electricity Commission 
enlarged and reorganised power generation to ensure supplies 
to heavy electricity users. Investment in steaming coal was 
encouraged, not just for export, but because it fitted into 
the government's plans for the development of electricity 
for further industrial growth. By the 197 0s, general 
infrastructure planning was integrated with large-scale 
resource-based development, and the government and its 
administrative agencies had developed "a far-reaching 
network of regulatory, planning and promotional activities 
concerned with monitoring and assisting particular patterns 
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of economic activity". 
The State accepted some of the risks of development in both 
agriculture and resource-based industries. There had, of 
course, always been an element of risk-taking associated 
with large irrigation schemes such as Tinaroo, and in the 
support for one-off speculative ventures such as the Peak 
Downs Scheme or the development of Blair Athol by the 
British Electric Corporation (Overseas) Ltd. Now the risks 
involved industries which were integral to the direction of 
the State's development, and in the early 1960s at least, 
essential to the establishment of the Coalition government's 
political credentials. Some risks centred on the 
government's plan to develop east and central Queensland by 
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opening land and developing ports and beef roads, while 
others were associated with the optimistic expansion of the 
sugar industry in the early 1960s in the expectation of a 
continuing market in Japan. The rise in incomes, the flow-on 
effects to other industries, and the chance that this spurt 
of development would begin the State's take-off into 
sustained economic growth were sufficient justification for 
the risks of providing infrastructure in excess of 
foreseeable needs and of encouraging increased production 
ahead of secured and profitable markets. 
An essential component of promoting Queensland development 
was the maintenance of a "good business climate" and an 
image of a progressive State in which the leadership was 
committed to economic growth. An important step in 
achieving this change of image was the removal of 
responsibility for State and Industry development from more 
junior Departments to the direct responsibility of the 
Premier and hence into a powerful Department of paramount 
importance to State welfare. This change in status was 
reflected in a more confident image as Queensland began to 
"break away from being a branch-office State, a State whose 
fate is determined for us by outside organisations and 
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outside capital". The new image was no longer promoted by 
"propaganda and publicity blurb [which] would not satisfy an 
advertising agency let alone a hard headed industrialist or 
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a business-man from overseas" but by an expanded and 
professional Public Relations machine similar to that of 
Premier Court of Western Australia. Part of its role was to 
help maintain business confidence at a peak and to portray 
an image of a go-ahead State of boundless opportunities to 
encourage the continued inflow of foreign investment. 
Structurally and politically the Premier was the focus of 
this progressive, pro-business image as he and his 
Department were directly involved in major questions of 
economic policy-making and in relationships with business 
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and other levels of government. The tradition of strong 
leadership was an integral part of Queensland politics and 
Hanlon, for example, had been "one of Australia's most 
discussed and formidable political leaders" who "drove his 
Cabinet as a team where he wanted to take them" as Forgan 
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Smith had done. In the 1970s and 1980s the strong Premier 
was epitomised in Joh Bjelke-Petersen whose government and 
leadership were virtually unthreatened for two decades. The 
longer his term in office, the greater the image of 
stability much prized by large investors whose projects are 
long-term commitments with many years of expenditure before 
a profit can be expected. Underlying tensions between the 
National and Liberal Parties, culminating in the dissolution 
of the Coalition in 1983, only served to increase the 
dominance of the Premier and the association of his 
administration with large investors, mining companies, and 
Japanese traders. This was complemented by a change of name 
from Country to National Party and a broadening of the 
Party's support base from rural and small town interests to 
the provincial cities and suburban areas of Brisbane. 
The success of the rural and resource-based projects which 
began to form the leading sector of the Queensland economy 
depended on adaptations by both State and business to meet 
the changing demands of large industries, capital-intensive 
production, and the needs of a variety of marketplaces at 
home and abroad. These adaptations required new forms of 
State-business involvement though they were contained within 
the traditional boundaries of indirect influence rather than 
direct participation by the State and continued the belief 
that a leading project or sector would precipitate a rapid 
take-off into economic growth. 
Relations with the Commonwealth 
The development of export-oriented rural and mining 
industries created new pressures on the relationship between 
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the State and the Commonwealth just as it had on the 
relationships between the State and business. 
Queensland's relations with the Commonwealth Government had 
historically been a mixture of cooperation and conflict, 
regardless of the Parties in Government. In the postwar 
period, both national and regional governments had broadly 
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shared a commitment to rapid development. Even after 
Commonwealth priorities changed in the early 1970s, on many 
issues, such as water resources or northern development. 
State and Commonwealth interests coincided and diverging 
views were worked out within established consultative 
mechanisms. On other issues, the priorities of Queensland 
and the interests of its dominant sectors of capital -
mining, farming and foreign investors - diverged from those 
in the southern States or of the Federal government. 
Queensland interests generally were opposed to restrictions 
on international capital movements, controls on land use, 
and to high tariffs which benefited manufacturing capital 
concentrated in southern States. Queensland urged the 
Commonwealth to recognise the bilateral nature of trade and 
to do more to meet Japan's need to export its manufactured 
goods, otherwise "that important customer would be unwilling 
or unable to maintain her valuable purchases of our primary 
products". 
The most serious disagreements arose over the respective 
jurisdictions of State and Commonwealth, the way in which 
"development" overrode other interests in Queensland's 
priorities, and the basic objectives of resources policy. 
Mining was a major issue for the Commonwealth as well as for 
Queensland because of its contribution to Australia's 
economic growth after the mid-1960s, and its importance in 
the Australia-Japan relationship. In addition, Australia's 
role as "a strategic anchor sheet in Japan's raw material 
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procurement" gave the management of the trading 
relationship considerable regional and international 
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significance, emphasising its importance for the national, 
rather than simply the subnational government. As boom 
conditions disappeared in the 1970s, conflict arose because 
of the State's desire to continue the pace of development 
and the Commonwealth's need to deal with "longer term 
problems of allocating the benefits in a way satisfactory to 
each party, reconciling bilateral interests with 
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multilateral objectives". The problem was exacerbated by 
the alliance between Queensland and Western Australia after 
the election of Sir Charles Court in 1974, which added a 
political disagreement about centralisation and State's 
rights to a substantive issue of national priorities. 
Queensland's "open door" attitude to foreign investment also 
led to conflicts with both the Whitlam and Fraser 
governments. Foreign capital had been recognised by 
successive Queensland governments as an important means of 
achieving economic development and had been sought by Hanlon 
to develop Blair Athol in the 1940s and by Deputy Premier 
Morris in an effort to establish secondary industries in the 
early years of the Coalition government. Up to the 1960s, 
large scale projects in mining had been unable to attract 
local venture capital, and Mount Isa Mines, for example, was 
able to survive only with financing from the American 
Smelting and Refining Company (ASARCO). The huge size of 
the investments required in the 1960s and 70s, the 
relatively poorly-developed local capital markets, the 
reluctance of Australians to enter speculative ventures, and 
the complexity of the financing requirements contributed to 
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the importance of foreign investment. In addition, foreign 
companies contributed technical expertise in large-scale 
development, established relationships with Japanese 
companies, and a means of access to closely guarded foreign 
markets. For Queensland, development was the primary goal 
and foreign investment was not only supported but actively 
sought and encouraged. 
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For the Commonwealth government, substantial Australian 
equity in resource development became an important objective 
from the early 1970s as part of a change in community and 
political values. Prime Ministers Gorton and Whitlam 
established institutions to tap overseas markets for loan 
funds rather than equity investment and to screen potential 
foreign investments according to the "national interest". 
Whitlam and subsequent Prime Ministers developed guidelines 
for minimum Australian equity in new and existing mining 
projects, which impacted directly on resources policy in the 
States. Whitlam's actions coincided with a sharp decline in 
minerals and energy exploration, partly in response to the 
collapse of the world commodity boom and a rise in 
Australian costs and prices. But Bjelke-Petersen and the 
mining lobby blamed the ALP government entirely. Queensland 
joined other non-Labor State governments (and occasionally 
Labor governments as well) in "virulent and effective anti-
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Canberra strategy and ideology" centring on the blockage 
of important resources and investment legislation by the 
Senate. 
Mining was also the catalyst for major confrontations 
between the State and the Commonwealth concerning the 
relative priorities of rapid development and environmental 
conservation. The dispute was highlighted by two major 
controversies - Queensland's acquiescence in the late 1960s 
in plans by Japex to drill for oil on the Great Barrier 
Reef, and in the 1970s, sand mining on Fraser Island for 
rutile and zircon which were significant exports to Japan. 
These decisions were consistent with the importance accorded 
to rapid development in Queensland as a whole, by 
Departments such as Mines and Lands which were responsible 
for environmental aspects of particular proposals up to 
1971, and by the Premier who subsequently oversaw such 
matters through the Coordinator-General. But the growing 
size and organisational sophistication of conservation 
groups and a change in community attitudes counterbalanced 
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the development ethos and made use of the multiple points of 
access to the policy agenda in a federal system. Japex and 
its partner, Ampol, responded to intense and well-organised 
public pressure and withdrew from the Reef area. The 
Commonwealth used its Environment Protection (Impact of 
Proposals) Act of 1974-75 and the Australian Heritage 
Commission Act of 1975 to hold an inquiry into Fraser Island 
mining, to place the Island on the Register of the National 
Estate and to prohibit exports of sand mined there. 
Patience argues that the events of this time "tested the 
outer limits of Australian federalism" and drew "the line on 
further centralisation of the Australian federal system". 
Bjelke-Petersen's "audacious challenge to the underlying 
structural tendencies in Australian federalism" was 
"successful in re-defining the residual constitutional 
powers of the States and asserting their preeminence in the 
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federal system". 
Queensland - a State apart ? 
Queensland's historical sense of separatism, its mistrust of 
the south and its sense of being unfairly treated by the 
Commonwealth and the other States were important background 
influences promoting Queensland's support for foreign 
investment and its interest in looking outward to Japan and 
other world markets as the basis for economic growth. 
A pro-Queensland, anti-southern stance was taken by 
politicians of all parties in an attempt to influence the 
Commonwealth or to emphasise Queensland's independence and 
its differences from other States. Hanlon, for example, 
refused to transfer to the Commonwealth the authority to 
licence the operations of commercial aircraft within the 
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State, and would not participate m the Joint Coal Board 
because "we dare not allow competitive interests outside 
Queensland to control our industries; our industries depend 
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on coal. If you control coal, you control everything". 
The Federal decision to subsidise the import of overseas 
coal by South Australia and Victoria in the 1950s was 
criticised as a typical example of anti-Queensland activity 
by entrenched southern interests and their supporting 
politicians, despite assurances that it was a temporary 
measure until local supplies could be organised. Similarly, 
Premier Gair as Mines Minister bitterly opposed the 
Commonwealth's decision to discontinue the Australian market 
for Mt. Isa copper and he "gate crashed a meeting ... in 
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Melbourne" to argue the Queensland case. Even Party 
loyalty was outweighed by State interests and there was 
considerable hostility when support did not eventuate for 
the Mt. Isa railway, which became "a critical internal issue 
between Federal and State governments, or at least between 
Liberal party interests in the south and . . . Queensland 
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interests". This sense of separatism reinforced the 
determination of the government in Queensland to be active 
in pursuit of opportunities for economic growth which were 
not dependent on capital from or markets in the southern 
States and which had the potential to enhance Queensland's 
status in the Commonwealth. 
The development of rural and resource-based industries 
directed substantially towards exports to Japan was part of 
a wider process of structural change in the Queensland 
economy. This process necessitated and was a powerful 
stimulus to change in the relationships between the State 
and business and between Queensland and the Commonwealth. 
At the same time, traditional aspirations and attitudes 
defined a distinctively Queensland approach to the problems 
and issues of growth and the re-orientation of leading 
sectors of Queensland industry towards production for export 
to Japan. 
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A QUEENSLAND APPROACH 
During the postwar period, in Queensland, as elsewhere, the 
degree of state intervention in economic life increased, 
stimulated in part by the efforts of entrepreneurs in the 
rural and mining industries to enter the Japanese market and 
the consequent demands for State involvement in the planning 
and implementation of projects, in establishing an 
environment conducive to trade and investment and in 
creating the preconditions for the growth of export 
industries. The domestic impact of external trade also gave 
the regional State an interest in the management of the 
international dimensions of important sectors of the State's 
economy, particularly trade with Japan. 
The general features of the growth of State/economy 
interrelationships are readily observable. But to analyse 
rather than merely to describe them, to determine their 
implications for the role of the regional State in the 
contemporary economy, it is useful to set the discussion in 
the context of the competing views of pluralist, marxist and 
corporatist writers and of Australia as a federal state. 
While the theories of the role of the state cannot be 
applied directly and uncritically, they provide a number of 
alternative explanations of the structures and processes 
which observers describe, and a foundation and framework for 
an understanding of interactions between State and economy 
in the growth of relations with Japan. 
Queensland shares with countries such as Austria and the 
Netherlands a number of characteristics of Katzenstein's 
democratic corporatist small states. It is relatively 
open to the world market, with significant sections of its 
economy dependent on trade, particularly with Japan. 
However, with a small GDP in world terms, and a political 
position as a sub-central unit of the Australian state, it 
cannot influence the world economic environment or shape the 
56 
pattern of international trade. It must accept the 
opportunities those patterns present and make domestic 
adjustments to turn the opportunities to its own advantage. 
This places heavy demands on business to be innovative and 
adaptable, especially where, as in Queensland, trade is in 
highly market-sensitive unprocessed raw materials rather 
than in manufactures or services occupying market niches 
where demand is relatively stable. The adjustments forced by 
adaptation to the market also place demands on the political 
system to manage the costs of change, providing political 
stability, while at the same time encouraging economic 
flexibility to achieve international competitiveness. 
The response in Queensland to the need for domestic 
adjustments contains many elements of continuity with the 
State's historical experience. Like other States, 
Queensland has an activist tradition which Hancock, writing 
of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, attributed to the 
necessity of minimising "the harsh impact of adverse effects 
from a volatile world market" and of acting to both 
supplement and "create and foster" the market which had to 
be forged in a hostile frontier environment.'^ The twenty 
years after World War II represented something of a similar 
situation. World trading patterns and arrangements changed; 
the protected markets in Britain and the Commonwealth began 
to disappear; new markets which opened were more demanding 
and competitive. Business and community infrastructure -
including basic services in water, transport and electricity 
- had to be rebuilt after the neglect of the Depression and 
War years as a prerequisite for business revival and the 
take-off to economic growth. 
The sense of being at the frontier remained very much alive, 
driven by economic imperatives, reinforced by the sense of 
separatism and isolation from the centres of business and 
political power in the south. It continued through the 
1960s as resources development began, largely in remote 
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locations well away from established facilities, imposing 
increasing demands for new infrastructure, as well as for 
State assistance in finding a foothold in the difficult and 
unfamiliar markets in Japan. Economic necessity demanded 
and tradition required that the State in Queensland be 
active, not passive, although public intervention 
supplemented rather than displaced private decisions. The 
State did not act to control or direct private enterprise or 
to transfer the initiative for business decisions to the 
public sector. Rather, the State was active in supporting 
and enhancing the activities of business by indirect 
methods. 
The frontier mentality and the long-established 
preoccupation with economic growth as the State's major 
objective were the foundations of an alliance between State 
and capital, although the nature of the association varied 
over time and from industry to industry. Large firms, 
especially those involving international capital in 
resource-based industries, provided the catalyst for a surge 
in economic growth through trade with Japan and became the 
dominant sector of capital. They were assisted by 
relatively unfettered access to resources, attractive 
conditions to encourage investment, and an intolerance of 
those with opposing views or other priorities. This sector 
of the economy came to be identified closely with the 
National Party in the 1970s and 80s and measures taken by 
the government to protect its interests from actions of the 
Commonwealth became the focus of Federal/State conflicts. 
But Queensland's economic development and its trade with 
Japan were more broadly based, dependent on a range of 
products from both small and large enterprises, processed 
and marketed by a variety of locally and internationally-
owned firms and government-sponsored authorities. Many of 
the products were from the rural sector whose long-standing 
relationships with sections of the bureaucracy and political 
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parties and relevance to the aim of decentralised 
development remained well into the 1980s. Support for these 
industries was complemented, not superseded, by the growth 
of mining capital. There were many conflicts in the needs 
and interests of these two sectors, and even within one 
sector the range of different industries, locations, and 
enterprise sizes made the general interests of capital hard 
to determine. The relationship was not simply the State 
acting to support the dominant fractions of capital, or 
capital as a whole, but a shifting pattern of alliances, 
compromises and conflicts within an overall commitment to 
development which became dependent on trade with Japan. 
The broad patterns of State/business interrelationships in 
Queensland seem to accord more closely to Lindblom's 
"duality of leadership" than to Marxist interpretations. The 
dynamic of Queensland's postwar economic growth was 
provided, not by Labor efforts to obtain foreign capital for 
mining or by Coalition attempts to interest overseas firms 
in manufacturing, but by private discoverers and developers 
of resources and by growers and marketers of primary 
products. The State provided support and assistance in a 
wide variety of ways which represented an accommodation 
between what business sought and what the State apparatus 
assessed as possible and essential for business to fulfil 
its economic and political role. The success of business, 
particularly the large, complex resources projects and the 
major rural industries which responded to opportunities in 
the Japanese market, underscored the legitimacy of the 
Liberal/National Coalition government, and encouraged the 
integration of project planning into government budgeting 
and infrastructure provision. 
Lindblom's model focuses on the shared goals of business and 
the State and their joint role in capital formation. But the 
State has separate goals as well. These inevitably include 
the maintenance of social harmony, and in a federal state 
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are also likely to encompass promoting one's own interests 
over those of other States, securing a fair share of 
Commonwealth disbursements and guarding the rights of the 
State against incursions by central authorities. Nor does 
Lindblom's model take account of the variety of structures 
and processes within Queensland industry, or the 
Constitutional restraints on the ability of a regional State 
to do what is necessary for business to perform its 
functions. When these are taken into account, the 
relationship between State and business forms a mixed 
pattern. It might best be described as a loose partnership 
in which both parties had the ability to act independently, 
but in which on issues crucial to the development of trade. 
State and business collaborated in ways which concentrated 
their efforts. The nature of the collaboration varied from 
formal partnership to a loose association in which the 
government assisted in establishing the preconditions for 
the production of an exportable product. Essentially, 
private enterprise recognised the opportunities in the 
Japanese market and took the initiative in developing them. 
State collaboration was necessary to assist and support 
industry in making the adjustments necessary to accommodate 
the scale of production, the quality demands of Japanese 
customers and the rigours of international competition. It 
will be argued in this thesis that it was their combined 
actions which enabled the growth of trade with Japan after 
World War II and was the distinguishing characteristic of 
the postwar compared with the prewar period. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
TENTATIVE STEPS 
THE PREWAR BASIS OF QUEENSLAND-JAPAN TRADE 
INTRODUCTION 
Reactions in Queensland to the prospect of Japan's re-
emergence as a trading partner after World War II were, like 
those of Australia generally, heavily influenced by both the 
war itself and the experiences of the prewar years. The 
1930s in particular provided "the only firm reference point 
from which Australian officials and businessmen could 
consider Japan's place in Australia's postwar future". 
Queensland's experiences in her relations with Japan were in 
part shared with Australia as a whole and in part unique to 
herself because of geography, the nature and importance of 
trade and the history of the contacts between them. 
Commercial contacts between Queensland and Japan began in 
the 19th and early 2 0th centuries at a time when the 
Colonial (and later the State) government was active in 
locating markets and fostering trade. In 1894 Queensland 
adhered to the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty despite 
fears by other Colonies and by protectionist interests that 
the Treaty would lead to a flood of Japanese goods and 
Japanese immigration rather than to a market for the export 
of local products. In 1904 the government employed its own 
Commercial Agent to seek markets in China, Japan, Malaya and 
the Dutch East Indies both as an outlet for local goods and 
to help pay the interest on foreign borrowings incurred 
during the boom of the 1880s. Direct government 
participation in trade promotion was part of a pattern of 
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active involvement in shaping the nature and direction of 
economic life, because, as Hancock comments, it was the 
only practicable way of overcoming the problem of developing 
the colony in the face of physical difficulties. 
Fitzgerald argues that this pattern of State involvement in 
economic life was perpetuated in Queensland at least to the 
end of Labor's period in office in 1957. It was 
characterised by the conception of the state as a 
developmental agency, reinforced politically by the paternal 
authoritarianism of governments, by the dominance of the 
civil, ecclesiastical and political bureaucracies and by the 
conservatism of society and the lack of the tradition of 
civilised dissent essential to pluralism. This view of the 
state was underpinned by a broad consensus that stability 
and development were the twin goals of Queensland economy 
and society. 
However, except in the first years after Federation, the 
broad role of the State government in international trade 
and investment before World War II was much more distant and 
indirect. Certainly the State apparatus was active in a 
range of issues where there was a clear link between 
domestic and external policies. Foreign capital was sought 
for railways to encourage decentralised development and for 
the support of fimms much as Mount Isa Mines. Policies to 
restrain prices were used also to compel the American Meat 
Trust to supply domestic consumers before lucrative overseas 
markets. Agricultural marketing boards were set up to 
facilitate domestic and overseas sales and to cushion the 
impact of volatile world prices on farm incomes. The 
Queensland Meat Industry Board was established to regulate 
the local market, but also to cooperate with the CSIRO in 
developing the technology to enable Queensland producers to 
take advantage of the market for chilled beef expected to 
result from the Ottawa Agreement in 1932. In these 
instances domestic objectives could be achieved by State 
62 
measures to support and facilitate, and at times to direct, 
the actions of private enterprise. 
But they were isolated examples, ad hoc responses to 
particular problems in the domestic economy which had an 
international dimension as well. They were not part of a 
coherent or consistent policy of cooperation between State 
and business to promote foreign trade as an engine of 
economic growth, or as a means of achieving the State's 
objectives. There was no concentration of the efforts of 
business and government which marked the successful 
development of Queensland-Japan trade in the postwar period 
and, the thesis will argue, made possible the domestic 
adjustments necessary for Queensland business to be 
competitive in the international market. 
The State government was generally content to leave foreign 
trade to the Commonwealth and to acquiesce in its emphasis 
on relationships with Britain and the Dominions. This was 
supported by dominant firms in the Queensland rural economy 
such as Vesteys which were British-owned or had strong links 
with Britain and British Commonwealth countries. The 
Federal government was active in influencing the direction 
of foreign trade through its tariff policies, the 
negotiation of treaties, participation in discussions on 
Commonwealth preference and, on occasion, through direct 
actions such as the purchase of its own ships when British 
transport was not available during World War I. However, 
repeated Japanese overtures between 1911 and the late 1920s 
for negotiations leading to a Commercial Treaty were 
rejected and it was not until 1934 that discussions began, 
and not until 194 0 that the first Ambassadors were 
exchanged. 
Commercial contacts were initiated and developed largely by 
individuals or firms, except in the early years of the 
century, although the policies of governments, both 
63 
Australian and Japanese, had an important bearing on the 
progress of the relationship. By the outbreak of World War 
II Japan had become important to the economic prosperity of 
a number of industries, especially wool, but had generated 
concern at both official and community level about her 
trading practices, aggressive nationalism, and the way in 
which her demand for products was related to wider political 
and strategic goals. 
THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF TRADE 
Relations between Queensland and Japan were clearly centred 
on trade and commerce, although issues of immigration and 
security assumed more importance than they did with other 
States. Trade was based on complementarity between the two 
economies, with Japan acquiring raw materials and selling 
manufactured goods, while Australia supplied a range of 
primary products and, with her relatively high per capita 
income, provided an attractive market for Japan's increasing 
industrial production. 
Before the 1930s, however, Japan accounted for only a small 
percentage of Australia's trade. Between 1930-31 and 1935-
36 it almost doubled in value to a peak of 10.3 per cent of 
total trade. From the start of the trade diversion dispute 
in June 1936, Japan's share of Australia's trade declined to 
levels lower than those even of the early 1920s. 
Queensland's experience is similar. Japan's share of 
Queensland trade ranged from 5.35 per cent to 8.4 per cent 
during the 1920s, increased rapidly during the first half of 
the 1930s, reaching 12.08 per cent in 1934-35. From mid-
1936 Japan's importance in Queensland trade declined 
rapidly, to a mere 2.67 per cent in 1937-38. Thus, for most 
of the early 193 0s, Japan's importance in Queensland trade 
was greater than that for Australia as a whole, the rise in 
her share of trade was greater and the eventual decline more 
severe. 
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TABLE 2.1 
TRADE WITH JAPAN AS A PERCENTAGE OF QUEENSLAND TRADE 
1921-22 to 1939-40 
Year Percentage 
1921-22 7.61 
1922-23 6.86 
1923-24 7.05 
1924-25 5.83 
1925-26 5.45 
1926-27 6.71 
1927-28 8.44 
1928-29 7.01 
1929-30 5.35 
1930-31 9.99 
1931-32 9.6 
1932-33 9.7 
1933-34 9.2 
1934-35 12.08 
1935-36 11.6 
1936-37 5.04 
1937-38 2.67 
1938-39 2.8 
1939-40 3.4 
Source: Statistics of Queensland 1929-30 and 1939-40 
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Changes in Japan's share of trade were due largely to 
varying demand for exports, particularly wool. Japan bought 
between 1 and 4.5 per cent of Australia's exports to the 
beginning of the 1920s, rising rapidly to approximately 6-9 
per cent until the onset of the Depression. From only 6.67 
per cent in 1929-30, Japan's share of Australia's exports 
rose to 10.5 per cent in 1930-31 and peaked at 14.19 per 
cent in 1935-36. From the start of the trade diversion 
dispute in June 1936 Japan's share of exports fell rapidly 
to only 6.54 per cent in 1936-37 and a mere 3.97 per cent in 
1939-40. 
Throughout most of the 1920s Japan bought between 6 and 8.5 
per cent of Queensland's exports, though this rose to 9.73 
per cent and 10.27 per cent in 1923-24 and 1927-28 
respectively. From a low of 6.03 per cent in 1929-
30, Japan's share rose to 11.56 per cent in 1930-31 and 
reached a peak of 13.17 per cent in 1935-36 before declining 
by more than half to 5.18 per cent in 1936-37 and then to 
only 1.89 per cent in 1937-38. 
Changes in Japan's importance as a supplier of imports were 
much steadier. She provided 0.97 per cent of Australia's 
imports at the turn of the century, rising steadily to 4.05 
per cent by 1930-31 to peak at 6.55 per cent in 1934-35, 
except for the 2 years 1917-1919 when the percentage rose to 
8.84. From 1936-37 Japan's share of Australia's imports 
declined a little, but was still 5.13 per cent in 1939-40 
and 3.38 per cent in 1940-41. During the 1920s Japan 
supplied approximately 4-6 per cent of Queensland's imports. 
This reached 6.87 per cent in 1931-32, then rose rapidly to 
8.12 per cent in 1932-33 and remained at around this level 
until 1934-35. Even before the trade diversion dispute, 
Japan's share of Queensland's imports began to decline, 
returning to more customary levels of approximately 4 to 6 
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per cent until trade ceased during World War II. 
Prewar trade for Australia as a whole and for Queensland in 
particular was based on a very narrow range of goods. The 
principal Australian export was wool. Japan bought only 
2.79 per cent of wool exports in 1920-21, but this rose 
during the 1920s to reach 14.75 per cent by 1927-28. After 
a brief drop to 11.37 per cent in 1929-30, Japan's share of 
wool exports rose rapidly from 18.85 per cent in 1930-31 to 
28.64 per cent in 1935-36. The increase in Japanese 
purchases helped to compensate for the drop in purchases by 
other previously important buyers. The United States bought 
very little wool between 1927-8 and 1936-7, France reduced 
purchases sharply after 1933, while Germany and Italy were 
not consistent buyers. Wool was an important part of 
Australia's trade, representing between 40 and 50 percent of 
total merchandise exports in the 192 0s and 3 5-4 5 per cent in 
the 1930s. Australia's other major export was wheat, with 
about 19 per cent going to Japan. Japan bought small 
quantities of a variety of other products including almost 
all Australia's exports of iron and steel scrap until 1936-7 
and most of the small amount of iron ore exported. 
For Queensland also the principal export was wool, with 
Japan taking an increasing share until 1936. Wool was a 
significant item in Queensland's merchandise exports and was 
particularly important to the State's objective of 
decentralised development as the grazing industry was 
concentrated in Western areas and formed the economic base 
for many rural towns. Queensland sold a very limited range 
of other products to Japan and A.C.V. Melbourne in 1934 
lamented that the State supplied 21 per cent of Australia's 
exports of wool to Japan, 69 per cent of hams and bacon, 70 
per cent of beef, 5 per cent of fruit and 10 per cent of 
cheese and butter, but very little else. Other exports 
included animal products such as hair, bones and tallow, 
iron and steel scrap, cotton, and, towards the end of the 
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1930s, zinc. While the absolute value of sales was not 
large, Japan was the major or sometimes the only market for 
these goods and was therefore a valuable outlet for 
Queensland producers. 
As a supplier of manufactured goods Japan was increasingly 
important, although Australia represented only a small 
segment of Japan's total export market - about 9 per cent in 
1935. Japan provided in 1935 about 62 per cent of 
Australia's imports of silk and rayon piece goods, 21 per 
cent of cotton piecegoods, 30 per cent of crockery and 2 6 
per cent of fancy goods and toys. She sold smaller 
quantities of a range of metal manufactures, machinery, 
bicycles, animal products such as gut or bristles and items 
of apparel and home furnishings. The broad composition of 
Queensland's imports was similar and was well established by 
the beginning of the 1920s, although within each 
classification the exact nature of the less important 
articles changed over time. What did change dramatically 
was the relative shares of Japan and the Empire in providing 
imports of a small range of products, mostly textiles. 
EFFORTS TO EXPAND TRADE 
Nineteenth century contacts between Queensland and Japan 
centred on the migration of Japanese to the sugar canefields 
and to the pearl and trochus shell fishing grounds in the 
north. Early hopes for Queensland-Japan relations were 
indicated by the establishment of a Japanese Consulate in 
Townsville in the 1860s and by the agreement of Queensland 
to the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and 
the United Kingdom in 1894. The State withdrew from the 
Treaty in 1908 at the request of the Commonwealth and with 
the agreement of Queensland firms who could see no further 
point in adherence since Queensland goods received no tariff 
preference over goods from other States.^ 
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In the first few years after Federation the Queensland 
government took the initiative in seeking to promote and 
develop trade with Japan, as well as with other countries of 
Asia. The State was interested in markets which would 
support development of primary and processing industries and 
provide funds to pay the interest on borrowings made during 
the boom of the 1880s. In March 1904 Mr. Frederic Jones was 
appointed the Queensland Government's first Commercial Agent 
in the Far East, including China and Japan, working from a 
Q 
base in Hong Kong. He was to ascertain markets, and report 
on the demand for goods, specific requirements and 
prejudices of consumers and details of matters such as 
shipping and storage. He worked essentially as a commercial 
salesman, taking with him samples of goods provided by firms 
who were invited by the Secretary for Agriculture, or who 
responded to articles in the Press or made arrangements 
through their local Chamber of Commerce. The government 
acted to facilitate and support the development of trade by 
providing the services of Mr. Jones, but it was left to the 
decision of the individual companies whether or not to 
participate in the search for markets. 
The response of business was a mixture of enthusiasm and 
lack of interest. Some were eager to participate, including 
9 
Geo. Hiron and Sons (biscuit manufacturers), the Merrimac 
Milk Co., and Queensland Meat and Agency Co., although 
they had only two cases of canned meat available that 
11 . • 
season. Others declined the invitation to be involved. 
Walkers Ltd. (Engineers and Shipbuilders) felt they could 
not compete against the European wage rates and better 
shipping facilities,^^ while C.S.R. Co. Ltd. and R.W. 
14 
Thurlow and Co.(wholesale grocers) saw little chance of 
doing profitable trade. Some, such as G.S. Lambert, (wine 
merchant and grower) were "not disposed to go to any trouble 
in the matter" because there were adequate markets within 
the State. ^^ 
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Nevertheless, by 1906 a number of firms approached by the 
Government felt Mr. Jones had laid a good foundation in 
trade and one of his trips to Java, China, Japan and the 
East Indies had been possible because a group of firms had 
guaranteed his expenses. ^*^  They were pleased that Mr. Jones 
had brought them into touch with leading merchants^^ and 
introduced new business which, while still relatively small, 
had promise of expansion, ^^ and some had undertaken 
expenditure on new plant to meet the special requirements of 
Eastern trade. ^' Government and sections of business thus 
cooperated to serve their joint interests by locating 
opportunities for trade with Japan, though the enterprise 
and persistence of individual firms determined the extent to 
which the possibilities were translated into trading 
outcomes. 
Many of the trade issues raised by Mr. Jones^° remained 
relevant throughout the 1920s and 1930s and many resurfaced 
in the 1950s and 60s when postwar trade was developing. He 
was insistent that exports to Japan and other Asian 
countries would develop only if close attention were paid to 
quality and to specific requirements. He identified a 
market for meat for the Japanese army provided the companies 
would supply the product in cans of exactly the required 
size and shape and with Japanese lettering. He quoted 
examples of American firms which had opened up markets at 
great expense and trouble, only to lose them permanently 
because of shipments of poor quality, and he warned that the 
same could happen to Australian merchants. He drew 
attention to the need for adequate display and demonstration 
of Australian products and described the Australian exhibits 
at the Commercial Museums in Osaka and Tokyo as "scarcely 
worth mention" - consisting of one case of wool, "a nice 
exhibit of wood from the Government of Western Australia" 
and "a few cans in an obscure corner" representing 
Australian manufactures.^^ He suggested a format for a 
Queensland display and submitted a proposal for the purchase 
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of a coldstore for meat for which he could see a good 
future. 
However, there seemed little real commitment at either 
government or business level to the development of trade on 
a long-term basis, although individual firms became 
established in the market. Mr. Jones' suggestions about the 
purchase of premises for the meat trade and displays to 
promote Queensland products as a whole were not taken up. 
There was no organised effort to produce or present goods in 
ways suitable for the needs of the Japanese market, as there 
would be in the 1960s and 70s. Government and industry did 
not always see the advantage in developing markets 
identified by Mr. Jones and potential trade avenues were 
left untapped. He was, for example, very anxious to 
organise sales of Queensland cotton in Japan, arranged with 
a firm in Kobe to accept consignments for auction and sent 
detailed advice on packaging and likely levels of demand. 
At the time, Australia and Great Britain took the entire 
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crop and the Under-Secretary for Agriculture could see no 
need to develop new markets. Traditional ties to Britain 
and the Empire were stronger than any opportunity to 
diversify, and after Mr. Jones completed his assignment at 
the end of 1906, official efforts to expand the trade 
ceased. It was left to private firms to locate and develop 
markets in Japan. 
Only the pressure of economic circumstances in the 1930s 
revived official interest in the trade relationship with 
Japan. Even then, efforts represented the separate attempts 
of concerned individuals and groups to explore the market 
situation or raise awareness of possibilities rather than 
the combination of State and business pursuing definite 
opportunities. Difficulties included a continued commitment 
to Britain and British policies in trade and diplomacy, a 
reliance on the anticipated benefits from the Ottawa 
Agreement and the lack of an infrastructure of trade 
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agreements and diplomatic representation. Nevertheless, 
efforts were made to take advantage of the spurt of economic 
growth in Eastern countries which coincided with the deep 
recession of traditional European partners. 
The lead was given by the Senate of the University of 
Queensland, on the initiative of one of its members, J.D. 
Story. In October 1931, in the depths of the Great 
Depression, he proposed to the Senate that "in view of the 
existing conditions and the desirableness of finding 
additional markets for Queensland products, particularly in 
populous countries within easy access of Australia" the time 
was opportune "to make a comprehensive survey of the extent 
of interest - common and otherwise - between Queensland and 
24 
Eastern countries". On the face of it this was a most 
unusual and unexpected action by an independent institution 
devoted to learning and research. But, as Thomis indicates, 
the University of Queensland, though independent, was 
established to apply its accumulated knowledge and research 
to Queensland's contemporary and practical needs and to have 
as its "prime concern" the commerce of the State and the 
25 
promotion of industrial development. It was not meant to 
26 
be an isolated institution, but "a people's university" 
and practical projects such as Melbourne's search for 
Eastern markets were evidence that it was fulfilling this 
role. 
Story had been closely involved with the University since 
its inception, first as Under-Secretary, Department of 
Public Instruction, then as a member of the Senate, and was 
a firm believer in the University's responsibility to the 
community. He was Public Service Commissioner in the 1920s 
and 1930s when the functions of the State bureaucracy were 
expanded in areas such as Electricity, Main Roads, and the 
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marketing of fruit and vegetables. So great was his 
influence he was described by Colin Clark as the leader of 
"the little band of oligarchs ... who handled Queensland's 
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affairs", and " had a finger in every pie".^ ® He was well 
aware of the major problems arising from reduced domestic 
consumption because of the Depression, and from falling 
levels of demand and prices in traditional markets abroad. 
Finding new and expanding markets was essential for the 
continued viability of the State's rural producers, and 
economic growth in Japan and other Eastern countries 
suggested that opportunities for increased trade could well 
exist. While the University was not an official part of the 
State apparatus, its action on Story's initiative was 
closely related to the type of State involvement in economic 
life described by Hancock^' and Fitzgerald^° - positive 
action to overcome obstacles and forge markets under 
difficult conditions. 
The Senate agreed to send Dr.A.C.V. Melbourne to Japan, 
China and Hong Kong during late 1931 and early 1932, with 
the cooperation of leading retailer T.C. Beirne, and a Miss 
Philp, who allowed funds they had contributed to the 
University for the purchase of Dunk Island to be utilised 
instead to defray the expenses of the survey. ^^ Dr. 
Melbourne's study confirmed that exports to Japan were 
likely to be confined to primary products or manufactures of 
them, though he concluded that there was a very large 
potential market which Queensland had not really tried to 
tap. The main impediments to increased trade were identified 
as tariff policies, the feeling that Australia was willing 
to sell, but not to buy, and lack of effort to understand 
and meet demand. Japan was prepared, even anxious, to be 
friendly, and this opportunity might not recur; on the 
contrary, if Australia continued its policy of 
exclusiveness, it might well provoke a Japanese reaction.^^ 
Melbourne's major recommendations included the signing of a 
commercial treaty with Japan, revision of Australian 
tariffs, a reduction in the exchange rate to a competitive 
level, the encouragement of bank lending for forward 
exchange, and the formation of a Japan-Australia trading 
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company with joint capital. 
Australian tariff policies and the reluctance of the 
Australian government to enter a Commercial Agreement with 
Japan were identified by Melbourne as major obstacles to 
increased bilateral trade. Australian goods offered for 
sale in Japan were often far too expensive to find a ready 
market since they were admitted under the general rather 
than the lower "conventional" tariff. In many cases the 
disparity between the two tariffs was sufficient to inhibit 
sales, but an additional penalty was incurred by products 
classed as ^luxuries' and subject to an ad valorem tariff of 
100 per cent. Dr. Melbourne felt that without these 
impediments Australia could have sold many products on the 
Japanese market, including items of particular interest to 
Queensland such as jams, fresh, cured and preserved meats, 
condensed milk, glue, tinned fruits and vegetables and 
leather.-'^  Melbourne tried unsuccessfully to interest the 
Federal Minister for Commerce (Hon.F.Stewart) in the 
possibility of a Commercial Agreement, ^^ since he felt it 
was "quite certain" that Japan would extend most-favoured-
nation treatment to Australia and discuss improved access 
for existing exports or for other products, including 
tobacco and possibly sugar - both of which were of special 
interest to Queensland.^^ 
The Australian government had consistently refused Japanese 
overtures to consider a Commercial Treaty, mainly because of 
Australian commitment to British and Empire trade and 
because of the possible effects of increased Japanese 
imports on Australian manufacturing. Fears of an influx of 
Japanese goods and Japanese immigrants had been a factor in 
the protectionist and White Australia policies at the time 
of Federation. These fears were overlaid in the years 1914-
1920 by security concerns stemming from Japan's expansion 
into the Pacific and by hostile undercurrents in Anglo-
Japanese relations, though Australian trade had benefited 
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from Japan's search for alternative suppliers of raw 
materials when European sources were cut off during World 
War I. Melbourne argued that for Australia to take 
advantage of the opportunities presented in the 1930s from 
the expansion of Japanese industry, a Commercial Treaty was 
essential. This would necessarily aim "definitely at 
increasing the importation to Australia of Japanese goods" 
which would be "contrary to ideas generally accepted in 
Australia" of favouring British trade rather of making our 
way independently. According to Dr. Melbourne, 
"responsible opinion in Japan readily acquiesce(d) in the 
policy of giving preference to Empire products", but it 
resented the imposition of prohibitive duties on Japanese 
commodities not produced in Australia or in which Empire 
countries could have no special claim. The Japanese would 
expect as a result of a treaty improved access to the 
Australian market of a range of Japanese products at the 
intermediate tariff including silk and cotton goods, china, 
porcelain, glass and toys. Queensland's small manufacturing 
sector would be relatively unaffected by Japanese imports, 
though both the Premier and businessmen expected opposition 
from vested manufacturing interests in the south to a 
reciprocal treaty. From Queensland's point of view, the 
benefits of trade would outweigh the disadvantages, but 
there is no evidence to suggest that any pressure was 
exerted at either business or government level for 
negotiations towards a treaty to begin. 
The Queensland Governor, Sir Leslie Wilson, also attempted 
to engender interest in Eastern trade and in March 193 5 he 
undertook a private tour of the East - the first by a person 
at such a senior level since the early years of the 
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century. From the beginning of his term of office. Sir 
Leslie took every opportunity in both public speeches and 
private contacts to emphasise the importance of Eastern 
trade and urged Premier Forgan Smith's government to adopt a 
more energetic approach to the development of markets in the 
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East^' instead of the "few efforts" in a "sporadic and 
unbusinesslike manner" that had characterised the approach 
in the past.^° He suggested the appointment of Queensland 
Trade Commissioners with real knowledge and understanding of 
the region who would help overcome the problem of prospects 
ruined by ignorance and insensitivity. Both he and Dr. 
Melbourne suggested that the Bureau of Industry should be 
used as the vehicle for stimulating interest in and 
facilitating trade with Eastern markets and for overcoming 
the inertia which the Governor at least attributed in part 
to the "innumerable Boards of control" which regulated the 
marketing of all primary produce except wool.^^ But no 
official action was taken apart from a reference to the 
Bureau of Industry, and its commitment to British trade and 
emphasis on local economic affairs made it an obstacle 
rather than an assistance to the extension of Queensland-
Japan relations. 
The Premier referred to the Chairman of the Bureau 
(Professor Brigden) Dr. Melbourne's suggestion that the 
organisation collect information on market prospects and 
requirements and publicise it within the business community 
as part of its charter under the Act to "acquire and 
disseminate economic information".^^ The Governor kept in 
close touch with the Bureau and passed on material and 
information which he himself collected.^^ However, the 
Bureau was not interested in international trade issues and 
saw its main function as advising the government on measures 
to increase productive employment,^ '* planning "a sound 
policy of development",^^ and coordinating specific 
projects, including the Story Bridge, the Hornibrook Highway 
and Somerset Dam. Prof. Brigden's poor relations with 
Premier Forgan Smith and his personality clash with Dr. 
Melbourne could not have helped matters, ^"^  though it is 
surprising that J.D. Story, one of the Bureau's directors 
and later its Vice-chairman, did not champion the issue. 
The Director excused the Bureau's inactivity as being due to 
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a need for time to assess the value of the recently-
appointed Commonwealth Trade Commissioners. But, more to 
the point, he argued that Queensland could not "afford to 
47 
throw away the substance for the shadow". The Bureau 
believed that of Queensland's exportable products, only wool 
and meat could compete on the open market; others depended 
on political rather than economic advantage, and this was 
48 
available only within the British Commonwealth. Trade with 
the United Kingdom was vastly more important than any 
possible expansion of markets in the East, and could be 
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damaged by efforts m that direction. 
At a Federal level, efforts to promote trade were stimulated 
by economic pressures of the Depression which helped to 
overcome the traditional reluctance to expand official 
relations with Japan. In 19 3 4 the Lyons government agreed to 
Japanese requests, made periodically since 1895-6, to enter 
negotiations towards a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, 
although the trade diversion dispute interrupted this 
process. In February 193 3, the Federal Minister for 
Commerce convened a conference with representatives of the 
business community in Sydney to devise ways of increasing 
exports to the East. State Advisory Committees on Far 
Eastern Trade were established with delegates from State 
governments, commercial, manufacturing, shipping and 
producer interests. These in turn appointed delegates to 
the Federal Advisory Committee, chaired by Dr. Melbourne. 
Business representatives considered it essential that the 
Commonwealth Government give the lead in finding new markets 
and doing the pioneering work; without this impetus "very 
little headway" would be made. It was seen as the state's 
role to forge markets in this alien and difficult 
environment; there were few in the private sector willing or 
able to take the risks and show the entrepreneurship 
necessary. 
Business response to the tentative steps at government and 
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semi-official level towards increasing bilateral trade with 
Japan was ambivalent. Sir Leslie Wilson felt that 
Queensland business was gradually awakening to market 
opportunities , but he acknowledged that, even aside from 
tariff imposts, Queensland goods were often not attractive 
to the Japanese market and little serious effort was made to 
address quality requirements. Dr. Melbourne drew attention 
to some of the problems. Handling costs, especially at 
Australian ports, were high, supply was not always regular, 
quality was often poor in the mistaken belief that it was of 
no consequence, and the standard was sometimes reduced after 
initial shipments had established the trade. Labelling, 
packaging and grading were often careless, with cans of 
fruit, for example, not containing pieces of uniform size 
and number. Wheat was often dirty, with foreign substances 
being found in bags; there was a lack of uniformity in bag 
weight, with many bags broken because of careless loading. 
The Japanese wanted wheat shipped in bulk and the Australian 
standard (FAQ) altered to allow for different grades as in 
Canada, rather than a single classification being applied to 
wheat of different qualities. The Governor also urged the 
need to send the best available quality, attractively 
packaged and labelled and that the people involved should 
"show they genuinely care about purchasers and that we 
intend to do our utmost to foster a lasting trade 
relationship". He emphasised the importance of sound 
quality, advertising and salesmanship and of not allowing 
the carelessness of a minority of exporters to damage 
Australia's reputation by treating the market lightly and 
underestimating the effort and high standards needed to get 
a foothold. ^^ 
Sections of Australian business remained unconvinced of the 
opportunities for trade with Japan and of the benefits that 
might flow from the appointment of Trade Commissioners and 
the Committees on Eastern Trade. Some large firms and 
organisations which already had extensive connections in the 
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East were opposed to more Trade Commissioners, although Dr. 
Melbourne thought they could help to overcome the barrier to 
trade growth caused by the dominance of Japanese trading 
houses and Japanese shipping and banking firms over the 
bilateral trade. Purcell estimates that in 1931 the 12 
major Japanese shosha controlled directly more than 60 per 
cent of the import trade and 7 3 per cent of the export trade 
and that by 1935 this had risen to 75 per cent and 93 per 
cent respectively, with Mitsui Bussan consistently 
accounting for between 20 and 3 0 per cent of the entire 
Australia-Japan trade. In a letter to Earle Page, Melbourne 
argued that because of the influence of these firms 
throughout Japanese industry and their close connections 
with the Japanese Government, they bought only what was 
needed in accordance with Japanese policy, regardless of 
what Australia had to sell. Because Australia lacked a 
marketing organisation, smaller Japanese firms who might buy 
additional products had no way of making contact. 
Dr. Melbourne was particularly concerned that there was a 
"serious danger" that Queensland would not benefit from the 
Commonwealth initiatives because most of the firms doing 
business in the East were located or controlled in Sydney 
and Melbourne and were unwilling to share information and 
experience with newcomers who might undermine their monopoly 
of trade. He suggested that the new Trade Commissioners be 
used as a source of information about market prospects, and 
that a separate Queensland Trading Company be set up, 
controlled by Queensland firms producing goods suitable for 
sale such as wool and yarn. Finance might be available from 
the banks or from Eastern buyers, particularly in China and 
the Dutch East Indies, and possibly in Japan, though it 
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would need "more careful thought". The response of 
Queensland business to this suggestion and to the efforts of 
Melbourne and the Chambers of Commerce to organise a mission 
to Japan in late 1933 or early 1934 was lukewarm. The 
invitation to primary producers and manufacturers to 
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participate drew a positive response from firms such as 
Ipswich Woollen Mills and J. Leutnegger Pty. Ltd., but 
leading banks and newspapers and many manufacturing firms 
were not interested. The trip was eventually abandoned 
because of "some rearrangement of the itinerary by the 
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Japanese Government", and the suggestion for a Trading 
Company was not taken up by either government or business. 
Throughout the 193 0s the Japanese themselves were active in 
promoting the growth of trade, especially in Japanese 
exports which lagged far behind imports from Australia. At 
official level, Japanese government pressure on Australia to 
enter negotiations for a Commercial Treaty was motivated by 
the effects of the Ottawa Agreement on Japanese exports and 
by the desire to reduce Japan's trade deficit with Australia 
to about 50 million yen. At a business level too, efforts 
were made to expand Japanese exports. Trade Inquiries in the 
Journal of Commerce. especially during 1934-35, sought 
exporters of a few lines such as tinplate clipping scraps 
and cork for beer and cider bottle stoppers. Importers or 
agents were sought for a wide variety of items such as 
textiles, sporting goods, stationery, toys, bicycles, tools, 
farm implements and porcelain ware. 
Japanese businessmen visited Queensland seeking trade. In 
March 1935, Mr. K. Oshima of Osaka Shosen Kaisha, operating 
a monthly Japan-Australia service, arrived to investigate 
shipping, and a delegation elected by the Tokyo Export 
Association visited in January 1936 to display quality 
Japanese goods, hoping to overcome prejudice against them 
and the belief that Japanese products were both cheap and 
shoddy. In April 1935, the Pacific Economic Inspection 
Party - a delegation of 4 0 Japanese businessmen - sponsored 
by the Tokyo Nichi Nichi and the Osaka Mainichi newspapers 
arrived in Brisbane as part of an Australian tour, as guests 
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of the Rotary Club and Thomas Cook and Sons. Members 
included representatives of the sponsoring newspapers, Mr. 
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S. Megata, a director of Yuki Electric Co., with interests 
in shipping and real estate, Mr. Y. Takatsu, director of 
Minami Shinkichi Shoten, Mr. Yabashi, a marble dealer, and 
Mr. Yokoyama of Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha. Mr. K. Sato, 
Managing Editor of the English edition of the Osaka 
Mainichi. foreshadowed the problems that were to dominate 
Australia-Japan trade over the next few years. He urged 
Australia to try to persuade the Empire to remove or 
alleviate trade barriers against Japanese goods, and warned 
that, if trade exclusionism continued, the time might come 
when Japan could no longer be a good customer of 
Australia. Nevertheless, he asked the Commonwealth 
Government to support an exhibition of Australian primary 
products in the principal cities of Japan and Federal and 
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some State Governments began planning for this event. 
During the same period, largely at the instigation of the 
University of Queensland, a first step was taken to expand 
the understanding of Japan by providing facilities for the 
teaching of its language, history and culture. A Joint Sub-
Committee of the Faculties of Arts and Commerce appointed to 
prepare the Constitution and Rules of the Institute of 
Modern Languages (IML) recommended that the University 
should "encourage the study of languages with cultural 
and/or commercial value to the State" and these were seen to 
be Dutch, Chinese and Japanese (as well as French, German 
and Italian which were automatically included). In August 
1935 the University sent Dr. Melbourne to Universities in 
China and Japan to see how this could best be achieved. The 
Senate accepted his recommendation to seek the cooperation 
of the Department of Public Instruction in securing the 
appointment of a Japanese scholar as a lecturer who could 
take University classes in Japanese history, political 
institutions and culture, and teach Japanese language at the 
IML and at specified schools. In his Press Statement in 
February 1937 announcing Cabinet's approval of the proposal, 
the Minister for Public Instruction said his Department had 
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agreed to pay the lecturer's salary because of the need to 
increase understanding of Japan, the need in Australia for 
people with knowledge of Japanese language, and the 
employment opportunities in the public sector and in private 
firms available to people with a knowledge of Japan. The 
Japanese Foreign Office recommended Mr. Ryunosuke Seita who 
took up duties in March 1938. Although only a relatively 
short time elapsed before the outbreak of the Pacific War, 
the interest in Asian studies remained active in the 
University and the Senate decided to include a School of 
Asiatic Studies in its scheme of postwar expansion. 
In the years from Federation to World War II, some sections 
of industry and government and some influential community 
leaders recognised the potential importance of Japan as a 
trading partner. This was not reflected in firm official 
commitment at either State or Federal level or in any 
concerted effort by business or by a particular industry to 
meet the needs of the Japanese market and develop a long-
term relationship. Aside from the large increase in wool 
exports, trade growth proceeded slowly, step by step, on the 
initiative of individuals or groups who struggled against 
the vagaries of the climate and the lack of supporting 
infrastructure which would have established the 
preconditions for the reliable, longterm production of an 
exportable surplus. The experience of the cotton industry is 
a case in point. 
JAPAN AND THE COTTON INDUSTRY 
Among the promising commercial contacts developed during the 
1930s were those between Queensland and Japanese cotton 
interests. 
The Queensland cotton industry was centred on the Burnett 
and Callide Valley areas which were part of the ill-fated 
Soldier Settlement schemes after World War I, and in the 
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Dawson Valley where cotton growing had been part of 
Theodore's grandiose plans for closer settlement on farms 
developed in conjunction with proposed major irrigation 
projects. In the 19th century, J.D. Lang had envisaged 
Queensland as a centre of cotton production, replacing the 
United States as the major supplier of Manchester mills. 
However, volatile world prices and dependence on seasonal 
conditions in the absence of irrigation made cotton-growing 
a precarious occupation. A modicum of stability was 
achieved only by bounties and by concentration on sales to 
domestic manufacturers in southern States and to guaranteed 
markets in Britain. 
In the 19 3 0s the Queensland cotton industry had an 
ambivalent relationship with the Japanese. On the one hand, 
imports of cotton goods, especially from Japan, began to 
make inroads into the market for Australian textiles 
manufactured from Queensland-produced cotton. On the other, 
the expansion of the Japanese textile industry and Japan's 
disputes with major suppliers in India and Egypt created a 
new market prospect for the Queensland crop. First sales 
were made in 193 3 and the General Manager of the Queensland 
Cotton Board thought there should be no difficulty, with 
proper organisation, in selling the whole of the available 
surplus to Japan. Sales to Japan were particularly 
attractive since they were made f.o.b. and not on 
consignment as they were to the British market. However, 
the General Manager conceded that Queensland knew very 
little about the Japanese market and its requirements and 
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recommended it be thoroughly investigated. 
Initial steps to open the trade appear to have been made by 
the Japanese. The Courier-Mail reported the visit of a Mr. 
Okamoto from "an Osaka textile factory" to investigate the 
possibility of exporting textiles and importing raw 
materials, especially cotton.'^ Later the same year, the 
Managing Director of Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha indicated that 
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Queensland had a good opportunity to develop the cotton 
trade and sent Mr. Kawamura of the company's Sydney office 
to inspect the cotton fields and to seek a sample shipment 
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of raw cotton and of cotton cake for stockfeed. Up to that 
time, most of the cotton exported went to Britain, but the 
hostile reaction of Lancashire interests to Australian 
tariffs provided the impetus for the Queensland Cotton Board 
to seek to open negotiations with Japan as an alternative 
market. 
By 1934 Australia exported 5108 bales of cotton, of which 
3430 went to Britain and 1678 to Japan. The Queensland 
Cotton Board sought to sell linters there also, as a raw 
material in the manufacture of artificial silk and 
explosives. Formerly the overseas price was not economical 
and they were sold cheaply in Australia. But after a small 
shipment, Queensland succeeded in selling its entire stock 
of linters to Japan and could have sold more had supplies 
been available. 
In 1935 Mr. Kitamura of Toyo Menka Kaisha visited Queensland 
with a representative of Mitsubishi Bussan to inspect cotton 
growing and to negotiate purchases. Japanese interests had 
been anxious for someone from the Queensland Cotton Board to 
go to Japan, but this had proved not practicable. Mr. 
Kitamura decided the Queensland product was ideally suited 
to Japanese millers' requirements. He was reportedly 
prepared to buy 10,000 bales although 5000-7000 seemed a 
more realistic target given the usual volume of annual 
production. Unfortunately, destruction of a large part of 
the crop because of the intense hot, dry weather and lack of 
irrigation prevented business on the scale anticipated. It 
was ironic that thirty years before, Mr. Frederic Jones had 
been unable to interest either Queensland cotton growers or 
the Minister for Agriculture in the Japanese cotton market, 
despite his having organised an agent and made detailed 
plans for initial sales. 
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International factors provided the opportunity for the sale 
of cotton to Japan and prompted a positive response from the 
Queensland Cotton Board. But the State's inability to 
finance irrigation schemes from its own funds or from 
federal loans, and the inadequacies of schemes such as 
Soldier Settlement meant that the necessary conditions for 
the steady growth of the cotton industry were not realised. 
Trade prospects foundered because of the inability of 
producers to guarantee consistent supplies and this in turn 
was due to the limited capacity of the State government or 
private industry to provide adequate infrastructure. 
It was federal rather than State policies which put an end 
to the good prospects for increased trade in cotton and 
other products when relationships were soured by the trade 
diversion dispute in 1936. 
THE TRADE DIVERSION DISPUTE 
The trade dispute between Australia and Japan stemmed from a 
series of measures adopted by the Commonwealth Government as 
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a "trade corrective". According to the Minister for Trade 
Treaties, Sir Henry Gullett, they were designed to reduce 
imports from poor customers, encourage Australia to 
establish its own secondary industries, speed up recovery 
from the Depression by increasing rural exports and primary 
and industrial production, and deal with a persistent 
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problem in the Balance of Payments. The underlying 
reasons were more complex. Certainly the tariff changes 
represented an extension of Australia's traditional trade 
policy of putting British commercial interests above all 
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others. But the measures were not simply "an example of a 
compliant Australian government sacrificing the interests of 
a key primary industry in order to advantage British 
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manufacturers". The Lyons government had interests of its 
own including privileged and secure access to the British 
market for meat, fending off an acrimonious dispute with 
85 
Britain over Australia's intention to promote its own 
secondary industries in areas previously supplied by British 
firms, and, according to Tsokhas, the need to realign and 
consolidate the fragmenting coalition of business groups on 
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which the United Australia Party was based. The ensuing 
dispute was portrayed by the Government and the Press as 
having been caused by Japan's intransigence, her lack of 
understanding of Australia's interests within the British 
Empire and her aggressiveness in pursuing her own commercial 
interests. 
The measures prohibited a range of imports, mostly Japanese 
textiles which had succeeded in overcoming Imperial tariff 
barriers, undercutting British products and disrupting the 
traditional pattern of automatic domination of Australian 
markets by goods from within the Empire. The Commonwealth 
Government argued that, in the four years since the Ottawa 
Conference, Australia's dependence on Great Britain as a 
market had increased. Agricultural products, except wool, 
had been increasingly excluded from nearly all foreign 
countries and there was little or no prospect of Australia's 
recapturing its old position in world primary-products 
markets. Its only hope was to increase sales to Great 
Britain, but to do so Australia would "reluctantly" have to 
divert more of its import trade to that country as a 
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reciprocal measure. The Japanese retaliated by applying 
quota restrictions on Australia's imports including wool, 
and imposing a prohibitive surcharge on other imports, 
effectively causing a complete cessation of exports to Japan 
and Manchukuo. 
The attitude of Queensland industries to these measures was 
mixed. The beef industry welcomed the prospect of secure 
access to the British market where it felt threatened by 
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British agreements with Denmark and Argentina. On the 
other hand, the Japanese market was valued as an outlet for 
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types of beef not readily sold elsewhere. It had been 
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developed by firms such as Pacific Commercial Company in 
difficult circumstances of domestic shortages and government 
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controls and the appointment of Commonwealth Trade 
Commissioners had been expected to provide the first real 
opportunity for expansion. Other agricultural industries 
such as cotton and dairying welcomed overtures from the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce suggesting the possibility of 
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expanded trade, although the Queensland Cotton Board had 
good prospects of sales to Japan. The most serious 
implication, however, was the cessation of the wool trade, 
especially as Queensland wools were those most suited to the 
Japanese market and Japan was the principal outlet for the 
State's production. Some sections of primary industry stood 
to lose substantially from the trade diversion dispute, 
while others stood to gain if Britain responded positively. 
It was difficult for the Queensland government to take a 
definitive position, and aside from a few brief comments, 
there was no official response and almost no mention of the 
dispute in the Queensland Parliament. 
Politicians such as Sir Henry Gullet and the Queensland 
Minister for Agriculture, Mr. Bulcock, were at first 
sceptical of the ability of Japanese manufacturers to 
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operate without Australian wool, and appeared relatively 
unconcerned about the impact of a possible withdrawal of 
Japanese buyers. However, Japan had provided the main 
growth factor in wool exports during the 1930s and Japanese 
buyers had been keen competitors for lower grades of wool as 
well as average and better fleeces. Graziers were in no 
position to withstand a crisis after a severe drought in 
Queensland and years of poor prices and accumulated debts, 
and they feared the long-term implications of the 
development of synthetic substitutes which was being 
encouraged in Japan by the Ministers for Commerce and 
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Industry, War and the Navy. Wool industry interests were 
therefore hostile at the action of the Commonwealth which 
had deprived them of one of their best markets. 
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Queensland woolgrowers joined their counterparts in other 
States in "defending the interests of the Japanese"'^ and in 
trying to persuade the Australian government to take 
alternative actions or at least to be more flexible in 
negotiations over the size of textile quotas. Meetings of 
the United Graziers' Association and the Graziers' 
Association of Central and Northern Queensland received 
motions from their local and district branches in the 
Maranoa and in southern, south eastern, central and northern 
Queensland expressing alarm and concern and urging the 
"strongest possible protest".'^ The United Graziers' 
Association, encompassing the majority of Queensland 
growers, was an integral part of the Australian Woolgrowers' 
Council and the Graziers' Federal Council, and fully 
supported the strong opposition of those bodies to the 
actions of the Government and their efforts to impress on 
Cabinet the seriousness of the position.'^ Their reaction 
was summed up in a Letter to the Editor of the Courier-Mail 
by Mr. R.J.F. Boyer, President of the Warrego Graziers' 
Association and member of the Australian Woolgrowers' 
Council. In 1935, he said, "Governments and wool growers 
alike hailed Japan as the mainstay of the market"; by 1936 
"countless loud speakers . . . transformed her into a menace, 
a dictator, an enemy within our gates".'^ 
Press accounts in Queensland emphasised Japan's role in 
provoking a tariff war, carrying almost daily reports of 
Japanese political and commercial leaders urging retaliation 
against Australia and united opposition to Australia's 
policies. Press and official spokesmen in Australia began 
to portray Japan as a menacing foreign power trying to 
dictate domestic policy to the Australian Government, 
destroy traditional commercial links, monopolise the market, 
undermine Australian industries and ultimately to weaken the 
security of the Empire as a whole. A series of editorials 
in the Courier-Mail linked Japan's disruption of British 
textile imports to Australia with foreign policy objectives 
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of "economic and financial penetration" of the Asia-Pacific 
area as a preliminary to the sort of political domination 
being imposed in China.'^ The trade dispute thus came to be 
portrayed as something of a national conflict between 
Australia and Japan and by extension between Japan and the 
Empire. 
The dispute eventually ended in December 1936 in a 
negotiated settlement establishing quotas for Australian 
textile imports, and securing a Japanese commitment to 
purchase up to 800,000 bales of wool in the 18 months to 
June 1938. Japanese buyers re-entered the wool market and 
bought freely at the Brisbane sales in March 1937, but in 
the years before trade stopped altogether, Japan never 
regained the dominant position she had occupied before the 
dispute. Japan continued to buy, mostly better class wools, 
obtaining the average and faulty descriptions in South 
Africa. Woolgrowers felt cheated. They had expected Japan 
to buy up to the limit of 800,000 bales, but she did not. 
By 1938, demand from the United States had fallen, wars in 
Spain and China reduced British buying, while competition 
from artificial fibres in Japan and Europe made sales 
difficult. There was a strong feeling that Japan had 
reneged on its agreement to the detriment of Australian 
exporters. 
Importers such as T.C. Beirne also felt the new Agreement 
was "entirely in favour of Japan" with the benchmark for 
imports set at the peak year of 1934.*^ The Merchants' 
Association and the Chamber of Manufactures had welcomed the 
higher tariff and licensing as protection against the 
inroads of increasingly good quality and attractively priced 
Japanese goods.'* They now sought Tariff Board protection 
against a new flood of imports such as Japanese earthenware 
and pottery which was cheaper than similar British or local 
articles, and Japanese hat linings which sold for less than 
50 per cent of the cost of local production.'^ Imports from 
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Japan had declined very little during the dispute and it 
appeared that Japan had emerged relatively unscathed. 
From both the Australian and Japanese perspectives, the 
Leader of the Opposition, John Curtin, summed up the results 
of trade diversion: far from increasing the number of 
countries with which Australia "was on terms of goodwill", 
it had engendered "a distinctly unwholesome atmosphere" for 
relations between Australia and her Pacific neighbours.'® 
For Queensland's major industries - wool and meat - the 
dispute marked the end of trade growth as exports did not 
return to 1934 levels until after World War II. This was 
particularly important to the economy of Queensland which 
had a larger proportion of primary producers than the other 
States, a larger proportion of exportable surplus, and a 
heavier dependence on international trade. Economic 
nationalism had closed markets in France, Germany and Italy, " 
and Japan afforded the best hope for increased trade. The 
dispute left a residue of mistrust and caution which 
persisted well into the postwar period and which was 
reinforced by the experiences of the pearling industry and 
by Japan's efforts in the late 1930s to involve Australia in 
its expansion of strategic industries and in the structural 
reorientation of its economy from light to heavy industrial 
production. 
JAPAN AND THE PEARLING INDUSTRY 
The impression of Japan that emerged from the trade 
diversion dispute - of an aggressive trader, willing to 
disrupt established relationships and do anything to promote 
its own interests - was reinforced in Queensland by 
experiences in the pearling industry. 
Japanese involvement in pearling began in the 1880s, and by 
the mid-1890s they were the largest national group working 
in the industry. ^°° There were two major categories - divers 
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and operators. The Japanese divers were highly skilled and 
for such dangerous and specialised work there were no 
alternative employees. The need for Japanese divers helped 
to bring Queensland into conflict with the developing "White 
Australia" policy, and eventually special arrangements were 
made to allow the number of Japanese to rise, which they 
continued to do until 1938-39 except for the two Depression 
years, 1930-31. The Japanese divers may have been respected 
for their skills, but owners resented the way in which they 
used their monopoly position to make ever-increasing demands 
for improved contracts, and for the employment of other 
Japanese as shell openers, divers and tenders. Owners 
accused Japanese head divers of being "the master(s) and 
director(s) of the Australian pearling industry."^°^ 
Even so, the most serious concerns in the industry related 
to Japanese who operated their own vessels, either as 
"dummies", ^ °^  or openly as foreign owners working out of 
offshore bases, fishing international waters and sometimes 
poaching within the three-mile limit. By the 1930s some 
of these vessels were very large and well-equipped, such as 
those owned by Fukutaro Tange who was backed by Mitsui and 
Mitsubishi. ^ °^  As the number and size of Japanese vessels 
increased, concern grew about the impact of Japanese fishing 
methods and the size of Japanese catches on the long-term 
future of resource stocks and of the industry itself. The 
Japanese were known to take the "chicken" or young shell 
which Australian licensees were forbidden to harvest, and 
they were accused of destroying all marine life in their 
path. As reported to the Mackay Commission, "they went over 
the Reef like a cloud of locusts" and left "nothing behind 
them, not even a clam shell".''°^ 
In addition, the huge Japanese catches had a severe impact 
on the market for Australian shell. European pearlers 
complained that, in addition to having larger vessels and 
avoiding restrictions and taxes imposed on Australian 
91 
licensees, the Japanese had much lower operating costs and 
could still make good profits even when prices fell. This 
arose because their supplies were bought cheaply in Java and 
their catch could be sent to Japan from Thursday Island in 
their own boats for about $14 per tonne compared with $2 0-3 8 
per tonne paid by Australian pearlers for shipment to Hong 
Kong.^ °^  European pearlers resented Japanese competition for 
the highly profitable pearlshell market in the United States 
which took a small, but significant share of the Australian 
catch, with the principal sales being in the United Kingdom. 
From 1915-18 Japan herself was the largest customer for 
Australian exports of shell, until imports were replaceby 
supplies from her own ships. Thereafter, until 1942, the 
United States was the major customer, especially for the 
larger and higher-priced shell. The Japanese made inroads 
into this market, partly on account of the superiority of 
their grading which in Australia was "purely nominal". ^ °* 
The situation was made more difficult when huge Japanese 
catches led to a rapid increase in quantities reaching the 
market as they did in 19 3 5 when Mitsui and Mitsubishi 
arranged contracts for the supply of shell from Fukutaro 
Tange's vessels to the Otto Gerdau Corporation in New York, 
a market formerly dominated by Australia. Tange's catches 
were very large and when both Japanese and Australian shell 
reached the market simultaneously, prices plunged to levels 
unprofitable to the Australian sellers, though still 
providing a reasonable return to the Japanese. 
Fears about the complete depredation of fishing areas and 
the commercial impact of Japanese pearling were compounded 
by suspicious about the objectives behind the presence of 
Japanese vessels inside the three-mile limit and the 
purposes of the unauthorised landings made from Japanese 
vessels on the Australian mainland and adjacent islands. 
Concern in northern Queensland was widespread. The Catholic 
Bishop of Bathurst Island claimed that young aboriginal 
women were bartered by older men of the tribe for tobacco. 
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liquor and food.^°^ Business interests in north Queensland, 
as in Western Australia and the Northern Territory, 
pressured the State and Commonwealth Governments to provide 
adequate surveillance. The Townsville Chamber of Commerce 
enlisted the support of its Brisbane counterpart in 
expressing its "alarm at the glaring and persistent visits 
of Japanese sampans on the Australian coast especially the 
Barrier Reef and adjacent islands"^ °® and joined the 
Returned Services League (RSL) in urging the government to 
send a light cruiser to patrol from Cairns to Thursday 
Island "to prevent further depredation in the shell 
industry". Both State and Commonwealth authorities at first 
regarded their fears as greatly exaggerated. Nevertheless, 
police inquiries verified that some reports were accurate, 
and after the arrest by the Customs Department of a sampan 
off Booley Island, Premier Forgan Smith asked the 
Commonwealth to take action. ^ °' The Commonwealth decided to 
provide fast boats to check for sampans on the Reef, to use 
Qantas to assist in surveillance on their regular flights, 
and to send a patrol vessel to operate east of Darwin, 
though it proved not fast enough to catch boats poaching. 
By the end of the 1930s Japanese dominance of the pearling 
industry was regarded as an economic threat to Australian 
interests. The best beds were denuded by Japanese 
operators, world prices depressed by the flood of Japanese 
supplies, Japanese divers demanded ever-improving contracts 
which European owners could not afford, and the formation of 
Nippon Shinju Kaisha directly tied the industry to Japan's 
plans for expansion in South Asia. In 1936 the RSL had asked 
the State Government to take up with the Commonwealth the 
possibility of an agreement with the Japanese regarding the 
size of shell taken from the Reef.^ °^ Diplomatic moves began 
during 1937-8 between Australia and Japan to establish a 
common policy in the three pearling States, but the States 
could not agree and nothing came of it. Pearling was an 
important industry in the economy of the north and of prime 
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importance to areas such as Thursday Island. The impact of 
the Japanese on it reinforced the view, at least in 
Queensland, of Japan's aggressive nationalism. 
JAPAN'S SOUTHWARD EXPANSION 
Concerns about the presence of the Japanese in the pearling 
industry were not just economic, but political as well. 
Long before World War II appeared imminent, security and 
defence issues worried Queenslanders, especially those in 
the north, and the pearling industry became a focus for 
unease about Australia's "indirect but intimate involvement" 
in Japan's economic and military expansion. ^^^  
Japanese interest in Micronesia dated from the late 
nineteenth century, but increased significantly after World 
War I when Japan acquired Germany' former possessions in the 
Northwest Pacific under mandate. The extension of Japanese 
interests into banking, shipping and deep-sea fishing was 
led by large commercial and trading combines such as Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi and Nanyo Kaihatsu KK (South Seas Development 
Co.) and by the 1930s their activities were seen as part of 
a state-aided attempt to co-ordinate and intensify the 
expansion of Japan's influence in the area.^ ^^  Her 
increasing presence in the pearling grounds off Australia's 
northern coast was part of this process. At the end of the 
1937-8 season the Japanese fleet was recalled to its home 
base, where, with Government sponsorship, the separate 
owners merged to form a new and larger company - Nippon 
Shinju Kaisha - a subsidiary of Nanyo Kaihatsu KK. Nanyo 
Kaihatsu had played an important part in the development of 
Japan's Pacific mandates in the 1920s and 30s, especially in 
bringing workers to the sugar plantations of Saipan, and its 
move into the building of schooners and development of 
shipping interests was supported by the Naval General Staff 
First Committee. ^^^  The new organisation for pearling 
therefore seemed to be part of Japan's "southward drive" to 
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expand and strengthen her influence in the region, and to 
obtain both markets for industrial goods and supplies of 
resources such as oil, minerals and raw materials. 
Geographically Queensland was at the frontier of this 
expansion and increasing concern was evident in the growing 
number and urgency of reports of Japanese mapping, making 
naval surveys, illegally landing or having land bases on the 
mainland or adjacent islands under the cover of pearling 
operations. At the very least, Japan's southward expansion 
brought a substantial world power nearer to Australia than 
ever before at a time when there was potential for conflict 
over her desire for materials and markets and the ways she 
sought to obtain them.^ *^ The movement of the Japanese 
economy to a quasi-wartime footing and, after 1937, the 
exigencies of war with China, were major influences on the 
size and pattern of Australia-Japan trade after the end of 
the trade diversion dispute. ^^^  The rapid expansion of heavy 
industry increased Japan's demand for resources such as 
zinc, iron ore, lead, and iron and steel scrap, and the war 
made necessary hides for footwear, and tallow for use in 
explosives. While this provided export opportunities, at 
the same time it generated concern about Australia's role as 
a supplier to Japan's war-based heavy industry and the 
consequences of her place in Japan's "raw material 
procurement strategy". ^ "^^  
Serious Japanese interest in Australian minerals began in 
the mid 1930s as part of a pattern of Japan's involvement in 
the actual production of certain commodities rather than 
merely buying them from countries to her south.^ "^^  Despite 
investment in Manchuria and North China, Japan continued to 
require imports of materials such as iron ore and European 
supplies dwindled as re-armament accelerated. Japan began 
to look at ways of obtaining supplies on a secure, longer-
term basis from largely untapped resources in Australia, 
Malaya, the Philippines and Indo-china. With Japanese 
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government approval and support, companies invested 
directly, or provided the capital for dummy firms, took the 
entire output of mines and provided Japanese shipping 
services, thus exercising real if not ostensible control 
over the whole mining operation. ^ ®^ 
The first attempt to incorporate Australian resources into 
this pattern was the purchase of the Yampi Sound iron ore 
leases from the British company H.A. Brasserts and Co. by a 
dummy operating firm, Yampi Sound Mining Co. Ltd., fully 
funded and effectively controlled by Nippon Mining Company 
of Tokyo.^^' The project received the initial support of the 
West Australian government because it would promote 
development and employment in a remote area,^ °^ and of the 
Australian government because of its contribution to 
exports. ^^^  The project had not come into production when 
the Australian government banned the export of iron ore in 
July 1938, ostensibly because of Australia's limited 
reserves and the desire to conserve them for future 
needs.^ ^^  The real reasons, however, were the "increasing 
geopolitical menace of Japan"^^^ and "fears of the effects 
of Japanese ownership of Australian resources and its 
widening economic interests in Australia". ^ '^^  
The Commonwealth was concerned about the spread of Japanese 
ownership beyond Yampi Sound and the incorporation of 
Australia's northern regions with their mineral, fishing and 
pearling resources, into Japan's southward expansion. This 
concern was acutely felt in Queensland as well. In July 
1937 Premier Forgan Smith warned the Prime Minister that 
Japanese companies, including the large mining group 
Ishihara Sangyo, were attempting to set up a dummy company 
to exploit the Iron Range deposits in Cape York 
Peninsula.^ ^^  Direct approaches had been made to the Mines 
Minister, Mr. Foley, seeking local interest in mines for 
which Japan would guarantee a market, ^ *^ and there were 
reports that Nobutaro Umeda, the chief intermediary in the 
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Yampi Sound dealings, had been making contacts in the 
State. ^^^  There had also been a report in 193 6 from the 
Queensland Commissioner of Police to the Minister for Health 
and Home Affairs that Japanese were trying to obtain an 
interest in mineral leases on Iron Island outside Mackay and 
that two Japanese geologists, a silk merchant (Mr. Koiso), 
and a representative of Japanese financial houses (Mr. 
Matsumoto) had met with an unnamed European to discuss the 
proposal. ^ ®^ Concern about the long-term implications of 
the extension of Japanese ownership of resources and the 
expansion of its commercial interests in Australia underlay 
the Australian government's ban on the export of iron ore 
which effectively ended Japanese attempts to develop 
Australia's mineral resources in the prewar period. 
Japan did provide a very useful market for zinc from Mount 
Isa Mines, though it embroiled the Company and one of its 
Directors in a great deal of public controversy. Mt.Isa was 
essentially regarded as a lead mine, which also produced 
silver; little interest was taken in the zinc which was not 
seen as a commercially marketable product. When zinc began 
to be produced in 193 6, it was initially hoped that overseas 
sales would help relieve the financial distress from which 
the company suffered. However, rail freights absorbed half 
the very modest price that could be obtained, and for the 
most part the zinc was either stockpiled or jettisoned. An 
ambitious idea to construct a railway from Mt. Isa to 
Burketown to a port in the Northern Territory and thus 
escape the stranglehold of the Queensland Railways 
eventually came to nothing, although the Commonwealth 
Government showed initial interest because of the line's 
strategic value. In 1940 the Company sold its large dump of 
zinc concentrate and most of its current zinc output to 
Britain, but much of the zinc was never delivered because of 
a scarcity of shipping space. Although Japan took less than 
3 per cent of the output of zinc concentrates, the Japanese 
market was thus particularly valuable, especially as the 
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lead price was low, and British contracts for one month 
only. Zinc, however, was a strategic metal and in early 1941 
its export to Japan was criticised in the Press and in the 
Commonwealth Parliament on the grounds that it could be 
surreptitiously resold to Germany. One of the Company's 
directors. Senator H.S. Foil, a member of Federal Cabinet, 
explained that the zinc contract had been authorised by the 
Commonwealth before World War II, and the Minister for Trade 
and Customs had taken precautions to ensure that it was not 
used for hostile purposes. ^ '^ Nevertheless, the Senator was 
pressured into resigning from the Board very shortly before 
trade ceased altogether. 
Exports of rural products, however, did not prosper from 
Japan's war economy and southward expansion. The Japanese 
developed a raw materials policy placing more emphasis on 
self-sufficiency, the spreading of purchases of essential 
goods such as wool, and the development and use of 
substitutes. As early as 1935, Dr. Melbourne reported that 
in the territories she controlled or influenced, Japan built 
up primary products that would supply material and 
foodstuffs and help her divert purchases away from countries 
(including Australia) with whom she had an unfavourable 
Balance of Payments. ^ °^ Increased spending on munitions 
strained financial resources and in January 1938 economic 
controls were tightened and non-essential imports reduced by 
50 per cent. Efforts were made by both Australia and Japan 
to increase trade in specific products. The Federal 
Department of Commerce and the Australian Meat Board 
explored the possibility of creating a regular market for 
Australian beef in Japan. They were encouraged by Mr. 
Hiroda of Kanematsu, visiting Australia in January 1938, who 
urged Australia to find markets outside the United Kingdom 
and away from Argentinian competition. The removal of a 50 
per cent surtax and the inauguration of shipment of chilled 
rather than frozen beef made the prospect more realistic, 
though lack of refrigerated transport from wharf to store 
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and the regularity of competitive shipments from China were 
major obstacles. The Japanese sought increased exports of 
Australian wheat but, by 1940, the export of wheat, and of 
most other primary products, was tied to Britain under 
wartime agreements. Queensland did, however, export 
increased amounts of hides and tallow to Japan at good 
prices though, by 1941, amid public criticism. Tallow had 
been exported to Japan for soap-making before the trade 
diversion dispute, but the market had been lost to imports 
from Manchukuo. Its reopening was welcomed by producers, but 
criticised because tallow could also be used as an input to 
explosives. In this way not only obvious strategic 
materials such as zinc, but primary products as well, were 
drawn into Japan's wider strategic plans. 
Opportunities in the Japanese market for Queensland products 
after the trade diversion dispute were thus controlled 
largely by political factors - the limits placed on 
bilateral exchange by the negotiated settlement of the 
dispute, the desire of Japan to incorporate Australia, 
especially northern Australia, into its economic and 
strategic plans, and the response of the Australian 
government to the threat posed by Japan's southward 
expansion and its ownership of Australian resources. 
CONCLUSION 
By the end of the 193 0s the bright promise of a friendly and 
expanding relationship had faded into suspicion and mistrust 
of the Japanese as traders and economic partners. By the 
outbreak of World War II, Queensland-Japan trade had 
declined to less than 3 percent of the total, due largely to 
a drop in Queensland's exports. The rapid and effective 
retaliation against Australia's trade diversion policies, 
the pattern of trade after the dispute's settlement, and 
competition in the pearling industry had given the Japanese 
a reputation as tough and aggressive traders and left a 
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feeling in some sections of the community that the Japanese 
were not interested in a real partnership, but only in 
pursuing their own interests regardless of those of other 
parties. There was a sense of frustration and 
powerlessness, of being "used" as a pawn in a larger game 
where Japan did not quite play by the rules and in which 
neither business nor State and Federal Governments could act 
effectively to promote Australia's own interests. Such 
feelings were greatly intensified by World War II and 
underlay the responses towards the revival of trade, 
especially in the calls for the exercise of strict control 
and supervision and in the opposition, even in the 1960s and 
70s, to Japanese ownership of Australian resources. 
Yet prewar trade, in reflecting at least partly the economic 
strengths of the respective economies, did provide a basis 
from which the relationship would develop after 1945. 
Japan's exports of textiles and the terms of their entry to 
Australia would be important issues in postwar trade, though 
her prewar exports of toys and crockery had little in common 
with the consumer durables and capital goods which were 
major items in Japan's postwar exports. From Queensland's 
overwhelmingly rural economy Japan took small quantities of 
foodstuffs, but mainly products that were inputs to 
manufacturing - wool, cotton, hides and tallow - and the 
resumption of this profitable trade would depend on the 
attitude of Occupation authorities and the international 
community to the revitalization of Japan's industrial base. 
When industry did revive, it came to provide the main market 
for a range of metals and other resources of which in the 
1930s only small quantities of zinc had been exported. 
After the end of World War II, Queenslanders shared with 
other Australians a strong anti-Japanese sentiment which 
made them hesitant about the resumption of relations of any 
kind with Japan. Business was cautious; neither unions nor 
manufacturers were likely to welcome the import of cheap 
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competitive goods. The State Government, the Director of 
Native Affairs, ex-service organisations and the Press were 
adamantly opposed to the re-entry of Japanese divers or 
boats into the pearling industry or into any kind of 
activity in waters in the vicinity of Australia. The re-
employment in 1947 by Bowden Pearling of two Japanese, 
Tomitaro Fuji and Ken Shibasaki, who had lived on Thursday 
Island for many years, led to such a furore that Cabinet 
quickly issued directives that no Japanese were to be 
registered as divers or to work in any capacity. ^^^  Even 
wool interests which had profited greatly from prewar trade 
were hesitant about the possibility that Japan might again 
become an important factor in the industry's prosperity. 
Both business and government favoured the strengthening of 
ties with the Commonwealth rather than seeking or even 
taking advantage of opportunities outside it. 
Yet, more quickly that might have been expected, there was a 
revival of interest in commercial opportunities stemming 
from a resumption of trade. There were difficulties because 
of the dollar shortage, tight controls by SCAP, and the 
limited capacity of the Japanese economy. Australia's 
protectionist policies and import restrictions, and the 
commitment of Australian primary products to the UK were 
further obstacles. ^^^  Yet both private traders (after 1947) 
and Government Departments and agencies sought entry to 
Japan to pick up the threads of prewar trade or investigate 
products to buy or sell. When applications were called by 
the Commonwealth Government for the first group of 24 to go 
to Japan in 1947, Queensland interests claimed that a 
representative from the State should be included because of 
the substantial trade of Queensland firms prewar and because 
Queensland's need for Japanese goods (presumably cotton 
textiles) was greater than that of the other States owing to 
the tropical climate. ^^^  For the Queensland Government, 
shortages of essential materials which delayed 
infrastructure projects and rural and industrial rebuilding 
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engendered a pragmatic approach. Gallup polls indicated that 
a proportion of the public shared their pragmatism. ^ ^ 
Other reports and articles in the Press agreed that, though 
the idea of Japanese goods was repellent, trade would have 
to be tolerated to provide employment for returned 
servicemen, to build up Japanese industry so she could pay 
war reparations^^^ and because, according to the President 
of the Chamber of Commerce, "Australia had been forestalled 
in markets in the East that should have been her special 
care" by the opportunistic actions of the United States.^^^ 
There was, however, a sufficiently substantial resistance by 
many individuals, groups and organisations to the 
restoration of trade to make reciprocity an obstacle to the 
growth of the relationship even 10 or 15 years after the war 
had ended. 
By the end of the 1950s Japan took 15 per cent of Queensland 
exports, the principal commodities being wool, sugar and 
hides and skins, following the prewar pattern, and often 
handled by the same institutions and processes. Wool from 
the Brisbane sales in 1948 was one of the first products 
traded and remained the dominant export until the mid-1970s. 
The initially very small exports of beef represented a major 
part of Australia's total sales of meat to Japan and rose 
rapidly throughout the 1960s to become by the early 1970s 
one of Australia's largest export earners. Because of the 
pattern of its agricultural production, Queensland did not 
participate as fully as the southern States in the growth of 
the export trade in food and feed grains though, taken 
together, cereals provided a significant export income. 
Japan provided a useful outlet for Queensland barley as well 
as the main market for wheat and for sorghum after the 
southern stockfeed market was whittled away by New South 
Wales suppliers. However, the promising cotton trade which 
had existed prewar did not resume until the early 1970s when 
the extension of irrigation allowed the production of an 
exportable surplus coinciding with an unexpected reduction 
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in the Mexican cotton crop and renewed interest from 
Japanese trade houses such as Marubeni lida for Queensland 
supplies. The development of "new" agricultural exports such 
as sugar and the growth in the volume and range of 
traditional rural products made trade with Japan an 
important determinant of the economic well-being of 
Queensland rural industries and involved the State in 
Japan's domestic policies to an extent never imagined in the 
prewar period. 
The trade in coal and minerals began more slowly than the 
sale of rural products, but in the 1960s and 70s Queensland 
and Japanese economic growth became closely linked through 
the rapidly increasing supply of the State's resources to 
Japan's expanding industrial sector. Sales of zinc from Mt. 
Isa resumed in 1953 with the export of 12,000 tons to Mitsui 
Mining and Smelting and expanded to other Japanese producers 
of high grade zinc for industry as rates of recovery from 
orebodies improved. Copper exports from Mt.Isa and Mt. 
Morgan began in 1959 after the completion of the Townsville 
refinery, and urgent efforts by the Japanese to secure 
supplies against an impending world shortage. It was made 
possible by the decision of the Queensland Government to pay 
for the upgrading of the Townsville-Mt. Isa rail link after 
approaches to the World Bank and to the Federal Government 
were unsuccessful. Exports of rutile and zircon from mineral 
sands along the Queensland coastline and offshore islands 
were inputs to the paint, paper and plastics industries and 
later to titanium used in aerospace and jet aircraft. Major 
mining developments in coal and bauxite, geared to the needs 
of the Japanese market, were reflected in greatly increased 
income from mineral exports and were the catalyst for 
changes in the pattern of Queensland's economic growth and 
the basis for a wider and deeper relationship with Japan. 
There had been opportunities for trade in the prewar period, 
created by the unavailability of traditional suppliers 
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during World War I, Japanese economic growth, especially in 
the early 1930s, and the desire of Japan to incorporate 
Australian resources into her plans for economic 
restructuring in the years before World War II. The ability 
of Queensland business to respond to these opportunities was 
limited. The wool industry, with a world-class, price-
competitive product with few viable substitutes, was able to 
attract buyers to the wool auctions and had long-established 
relationships with Japanese spinners through the trading 
company Kanematsu Gosho. Apart from wool, Queensland 
produced only a limited range of products of interest to 
Japan, business was generally small, serving local needs or 
the secure and familiar markets in Britain and the Empire. 
Many Queensland products were uncompetitive and unattractive 
because of high costs, especially of handling and shipping, 
inadequate presentation, poor quality, and the inability to 
supply product on a consistent, year-round basis. Except 
for a small number of enterprising individuals and groups 
such as the woolgrowers and the Queensland Cotton Board, the 
opportunities in Japan went largely unheeded. The positive 
steps taken by the Government in appointing Mr. Frederic 
Jones were not followed through and the investigations and 
enthusiasm of Sir Leslie Wilson and Dr. Melbourne bore 
little fruit. There were few pathfinders whose success would 
show the way, and little recognition at industry level of 
the necessity of identifying and meeting the needs of the 
Japanese market in order to take advantage of the 
opportunities it presented. Queensland business, and 
Australian business generally, was committed to export to 
Britain and the Dominions with whom it had close historical 
ties and where political advantage and tariff concessions 
overcame the economic disadvantages business faced in Japan. 
Except for the short period around the turn of the century, 
there was little effort at State level to promote trade with 
Japan, to take advantage of specific opportunities, or to 
encourage or support business attempts to break into the 
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market, though it must be admitted that difficulties 
stemming from inadequate infrastructure were beyond the 
State's resources to remedy. Within the public sector there 
were those who were active in support of trade with Japan -
Sir Leslie Wilson, J.D. Story through the University of 
Queensland, A.C.V. Melbourne through his chairmanship of the 
Committee on Far Eastern Trade. They were opposed by 
Professor Brigden at the Bureau of Industry and 
counterbalanced by the commitment at government and industry 
level to trade with Britain, and by the tendency to leave 
foreign trade matters to the Commonwealth government. 
Dr. Melbourne had set out the alternative attitudes that 
government could adopt: 
we could just be passive and wait and see if 
they (the Japanese) still need us or go out and 
support purchases ... anticipate negotiations with 
competitors by gathering market information early 
. .. gain acceptance ... watch for ... the possibility 
of improving products ... arouse interest. ^^^  
The Queensland Government clearly took the first course 
despite efforts by the Governor and others to induce a more 
active approach. There was no recognition that State 
objectives could be achieved through trade with Japan, no 
State-business collaboration to overcome obstacles and make 
adjustments necessary for market growth. It is the progress 
of the Government towards the second choice that is one of 
the features of the post war period and a major factor in 
the development of the Queensland-Japan relationship. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RURAL ENTREPRENEURS: 
JAPAN AND THE QUEENSLAND BEEF INDUSTRY 
INTRODUCTION 
The development of the beef trade followed recognition by 
entrepreneurial individuals and companies that opportunities 
existed in Japan for the resumption and possibly the 
expansion of the exports of manufacturing beef which had 
existed in the prewar years. But the real impetus for the 
rapid growth in trade came from innovations in cattle 
raising and meat processing to satisfy the expanded demand 
in Japan for quality table beef and from joint 
industry/government promotion of a distinctively Australian 
product. This was supported by the actions of State and 
Federal Governments to open up new lands and to improve 
transport infrastructure, and by agreements negotiated by 
the Commonwealth for improved and more stable access to 
Japanese markets. 
As for all rural products, the growth of the beef trade was 
heavily influenced by both domestic and international 
factors. The postwar arrangements with Britain, the 
development of the European Community, protectionist 
policies in Japan, and changes in the world economy affected 
the level of trade and presented major challenges in the 
management of the relationship. Within Australia, federal 
macroeconomic and specifically rural policies set the 
domestic economic and operational framework which helped to 
determine the ability of producers to provide, transport and 
sell the quantity and quality of products demanded by the 
Japanese and other markets and to make reasonable profits at 
the prevailing prices. In Queensland, State-based activities 
such as revision of rural leases, research into breeds and 
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pastures, and joint State-Federal projects such as the 
Brigalow Scheme established the preconditions for the 
development of the industry so that it was able to take 
advantage of the opportunities in the Japanese market as 
they arose. 
The nature and location of the beef industry, the large-
scale public infrastructure needed to support it, and the 
influence of Japanese domestic and international trade 
policies on the beef market tended to emphasise the role of 
the Federal rather than the State government in the 
development of the beef trade with Japan. Important though 
the beef industry was to the Queensland economy, its gradual 
development and its national character meant it did not have 
the political as well as economic role necessary for a 
"duality of leadership" in the State or the close and formal 
sharing of decision-making with the State government which 
we shall see in the sugar industry. The relationship between 
State and industry was more remote, though in the areas for 
which it was responsible, the Queensland government was 
active and supportive, though limited by Constitutional 
factors and by the conditions of a market established 
elsewhere. 
THE STATE AND RURAL INDUSTRIES 
Governments at both regional and national levels have 
traditionally been deeply involved in rural policy for 
economic, social and political reasons. These include the 
large number of relatively small competitive units dispersed 
over a wide geographical area, the high degree of 
uncertainty and variability in seasonal conditions, markets 
and incomes, and the importance of agriculture as an earner 
of foreign exchange and as the economic base of most regions 
outside the capital cities. Politically the rural vote has 
been magnified by the distribution of electoral boundaries, 
especially in Queensland, and long-standing attitudes to 
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primary production have given rural policies an importance 
in community values beyond that justified solely on economic 
criteria. 
The Constitutional division of responsibility for rural 
industries has had a pervasive influence on the respective 
roles of national and regional State governments. At 
Federal level, government support has included measures to 
supplement the market, affect the economic structure of 
farming, and assist producers to deal with problems caused 
by the volatility of world economic activity and by the 
mercantilist approach to international trade within 
developed countries. Provisions for various industries at 
different times have included price support, input 
subsidies, protection against imports, tax concessions, 
payments for research and promotion, devaluation 
compensation and rural adjustment assistance. In Queensland, 
they have also included the general supervision of a range 
of Boards such as the Livestock and Meat Authority and the 
Sugar Board which are a basic point of contact between 
industry and government and an important part of the 
framework within which State and industry interact. The 
Boards' roles and functions vary widely and there is no set 
pattern in a complex of statutory controls, voluntary and 
compulsory organisations and stabilisation arrangements. 
Their ad hoc nature reflects the requirements of particular 
commodities and the attitudes of participating groups of 
producers. The result is that at both regional and national 
level, the relationship between state and industry is 
convoluted, varying with the commodity, its organisational 
framework, the nature of the issues, the degree of unanimity 
among interested groups, and the division of authority 
between levels of government. 
In the beef industry, a number of State and Federal bodies 
and Departments, and various industry organisations, have 
had a role in the regulation, development and promotion of 
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beef production and export. The Commonwealth Department of 
Agriculture supervised the quality of export meat by 
licensing export abattoirs, boning rooms and coldstores and 
providing a meat inspection service. The Australian Meat 
Board, established in the 1930s, had the complementary role 
of licensing meat exporting firms, but came to be 
responsible as well for market development, promotion and 
diversification of the industry and for market information 
and advice to governments on international trade. The Board 
was replaced in 1977 by the Australian Meat and Livestock 
Authority, with the statutory functions of promoting 
increased meat consumption at home and abroad, ensuring the 
specification of meat for export conformed to any agreement, 
trading on its own account if market conditions precluded 
private sellers, and issuing directives to licensed 
exporters on matters such as quotas. 
In Queensland the Department of Agriculture and Stock 
maintained a parallel inspection service which concentrated 
on detection of diseases and refused, despite the 
recommendations of Inquiries and Federal legislative 
attempts, to agree to a single supervisory unit. The 
Queensland Meat Industry Board provided all meat for 
domestic consumption in the Brisbane Metropolitan area and 
managed one of the abattoirs licensed to slaughter and 
prepare meat for export. The Board was replaced in 1978 by 
the Meat Industry Organisation and Marketing Authority, 
comprising representatives of the Primary Industries 
Department, meat processor and distributor organisations and 
meat producers. Its role was to advise the Minister 
regarding the industry, promote wider consumption of meat, 
conduct and manage certain abattoirs and to provide and 
develop programs of benefit to producers, processors and 
consumers. Both the State and Federal bodies include 
representatives of the industry and have established 
mechanisms for consultation with industry organisations and 
between the industry and related groups such as those 
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representing shippers and unions. 
The evolution of the State and Federal meat authorities 
marked attempts by governments and industry representatives 
to develop a structure able to deal with the issues of the 
global market, including Japan, in a way which reconciled 
the sometimes conflicting interests of the various 
producers, processors and exporters. The division of 
functions between the AMLC nationally and the Queensland 
Board and Authority reflected the major roles of the two 
governments in the industry. The Commonwealth was directly 
concerned with issues of international marketing, while the 
State concentrated on basic issues of industry development. 
Both were concerned with the maintenance of quality which 
was a vital element in obtaining and retaining access to the 
Japanese market and in promoting an Australian product 
acceptable to the Japanese consumer. 
SALES OF BEEF TO JAPAN 
Beef was among the first products exported to Japan when 
trade resumed after World War II, mostly supplied for the US 
Services stationed in Japan and paid for in US dollars. 
Quantities were small, with 95 tons coming from the "free 
quota" in 1952-3, 1298 tons in 1953-4 and 1503 tons in 1954-
5 or about 1 percent of Australia's total beef exports. 
During the 1950s, exports were restricted by a combination 
of factors including difficulties of producing sufficient to 
meet commitments to the UK market, the introduction of 
import restrictions in Japan, decreased demand from 
importers and the very attractive market in the USA for the 
limited quantities of "free quota" beef. 
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TABLE 3.1 
EXPORTS OF AUSTRALIAN BEEF AND VEAL TO JAPAN 
( '000 tons shipped weight) 
Source: 
Year 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
t Board 
Qty 
1.3 
1.5 
1.2 
8.0 
3.0 
1.0 
2 
2.1 
3.2 
3.2 
4.8 
6.2 
8.3 
8.4 
11.87 
14.63 
16 
29.7 
44.6 
84.9 
80.2 
8.12 
65.5 
71.2 
71.4 
Annual Report 
Ill 
After World War II, most of Australia's exports of beef were 
made to the United Kingdom on a year-to-year basis, 
eventually formalised into the 15-Year Meat Agreement of 
1952 which aimed to increase production, provide secure 
supplies to the British consumer and guaranteed markets to 
the Australian producer. Minimum prices were guaranteed for 
each type of meat with "deficiency payments" if market 
prices were less than the minimum. In return, Australia 
accepted, until 1961, restrictions on the export of meat 
outside the United Kingdom except for a small "free" quota 
to allow exploration of alternative markets. Although the 
arrangement provided welcome stability, it prevented 
Queensland and other producers from taking full advantage of 
opportunities in Japan when they arose. 
A further and more permanent limitation on exports to Japan 
arose from that country's import policies. Imports in the 
immediate postwar period were limited by Japan's shortage of 
foreign exchange, especially for trade with countries such 
as Australia in the sterling payments area. But by 1954 
foreign exchange banks were able to automatically approve 
applications to import a range of products, including beef, 
subject only to 10 per cent tariff ad valorem. After 1957, 
however, the Japanese Government protected its high-cost 
domestic beef industry by quota limits on imports. At 
first, (1957-64) limits were determined by a ceiling on the 
monetary value of imports - the Fund Allocation system -
supplemented by the duty of 10 per cent, a levy of 
approximately 5c per lb and a requirement that importers 
deposit 35 per cent of the cif value of proposed imports. 
Longworth argues that this system of limitation by value 
encouraged the import of cheaper meats where the maximum 
quantity was obtained with the limited funds available. 
Australia supplied mainly frozen briskets from grassfed 
cattle which were used in the institutional and processing 
sectors of the trade and it came to be believed in Japan 
that Australian beef was of very low quality. 
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Subsequently, from 1964, after Japan joined the IMF, 
protection was afforded by restrictions on the quantity 
rather than the value of beef imported. This Import Quota 
(IQ) system posed new challenges but opened new 
opportunities for beef exporters. The quota system was 
linked to a beef wholesale price stabilisation scheme 
achieved using a buffer-stock operation and fluctuating 
imports to manipulate the amounts of beef entering the 
wholesale market. Imported beef was purchased at world 
prices by the Livestock Import Promotion Corporation (LIPC) 
or permitted traders and resold to Japanese wholesalers at 
an amount sufficient to ensure high prices to Japanese beef 
producers. The quota system placed an upper limit on the 
market, but removed the incentive to import only cheaper 
cuts. Australian exporters and the Australian Meat Board 
worked to persuade the Japanese meat trade that better 
quality beef was available, but they met considerable 
resistance from the meat industry which believed that 
Japanese housewives would buy only fresh, and not frozen, 
beef. 
The uncertainties of the operation of the IQ system, 
especially the 6-monthly declaration of quotas, posed a 
major obstacle to the planning of appropriate production 
levels and sequencing the flow of beef for the market, while 
the complexities of the distribution channels meant there 
was no direct relationship between producer/exporter and 
consumer to facilitate understanding of market requirements. 
Political influences on the beef market in Japan were the 
major determinant of the wide fluctuations in export 
opportunities in the 1970s. In the early years of the decade 
Japan was concerned that it might not have adequate supplies 
of domestic or imported meat to satisfy market requirements. 
The Chairman of the Australian Meat Board addressing the 
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Australia-Japan Business Cooperation Committee meeting in 
1972 indicated that almost without exception every Japanese 
visitor in the previous year, whether Government official, 
commercial buyer or shipping representative, expressed 
concern regarding future supplies to Japan and tried to 
assess Australia's ability to meet requirements. The import 
quota rose from 24,200 tonnes in 1971 to 160,000 tonnes in 
1974 as part of attempts by the Japanese government to 
Q 
control inflation in general and meat prices in particular. 
The Japanese Government in 1973 asked Australia not to 
restrict exports, as it had been considering in order to 
reduce domestic meat prices, but to increase them because of 
the scarcity of beef in Japan and the high prices that would 
9 
result from curtailment of imports. 
TABLE 3.2 
EXPORTS TO JAPAN BY STATES 1966-1973 
(tons) 
NSW Vic Qld S.A. W.A. Tas. NT. Total 
1966 1841 1040 4803 ... 422 206 65 8377 
1967 1288 1082 
1968 2278 306 
1969 2052 581 
1970 3700 2174 
1971 5481 6173 
1972 13133 7417 
1973 24682 14124 
Source: Australian Meat Board, Annual Report various years, 
4183 
8951 
11110 
9517 
16671 
21316 
41362 
10 
1 
11 
39 
80 
200 
297 
214 
268 
762 
646 
852 
1909 
2665 
217 
25 
75 
129 
170 
476 
1687 
49 
42 
41 
37 
279 
174 
145 
7043 
11871 
14632 
16242 
29706 
44625 
84962 
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However, by mid 1973 a decline in Japanese consumer demand, 
coupled with continuing imports, reduced prices below viable 
levels for Japan's domestic producers, and manufacturers and 
end-users were asked to seek deferment or cancellation of 
import contracts already entered into. Quotas were 
suspended and eventually cancelled, and the market closed 
altogether from February 1974 to June 1975. This action 
"shook the Australian beef industry to its foundations", 
particularly as it came as a complete shock. Since 
Australia supplied over 80 per cent of Japan's beef imports, 
of which more than half came from Queensland, this State's 
producers bore the brunt of the embargo. 
Australia's exports of beef to Japan fell from 85,000 tons 
in 1972-3 to 80,200 tons in 1973-4 and only 8100 tons in 
12 
1974-5. The value of Queensland's exports fell from 
approximately $64m in 1972-3 and $75m in 1973-4 to only $8m 
in 1974-5. Given the importance of beef to both Australia 
and Queensland, this was a major economic setback. The 
Chairman of the AMB in the covering letter to the Minister 
with the Annual Report for 1974-5 indicated that during the 
year the industry had gone from relative prosperity to "a 
situation so critical" that its very survival was 
threatened. 
Despite the problems caused by market closure, the industry 
remained confident that Australia would regain its position 
and would be looked to as the source of the bulk of Japan's 
import requirements. But when the market reopened, 
Australian exporters struggled to return their sales to 
Japan to former levels and to obtain some greater 
predictability in the quota system. Political decisions in 
Japan to make a positive response to United States demands 
for increased market access added to problems caused by 
Japanese protectionism. The administration of the quota 
system was changed to ensure that most of the increased 
quota for FY 1977 came from the United States. ^^ Beef 
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specifications were altered to relate them more closely to 
the US grading system, though this was not a problem for 
specialist producers such as Queensland's Beef City. More 
importantly, emphasis placed on cuts rather than full sets 
effectively prevented Australia from competing since there 
was no domestic or foreign market for the remainder of such 
a fatty and mature carcase. The effect of these changes was 
particularly evident on the decline in Australia's share of 
the high quality sector which had provided much of the 
market growth, together with good prices which were an 
incentive for improvements in production and processing. 
Between July 1978 and June 1979 Australia shipped only 227 
tonnes of high quality beef to Japan in the form of full 
carcases in primal cuts, though the fall was partly offset 
in subsequent years by the introduction of aged beef full 
sets into the LIPC frozen tenders. A delegation to Japan in 
June 1978 including the Chairmen of the AMLC and Australian 
Meat Exporters' Federation and subsequent negotiations 
between the Japanese and Australian governments sought to 
increase Australia's share of the high quality grain-fed 
beef market. The LIPC in 1980 agreed to establish as a 
trial a global quota of 200 tonnes in full sets, most of 
18 
which was drawn from Australia , but the high reserve price 
placed on these by the LIPC and the difficulty of selling at 
auction only confirmed in Australian minds that Japan was 
deliberately discriminating against them in favour of US 
suppliers. 
Another factor contributing to the depressed demand for 
Australian beef was the extraordinary growth in imports of 
US grainfed diaphragm beef (i.e. hanging tenders and outside 
skirts) , classed as "offal" rather than "beef" and therefore 
not subject to quota restrictions. This meat was tender, 
juicy and marbled and was sold as steaks and sliced meat, 
especially in family chain restaurants and beef and rice 
21 
fastfood outlets. Australian diaphragm beef could not 
compete for the table trade because the grassfed animal 
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produced diaphragm beef that was dry, tough and 
unappetising, although Australia continued to supply 
quantities of offal for ham and sausage processing. 
TABLE 3.3 
JAPAN'S BEEF OFFAL IMPORTS BY COUNTRY SHARE 
1976-1983 
Year 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
Austral la USA Other 
percent 
41.7 
29.7 
22.8 
22.1 
18.3 
13.7 
11.9 
37.1 
55.3 
64.7 
64.7 
70.8 
76.1 
78.3 
21.2 
15.0 
12.5 
13.2 
10.9 
10.2 
9.8 
Source: A. George, Japan's Beef Export Policies 1978-1984 
The Growth of Bilateralism (Canberra: Australia-Japan 
Research Centre, 1984) . 
The rise in US offal imports displaced demand for beef 
imports under quota, especially frozen grassfed beef which 
was outstripped by diaphragm beef as cheap meat for 
consumption at the lower end of the table beef trade. 
The decline in Australia's quota for the second half of FY 
1976 and subsequent incremental shifts towards US suppliers 
meant that Australia's share of total imports dropped from 
78 per cent in 1978 to 66 per cent in 1983. 
Political control of the beef market in Japan was the major 
determinant of the extent to which increasing consumer 
demand was translated into opportunities for trade. The 
operations of the Japanese protection system established the 
boundaries within which Australian producers and exporters 
had to work, and precipitated the major crises of the 
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trading relationship. 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE BEEF TRADE - THE 1950S. 
Despite the obstacles posed by the Japanese quota system and 
Australia's commitment to the 15-Year Meat Agreement, 
initiatives towards opening up the beef trade were taken by 
both Japanese importers and Queensland exporters. The first 
steps were taken by private enterprise, but the start of 
long-term development occurred after a combination of 
changes in the international market, difficulties in the 
Australian economy and industry pressure brought recognition 
by governments, government agencies and the AMB of the 
opportunities created by economic and social changes in 
Japan. 
In April 1957 two Japanese businessmen came to Brisbane 
seeking to import 30,000 tons of meat. They were Mr. Okada 
of Nippon Chikusan Boeki, and formerly chairman of the Japan 
Meat Industry Board, and his import adviser, Mr. Okazaki of 
Rika Shizai Co. which also acted as a liaison company for 
the local firm Amagraze. Its Managing Director, Mr. Beaver, 
said his company had been working hard for two years to 
increase exports to Japan because the price was better than 
that in the UK market and he regarded it as only a matter of 
time before either Australia or Britain allowed the Meat 
Agreement to lapse. He believed that if Australia walked 
away from this opportunity it would "live to regret it" and 
urged that a way be found to permit at least a token 
quantity to be exported to "hold the market" and as a base 
23 
on which to build an expanding trade in the future. 
Although the delegation had to return to Japan empty-handed, 
since supplies were committed under the 15-year Meat 
Agreement, pressures were exerted by other sectors of the 
beef industry for positive efforts to be made to expand 
sales to Japan. 
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Their interest in the Japanese market was part of a 
recognition by the mid-1950s at industry and government 
levels that the wartime era in overseas marketing was over. 
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Both the Queensland Department of Agriculture and Stock 
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and the Australian Council of Agriculture emphasised the 
urgent need to open up new markets for products such as 
meat, oats, barley and sugar whose production had been 
expanding and to minimise problems in the Balance of 
Payments caused by escalating imports of goods such as 
petrol, rubber, fertilisers and machinery. The interest of 
beef producers and exporters in Japan was not at first 
supported by the Australian Meat Board or by the Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics. The Bureau found it hard to gauge 
the extent of demand in markets outside the United Kingdom 
and was reluctant to encourage their exploration since the 
arrangements of the 15-Year Agreement overcame the 
uncertainties of low prices and demand fluctuations which 
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had bedevilled the industry before World War II. 
Nevertheless, sections of the beef industry urged a search 
for markets outside the United Kingdom, especially in Japan. 
In April 1958 a meeting of the Central and North Queensland 
Graziers' Association Cattle Committee decided to ask their 
representative on the Australian Meat Board (Mr. W.M. Gunn) 
to suggest to the Board an immediate investigation of the 
prospects of expanding sales to Japan. They urged that this 
occur prior to the scheduled review of the Meat Agreement so 
that Australian negotiators would be aware of the prospects 
before talks began. The AMB believed there was no market 
in Japan for Australian beef and Mr. Gunn thought that 
Japanese restrictions on imports and increased domestic 
production meant that the continuing market for exportable 
beef would lie in the UK. Nonetheless, by 1959, with the 
end of the protected market in the UK in sight, the AMB 
began to look again at the possibilities of sales in Japan, 
though the Board initially saw the main prospect as 
manufacturing mutton. The price was "satisfactory" if 
119 
somewhat less than in the United States market and some 
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exporters appreciated the value of diversification. 
Although there were several buying missions from Japan after 
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an AMB delegation visited Japan in 1959, the Board was 
very cautious and thought it preferable that the market be 
developed judiciously because of the higher prices in the 
USA and the shortage of Australian supplies. However, by 
1960-61, changes in the international market coinciding with 
a downturn in the Australian economy made the development of 
new sales outlets more urgent. With the end of the 15-Year 
Agreement, restrictions on exports to the rapidly-growing 
and very profitable United States market led the Board to 
urge that trade with Japan "should be encouraged as much as 
possible because of the anticipated long-term advantages to 
the industry". By 1961-2 it recognised "the special 
importance of the Japanese market" as a much-needed 
diversification away from the United States "for exports of 
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meat particularly boneless beef and mutton". After a visit 
by representatives to Japan in 1963, the Board acknowledged 
that at that stage the Japanese market "had not been 
properly covered or fully understood" and urged exporters to 
give it personalised, on-the-spot attention, to send senior 
executives to obtain first-hand knowledge and to develop 
trust and goodwill. The Board advised that consistently 
successful business would "depend to a greater degree than 
elsewhere on personal contact" and on patience and good 
faith.^ ^ By 1959-60 the value of Australian exports of beef 
and veal to Japan was $412,000 of which Queensland 
contributed just over 90 percent. 
Economic and social changes in Japan and in the operation of 
the quota system created new opportunities for the export of 
table as well as of manufacturing beef. From 1967 the 
market expanded rapidly, especially for better quality meat. 
Real disposable incomes in Japan rose, and increasing 
urbanisation, the growth of the nuclear family, increasing 
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demand for convenience foods and restaurant meals all 
contributed to rising demand. The growing use of dishes 
cooked on the stove rather than at the table, and the 
increasing use of hamburgers and similar foods opened the 
way for grain fattened beef and for better quality grassfed 
chilled beef which were very suitable for this "popular" 
market encompassing the table trade, supermarkets and 
convenience stores, hamburger and fast food chains. 
Australia thus positioned its exports in the most rapidly 
growing "submarkets" which account for some 65-70 percent of 
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the total beef trade. 
Although Australian and Queensland beef had been sold to 
Japan before World War II, and in limited quantities in the 
early 1950s, the development of a substantial and long-term 
market was a pioneering project whose possibilities had only 
begun to be recognised by the beginning of the 1960s. Very 
little was known of the nature, characteristics and 
potential of the Japanese market or of the political role of 
the beef industry in Japan, and past experience was only a 
rudimentary guide to the tortuous channels and internal 
politics of the Japanese beef marketing system. There was 
little recognition in Australia or Queensland at an official 
or industry level of the changes in production, handling and 
marketing of beef that would be necessary to respond to the 
demands of the Japanese market or of the major improvements 
in transport, finance and land access that would provide the 
essential infrastructure for industry development. Taking 
advantage of the opportunities presented by economic and 
social changes in Japan depended on the willingness and 
ability of producers to provide beef of suitable quality, 
and on the marketing activities of private traders and the 
Australian Meat Board to identify and develop appropriate 
segments of the wholesale and retail trade. Private and 
national initiatives were supported by State-based 
activities, such as in Queensland the revision of land laws, 
research into breeds and pastures and cooperative projects 
121 
with the Commonwealth, especially in transport and land 
development. These contributed to the development of the 
industry to a point where it was able to produce quality 
beef which was available for export all year round, thus 
establishing the basic prerequisite for the growth of 
markets in Japan and elsewhere. 
DEVELOPING THE BEEF INDUSTRY 
Marketing of beef is an activity involving the whole of the 
industry - breeders, producers, processors and marketers. 
Factors which impact at the farm level determine the ability 
of the industry to produce and deliver animals of suitable 
quality at the appropriate time at a cost that allows a 
reasonable profit at the prevailing market price. These 
factors include availability of suitable breeds, appropriate 
systems of animal nutrition and health management, transport 
and water resources, land tenure systems, and the general 
level of prices. Decisions about the mix of these factors 
in farm practice were in the hands of individual producers, 
but State and Federal governments had a major role in 
research and infrastructure provision and in general 
economic management which set the environment in which 
decisions were made. This influence on the ability of the 
industry to produce and deliver the basic product has been 
the main role of the State in the beef trade with Japan. 
Like sugar production, the cattle industry was an important 
part of plans developed by State and Federal Governments for 
northern development and postwar reconstruction. A 
submission by Prime Minister Chifley to the 1944 Premiers' 
Conference led to the establishment of the NADC, the 
assembling of data on the pastoral potential of the north by 
the Queensland, West Australian and Federal Governments and 
the establishment of a Policy Committee consisting of the 
Premiers of those States, the Prime Minister, and the 
Minister for the Interior. Recommendations from this 
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Committee and from the NADC, the Meat Production Development 
Committee and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics(BAE) led 
to vigorous research by the CSIRO, BAE and the Departments 
of Agriculture in Queensland and Western Australia into 
cattle breeds, nutrition and pastures, and formed the basis 
of policy initiatives by State and Federal Governments over 
the next 20 years. Without them, Queensland would not 
have been able to achieve adequate production levels and 
deliver quality beef throughout the year to take advantage 
of export opportunities when they arose. 
The beef cattle industry was also an important part of the 
vision of successive Premiers for large-scale development in 
Queensland. Premier Hanlon would not tolerate the negativism 
that pervaded the industry in the immediate postwar period 
and its members received a stern lecture from him in 1948 
about the view then being expressed that Queensland would 
have no surplus available for export by 1960. "To suggest 
that was the best we could do with the immensity of the land 
available", he said, "was to give expression to a defeatist 
attitude from which ruination would be the outcome." He 
promised that the government would do whatever was necessary 
to improve breeding and fattening country and that by 1960 
industry members would laugh at "the crazy theory" that 
there would be no beef for export. Persuading beef 
producers that increased production would be viable in the 
longer term was an important step in developing an industry 
sufficiently large to take advantage of the opportunities 
that were to arise some 15 years later. 
Industry pessimism had its origins in prewar experience, 
when producers, especially in the north and west, had been 
chronically on the verge of bankruptcy because of poor 
prices and difficulties inherent in the harsh environment. 
In the immediate postwar years, the economic gains from 
wartime stability had been eroded by the drought of 1945-6, 
while shortages of manpower and machinery impeded progress 
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and contributed to the stagnation of inland towns. Both the 
Bureau of Industry and the Royal Commission on Abattoirs and 
Meatworks in 1945 had pointed to the "immense possibilities" 
of the Cooper Channel Region and the fattening areas between 
Clermont and Charters Towers which would be assisted by 
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developments in irrigation and transport. There were 
proposals to make the Channel Country accessible by a rail 
link from Bourke to Camooweal, a start was made on a system 
of beef roads and in 1949 Prime Minister Chifley and Premier 
Hanlon agreed to establish the Burdekin River Authority, 
similar to the Snowy Mountains Authority, to provide water 
and power to northern Queensland. The Bureau and the Royal 
Commission believed there was a "colossal market" to be 
developed in countries such as China and India as their 
living standards rose, and among the "teeming millions of 
Asia and underfed Europe" who could "destroy the world" if 
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they did not get food. The efforts of the Queensland 
government to overcome industry pessimism was based on the 
widely-held belief in the urgency of northern development 
for defence and strategic reasons, as well as on the State's 
interest in the development of all forms of rural 
production. The 15-Year Meat Agreement, with stability of 
prices and quantities, provided a foundation for a more 
optimistic outlook. Funds allocated under the States Grants 
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(Encouragement of Meat Production) Act of 1949 went some 
way to assisting Queensland and Western Australia with 
developmental projects to put the beef industry on a firmer 
footing, although the grand schemes for beef roads and the 
development of the Burdekin were abandoned by the Menzies 
government. 
The Nicklin Government also saw the cattle industry as 
important and sought to establish the basis for policy 
through consultation between the industry and Government 
Departments and agencies. It set up a Standing Advisory 
Committee on the Beef Industry, with representatives of the 
Departments of Agriculture and Stock and Treasury, graziers 
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and meat processors, to advise the Minister on the 
41 
production, processing, transport and marketing of beef. 
In 1961 this Committee was asked to present a comprehensive 
report to Cabinet to serve as a guide for the development of 
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the industry, especially in Central Queensland. Government 
action was directed towards improving the ability of 
Queensland producers to compete on the world market, rather 
than just within the protected and guaranteed market in 
Britain. 
An important and controversial step was the granting of 
concessions to large investors, even on matters regarded by 
many in the Government parties as settled policy. The Hanlon 
Labor government had rejected the major recommendation of 
committees appointed under Prime Minister Chifley that 
capital improvements were more likely with freehold title 
and with properties of sufficiently large size. Nicklin in 
his Country Party policy speech in 1966 said his government 
also had "repeatedly rejected arguments in favour of big 
company development" because "immediate closer settlement 
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best serves the interests of the State and the nation." In 
reality, the high capital outlays required for the 
production of quality beef in inhospitable areas militated 
against the small producer, and a necessary prerequisite for 
large capital investment was revision of the Labor land 
legislation to allow increased conversion to freehold and 
larger and more secure leases. Pastoral interests such as 
the United Graziers' Association, its President, Sir William 
Gunn, and companies with large-scale investments pressed for 
freehold or perpetual leasehold, questioning the wisdom of 
whittling down properties to parcel the area out to 
selectors.^^ Traditional policy allowing large holdings and 
long (30-year) leases only in remote areas where pioneering 
developments would eventually make way for "more productive 
settlement"^^ had been justified by successive inquiries -
the Royal Commission on Abattoirs and Meatworks (1945), the 
Royal Commission on Pastoral Lands Settlement (1951), and 
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the Land Settlement Advisory Commission (1959). To 
encourage larger properties and economies of scale. Premier 
Nicklin relaxed the rules, over the objections of some in 
his own Party and of cattlemen's organisations, allowing 
extensive long-term leases in areas that could by no stretch 
of the imagination be regarded as remote. Some of these 
areas were in or close to the Brigalow lands whose 
development, together with the Beef Roads scheme, marked a 
major State-Federal cooperative effort to encourage 
increased production, initially for the United States' 
market. 
The Beef Roads scheme, which had been abandoned by Menzies, 
was important in providing access for cattle bred in the 
north and west to the good pastures of Eastern and Central 
Queensland where they could be fattened to produce high 
quality table beef. Manufacturing and frozen beef came from 
cattle which received good quality feed in spring and 
summer, and low quality in autumn/winter, whereas table beef 
came from young cattle that had never been set back, so that 
feeding had to be supplemented at certain times of the year. 
In the North and West this was more difficult as the young 
grass dried to straw very quickly and there was a shortage 
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of legumes even m good seasons, at least until new 
varieties were developed by the Department of Primary 
Industry and the CSIRO. The more reliable rainfall and more 
fertile soils in Central and Eastern Queensland were better 
for fattening on crops and improved pastures. The economic 
survey of the beef cattle industry organised by the AMB and 
the NADC identified a lack of facilities for the rapid 
movement of stock as a major impediment to the development 
of the industry. Therefore the Agreement between the 
Commonwealth and Queensland Governments for the Beef Roads 
Scheme to provide better access between the breeding areas 
of North Queensland and the fattening areas of South and 
Central Queensland was an integral part of the development 
of quality beef which was available for the export trade all 
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through the year. 
So, too, was the opening up of the Brigalow lands, 
recommended by the Queensland Land Settlement Advisory 
Commission and urged by the State government to expand beef 
and grain production, and to redress Queensland's unfairly 
small share (0.4 per cent to 30 June 1960) of postwar 
Commonwealth grants to the States for land settlement. 
Most of the cleared land was used for livestock fattened on 
improved grasses and grains which extended the fattening 
season and increased productivity. But costs were high -
especially clearing and preventing sucker re-growth - and 
profitability depended on continuing good returns for beef 
on the export market. Established producers were very wary 
of the Government's expansion plans as they faced 
uncertainty in the UK and US markets and had little 
confidence in the long-term profitability of existing 
outlets. There were calls by organisations such as the 
United Graziers' Association, the Cattle Committee of the 
Graziers' Association of Central and Northern Queensland, 
and the Central Council of the Graziers' Association of 
Queensland for all government-sponsored rural development 
programs to be halted until lucrative and stable markets 
were found. Nevertheless, the development of Central and 
Northern Queensland was so important that Nicklin was 
prepared to override objections that industry expansion 
could not be justified on economic grounds, the costs of 
development were too high, markets too uncertain and 
prospects of profit too far in the future. The programmes 
went ahead, and in the market downturn in 1975 many new 
producers found themselves financially overextended. When 
markets recovered, the Brigalow areas were able to produce 
pasturefed bullocks nearly equal in quality to grainfed 
beasts and at a more economical price. The determination of 
the Queensland government to see the Brigalow scheme go 
ahead allowed the establishment of an area which was to be 
the centre of high-quality beef production for the Japanese 
127 
market. 
The Queensland Government, under both Nicklin and Bjelke-
Petersen, also overrode objections to support and even 
encourage foreign investment in beef and other rural 
industries in order to promote larger holdings, introduce 
new breeds and methods and provide much-needed capital. 
This investment was facilitated by the Aliens Act of 1965, 
allowing foreigners to buy freehold or leasehold land in 
Queensland as if they were citizens. Foreign ownership 
increased, although its precise extent was unknown. Some 
companies which expanded their holdings had been in 
Queensland for many years. They included Stanbroke Pastoral 
Co. (owned by Borthwicks and the AMP) and the English firm, 
Vesteys, operating as William Angliss and Co. New investors 
included King Ranch Development Co. , responsible for the 
introduction of Santa Gertrudis cattle, and Tipperary Land 
Corp. which "pioneered the ^pasture revolution' in 
Queensland". In 1968 the Lakeland Downs Co., an affiliate 
of Tipperary, undertook a large development "possibly 
unparalleled in any remote region of the north" especially 
to meet the demands of the Japanese market and in which 
Sumitomo Shoji (Aust.) acquired a 13 per cent interest. 
The Queensland government did not actively seek foreign 
investment, but their cooperative attitude, together with 
that of the Federal government, made investment relatively 
easy and contributed to an inflow of capital and ideas, 
though there was disagreement at both community and industry 
level about the net benefit such investment brought. 
Slowly at first, but with increasing strength, the community 
began to object to the level of foreign ownership of rural 
land, and by the 1970s these objections had become entwined 
with the larger, Australia-wide questions of foreign 
ownership of Australian resources and "buying back the 
farm". Local branches of industry associations, such as the 
Muttaburra and Stonehenge Branches of the Graziers' 
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Association of Central and Northern Queensland, urged their 
organisations to press for foreign ownership of rural land 
to be referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Investment, and for limits to be placed on ownership by 
54 . . . 
Japanese and other Asians. Cattle industry organisations 
put together a set of guidelines for foreign investment, 
with 51 per cent Australian equity, no transfer of equity 
without Australian consent, and no transfer pricing - but 
the government was unwilling to adopt them. By 1978 the 
Cattlemen's Union was expressing its concern at reports that 
Japanese tourist developer, Mr. Iwasaki, and some of his 
associates were planning to move into beef production on 
land bought for or near his resort at Yeppoon, and the 
National Party itself urged the introduction of a compulsory 
land register to enable monitoring of the level of foreign 
ownership of or interest in lands in the State. Mr. 
Bjelke-Petersen, like his predecessor, was prepared to 
ignore these calls in the interests of "development", some 
of which was for the raising of cattle for the export of 
beef to Japan and the USA. 
Increased investment, the opening of new lands, and improved 
transport were part of a changing attitude to beef 
production in Queensland and a prerequisite to the 
development of the Japanese market. Before World War II, 
graziers ran cattle only when they were unable to run sheep, 
and produced lean beef for the domestic market or fat beasts 
for the frozen beef trade with the United Kingdom. In the 
1950s the opening of the United States market required a 
completely different article produced mainly from cows and 
lean beasts, with no marbling and no premium for fat cattle. 
New strains of cattle were introduced, especially those that 
were tick-resistant and suitable for North Queensland, and 
many producers turned to this type of production. When the 
market opened in Japan, production requirements were 
different again, and much more specific. The Japanese 
market paid a premium for the fat animal and set the tone 
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for the fat cattle market. Efforts were made to produce a 
beast with an increasing percentage of saleable product, 
developed from British breeds and European/British crosses, 
meeting specific quality requirements in terms of fat, 
marbling, tenderness and colour. 
Given the frontier nature of the beef industry because of 
its remote locations, its depressed and dispirited condition 
in the early postwar period, and the scope and complexity of 
essential improvements, only governments could provide the 
leadership and capital to establish the basic conditions on 
which the industry could build. All postwar Queensland 
Governments concerned themselves with policies such as roads 
and irrigation which allowed the cattle industry to exist, 
with improved communications to facilitate the transport of 
cattle to market or to fattening areas all through the year, 
and with concessions and infrastructure projects such as 
relaxed land tenure and the Brigalow Scheme to allow the 
Queensland beef industry to develop to a point where it 
could compete successfully in overseas markets. The most 
complex of these projects were beyond the financial capacity 
of the State and succeeded only with the cooperation of the 
Federal government. The development of foreign markets was 
left largely to individual exporters, the Australian Meat 
Board and its successor, the AMLC. Neither the Commonwealth 
Government nor the Queensland Government intervened 
directly, except in crisis situations. 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE BEEF MARKET IN JAPAN 
Exporters and the Australian Meat Board both responded to 
and helped create an increasing demand for better quality 
Australian meat in Japan. There were two major approaches: 
(i) improvement in commercial export marketing techniques to 
satisfy the Japanese consumer preferences, for example the 
development of the chilled beef trade and some commercial 
experiments as an integrated activity between feedlots. 
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Australian export meatworks and Japanese importers (ii) 
identification on an increasing and widening scale of 
Australian beef at the point of sale. 
Initiatives in the chilled beef trade 
Supplying quality table beef placed much greater demands on 
producers than supplying an anonymous input for processing. 
The quality and condition of the animal at slaughter was of 
paramount importance, and this had to be complemented by 
accurate grading and careful preparation and transport. The 
development of the chilled beef trade and the finishing of 
animals in feedlots were two of the major improvements 
designed to meet the quality standards of Japanese table 
beef. Initiatives in these developments were taken by 
private enterprise, though close involvement of government 
agencies such as the CSIRO in research and tighter 
classification standards were essential for the successful 
growth of chilled beef exports. 
The development of the trade in chilled beef was encouraged 
by the broadening of the Japanese market to include a wider 
variety of cuts and the product found a ready outlet in 
retail stores and supermarkets. During 1967 the Japan Meat 
Conference considered the possibility of chilled beef 
imports and set up an investigating committee in which the 
AMB's Asian representative was invited to participate. In 
1968 the AMB offered a small quantity processed in Brisbane 
as a trial for assessment and though it was well received, a 
lack of chiller shipping space precluded further development 
till after containers became available in the 1970s. 
Queensland cattlemen's organisations and some Harbour Boards 
were concerned that container shipping would bypass 
Queensland ports and representations were made to the 
Queensland Government, through the UGA and the Australian 
Woolgrowers and Graziers' Council and directly to the 
Minister for Shipping and Transport (Mr. Sinclair) to ensure 
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that this did not happen. Initial shipments began 
cautiously, accompanied by guidance and recommended 
specifications resulting from trade surveys undertaken by 
the AMB's Tokyo office. These included strong 
recommendations that Australian exporters select only 
"chiller quality" and the top range of first quality beef 
for this trade, most of which comprised cartons of boneless 
cuts, cryovac sealed. The cartons were convenient to 
handle, standards of hygiene in preparation and packing were 
higher than the Japanese equivalent, and the beef was cheap 
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by Japanese standards. The product gained ready 
acceptance and sales grew rapidly from 550 tons to December 
1970, 3289 tons in the 6 months to June 1971, 12000 tons in 
1971-2, and a peak of 43,000 tons in 1973-74.'^ ° 
Initiatives in the development of the trade were taken by 
private enterprise, working within the Japanese import 
system, developing and adapting new technologies to fill 
niches which were identified in the Japanese market. The 
experiences of one of the first exporters, Thomas Borthwick 
& Sons (Australasia) Pty.Ltd., illustrates the 
entrepreneurship of firms and individuals and the important 
backing role of government agencies such as the CSIRO in 
giving technical advice. 
Borthwicks was an English-based integrated meat company 
which had operated properties and meatworks in Australia 
since the late 19th century. The Company produced mainly 
frozen beef for sale to the United Kingdom market, with 
small quantities sold in Japan after 1962. By the late 
1960s the Japanese market was "not . . . particularly 
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significant, but it seemed it might become so." In 1968 
the firm's Sales Manager (Mr. C. Cole) and the Manager of 
the Brooklyn (Victoria) Branch (Mr. J. Palfreyman) went to 
Japan to investigate why Japanese importers claimed a 
shipment had not been of the type and quality ordered when 
the firm was confident that all specifications had been met. 
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During the visit they assessed the opportunities for future 
export growth and decided there were good prospects in the 
middle and high class market segments in Japan which 
Australian producers had never tapped up to that time. 
Despite high prices, per capita consumption only about 5 
percent of the Australian amount, the desirability of beef 
as a "status" food, and the availability of suppliers, the 
Japanese beef import quota, small as it was, had not been 
filled. For a variety of reasons, including cattle 
quality, the effect of freezing, and the fact that 
conventional Australian and western cutting methods broke 
muscle sections and thereby destroyed value by Japanese 
standards, high-quality Australian grassfed beef was 
positioned in the low-class market segment for canned meats, 
curries and products sold in inexpensive retail outlets. 
Nevertheless, Palfreyman and Borthwicks believed that 
feedlot and crop-fattened chilled beef could fill a niche in 
the mid- and high-class markets which together comprised 55 
per cent of total sales and attracted prices over a wide 
range at a better level than for manufacturing meat. To do 
so would involve eliminating some distinctively Australian 
qualities in the meat such as yellow fat, grassfed smell, 
quality variation and traditional meat cutting. It also 
meant a "^watershed'-scale change in the technology of meat 
processing" to an extent last undertaken with the 
introduction of deep freezing in the late nineteenth 
century. ^ ^ 
Mr. Palfreyman played a key role in identifying the way in 
which technical developments in chilling, vacuum packing and 
containerisation could enable Borthwicks to supply a higher 
quality product, and in organising the resources to take 
advantage of this opportunity. The firm already had a 
working knowledge of the outlines of the technology from 
general experience in the meat trade and from vacuum packing 
for the domestic market. However, the company's plants were 
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geared to a different type of production and, in common with 
a number of other firms, Borthwicks had recently had some 
plants delicensed because they did not meet the hygiene 
requirements for the US market. Production of consistently 
high-quality chilled beef for Japan required much higher 
standards still in order to reduce contamination of the meat 
after slaughter and enable it to be delivered in top 
condition with a shelf-life of around 10 weeks. 
Research by Borthwicks and the CSIRO emphasised the need for 
careful handling of the live cattle to keep the pH of the 
meat as low as possible, strict temperature control with 
very small margins of tolerance in the processing plant and 
in the shipping container, and complete separation of 
carcases during processing. The work of the CSIRO was 
crucial in improving the Cryovac technology, previously used 
in packaging for the Australian and US domestic markets, but 
now required to withstand much rougher and longer handling. 
Their success helped give Borthwicks and, subsequently, 
other Australian producers a technological advantage over 
competitors not just in Japan, but in other countries where 
meat was to be transported over considerable distances and a 
long shelf-life was required. 
Marketing the beef involved cooperation of Borthwicks and 
Japanese trading houses and importers. The firm decided to 
differentiate the chilled product so that the bureaucracy of 
the import system did not cause it to be equated with fresh 
or frozen beef with which it would then compete on the basis 
of price rather than on the basis of quality and technical 
superiority. The key to product identification was its 
external pack of pine wood cases with cardboard lids and 
insert of laminated card with factual information in 
Japanese. Borthwicks decided not to reduce prices to 
obtain a contract, refused to quote an importer without 
knowing the client, and dealt only with trading houses who 
seemed most likely to build a quality image and least likely 
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to be more interested in margins than meat. 
Initial shipments were handled by C.Itoh who worked with 
other members of the Meat Importers' Association to 
disseminate information on the product and undertake 
promotion activities subsidised by the Japan Meat 
Conference. Borthwicks initially opposed the Association's 
involvement for fear of losing the competitive edge if 
information were widely released or if lead time were lost. 
Itoh insisted, and the company eventually agreed that the 
detailed analyses of the initial shipment provided to the 
Association and through it to the trade had been worth many 
millions of dollars in advertising. 
The company attributed its success to technical superiority 
and product differentiation in a wide price-range sector and 
to the Company's ability to control its market by selling to 
specific consumers. This ability disappeared in 1975 when 
most beef was purchased by the LIPC rather than by licensed 
private traders. Although already-established brands or 
traders could still be preferred, some of the incentive for 
improved quality and technical innovation had been removed 
as the direct relationship between exporter and consumer was 
severed. 
The start of feedlottina 
The rapid increase in demand for chilled high quality beef 
stimulated an interest among a number of entrepreneurial 
Australian producers in finishing cattle in feedlots adapted 
from the US model to give better control over the quality 
characteristics of the product. 
Cattle in Australia had traditionally been raised on 
extensive and abundant pasture lands, and the first exports 
to Japan were of grassfed beef which remains the major, 
though diminishing segment of the market. Feedlotters aimed 
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at meeting the Japanese demand for beef from good quality 
steers with specialised grain feeding for 90-120 days, 
dressing at 270-340kg with a fat selvage less than 0.5". 
This type of meat was not wanted in Australian or in other 
world markets where consumer preference was for a lighter 
beast and a leaner product. The AMB urged caution 
"encouraging production of better quality beef for this and 
other markets" but not extensive feedlotting when cattle 
could be "fattened on improved pastures or supplementary or 
68 
crop feeding at much less cost". 
Nevertheless, between 1970 and 1973 a number of individuals 
and firms were sufficiently entrepreneurial to establish 
feedlots to try to meet the demand in the Japanese market. 
Risks were high because of the lack of alternative markets 
for the specialised product and because the uncertainties of 
Japan's quota announcements were inconsistent with the 
planning time needed for lot feeders. However, the 
possibility of combining grains and cattle to give a higher 
value-added was attractive, especially in years when grain 
production was high and the grain marketing authority 
refused to accept the whole of the crop. 
Some feedlots were integrated with export companies and/or 
feed producers such as Millaquin Sugar Co. which utilised 
waste from the Bundaberg distillery as an addition to 
stockfeed. Some were under joint Australian-Japanese 
ownership, like the small pilot feedlot approved by the 
Reserve Bank as a joint operation by Borthwicks, Mitsui 
and Co. and Itohan Provisions Co. Ltd. to supply a small, 
regular flow of high quality beef for the chilled trade. 
The Japanese partners were perhaps impelled by encouragement 
from their Government for importers to consider investment 
opportunities in the beef industry in overseas countries as 
a contribution to the security of supply. The AMB reported 
in 1972 that worldwide the Japanese had plans for forty two 
projects in the meat industry. In Australia, 12 projects 
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involving Japanese firms were operating in cattle raising, 
feedlot finishing or meat processing and 18 further projects 
were planned. The firms involved were major companies such 
as Mitsui, C. Itoh, Marubeni lida and Mitsubishi, although 
the partners were often nominally department stores or 
supermarkets. 
Other feedlots were begun by individuals such as Mr. Don 
Bridgeford, a grain and cattle producer of Jandowae, who 
happened in 1970 to read an article on the poor reputation 
of Australia beef in Asia. He had already been brave 
enough to develop a small feedlot with the idea of adding 
value by combining grain and cattle to produce a superior 
product, but lack of interest in the domestic market meant 
he was struggling to obtain a premium price and make the 
operation viable. Mr. Bridgeford contacted the Federal 
Minister for Primary Industries, Mr. Sinclair, who agreed 
with him that feedlot beef could help restore Australia's 
reputation for quality in Japan or other Asian markets. Mr. 
Bridgeford approached KR Darling Downs whose manager agreed 
to process the beef and persuade Dalgetys to broker and sell 
it through Kanematsu Gosho, thus providing the first 
container of grainfed beef to Japan in November 1970. Two 
years later, Bridgeford and three friends formed their own 
company. Stockyard Meat Packers, to trade with Japan. When 
the Japanese ceased beef imports in 1974, most feedlots 
closed, though some such as Bridgeford's turned to 
production for the domestic market until sales to Japan 
could resume. Even then, however, the price premium 
available was insufficient to justify the risks. Most 
commercial feedlots were able technically to quickly 
diversify to suit any market and depended much less heavily 
on Japan. 
The start of feedlotting by private individuals and firms 
was important for the long-term development of specialised 
markets in Japan and a major step forward in matching the 
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product to the particular demands of Japanese and other 
customers. 
Relationships with Japanese importers 
An important part of the development of the Japanese market 
was the establishment of close relationships between meat 
exporters and Japanese importers and meat industry 
organisations. Person-to person and firm-to-firm 
relationships complemented contacts developed by the 
Australian Meat Board personnel with sectors of Japanese 
industry and were important in establishing and maintaining 
a position as a supplier and in dealing with conflicts over 
Japanese government policies regulating access to that 
country's market. 
A few relationships stemmed from prewar trading. In 
Queensland, for example, R.O.Manton and Sons, which had 
exported beef to Japan in the 193 0s through the trading 
house Kanematsu, assisted Teys Brothers to market their 
product in the postwar period. Most contacts, however, were 
newly developed. Mr. R. Hart, one of the partners in 
Stockyard Meat Packers, was introduced to the Japanese 
market by Mr. Beaver of Amagraze who had made his initial 
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contacts through the Australian Meat Board. In the early 
1970s Stockyard formed an association with Nitchiku, one of 
the 10 principal beef importing companies, which had as one 
of its shareholders the Department store chain, Hankyu. 
Nitchiku's main strength was in its representation of strong 
butchery and abattoir interests in Kobe and Kyoto, and the 
President of Zenchikuren, Mr. Hirai, held a senior position 
in the company. Such relationships were particularly 
important at a time when the bulk of the import quota was 
handled by the private trade, though the share of the LIPC 
was increasing. Even under the new arrangements from June 
1975, a proportion of the trade remained in private hands, 
and part of the LIPC quota was sold direct to distributors 
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under the "one-touch" system. In the complex channels and 
interlocking networks of the meat distribution and retailing 
system in Japan it remained important to have established 
connections and be a preferred brand in the market. 
Kilcoy Pastoral Company was introduced to the Japanese 
market by Mr. D. Baldie, a friend of the Company's 
founder. Mr. Baldie had set up his own trading company in 
the late 1950s after working in a large meat enterprise for 
some years and had gone to Japan to investigate the 
possibility of markets there since the end of the 15-Year 
Meat Agreement was in sight. He became acquainted with a 
Mr. Hasegawa who, like Mr. Baldie, had been a pilot in World 
War II and was in the 1950s an executive of a Japanese meat 
company with which Mr. Baldie began a trading relationship. 
Kilcoy Pastoral Co. supplied meat through Mr. Baldie's 
company until, in the mid-1970s, the companies merged and 
Kilcoy began to trade direct, continuing the close contacts 
with a small number of Japanese importers, servicing the 
needs of their particular clients. Beef was supplied to 
Kilcoy by a small number of feedlotters, including 
Bridgeford, who tried to meet the particular market 
requirements. They built up a basis of mutual trust and 
flexibility which survived the beef embargo and continued 
into the 1980s. When the demand for grainfed beef grew 
beyond the capacity of the feedlotters to finance, an 
innovative solution enabled production to expand. A joint 
venture - Mirrabook Cattle Co.- was established with Kilcoy 
Pastoral Co. holding 54 per cent and Japanese interests 46 
per cent. Mirrabook leased the feedlots from existing 
suppliers such as Mr. Bridgeford on the basis of the profits 
being shared in equal thirds between Kilcoy Pastoral Co., 
Japanese interests, and the feedlotters. This arrangement 
is in the 1990s helping to cope with the increasing demands 
to target the needs of particular customers and to compete 
against the growing number of competitors in the liberalised 
market. 
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The development of relationships between exporters and 
importers helped to establish the reputation of particular 
firms and brands in the early years of trade and assisted 
those firms to work successfully within the Japanese 
protection system even in the changed arrangements after the 
beef embargo. Closer ties also promoted an understanding of 
market conditions in both countries, and helped the beef 
industry to ride out the problems which inevitably arose in 
a long-term relationship. 
The Australian Meat Board and Market Promotion 
The efforts of private traders were supported by the AMB's 
market development activities, designed to persuade the 
Japanese that Australia did have a quality beef product and 
that it could be successfully retailed to consumers. 
The AMB directed its campaign first to the Japanese meat 
trade and then to retailers and end-users to create 
awareness of an identifiably Australian product. The Board 
organised shipments of beef for public tastings and for 
private displays to the meat trade and distributed brochures 
and recipes. At the same time the AMB urged exporters to be 
careful about carcase weight shrinkage, short shipments 
which penalised importers and could lose them their deposit, 
and meticulous care and accuracy in shipping documents in 
order to engender goodwill and expansion of trade. The 
promotion was further developed in visits to Australia by 
representatives of the All-Japan Meat Industry Cooperative 
Association (AJMICA), importing companies and the LIPC and 
by parties of Japanese meat retailers and processors and 
home economists brought to Australia by the AMB under a 3-
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year program from 1967 to 1969. 
From 1968-9 the AMB expanded its promotions to retailers and 
consumers with a series of Australian beef campaigns 
supported by the Kansai Housewives' Federation, cooking 
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classes, and the production of a Handbook for retailers. A 
high degree of cooperation from Japanese retailer 
organisations was vital, especially in obtaining outlets to 
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sell identifiably Australian beef on a daily basis. The 
Australian Designated Store Project was developed and 
jointly funded with AJMICA and eventually expanded to over 
7000 outlets throughout the principal cities of Japan. In 
addition, from 1971-2, imported beef was sold separately 
from domestic beef in a series of Government (LIPC) 
designated stores and Australian beef identified by a small 
prepack sticker bearing the "Beef from Australia" logo and 
the name of the cooperating supermarket. To exploit the 
market opportunities arising from the increased involvement 
of the Japanese distribution trade in the sale of Australian 
beef, the AMB increased its promotion budget, subsidised 
dollar-for-dollar by the Overseas Trade Promotion Committee. 
The Board sponsored TV advertisements during the peak winter 
demand season, aimed at relating table quality Australian 
beef with the Board logo, so that "imported beef" and 
"Australian beef" would become synonymous. The Board 
continued its promotions even after the downturn in consumer 
demand from mid 197 3, based on advice from the Japanese 
business community, representatives of meat traders and the 
Japanese government that buying patterns would soon 
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recover. When this did not occur, and quotas were 
suspended, the Board at first scaled down its promotions, 
discontinuing them altogether in October 1976 as Australia 
could readily sell all the beef it was allowed to export to 
Japan. 
When beef promotion resumed in the 1980s it concentrated on 
television advertising in major population centres, 
identifying beef as a healthy, natural product, ideal for 
serving regularly to the family. Supermarket chains were 
the focus of complementary campaigns, because it was 
believed that in a liberalised market the supermarket chains 
would be the key to market development. 
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An important part of marketing was the development of better 
systems of grading to provide specified objective standards 
that adequately described the characteristics of meat, and 
this required the cooperation of State and Federal 
authorities and processing firms. The industry had been 
warned in the 1950s of competition from countries such as 
Argentina where production was technically inferior but 
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grading and classification was much more strict. The 
Japanese complained that Australia's export classifications 
were too general and the quality not consistent. Under the 
All-Japan Beef Carcass Transaction Standards (grading 
system) introduced in 1961, "most traditional meat traders 
in Japan would regard even the best grass-fattened chilled 
beef from Oceania as having a sashi (marbling) score of 1, 
Q"Z 
and thus being in the 3rd grade category." 
The Australian Meat Board was generally responsible for meat 
quality, but there was no tight system of control as there 
was, for example, in the sugar industry, to ensure the 
achievement and maintenance of particular standards, except 
for those of health and hygiene enforced by the Meat 
Inspection service. In effect, control of quality was 
exercised through the willingness or otherwise of processors 
to purchase cattle and the price the animals could command, 
together with the practices and procedures of individual 
processing and exporting companies. This market-based 
system did not always have optimal results. As late as the 
1980s a report commissioned by the Cattlemen's Union showed 
that "meat of extremely poor quality" had been exported to 
Japan, with quality varying according to the area of 
production and the packer, sometimes with unacceptable 
characteristics and not always matching the specification on 
the outside of the box.^ 
At national and industry level Australian beef was promoted 
in Japan by the Australian Meat Board through organised 
information campaigns directed first at the different 
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sections of the Japanese meat trade and then at retail 
consumers. This was complemented within Australia by the 
efforts of the AMB, industry organisations and the State 
Department of Primary Industries to increase the knowledge 
and understanding of Japanese requirements among producers 
and processors and to promote consistent quality and 
improved grading standards. Although Queensland provided 
most of the beef exported to Japan, State agencies did not 
become involved in promotion and marketing, leaving it to 
individual firms to promote their own brands and the 
Commonwealth-sponsored AMB to create and foster a 
distinctively Australian image. Both exporters and the AMB 
were extremely successful until the closure of the beef 
market, difficulties with the quota system and arms-length 
purchases by the LIPC reduced the incentive for active 
market promotion in the late 197 0s. 
Social and economic changes in Japan created a potential 
demand for increased sales of beef, both processing and the 
more profitable table quality. Turning the potential into 
actual demand for specifically Australian beef was the 
achievement of entrepreneurs among beef exporters and 
producers who recognised and responded to market signals, 
assisted by the promotional activities of the Australian 
Meat Board and its successor which focussed attention on the 
Australian product and facilitated its entry into Japanese 
marketing channels. 
DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF MARKET ACCESS 
The beef quota system, the embargo, and the erosion of 
Australia's share in the Japanese market were part of a 
complex problem in which domestic and international policies 
were fundamentally linked, and conflicts over the respective 
roles of State and Federal governments clouded the way in 
which the issue was handled. 
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The problem of access to the Japanese beef market brought 
Australia into the centre of the international debate about 
liberalisation of markets for agricultural products, 
especially in Japan and the European Community. Although 
Australian producers had achieved a significant share of the 
Japanese import market, beef had been excluded from the 
products specified in the Australia-Japan Trade Agreement, 
so that Japan was not bound to remove quota restrictions or 
other forms of import control and Australia had no special 
privileges in terms of market access. Access to Japan's 
market for agricultural products was improved by the Kennedy 
Round, in discussions under GATT and in the Tokyo Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations which together rewrote much 
of the postwar trade rules. The major participants, the 
United States and the EEC, with Japan as a important but 
secondary partner, largely determined the outcomes of these 
negotiations. Australia's policies, like those of other 
small powers, could only reflect the international situation 
and political attitude of the major participants. 
Nonetheless, the Australian government could and did seek 
improved access and conditions which protected existing 
markets, in beef for example, especially where other 
countries were seeking to negotiate changes to Australia's 
disadvantage. 
At the same time there was a domestic policy dimension in 
Australia resulting from problems of Japanese market access. 
This related to the nature and size of assistance to the 
beef industry and the need for new structures to provide an 
organisational framework that would help the industry adjust 
to continual and fundamental changes in economic 
circumstances. In the late 60s and early 70s there had been 
a substantial growth in beef production from good seasons in 
southern States as well as in Queensland, a switch to beef 
when wool prices fell, improved pastures, techniques and 
transport and optimism about markets in the US and Japan. 
In the 1960s and 1970s the beef industry had prospered. 
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largely because of increased sales to Japan, but by 1974, 
Japan's quotas were uncertain, prices at home and abroad 
declined to around 60 per cent of their 1971-2 levels and 
the industry was facing a problem of overexpansion for what 
was now a doubtful market. Rising costs and interest rates, 
together with high levels of debt, provoked fears of an 
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industry crisis. The problem was worse in Queensland, as 
well as the Kimberleys and the Northern Territory, where 
basically 100 per cent monoculture beef enterprises depended 
on export markets with no wool, wheat, dairying or coarse 
grain industries to supplement their income. 
The response of the State and Federal Governments was thus 
on two fronts - the general problems of the industry which 
were addressed by the Commonwealth and the States both 
jointly and individually, and the specific problem of access 
to the Japanese market which was clearly a Federal matter on 
a Government-to-Government basis or as part of Australia's 
effort in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations and in its 
relationship with international organisations. The initial 
problem related to the beef embargo in 1974, but, in the 
longer term, friction centred on Japan's discrimination in 
favour of the USA which effectively diminished Australia's 
ability to compete for the limited quotas available. 
Beef is a politically very sensitive issue in Japan and has 
caused the Japanese more problems internationally and 
domestically than any other product. Japan's beef import 
policies reflect a complex of factors including objectives 
of protecting incomes of domestic producers, encouraging 
domestic production to achieve 80 per cent self-sufficiency, 
and curbing domestic prices. The need to secure essential 
food supplies was always a consideration, and this 
intensified after 1973 because of the rising prices for 
basic commodities such as cereals and sugar and the short-
lived US embargo on the export of soybeans. 
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Protectionist policies for beef were also an acknowledgment 
of the importance of the farmer vote to the Liberal 
Democratic Party, especially to members seeking to maintain 
their seats in more remote parts of Japan where households 
raising cattle are concentrated and where income from "side-
line" industries such as beef production is more significant 
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than in areas closer to other sources of employment. 
Farmer co-operatives (Nokyo) form an extremely influential 
lobby group through their political arm, Zenchu, and their 
organisation at local, prefectural and national level, which 
is a useful power base for politicians in multimember 
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constituencies with a weak grass-roots party system. In 
addition, within the factional policies of the ruling 
Liberal Democratic Party, beef producers had powerful 
allies, such as Mr. Yamanaka, a representative from 
Kagoshima, one of Japan's main beef producing areas, and 
President of the All-Japan Beef Cattle Association, and Mr. 
Eto, representative from the important beef-producing region 
of Miyazaki, and Vice-Minister for Agriculture and 
Forestry - both members of the important Nakasone faction. 
Domestic economic and political factors outweighed 
international pressures for import liberalisation deriving 
from Japan's position as a major trading nation through the 
1970s and 80s. Only powerful pressures from the United 
States were able in the 1970s to alter attitudes to beef 
imports, but the change was not towards liberalisation but 
towards advantaging the United States at Australia's 
expense. 
Australia's response to the 1974 embargo was a sustained and 
vigorous protest at the peremptory treatment of an industry 
which had been encouraged, even urged, by the Japanese to 
expand and to develop a product with characteristics 
uniquely tailored to the Japanese market. Yet the beef 
embargo did not seem to engender the intensity of 
bitterness, resentment and hostility which, as we shall see, 
was evident in the sugar industry during the dispute over 
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the Long-term contract. Beef was a national industry, 
although the principal exporters to Japan were in 
Queensland, and in southern States the effect of the embargo 
was cushioned by income from other forms of production or 
exports to other markets. The good relationships developed 
by exporters and the AMB with the Japanese industry assisted 
the parties to ride out the difficulty which at both 
industry and political level was expected to be only a 
temporary disruption to long-term growth. The Federal 
Treasurer, Mr. Crean, said the position was not regarded as 
"grim"; the government believed that what was needed was the 
development of some form of agreement which gave stability 
of quantity, with the flexibility to negotiate regarding 
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prices from time to time. 
Despite the desire to look to long-term relations rather 
than short-term bitterness, the Federal government ensured 
that Australia's view was put forcefully to Japan. At 
Federal level, the embargo was strongly attacked by 
Ministers such as Dr. Cairns, (Overseas Trade) and Dr. 
Patterson (Northern Development) whose electorate included 
some of the principal beef producing areas of Queensland. 
The Minister for Agriculture, Senator Wriedt, went to Japan 
to confer with MITI Minister Nakasone and the Japanese 
Minister for Agriculture to try to bring some stability to 
the meat trade. There were repeated discussions in Cabinet 
prior to the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister with whom 
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Prime Minister Whitlam raised the issue, and it remained 
one of the principal items of contention at the Australia-
Japan Ministerial Meeting in Canberra in May 1975. The 
feelings of the industry were made plain by the Chairman of 
the AMB in a speech to the Australia-Japan Business 
Cooperation Committee meeting in May 1974, when the Japanese 
were reported to have been "somewhat taken aback" by his 
emphasis on the need for continuity and the preference of 
the industry for customers who dealt on the basis of steady 
demand rather than continually varying their requirements 
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without considering the disruption and uncertainty they 
engendered.'^ A number of delegations from the Department of 
Overseas Trade, the Australian Meat Board and the Australian 
National Cattlemen's Council supported the political efforts 
and met with Government and trade representatives to 
develop longer-term arrangements for trade. 
Australia also sought international support, arguing that 
the Japanese action was contrary to the terms of GATT, and 
indicating that Australia would propose a working party of 
GATT members to consider the meat problem. Despite 
opposition from Japan and the EEC, a Consultative Group on 
Meat was established to provide an international forum for 
the interchange of views and information and to try to avoid 
disruption of the world market by unilateral imposition of 
import restrictions. Meanwhile, consultations were held 
under Article 22 of GATT between Australia, New Zealand, 
Japan and the United States, but they proved fruitless and 
were adjourned indefinitely. 
In Queensland, the government was urged to take a more 
active role in attending to the interests of the State's 
industries in Japan by having its own representative in 
Tokyo as did Western Australia, South Australia and New 
South Wales. The ALP member for Mackay (Mr. Casey) argued 
that the Australian Embassy lacked appropriate staff, the 
AMB market intelligence was deficient, and that a Queensland 
representative could have warned the State's producers of 
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the impending market closure well in advance. The National 
Party also wanted direct Queensland representation in 
Japan'^  and at the Party's State Conference in 1977 an 
urgency motion by the Cattle Committee called for the 
establishment of a Queensland Agent-General in Tokyo, with 
the position filled by a senior Government politician who 
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would safeguard the interests of the State's exporters. 
The Cattlemen's Union regarded "high level intergovernment 
exchanges" as "irrelevant" and pressed for the appointment 
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of a Queensland representative or for a Commonwealth 
agricultural attache to Tokyo because "an intelligent 
attache with a finger on the pulse would have warned us of 
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the LIPC rip-off and the shut-off of beef quotas". Mr. 
Bjelke-Petersen was "reluctant to rely on a Trade 
Commissioner or a trade agency" and thought that it was 
"better that ... Ministers of the Government should deal 
directly" with the Japanese. He thought the "close liaison" 
between Japanese business interests and himself, the 
Treasurer and the Minister for Mines and Main Roads had 
"more than met the present situation", though this was a 
view not shared by either his own National Party or beef 
interests. 
The Queensland Premier refused to follow the Commonwealth's 
conciliatory tone or to concentrate on working towards a 
better system for the future. Instead he engaged in 
"resources bargaining" by declaring that no new mineral 
leases would be granted for projects to supply Japan until 
the Japanese purchased more of Queensland's agricultural 
products. This was echoed by his Federal colleague, 
Mr.Sinclair (Deputy Leader of the National Party) who urged 
Prime Minister Whitlam to ensure that any discussions 
considered "the availability of one commodity being balanced 
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by the preparedness to accept others". Although Dr. 
Paterson also had suggested that "a multibasket approach" 
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might be considered. Prime Minister Whitlam regarded Mr. 
Bjelke-Petersen's idea as both "dishonourable" and 
"foolish", implied that the Premier was being bombastic and 
grandstanding, and made much of Mr. Bjelke-Petersen's 
statement that he "wanted Japan to buy beef from Queensland, 
not from Tasmania or New Zealand or any other foreign 
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country". 
Aside from the Prime Minister's a personal antipathy to the 
Premier's style and a certain amount of political 
partisanship, Mr. Whitlam's opposition to Queensland's 
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intervention into the dispute reflected the belief of all 
federal governments, of whatever political persuasion, that 
the Commonwealth alone could deal with foreign nations. 
Certainly, to Mr. Whitlam, the Constitution clearly provided 
that it was the Australian Government that was vested with 
power over trade and commerce with other countries and the 
States could play no role in international diplomacy. 
But, in reality, issues relating to the beef trade with 
Japan impinged so closely on the domestic wellbeing of a 
State such as Queensland that they became a matter for 
internal politics as well as foreign relations. In 
practical rather than theoretical terms there was a climate 
of uncertainty about the boundaries of State and Federal 
interest in issues such as this. Disagreement over the 
respective roles of State and Federal governments in 
international issues affecting industries vital to the 
State's economy lay at the basis of the bitter disputes 
between the Queensland Premier and the Whitlam government, 
and indeed were the cause of differences between State and 
Federal governments of all persuasions at various times. 
Mr. Whitlam attempted to denigrate Mr. Bjelke-Petersen and 
portray him as a figure of fun, but the Queensland Premier's 
attempt at resources bargaining raised serious questions. 
Did a regional State such as Queensland have powers which 
enabled it to exercise a policy towards a foreign country 
which differed from that of the national government? How 
would a foreign country such as Japan react to an attempt by 
a State to implement such a policy? At a time when 
international and domestic issues were so entwined, where 
were the limits of State powers on matters involving foreign 
countries? Whether the Queensland Premier would have 
carried out his threat and whether the Japanese took it 
seriously into account are both debateable, but, given the 
State's control over mining leases, Mr. Bjelke-Petersen 
certainly had the power to disrupt any planned expansion in 
coal and minerals if he chose to do so. According to 
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newspaper reports, the Japanese Deputy Prime Minister took 
the trouble to tell the Premier personally by phone of the 
decision to relax the embargo by an allocation of a small 
quota for Okinawa in March 1975. Mr. Bjelke-Petersen 
regarded this as indicative of the importance of his threat 
in securing the re-opening of the Japanese market. It is 
not, however, implausible to argue that Mr. Fukuda•s action 
was one of courtesy, designed to maintain a harmonious 
relationship with the somewhat irascible Premier, rather 
than evidence of the power of Queensland politicians to 
influence Japan's international trade policy. 
Apart from the general principle of Federal responsibility 
for external matters, Mr. Whitlam was opposed to the idea of 
resources bargaining. He argued that it would be foolish to 
disregard the fact that exclusion from markets and resources 
had been a contributing cause of Japanese hostilities 
towards Australia in 1941. Whitlam was also anxious to 
move towards the signing with Japan of a treaty of 
friendship, commerce and navigation which he considered 
had been far too long delayed. Discussions with Japanese 
Prime Minister Tanaka in late 1974 were to concentrate on 
"general terms of trade between Australia and Japan", from 
the starting point that each country needed the other and 
should understand that internal pressures made it inevitable 
that there should be greater scrutiny of particular imports 
"than would otherwise be the case in terms of dispassionate 
logic". Whitlam argued that resources bargaining, or 
some quid pro quo attitude would be counter-productive in 
arriving at an agreement designed to ensure that Australian 
and Japanese producers could in the future look with 
reasonable certainty to the market that each had in the 
other country. 
The re-opening of the beef market in 1975 did not enable 
beef exports to continue the growth they had enjoyed before 
the embargo. Changes to the purchase system and concessions 
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to United States producers reduced opportunities for 
Australian exporters. Market difficulties, coupled with a 
drought, precipitated a crisis in the beef industry. The 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics estimated that, even if 
cattle prices doubled, fifty per cent of beef producers 
would have an income less than $5000 per year and 7,000 of 
them would still be earning a negative income. Every third 
beef producer had debts exceeding 15 per cent of capital 
invested and cost/price pressure placed individual 
properties at risk. Mr. Bjelke-Petersen had not abandoned 
the idea of a beef-coal tradeoff, though publicly at least 
he did not press this approach, and concentrated rather on 
short-term and immediate action to relieve the worst effects 
of the beef crisis. In the Queensland Parliament a 
relatively large amount of time was devoted to the beef 
industry and the effect of Japan's import policies. In the 
Meat Industry Act Amendment Bill, the Rural Adjustment 
Agreement Bill and a Matter of Public Interest - the Beef 
Industry, speakers from rural electorates, such as Mr. 
Katter and Mr. Cory (National Party) , Mr. Wright and Mr. 
Casey (ALP), outlined the concerns of their constituents and 
largely reflected the frustrations of Mr. Tomkins that "as a 
State government we have very little control in the export 
field". Practical suggestions centred on taxation, 
carry-on finance, and adjustments of leases. The government 
formed a beef industry committee which submitted a beef 
stabilisation plan based on a minimum price paid to the 
producer, though this ultimately came to nothing. The ALP 
member for Lytton (which included the major Brisbane 
abattoirs and meatworks), Mr. Burns, advocated that we 
should "start telling the Japanese consumer that he is being 
robbed" and should "insert a few advertisements in Japanese 
newspapers and see if we can stir up a little trouble for 
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those who are robbing our beef producers". This 
particular suggestion might have been impractical, but the 
basis of the idea was taken up by industry associations - to 
seek a way of working to increase pressure within Japan, 
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from meat importers, retailers and consumers, to induce a 
change of government policy. 
By the late 1970s, the Queensland government had ceased to 
be so vociferous in its criticism of Japan and concentrated 
on the basic problem of assisting the industry to survive. 
Federally, however, the problems of Japanese market access 
became highly politicised. Prime Minister Fraser and his 
government came under intense pressure from producer 
interests and the rural community generally to take action 
to recover the share of the Japanese market and to undertake 
domestic economic policies that would assist the industry to 
be internationally competitive. The Cattlemen's Union 
109 
accused Mr. Fraser of an "ostrich approach" and Mr. 
Sinclair, the National Party Deputy Leader, was booed and 
abused at a Cattlemen's Union Convention in Toowoomba, where 
a vote of no confidence was passed in the government's 
policies. Cattlemen urged a hard line with Japan, with 
meat access considered in conjunction with Japanese rights 
111 in Australian fishing grounds. The frustration of the 
industry with the efforts of the Federal government was 
echoed by Mr. Bjelke-Petersen who played up traditional 
Queensland-southern mistrust in complaining that he had been 
"telling Mr. Fraser for years about the problems being faced 
by cattlemen", but "neither Mr. Fraser nor his Sydney and 
Melbourne ... Liberals showed the slightest interest", until 
"electoral reality" set in. 
Unlike Mr. Whitlam, Mr. Fraser had no objection to the use 
of resources bargaining and at the PostASEAN Conference 
talks in Kuala Lumpur in 1977, he pointed out that 
Australia's ability to make its market an open one depended 
"very considerably upon the reciprocal treatment that 
Australian exports get in major countries around the 
world". ^ " More specifically, Mr. Sinclair suggested that 
the Australia-Japan Fisheries Agreement due for 
renegotiation in November 1976 might not be extended and 
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Japan would thus lose port access for its estimated 3 50 
ships fishing in Australian waters. Should Australia also 
declare a 200 mile instead of 12 mile fishing zone, Japan 
would be excluded from the 10 percent of its tuna catch 
previously obtained from these waters. Mr. Fraser escalated 
the dispute still further politically by sending a letter to 
Prime Minister Fukuda calling into question the whole fabric 
of Australia-Japan relations and releasing its text to the 
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Press before it could have been received in Tokyo. 
At the Australia-Japan Ministerial Committee meeting in 
January 1977 a tradeoff was agreed, with Australia extending 
port access for 2 years while Japan increased its beef quota 
by 15,000 tonnes (general) and 5000 tonnes (special), 
effectively doubling Australia's allocation for the 6 months 
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to March 31 1977. Japan also agreed not to close its 
market completely again and to hold annual talks so that 
changes to quotas or policies would not come so suddenly and 
unexpectedly. Mr. Fraser had foreshadowed some effort to 
set a "base quota" and Japan announced in advance a minimum 
beef import quota of 40,000 tonnes for the first half of FY 
1977-8, which maintained the size of the general quota and 
went some way to providing more stability. 
The establishment of the Australian Meat and Livestock 
Corporation was part of the effort to give the industry an 
organisational structure better equipped to meet the 
changing conditions of the international marketplace. Though 
the new structure was not solely a response to problems with 
Japan, the hiatus caused by the transition from the AMB to 
the AMLC helped to dampen the bitterness of the past and 
make a fresh start. The new Corporation had a more 
interventionist philosophy and greater powers than the 
former AMB.^ *^^  One of its first acts was to introduce 
export controls in November 1977, just after Japan announced 
the quota for the second half of FY 1977. Its objective was 
to overcome the problems caused by the Japanese tender 
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system under which Australian exporters were forced to 
compete against one another for the right to supply a 
quantity of beef, thus reducing prices paid to exporters and 
increasing the profits in the hands of Japanese importers. 
In practice, a supplier would often not know the price to be 
received until long after his tender had been accepted, and 
a great degree of mutual trust was essential between 
exporter and importer that a fair price would be paid. A 
secondary consideration was that the tender system worked 
against the hard-won reputation of Australian brands for 
quality since minimal returns were a disincentive to 
producers to incur the costs of providing high quality meat. 
The AMLC indicated that the possibility of a single 
marketing authority had been considered and the Australian 
Exporters' Federal Council asked to examine the idea which 
might be implemented if export controls were not 
successful. This proposal was strongly supported by a 
senior Queensland Minister, Mr. Tomkins, who had been a 
member of the UGA and its representative on the Queensland 
Meat Industry Authority, and by "repeated calls from the 
Cattlemen's Council of Australia and the Cattlemen's 
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Union". It was, however, opposed by the National Party 
in Queensland which called for an immediate review of export 
controls and more urgent action by the Federal Government to 
instigate negotiations with Japanese importers to persuade 
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them to exert pressure on their government. 
An agreement with Japan in April 1979 was the outcome of the 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations which began in 1973. Japan 
anticipated a steady increase in its global quota to 1982 
and gave an "understanding" the quota would rise again 
thereafter. The two countries agreed to cooperate in 
examining the market in Japan for manufactured beef and in 
making efforts to exploit the demand for high quality beef 
with a view to increasing global imports by FY 1983. 
However, there remained some hesitancy about Japan's longer 
term reliability as an importer and the AMLC emphasised the 
need to diversify to other markets. 
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The role of a regional State such as Queensland in dealing 
with the complex question of access to Japanese markets was 
extremely limited. The State could, and did, exert pressure 
on the Federal government to take steps to solve the 
problem, contribute to the establishment of new structures 
better able to handle the vagaries of international markets, 
and assist the industry to survive in crisis situations. 
But, despite Mr. Bjelke-Petersen's efforts at resources 
bargaining, the long-term solution lay in agreements reached 
in international forums where only national governments 
could take a part. 
CONCLUSION 
Initial opportunities for the meat trade with Japan lay in 
the provision of quantities of processing beef which was 
cheap by Japanese standards. Subsequently, increasing 
affluence and changing lifestyles in Japan expanded the 
market for quality table beef which provided the impetus for 
the growth in both the volume and value of Queensland's beef 
exports. 
The extent to which demand was translated into export 
opportunities was, however, limited by the policies of 
governments. The strict adherence of Britain and Australia 
to the 15-Year Meat Agreement initially prevented firms 
from taking advantage of the potential market in Japan, 
though the trade was delayed only slightly before the 
Agreement was relaxed and eventually lapsed. The 
inevitability of British entry to the European Community, 
together with the need, for political and economic reasons, 
to impose voluntary restraints on exports to the very 
attractive United States market gave impetus to the search 
for alternative customers for Australian beef. The Japanese 
market offered an opportunity to supply high quality beef at 
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reasonable prices, but the extent to which it provided the 
stable and long-term custom sought by the industry was 
severely limited by protectionist policies and by the 
apparent bilateralism of her relations with the United 
States. 
Private individuals and companies provided the impetus for 
trade development by recognising the nature of the market 
and the changes in stock management, processing methods and 
transport which would be needed to tap the opportunities it 
presented. Broad-acre producers improved herd breeding and 
management, feedlotters attempted to produce to specific 
consumer requirements and processors altered cutting and 
packing techniques. Entrepreneurial individuals such as 
Beaver, Bridgeford, Cameron and Palfreyman, and companies 
such as Borthwicks initiated contacts with Japanese 
importers, identified market niches and their relationship 
to production and processing methods, and took the risks 
associated with organising resources to develop a product 
suited to Japanese requirements. 
Their efforts were supported by technical developments 
involving State and Federal agencies such as the CSIRO and 
State Departments of Primary Industries and by joint 
State/Federal expenditure on better roads and the opening up 
of Brigalow lands. State and business worked together to 
provide infrastructure, capital investment and the technical 
basis which enabled the industry to produce the quantity and 
quality of output necessary to take advantage of the 
opportunities presented by the Japanese market. The State 
was interested in the growth of a traditional industry, 
concentrated in central and northern Queensland and in areas 
which offered little opportunity for other forms of rural 
development. Beef exports, initially to Britain and the 
United States, were a welcome diversification from heavy 
dependence on wool and on exports of dairy products and 
sugar to the guaranteed, but rapidly declining, markets in 
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the Commonwealth. Technical advice from government 
agencies, research into breeds, pastures and diseases and 
relaxation of lease conditions were urged by the industry 
and accepted by government as essential prerequisites for 
the expansion of production to allow large-scale, year-round 
and long-term export. Encouragement of foreign investment 
and the opening up of the Brigalow lands were opposed by 
sectors of the industry and by some members of the 
government and the National Party. In hindsight, both 
contributed to industry development, and the Brigalow scheme 
in particular was ultimately the basis for the production of 
much of the high-quality grassfed beef exported to Japan. 
The determination of the Queensland government to press 
ahead despite the risks involved and the need to assist 
farmers unable to cope with the heavy costs of establishment 
in the Brigalow opened the way for long-term development for 
export. Both the Brigalow and Beef Roads schemes were 
beyond the capacity of the State alone to provide and the 
urgings of the Queensland government were important in 
obtaining Federal commitment to these two projects. The 
cooperation of the industry and the State and Federal 
governments established the basic production conditions on 
which export could be built. 
Development of the export market was largely in the hands of 
private enterprise, the Australian Meat Board and its 
successor, the AMLC, who developed relationships with the 
Japanese meat industry and were instrumental in persuading 
importers, wholesalers, retailers and consumers that 
Australia could supply quality beef which met market needs. 
The issues which arose in the beef trade were not confined 
to Australia and Japan alone, but involved larger 
international questions of market access for primary 
products and the wider relationship between Japan and other 
countries, particularly the United States. The resolution 
of these questions involved bilateral and multilateral 
agreements in which the Commonwealth was the negotiator on 
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behalf of Australia, although the Queensland Premier was 
vociferous in his demands for the interests of one of the 
State's major industries to be vigorously protected. 
Both the Queensland government and beef producers and 
processors were interested in the growth of trade with Japan 
which they hoped would provide part of the stable and long-
term foundation for a profitable industry and a means of 
developing central and northern regions of the State. For 
this reason, the State adapted its policies and engaged in 
projects designed to develop the beef cattle industry, 
assist it to overcome its frontier status, support it in 
times of stress, and encourage types of investment and 
production likely lead to success on the international 
market. The industry itself provided the impetus and 
initiative for market development and improvements in 
production and processing, supported by the AMB's promotion 
of a distinctively Australian product. The meat industry 
reflected the Constitutional division of powers over 
agriculture between the State and Federal governments, with 
the State concerning itself largely with "bread-and-butter" 
issues. State and Commonwealth cooperating in large 
infrastructure projects, and coordination, especially with 
respect to export marketing, left largely in the hands of 
the Australian Meat Board and its successor the AMLC. 
The role of the regional State was supportive. It was not 
directly involved in marketing or in the settlement of major 
marketing issues, though its activities were important in 
establishing the ability of the industry to take advantage 
of market opportunities. The different location, structure 
and framework of the sugar industry gave the State a much 
more direct role in market-related decisions and an 
established place in the negotiations of international 
questions, as we shall see in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PARTNERS IN ENTERPRISE 
JAPAN AND THE SUGAR INDUSTRY 
INTRODUCTION 
The export of sugar to Japan was, like the sale of beef, 
part of the realignment of Queensland exports away from the 
protection of the Commonwealth towards the wider world 
market. The industry, however, continued to seek stability 
through long-term international and bilateral arrangements 
as it had in the past and the unsuccessful search for a 
suitable institutional framework to provide security in the 
trade with Japan provoked one of the most bitter disputes in 
the Australia-Japan relationship. 
Queensland had a unique relationship with the industry since 
almost all of Australia's sugar is grown the State, 
legislation supports State ownership of the crop and 
responsibility for its disposal, and the industry is tightly 
controlled. Under these arrangements the regional State was 
an official partner in the sugar industry and played a major 
role in the management of its international dimensions. We 
are therefore concerned in this chapter with the dynamics of 
the partnership between State and business and the way in 
which the government exercised its role as owner and 
regulator, at the same time sharing its authority and the 
decision-making and entrepreneurial functions of leadership 
with other sectors of the industry. 
SUGAR AND THE QUEENSLAND ECONOMY 
The sugar industry is concentrated into a few localities 
along the coastal strip from Grafton in New South Wales to 
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Mossman in north Queensland, and is the foundation of the 
economic viability of many of the major towns and ports in 
Queensland. 
The industry has strong regional influences on income, 
output and employment. The Savage Committee identified it 
as the largest rural employer in Queensland, with more than 
15,000 people employed in the industry in 1983, and another 
45,000-60,000 directly or indirectly dependent on it. 
Berezovsky estimated that in the Queensland Statistical 
Divisions of Mackay, Townsville and Cairns in 1963-4, the 
gross value of sugar cane ($123.5m) was 72 per cent of the 
gross value of recorded production and 48 per cent of the 
combined gross value of primary production and the net value 
2 . . 
of manufacturing. Additional value could be attributed to 
significant by-products and to the flow-on effects to other 
industries such as the production and maintenance of farm 
and mill machinery and activities at the ports for which 
sugar provided 40 per cent of the tonnage. Powell and 
McGovern concluded that, in 1978-9, the industry contributed 
3.5 per cent of State production, 2.7 per cent of household 
income and 3.3 per cent of employment. Although no studies 
are available for the 1950s and 60s, it is reasonable to 
assume that before the growth of other industries such as 
coal the importance of the sugar industry in the economy 
would have been even greater. 
Because of the significance of the industry in the State's 
economy, the government strongly supported domestic and 
international arrangements designed to promote its well-
being and provide it with a high degree of predictability in 
quantities and prices. 
ORGANISATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The relationship between the government on the one hand and 
the sugar industry - its members, its sectors and its 
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associations - on the other has been one of close and 
constant cooperation as partners in a joint enterprise. As 
owners of the sugar output, the State was the major partner, 
responsible for overall policies and ultimately for 
strategic decision-making. Management and coordination of 
the industry was in the hands of the Sugar Board, and CSR 
acted as marketing agents on behalf of the government and 
the Board. Millers and growers were responsible for 
business decisions determining the efficiency and 
profitability of their enterprises and for the quantity and 
quality of sugar production on which success in the Japanese 
market was ultimately based. 
The relationship between the members of the industry was 
formalised in a legislative framework which remained 
virtually unchanged from 192 3 to 1990, reflecting the mutual 
interest of the partners in security and stability. It was 
originally intended to provide secure supplies at stable 
prices to the domestic market, protect the home industry 
against imports from countries growing sugar with cheap non-
white labour, and provide an adequate and stable return to 
small growers. The central feature of the arrangement was 
that Queensland, under the Sugar Acquisition Act of 1915, 
acquired all sugar produced in Queensland and NSW, and thus 
became a partner in the industry, together with cane growers 
and sugar millers. Queensland undertook to make sugar and 
sugar products available to the domestic market at prices 
and conditions fixed under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, 
and the Federal government agreed to enforce an embargo on 
sugar imports. 
Queensland also had responsibility for the control of cane 
production which it exercised through a system based on the 
sugar mill. Each year the Sugar Board determined the mill's 
"peak" or share of the available and anticipated market and 
its output was restricted to this amount, plus an extra 
percentage determined by the Board. The local Sugar Cane 
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Prices Board determined the share of the mill's needs to be 
provided by each grower who could produce sugar only on land 
"assigned" for the production of cane which he was required 
to deliver to a particular mill. Production from the mills 
was purchased by Millaquin Sugar Co. and CSR Co. Ltd. for 
refining for the domestic market or for sale abroad by CSR. 
The net proceeds of both Australian and foreign sales were 
"pooled" and a uniform price per ton paid to mills up to a 
quota, with lesser sums for additional amounts. These 
controls contributed to the stability of prices by relating 
supply as closely as possible to anticipated demand, and 
obviously meant that expansion or contraction of output was 
a matter for the entire industry. Likewise, the pooling of 
receipts meant that disruptions to the market caused, for 
example, by the dispute with Japan, affected the entire 
industry and not sections of it as the beef dispute had 
done. This tended to focus and solidify industry feeling 
and contributed to the intense bitterness in the conflict 
with Japan over long-term contracts. 
The unity of interest created by production and marketing 
arrangements was further encouraged by the requirement that 
growers and millers be members of industry associations and 
be represented on the various bodies which controlled the 
industry and implemented the Government and Sugar Board 
policies. This ensured continual interaction between 
millers, growers and their organisations, local and Central 
Cane Prices Boards and the Sugar Board. The arrangements 
established regularly-used consultative processes and 
decision-making mechanisms which enabled the industry to 
arrive by internal discussion at a united viewpoint and a 
commitment to agreed policies, for example on expansion, 
quality control and negotiating positions which were 
central issues in the development of the sugar trade with 
Japan.^ 
Under this legislative framework, policy was the outcome of 
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negotiations between economically defined groups in 
government and business who had a sense of common interest 
and the ability to secure the compliance of members to 
agreed courses of action. The arrangements formally 
established the position of the Queensland government as a 
partner in the sugar enterprise, delineated the extent of 
its control over production and marketing and laid the basic 
mechanism for consultation between the partners. The sense 
of shared decision-making and responsibility were important 
in obtaining the commitment of the industry to expansion to 
take advantage of the opportunities in Japan, while 
government controls were vital in the improvements in 
quality essential to the maintenance of the sugar industry's 
standing in the Japanese market. 
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The development of sugar sales to Japan took place within a 
framework of international arrangements concerned with 
access to particular markets and the sharing of available 
markets among suppliers. These arrangements provided the 
basis for industry stability and growth and helped to 
determine the timing, direction and maximum quantity of 
exports. 
The British Commonwealth Sugar Agreement 
The first of these was the British Commonwealth Sugar 
Agreement (BCSA), a multilateral agreement which stemmed 
from a conference in 1949 to dismantle the wartime 
arrangements for bulk purchase of all Australia's exportable 
sugar and at the same time provide adequate supplies for 
United Kingdom and other Commonwealth importers and 
equitable market access for Commonwealth exporters. 
Premier Hanlon undertook on behalf of the industry and the 
Commonwealth to have available for export 600,000 tons tel 
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quel per year by the 1953 season. The United Kingdom 
guaranteed to take 314,000 tons at a negotiated prices fixed 
annually and to assist with the sale of the remainder at 
world prices, but with the advantage of Commonwealth 
preferences. Expansion of the industry from 1950-1954 was 
designed to meet the firm commitment to the domestic market 
and to the BCSA quota. There was virtually no prospect of 
sales to anyone else and, until 1953, there was considerable 
doubt whether the target quantity would be reached. Growers 
were extremely cautious and output did not increase 
sufficiently until the Queensland government agreed to a 
more liberal assignment policy and the Commonwealth and 
State governments increased the price paid for sugar 
consumed on the domestic market. 
TABLE 4.1 
AUSTRALIAN SUGAR EXPORTS 
Season Tons 94 n.t 
1945 209956 
1946 88393 
1947 106503 
1948 443072 
1949 439635 
1950 402680 
1951 157346 
1952 471008 
1953 732208 
1954 784449 
1955 626202 
Source: Australian Sugar Journal vol.52,no.11, 
February 1961, p.851. 
The industry was conscious that there were guarantees for 
only 314,000 tons, and after Canadian Agreements with Cuba 
there was no alternative but to compete on the open market. 
Over time the importance of sales under the BCSA declined 
relative to those to the free market, but the Agreement 
remained the basis of the sugar export trade and a valuable 
165 
and effective safeguard of industry stability until it 
ceased with United Kingdom entry to the EEC in 1974. 
The International Sugar Agreement 
Sales of "free market" sugar were regulated by the operation 
of the International Sugar Agreement (ISA) which began in 
1954 and aimed to provide stability in world markets through 
the limitation of total exports to a level approximating 
estimated demand. Floor and ceiling prices were established 
and the International Sugar Council was authorised to adjust 
export quotas so as to keep prices within this range. 
ISA quotas effectively placed an upper limit on what 
Australia could export to Japan or to other countries in the 
free market. Initially, the ISA imposed a limit of 2,375,000 
tons for Commonwealth exporters, of which Australia's share 
was its BCSA quota of 600,000 tons as an irreducible 
minimum, with other amounts available from time to time as 
Australia's share of shortfalls elsewhere. Subsequently, in 
years when quotas were not imposed, or when the ISA was not 
in force, Australia took advantage of the opportunity to 
establish a place in the Japanese market. When quotas were 
reimposed, the expanded limits reflected the growth in sales 
and in output in the non-quota periods. 
After 1954, commitments to the BCSA and adherence to ISA 
quotas determined the maximum amount of sugar Australia 
could sell, and the fluctuations in the volume of sales 
coincided broadly with the conditions imposed by these two 
Agreements. Growth in the Japanese economy made it an 
attractive market outlet, but the extent to which Australia 
took advantage of the opportunities and the terms on which 
sales were negotiated were dependent on the decisions of the 
Queensland government taken in conjunction with its 
partners, the growers and millers, and its managers and 
agents, the Sugar Board and CSR. 
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The Australia-Japan Trade Agreement 
This Agreement, signed in 1957, added another dimension to 
the framework within which sugar sales occurred. Prior to 
1957 Japan had bilateral agreements with suppliers of sugar, 
apart from Australia, under which she imported a large 
percentage of her sugar requirements. Her import system for 
the remaining portion was unpredictable; at times Australia 
was prevented from selling and at other times sales could be 
made. After 1957, despite Japan's bilateral agreements, 
Australia was free to compete with other suppliers for up to 
40 per cent of Japan's total imports, subject to exchange 
control allocations. This was particularly important in 
years when Australia was able to export over the BCSA quota, 
or when ISA quotas were inoperative. 
The negotiation of international arrangements was the 
responsibility of the Commonwealth, and not of the State 
government. But the partnership structure of the sugar 
industry was reflected in the recognition of the Queensland 
Agent-General in London as the permanent delegate to the 
BCSA and in the composition of negotiating delegations to 
the ISA and BCSA. These routinely included the Queensland 
Premier and/or senior Ministers, representatives of the 
Department of Agriculture, the Sugar Board and industry 
Associations. In this way, the major industry partners were 
involved in the negotiation of two of the three Agreements 
which established the basic international parameters within 
which Australia was able to export sugar to Japan. 
SALES OF SUGAR TO JAPAN 
Initial opportunities for sales of sugar to Japan in 1954 
arose because of the expansion of Japanese demand, the first 
surplus since World War II of Australian production over 
commitments to domestic and BCSA requirements, and because 
of requests from the British Government to help alleviate 
167 
their storage problem with the large quantity of sugar 
purchased in anticipation of high levels of demand after the 
abolition of rationing.® Subsequent opportunities for sales 
and the prices which could be obtained were largely 
dependent on conditions in the world sugar market as 
reflected in the ISA quotas and in the London Daily Price 
which formed the basis for price negotiations. 
The Japanese themselves had sought to purchase Australian 
sugar as early as 1950, although shortages of sterling 
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limited the amounts. Neither the industry nor the 
Queensland government was interested since production was 
totally committed to the domestic market and the BCSA quota 
and it had been difficult to reach even this level of 
output. CSR told the 1950 Royal Commission into the Sugar 
Industry that export markets were and were likely to be in 
the future confined to the UK and Canada and that the 
exportable surplus was likely to be 600,000 tons per annum 
for the foreseeable future. 
By 1954, however, initiatives for sugar sales came from both 
Japanese importers and CSR on behalf of Australian 
exporters. Technical improvements and better farm practices 
had increased productivity so that Australian producers 
faced for the first time the possibility of a surplus over 
commitments. Growers and millers urged the Sugar Board to 
examine every possible market in the hope of future export 
quotas, since the only alternative was the imposition of 
restrictions on output. CSR had already made sales to 
Hong Kong and was attempting to break into the Ceylon 
market. its marketing officers felt there might be 
opportunities in Japan, at least in the short term, 
although, in the longer term, prospects for continuing sales 
did not look particularly hopeful.^^ A White Paper by the 
Japan Economic Council indicated that shortages of foreign 
currency would limit imports and there was every likelihood 
that existing levels would be maintained only by barter 
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deals. Even spot sales were welcome in the circumstances 
and the approach by Daiichi (Mitsui) Bussan through Alliance 
Industries'^ came at an appropriate time and resulted in 
sales of 79,000 tons in 1954, 43,500 tons in 1955 and 52,000 
tons in 1956, arranged through the London brokers, C. 
Czarnikow Ltd. Except for 1956, when a shortage of sterling 
limited Japanese imports, Australia's share of Japan's sugar 
purchases rose steadily from 0.9 per cent in 1954 to 10.9 
per cent in 1955 and 12.4 per cent by 1958. By then Japan 
had become Australia's second-largest customer for sugar, 
though her share of 15.4 per cent was small by comparison 
with that of the United Kingdom. 
By the 1960s the industry looked positively to the markets 
of Asia, including Japan, to supplement, and later to 
replace, outlets in Britain and the Commonwealth as 
opportunities for export growth declined in traditional 
markets and local beet producers and other Commonwealth 
exporters competed fiercely for sales. The Sugar Board's 
marketing strategy was directed to establishing a firm 
foothold in Japan as the basis for future expansion if and 
when conditions allowed. Japan was experiencing growth in 
output and incomes which seemed likely to continue given 
high levels of investment and low inflation. Sugar 
consumption was low, only about 25 per cent of that in 
Australia, but had good potential to increase. 
The Japanese were interested in expanding trade and 
approaches were made to Australia by firms such as Taiyo 
Bussan Kaisha acting for Osaka refiners. CSR estimated 
that the existing market would double within a short time 
despite competition from Cuba, the world's largest sugar 
producer, and Taiwan whose sugar was well known to the 
Japanese refiners, many of whom had worked there before 
World War II.'® However, political instability made Cuba a 
less attractive supplier to security-conscious Japan and 
Cuba's emergence as a major supplier to the socialist bloc 
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left a market opportunity for Australia to fill. 
From the late 1950s expanded sales to the free market, 
especially to Japan, in non-quota periods led to significant 
increases in quantities exported. The Sugar Board was able 
to accept for marketing the whole of the 1957 crop because 
of record sales of 768,000 tons of which 15 per cent went to 
Japan. 
TABLE 4.2 
AUSTRALIA'S SUGAR EXPORTS 1957 
United Kingdom 
Canada 
Japan 
New Zealand 
Hong Kong 
Ceylon 
Malaysia 
(tons) 
413,000 
118,000 
118,000 
79,000 
22,000 
17,000 
1,000 
Source: CSR Annual Report 1958. 
In 1961-69 Australia was well placed to take advantage of 
free market opportunities, with a quality product, 
efficiency, especially in bulk handling, and a reputation as 
a reliable and stable supplier to Japan which provided the 
biggest potential market. Sales almost trebled in 1961-2, 
and a contract for 300,000 tons from the 1963 crop was one 
of the largest single purchases on private account since 
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World War II. This was followed by a long-term contract to 
supply 350,000-450,000 tons annually for the three seasons, 
1964-1966, later extended to 1968,^' and by a subsequent 
contract for 3 million long tons over the seasons 1975-9. 
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TABLE 4.3 
EXPORTS FROM SEASONS - TONS ACTUAL SUGAR 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
U.K 
Canada 
N.Z. 
U.S.A. 
Japan 
Malaysia 
Other 
369890 
133137 
73040 
56280 
120974 
• • • 
44037 
444593 
148285 
50773 
171715 
309399 
• • • 
42879 
422755 
109830 
54047 
146288 
342746 
• • • 
28441 
397421 
111746 
46996 
186194 
501566 
25930 
16159 
459147 
111365 
67479 
174397 
388181 
51496 
18904 
Total 797358 1167644 1104107 1285012 127096 
Source: Australian Sugar Journal vol.59, no.6, September 
1967, p.331. 
Opportunities for sales of sugar to Japan were created by 
international factors and by international agreements which 
determined access to particular markets. Turning 
opportunities into actual sales was the responsibility of 
CSR acting as agents for the Queensland Government and the 
Sugar Board. The marketing strategies were based on 
information about world conditions supplied by Czarnikow 
Ltd. , by CSR and by observations and discussions at 
international conferences such as those related to the BCSA 
and the ISA. Sales negotiations were undertaken by CSR 
Sugar Division and an ongoing relationship between its 
officers and refiners in Japan cemented growing goodwill 
which helped to overcome some of the difficulties which 
arose, especially relating to quality. 
LONG-TERM CONTRACTS 
Two of the key points in the development of the sugar trade 
were the long term contracts of 1964 and 1975, both of which 
required the agreement and commitment of all the partners in 
the industry to expansion to meet the contractual 
obligations. CSR, the Sugar Board and the Japanese 
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themselves recognised the opportunity for the growth of 
trade presented by increasing demand in Japan and the 
absence of ISA quotas. It was the State's responsibility to 
determine the risks, ascertain the views of its partners, 
decide how extra production would be achieved and ultimately 
make the decision whether or not to proceed. The decision to 
undertake the 1964 contract was a major turning-point in the 
industry and marked what the Economist Intelligence Unit 
identified as an essential prerequisite for growth - an 
attitude of looking forward to what might be achieved in the 
future, rather than the "safety first" concern with what had 
been in the past. 
Such an agreement in 1963-4 was a radical departure from 
long-standing practice. Stability was so important to the 
sugar industry it was prepared to accept control over 
production and marketing, submit to restrictions imposed by 
the ISA and accept a "pool" price for raw sugar. The bases 
for stability were the Australian Sugar Agreement for supply 
to the domestic market and the BCSA, both of which were very 
long-term arrangements incorporating guarantees not only 
regarding quantities, but also wholly or partly with respect 
to price. Expansion in the 1950s had been on the basis of 
the security of these Agreements, with clearly defined 
production targets, endorsed as public policy by Queensland 
and Commonwealth Governments of all parties and which were 
unlikely to be reduced. ^'^  There were no such clearly 
defined targets in 1963, no guarantees of quantity beyond 
1967, and no commitment at all to fixed prices. Expansion 
to meet the opportunities in Japan, as well as in the USA 
and elsewhere, would expose growers and millers to greater 
risks than at any time since the Sugar Agreement Act of 
1915. Increased production in the 1962 season had already 
produced 500,000 tons of excess sugar which had to be sold 
on a catch-as-catch-can basis and the volatility of world 
prices was well illustrated by the spectacular price rise 
from 26 pounds stg. per ton in 1962 to 72 pounds in 1963. 
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When opportunities for very large sales had first arisen in 
1961-2, the Queensland government was anxious for them to 
proceed. The government had been in office only some two 
years after a long period of Labor rule, rural seats had 
been traditionally Labor strongholds in which Government 
members did not yet feel secure, and the backward Queensland 
economy had been hard hit by the recession of 1961. The 
Sugar Board, on behalf of the government, sought the 
commitment of the Associations of growers and millers to 
ensure the fulfilment of the possibly large contracts by 
producing the requisite amounts of sugar irrespective of 
adverse export prices. Their support encouraged the Board 
to pursue a vigorous marketing strategy which led ultimately 
to the long-term contract, although at the time neither the 
growers nor the Board realised the extent of the risk that 
would be involved. They expected that increased output could 
be achieved from greater productivity and increased use of 
existing assignments. 
The granting of new assignments, made necessary by the long-
term contract for 1964-6, was completely counter to the 
recommendation of the producers' Associations as late as 
March 1963 that the positive aim of the industry should be 
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maximum economic production from existing lands. Only the 
prospects of a contract for the supply of sugar to Japan for 
some years ahead persuaded the Associations to change their 
mind. Before the contracts were signed, the Sugar Board 
again consulted with the Association Presidents and 
Secretaries in April 1963. They agreed with the Queensland 
Minister for Agriculture that the contract was a much-needed 
opportunity to broaden the range of countries with which 
Australia had long-term, rather than ad hoc arrangements. 
Their attitude was summed up by the Chairman of the 
Proprietary Sugar Millers' Association - "How could you 
possibly knock back the opportunity of firming up the 
quantity for sale to Japan".^^ 
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It was then the responsibility of the Queensland government 
to decide on the extent of expansion and where and to whom 
the additional assignments would be allocated. The Premier 
and the sugar Associations agreed that the best method of 
orderly and equitable planning for long-term production 
targets and associated infrastructure requirements was to 
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establish a Committee of Inquiry. The inquiry was 
constituted under Mr. Justice Gibbs, with Mr. O. 
Wolfensberger (Chairman of the Sugar Board) and Mr. N. King 
(Director of the Bureau of Sugar Experiment Stations) and 
advisers from the industry Associations. 
The Inquiry brought to light a substantial difference of 
opinion between the government and its selling agent, CSR, 
who provided the main body of detailed marketing information 
to the Inquiry. In part this arose from the different 
interests of the parties. The government was anxious for 
northern development, the growth of the industry, and a 
replacement for the stability of the BCSA. CSR, as a 
producer and miller in its own right, as well as the 
government's marketing agent, had a more strictly commercial 
outlook. Its assessment of likely sales and prices, based 
on its own experience and the advice of Czarnikow Ltd. , led 
CSR to take a cautious view. The only firm, long term 
commitments were to the domestic market and the BCSA, and 
CSR was hesitant about its ability to dispose of a greatly 
increased output at viable prices on the world market once 
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the Japanese contract expired. 
However, other evidence to and investigations abroad by the 
Members of the Inquiry led them to be more optimistic. They 
regarded the Japanese market as secured and reasonably 
assured to the end of 1966-67 and prospects for continuance 
and steady growth beyond that date as "reasonably good" and 
reinforced by the signing of the Australia-Japan Commerce 
Agreement. ^° They therefore recommended production targets 
for the years 1965-6 to 1970-1 of over 2 million tons. 
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though the viability of the industry at this level depended 
on world prices which were expected to drop somewhat from 
the record heights of 1963. The Inquiry identified both the 
opportunities and the risks and left it to the Queensland 
government to decide whether to accept the Committee's 
recommendations rather than CSR's more cautious view. 
TABLE 4.4 
AUSTRALIAN COMMITMENTS OF SUGAR 
(million tons) 
Year 
1965-6 
1966-7 
1967-8 
1968-9 
1969-70 
1970-71 
Aust. 
601 
609 
618 
627 
636 
645 
BCSA 
600 
600 
600 
600 
600 
600 
Source: Australian Suga 
Japan 
350/450 
350/450 
r Journal 
USA 
35 
vol. 
Other 
15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
65, no. 
December 1973, p.577 
Experiences after the expansion of 1964-1967 coloured the 
attitudes of the industry in 1974 to the requirements of the 
long-term contracts proposed with Japan and to the prospects 
of expansion to service larger market outlets. The approach 
to both contracts and expansion plans was markedly different 
to that in 1963. 
After the industry was committed to the 1963 contracts and 
to the subsequent expansion, world prices declined to 
uneconomic levels, coinciding with increased exposure of the 
industry to the free market. The collapse in 1965 of the 
London Daily Price on which three-quarters of Australia's 
exports to the free market, including Japan, were based 
precipitated a major financial crisis in the industry. 
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TABLE 4.5 
LONDON DAILY PRICE OF SUGAR 
(pounds stg. per long ton cif UK) 
Year 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
Highest 
30.5 
40.0 
105.0 
93.75 
26.75 
24.25 
32.00 
31.00 
Lowest 
21.5 
19.75 
40.5 
24.75 
17.75 
13.25 
12.25 
16.00 
Average 
25.68 
25.98 
71.7 
51.11 
21.51 
17.87 
19.36 
21.84 
Source: John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/417. 
"A Case for Financial Assistance to the 
Sugar Industry by the Extension of Credit 
Facilities" - Submission to Premier Nicklin. 
New farmers in particular suffered severe financial hardship 
and, for the first time, the industry had to approach the 
State and then the Federal Governments for funds to provide 
an adequate return to growers from the 1966 crop. Federal 
Cabinet approved advances from the Reserve Bank to the Sugar 
Board and a loan from the Commonwealth Government of $19m, 
with principal and interest to be repaid by the Sugar Board 
from sales from the seasons 1970-1979. Both individual 
growers and the industry as a whole had debt repayments 
extending into the 1970s as a result of the 1960s expansion. 
The 1964 contract had provided a secure outlet for part of 
the now-enlarged sugar crop, but the disastrous effects of 
fluctuating prices emphasised the need for security of price 
as well as of quantity. The Sugar Board pursued a strategy 
of seeking stable prices through the ISA or other 
arrangements including special agreements such as those 
under the US Sugar Act or long-term contractual arrangements 
embodying price provisions designed to ensure the industry 
of reasonably remunerative returns independent of 
fluctuations in world prices. 
176 
Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s the Sugar Board and the 
Queensland and Commonwealth Governments worked to influence 
the environment in which any future negotiations for sugar 
contracts would occur. High level delegations of State and 
Federal Ministers, the Sugar Board and industry Associations 
worked actively for a new ISA, Deputy Prime Minister McEwen 
in consultation with industry advisers made direct 
approaches to the Governments of Japan and other sugar 
importing countries, and the Commonwealth worked in the 
Kennedy Round of GATT discussions to achieve an arrangement 
with Japan providing for more satisfactory prices. Despite 
their efforts, these negotiations came to nothing. The 
Sugar Board remained optimistic that the difficulties 
inherent in the complex structure of the Japanese refining 
industry could be overcome and agreement in principle 
reached on a range of prices acceptable to both importers 
and exporters, and throughout the 1960s and 1970s it 
endeavoured to reach a consensus with Japanese refiners on 
this point. 
The opportunities in 1973-74 were presented in different 
economic and political circumstances. The Queensland 
government was firmly established, the State's economy had 
been broadened through the development of resources in coal, 
bauxite and copper, and close trading links established with 
Japan. The new Federal Labor government had a particular 
interest in the possibility of the sugar contract as part of 
the high priorities it accorded northern development and the 
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growth of Australia-Japan relations. Prime Minister 
Whitlam established a Department of Northern Development 
whose responsibilities included the sugar industry. Its 
Minister was Dr.R.A. Patterson, the former Director of the 
Northern Division of the Department of National Development, 
and Member for Dawson, centred on the sugar-growing area of 
Mackay. The possibility of a long-term contract was 
attractive to both Commonwealth and State governments, but 
did not provoke the unbridled optimism which prevailed in 
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1973. It might well have been "tempting to advocate 
expansion" as Minister Patterson indicated, in the belief 
that there would never be a better time to gain permanent 
access to expanding markets, but no one, including the 
Minister, wanted a repeat of the 19 60s experience. 
The opportunities in 1973-74 arose because of a world sugar 
shortage precipitated by the entry of socialist economies as 
large buyers of world sugar, at a time when a shortage of 
fertilizers and the limited availability and high cost of 
capital limited the likelihood of expansion of output. 
Importers, including Japan, expressed interest in long term 
contractual arrangements as a means of securing future 
supplies. There were two major obstacles:-
(i) the industry would have to expand and there was a 
genuine and widespread hesitation about commitment to an 
increase in productive capacity even if (as industry policy 
required) it was from the base of assured long-term 
marketing arrangements 
(ii) the State and Federal Governments, the Sugar Board, and 
all sectors of the industry agreed that contract prices 
would have to be expressed in terms which did not expose 
either party to the risk of unpredictable currency 
fluctuations and which provided some buffer against the 
rising costs of production. 
In the negotiations which led ultimately to the 1974 
contract, all sectors of the industry were much more 
cautious than they had been in 1963. The ASPA urged 
That the Sugar Board be requested to include 
the strictest provisions for adjustments for 
inflationary and monetary influences in all 
future long term Agreements 
and that a price should be sought 
equivalent to the home consumption 
price (in the absence of an international 
agreement) or, if an international 
agreement is in operation a price 
not less than the pivot price of that 
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agreement and that a clause be included 
to cover the increased costs of production, 
percentage increase of these costs to be 
applied yearly to the interim agreement 
price of the contract. 
The Queensland government insisted that security of supplies 
for importers could be obtained only if they provided 
reasonably remunerative and secure returns for exporters. 
Anything less than a base price which could be adjusted to 
compensate for rising costs or currency realignments was 
unacceptable to the Queensland government and the industry. 
It would also have been unacceptable to the Commonwealth 
government which had already criticised coal exporters for 
failing to obtain adequate protection in long-term contracts 
with Japan. The Federal Minister (Dr. Patterson) agreed on 
the need for security because the industry would have to 
expand and felt that the contract should be reinforced by a 
formal Understanding at Government level. Queensland and 
Commonwealth governments were in complete agreement and, 
although the Commonwealth was not directly responsible for 
sugar sales, the Sugar Board, CSR and the industry as a 
whole sought and expected Federal involvement and 
acknowledgment of the situation. 
Working within the guidelines established by the Queensland 
government through the Sugar Board, CSR entered discussions 
with Japanese refiners to develop contract terms acceptable 
to both sides. Negotiations were adjourned indefinitely 
when the parties could not agree on a base price or a method 
of adjustment for inflation or currency realignments. CSR 
and the Sugar Board indicated that, especially in the 
existing conditions, sellers would prefer to deal on an 
annual or "spot" basis with Japan and seek long-term 
contracts elsewhere. To maintain a strong negotiating 
position, the Sugar Board urged millers to say nothing that 
might suggest to the Japanese a retreat from the official 
stance, and decided to take no action towards industry 
expansion prior to the signing of an Agreement. 
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Ultimately this decision was reversed, but only after a 
reassessment of the world market by CSR persuaded extremely 
reluctant growers that a modest expansion would not affect 
negotiations or "let Japan off the hook", and that 
additional production could be absorbed readily by 
international demand. 
Negotiations resumed only after a visit to Japan by Minister 
Patterson and discussions with MITI Minister Nakasone and 
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the Minister for Agriculture and Forestry, Mr. Kuraishi. 
Dr. Patterson exerted some pressure on Japan, emphasising 
the importance of secure supplies and intimating that long-
term contracts Australia might sign with other buyers would 
take priority over spot or annual sales although, in 
reality, the attempt to sign long-term contracts with other 
countries had enjoyed only limited success. The Australian 
and Japanese governments agreed to cooperate to encourage 
commercial interests to resume negotiations which began 
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again in October 1974. The eventual contract provided for 
the sale of 600,000 tonnes per year from the five seasons 
beginning in 1975. According to the Japan Times, half was to 
be at $A405 per ton and half at $US525 per ton, giving an 
overall price equivalent to 229 pounds stg per ton at a time 
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when the LDP was approximately 400 pounds stg. per ton. 
The industry felt that both sides had benefited and that the 
security of the contract was underpinned by the involvement 
of both national governments. 
The Queensland government determined the basic principles 
and strategies underlying the negotiations for the long-term 
contracts of 1963 and 1974 after consultations with its 
industry partners, the millers and growers. In the 1963 
negotiations, the State's economic and political interests 
promoted a positive approach to investigating and overcoming 
objections and problems raised by industry partners. In 
1974, the State's approach was much more cautious, and 
successful negotiations required Federal support and 
180 
encouragement, forthcoming because of the Whitlam 
government's high priority to northern development and to 
stronger relationships with Japan. The two long-term 
contracts were major steps in the development of the sugar 
trade, but in the course of that development a number of 
significant issues and problems could have meant that the 
trade growth did not proceed. The three principal issues 
centred around the development in Australia and Japan of 
facilities for bulk handling, the quality of Australian 
sugar, and the dispute over the 1974 long-term contract. 
BULK HANDLING 
The sugar industry would not have been able to take 
advantage of the opening of the United States market or of 
the opportunities for additional contracts with Japan 
without the throughput and turnaround capacity provided by 
bulk handling. This major innovation was initiated, 
coordinated and funded by the industry itself, supported by 
the Queensland government and by government 
instrumentalities such as the Railway Department and Harbour 
Boards whose cooperation was essential to the success of the 
venture. 
There had been some interest in bulk handling by the Sugar 
Board and CSR as early as 1945, and at the ASPA Conference 
in 1947, but the prime incentive for its introduction was 
the recognition by all sectors of the industry that 
escalating costs and turbulent conditions on the waterfront 
were not compatible with the need to sell part of 
Australia's sugar exports at market rather than at protected 
prices. Orderly shipping was one of the industry's prime 
objectives, but despite the efforts of sugar, shipping and 
port interests, the Queensland Premier, the Federal 
Minister for Labour and National Service and the Prime 
Minister, there was little improvement. By 1951 the ASPA 
and the QCGC members asked the Premier, the Sugar Board and 
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CSR to take immediate steps to introduce bulk handling and 
to regard it as an urgent and major priority, a view 
supported by the Minister for Labour and National Service, 
Mr. Holt.^^ The Queensland Government appointed the Sugar 
Board to coordinate the introduction of bulk handling, which 
involved a complexity of interests including some 9,000 
farms, 31 mills, road and rail transport, private tramways, 
and 11 ports, some controlled by Harbour Boards and some by 
the State Treasury. The Sugar Board was advised by a 
Consultative Committee which included representatives of the 
QCGC and the ASPA, ensuring input into decisions by all 
sections of the industry. 
CSR made a major contribution to the successful planning and 
implementation of bulk handling. The Company acted as 
associate consultants to the Sugar Board and reports by both 
the Company and the Board formed the basis of 
recommendations approved by the Consultative Committee and 
by the Queensland Government. CSR enlisted the cooperation 
of the Queensland Railways in overcoming the major problem 
of transport from mill to port caused by unreliable service, 
high cost, and outdated wooden wagons. CSR also surveyed 
sugar ports and developed a plan for weighing and sampling 
of sugar, expedited bulk handling installations at domestic 
refineries and organised testing such as deterioration 
trials at Hambledon mill. CSR devoted managerial resources 
to the coordination and implementation of bulk handling, 
with two senior staff (Mr. Alley and Mr. Hay) working full 
time, with other specialist personnel involved in 
negotiating the special Industrial Agreement, training 
Terminal management and solving technical problems. 
Financing the conversion to bulk handling throughout the 
industry was shared by the industry collectively, refiners 
and millers individually, and by various Departments and 
agencies of the Queensland government. CSR established 
facilities in its own refineries and its NSW mills; 
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Queensland mill facilities were established by the owners, 
and conversion costs of railway rolling stock were met by 
the industry. In the ports, the Government contributed to 
the construction and maintenance of the port itself, but not 
to the bulk terminals. They were initially financed and 
built with Loan funds by the Harbour Boards with the 
participation of the Department of Harbours and Marine and 
sometimes other Departments. The Cairns Terminal, for 
example, was part of a reclamation project undertaken as a 
partnership between the Department of Lands, the Cairns 
Harbour Board and the Cairns City Council. Subsequent 
expansion for the 1964-66 Japanese contract was financed by 
the Sugar Board out of sales proceeds, authorised by the 
industry Associations. The Harbour Boards could not have 
obtained funds without special arrangements to ensure that 
their receipts were adequate to meet interest payments and 
capital redemption. These problems were met by increased 
lending from CSR to the Sugar Board of $3m. for working 
capital and by the establishment of the Sugar Board Bulk 
Handling Facilities Special Fund by the Queensland 
A3 
Treasury. 
The industry was determined that the operation and control 
of the port installations would be in its own hands, and in 
1955 the Queensland Harbours Act was amended to let the 
Sugar Board take over the terminals and pay port authorities 
interest and redemption on loans raised to build the 
facilities. The terminals were then operated through local 
organisations set up by the Sugar Board for the purpose. 
The first bulk terminal was opened at Mackay in 1957 and the 
final terminal in the overall plan opened in Cairns in 1964. 
The economic significance of the change may be gauged from 
the improvement of throughput at Mackay from 65 tons per 
hour with an average port-stay of 3 weeks per ship before 
bulk handling to 600 tons per hour with an average port-stay 
Of 2 days per ship in the 8 months to March 1958. 
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However, not all customers changed simultaneously to bulk 
delivery, and the Japanese did not receive bulk sugar until 
1962. Cairns was chosen by the sugar industry with State 
Government and Cairns Harbour Board approval to serve the 
needs of the substantial, if declining, export demands for 
sugar in sacks. Mossman, Hambledon and Mulgrave mills, with 
a combined peak allotment of 126,000 tons 94n.t. supplied 
sugar, principally for Japan. 
As a long-term project, CSR tried in various ways to 
interest the Japanese refiners in bulk sugar. The company 
had a team of people in Japan supplying consulting services 
to assist refiners in converting their facilities. The 
Japanese themselves indicated that, without this 
cooperation, bulk handling could not have been introduced so 
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soon. In August 1962, CSR, supported by the Sugar Board, 
invited a Japanese delegation to inspect bulk handling in 
operation. The group was led by the President and Vice-
President of the Japan Sugar Refiners' Association and 
included representatives of 16 refining companies 
responsible for 90 per cent of Japan's sugar imports. They 
visited a small refinery in Adelaide, as well as bulk 
installations at ports, mills and farms. Despite qualms by 
some Japanese refiners about bulk sugar during the Japanese 
winter, Japanese customers had essentially converted to bulk 
handling by the end of 1962. 
Bulk handling was an essential prerequisite to the expansion 
of sugar exports to Japan during the 1960s. The Queensland 
government through its managers, the Sugar Board, 
coordinated its implementation and supported its 
introduction by ensuring the cooperation of relevant 
Departments and by seeking Loan funds and establishing a 
special capital facility. The success of bulk handling was 
due to industry initiatives in proposing it, cooperation 
especially between the Sugar Board, CSR and the Queensland 
Government in implementing it, and to CSR's efforts in 
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persuading the Japanese to adopt it. 
THE QUALITY OF SUGAR 
The leadership of the Queensland government through the 
Sugar Board and the cooperation between the Sugar Board, CSR 
and growers and millers was also instrumental in overcoming 
the poor quality of Australian sugar which was a substantial 
obstacle to the retention or development of the market for 
sugar in Japan. 
In general what was required was a high-standard, good-
keeping, well-dried, good filtering sugar with less than 99 
polarization. Refiners in the United Kingdom and other 
Commonwealth countries, as well as customers in the free 
market, complained that Australian sugar did not meet these 
standards. The need for action became more pressing as 
competition for markets intensified and other exporters 
began to concentrate on improving sugar quality in the late 
1950s. In the 1955 season the Sugar Board implemented for 
the first time penalties for sugar with an excess dilution 
indicator and subsequently for sugar with more than 99 
polarity. Some mills cooperated fully, but others 
complained that they were "unjustly saddled" with more than 
their fair share of the high quality market and its 
attendant costs. CSR refused customers' requests to 
exclude certain marks from shipments and decided not to 
manufacture special sugar for Canada, but to exercise 
discretion in the selection of brands for particular 
destinations and greater supervision to meet specifications. 
The Japanese market had slightly different, but very 
specific requirements, and greater precision was needed in 
meeting them. 
The Sugar Board took a number of steps to induce millers to 
produce sugar of acceptable quality, while the Queensland 
Government and other participants in the industry. 
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especially CSR, tried to improve the industry's technical 
capacity to solve the problems of sugar quality. The 
Minister for Agriculture and Stock set up a Committee of 
officers of the Bureau of Sugar Experiment Stations, the 
Central Sugar Cane Prices Board and CSR to inquire into the 
technical aspects of cane analysis. The CSR Central 
Laboratory and technologists from CSR and other mills worked 
on the problem of filtrability which had been a concern in 
the United Kingdom and Canada, but became worse in 
association with the lower polarization demanded by the 
Japanese. The Sugar Board arranged to produce a special 
quality of sugar, known as JA, with a polarisation as close 
as possible to 97.80 and a dilution indicator of 40 or less. 
After trials in 1956 at Bingera, Fairymead and Isis mills, 
other producers were asked to volunteer to produce JA sugar 
and were offered a monetary incentive of 3/- per ton and an 
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allowance of 0.009 tons of 94 n.t. per ton of JA produced. 
The Sugar Board impressed on mills the need for uniform bag 
weights as Japanese refiners accepted a quantity of sugar 
based on the average bag weight multiplied by the number of 
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bags. Some mills found this too onerous at the rate of 
throughput necessary to maintain the harvest schedule, 
especially when giving extra attention to adequate drying 
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and cooling after fugalling, and the maintenance of 
humidity at between 50 and 70 per cent to avoid bags of 
excessive hardness - referred to by Canadian refiners as 
"Queensland tombstones". ° Mills found the production of 
sugar for Japan "very exacting", and despite the special 
JA brand, the Queensland government and the Sugar Board had 
to give the lead towards a totally new attitude to sugar 
quality before a satisfactory product was achieved. 
CSR reported numerous complaints from the Japanese comparing 
Australian sugar unfavourably with that from Taiwan and 
Cuba. Daiichi Bussan Kaisha and Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha 
reported difficulty in selling Australian sugar whose 
quality added to refinery costs so that customers would pay 
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a maximum of $3-$3.50 per ton less than for the Cuban or San 
Domingo product. ^^ One unnamed customer put the matter 
succinctly - "once our refineries deem the supplies not 
reliable, then no further business follow" (sic). By 1959 
the filtrability of sugar sold to Japan had declined to such 
an extent that the Japanese agreed to buy from the 1960 crop 
only on the strength of promises by CSR that very 
considerable efforts would be made to improve the 
• ^  . . 54 situation. 
Acutely conscious of the impending loss of the Japanese 
market, the Sugar Board in 1960 offered financial incentives 
for good filtrability to producers of JA sugar despite 
protests from sugar organisations that there was 
insufficient technical knowledge for the problem to be 
solved. Three mills - Mossman, Hambledon and Mulgrave -
undertook particular studies of the filtrability problem and 
were eventually successful in achieving "one of the most 
important technical developments in the marketing of raw 
sugar for some time". Other mills followed suit, with the 
four Burdekin mills, for example, deciding to fund a central 
laboratory servicing the mills supplying the Townsville 
terminal so as to provide immediate feedback on sugar 
characteristics. CSR acknowledged that Australia's ability 
in 1961 to sell successfully to the Japanese in open 
competition was entirely due to these three mills, although 
the Japanese gave credit to Mr. Jackson and Mr. Wheen of 
CSR. In 1961 bonuses for the achievement of quality 
targets were extended to all sugar producers with 
corresponding penalties applying from 1962. 
The filtrability of sugar improved substantially, with JA 
brand improving from only 12.2° in 1959, the year of most 
complaints, to 35.9° in 1960. The attitude of the Japanese 
changed completely. They came to regard Australian sugar as 
of very high quality indeed, and Mr. Fujiyama, President of 
the Japan Sugar Refiners' Association, indicated that the 
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improvement in quality was the main reason for the expansion 
of trade. The cooperative effort of the Sugar Board, mills 
and CSR had led to the development of knowledge and 
technology to a point where high quality sugar should be 
produced almost all the time provided sufficient management 
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attention and resources were devoted to it. When the ISA 
quotas were suspended in 1962 and competition was very 
fierce, Australia's established reputation for quality was a 
major factor in increasing or even maintaining exports, 
especially as a large proportion of any export growth would 
inevitably come from Japan. 
The expansion of the industry from 1962, largely to supply 
the Japanese market, quality improvements by other 
exporters, and the fierce competition in the buyers' market 
after 1962 brought to an abrupt end the complacency 
engendered by several seasons of steady progress towards 
consistent and satisfactory quality. Poor weather 
conditions, the need for sugar for Japan to be produced even 
by mills unwilling to meet the stringent specifications, and 
the emergence of new problems all contributed to a decline 
in quality. The Japanese claimed compensation for poor 
quality sugar from the 1964 season and one of the Japanese 
refiners refused to take any more sugar from that season's 
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crop. 
In February 1965, as in 1959, CSR negotiators were able to 
finalise contracts with Japan only after undertakings to 
major refiners on the steps to be taken to improve quality. 
The largest single buyer of Australian raws - Taito - bought 
only on the strength of these assurances and past favourable 
reputation. Taito was one of the leaders of the sugar 
industry in Japan and Australia's position as its major 
supplier had materially assisted in making sales to smaller 
refineries. The loss of its custom would have serious 
marketing implications. Strong complaints were also 
received from Nissin, whose sugar was the market standard in 
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Japan and who also was a shareholder in the Malayan Sugar 
Manufacturing Company's new refinery in Prai, Malaysia, to 
which Australia hoped to be a supplier. Nissin was so 
dissatisfied it refused to process some of the 1964 sugar 
and both Taito and Nissin raised the question of being able 
to select the mills from which their supplies came. The 
industry realised that unless effective action were taken, 
it would lose not only the Japanese market, but the 
opportunity to establish production and sales figures that 
would be the essential basis for Australian quotas in any 
eventual International Sugar Agreement. 
The Queensland Government and the Sugar Board took the 
initiative in developing an entirely new attitude to sugar 
quality. The Sugar Board decided to concern itself formally 
with the broad issues of quality, rather than simply with a 
number of specific problems such as filtrability, dilution 
indicator and polarization as they arose. In 1965 it 
began to frame a comprehensive set of target standards for 
recommendation to the Minister for Primary Industry, based 
on information about those operating overseas and buyers' 
indicated specifications. The Minister, in making his 
annual Proclamation under the Sugar Acquisition Act 
announced added powers for the Sugar Board to control 
quality, including power to reject sugar not conforming with 
specific standards. The Sugar Board applied financial 
incentives based on target standards for major 
characteristics of sugar, and, from 1966 tightened the 
procedures for sampling and testing of sugar. Mills were 
required to provide to the terminals daily certificates of 
analysis; at the terminal, quality inspectors were to sample 
deliveries and provide feedback to the mill, while 
terminals were required to segregate any sugar not meeting 
standards. 
Although the statutory responsibility of the Sugar Board was 
directly with the mills, achievement of quality sugar 
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required the cooperation of all sections of the industry. 
Growers addressed aspects of harvest management which 
affected sugar quality, especially its grain size. CSR 
researchers investigated the problem of excess starch, and 
their success placed Australia well ahead of its 
competitors in dealing with an issue to which refiners gave 
increasing attention. The mills assisted with the time-
consuming process of collecting detailed data for research 
and made the necessary investment in technology to implement 
the new procedures. CSR and the Sugar Board provided the 
leadership which encouraged other sectors of the industry to 
commit themselves to the achievement of technical 
superiority over alternative producers, which was an 
important factor in the maintenance of market share in 
Japan. 
The most serious quality problem in the 1960s was the 
darkening of sugar held in bulk storage and Japanese buyers 
made it clear the entire market would be jeopardised if the 
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problem could not be solved immediately. Darkening was 
first evident in 1964 and was attributed to the increased 
use of high-speed fugals which raised the temperature of the 
sugar, increasing quantities of JA brand in store to meet 
increased sales and the fact that bulk sugar retains its 
heat more than bagged sugar would do. Initially the 
problem related to sugar stored at the Cairns terminal, and 
after a complaint from Japan no further exports were made of 
the Cairns sugar. The Acting Secretary of the ASPA 
described the sugar as darker than any he had ever seen and 
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having a smell which indicated some form of deterioration. 
He was "shocked" at its condition. The problem became acute 
with the progressive darkening of the 1965-season sugar, 
some of which was rejected on arrival, and the loss of an 
appreciable section of the Japanese market was a real 
possibility." 
The problem was dealt with on two levels - CSR worked with 
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Japanese refiners and the Sugar Board coordinated studies in 
Australian mills. Mr. Jackson of CSR inspected the sugar in 
storage in Tokyo and had discussions with refiners. CSR 
sent the Inspecting Chemist for Refineries and another 
technical officer to Japan to assist refiners to deal with 
the problem. Despite the seriousness of the difficulty, 
there was considerable goodwill by the Japanese towards the 
Australian industry and Taito, for example, expressed its 
appreciation for CSR's efforts, acknowledged that the 
problem was two-sided, and cooperated by providing samples 
from all stages in the refinery process for research. 
A concentrated effort was made to discover some way of 
arresting the colour formation by reference to overseas 
research and by testing different hypotheses in a number of 
mills. Findings confirmed that the temperature of the sugar 
on delivery from the mill was critical. Mills were asked by 
the Sugar Board for their own assessments of how this might 
be improved, some mills experimented with their own ideas, 
and CSR's Harwood mill used the cool ambient night air in 
June 1966 to produce a trial quantity of sugar which was 
monitored for several months. 
The initiative which eventually provided the solution to the 
problem of darkening sugar was taken by the Sugar Board, in 
consultation with the sugar Associations and CSR, and 
involved upgrading and airconditioning of drier stations in 
the mills. This was a difficult decision as there was no 
previous large-scale practical experience to verify the 
theoretical conclusions that airconditioning would solve the 
problem and it was feared that the cooled sugar might 
present some physical handling difficulties. In addition, it 
would involve substantial capital outlays at a time of 
exceptional financial difficulties. Nevertheless, because 
the Japanese market would otherwise be lost, the Sugar Board 
proceeded. The Harbour Boards purchased the airconditioning 
units and leased them to the Sugar Board which arranged with 
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the 11 nominated mills for their installation. The mills 
paid the costs of bringing the dryer stations to maximum 
operating efficiency and pool funds were used to repay the 
Harbour Boards. By October 1966 the average temperature of 
JA sugar had been reduced very significantly. CSR was able 
to report "spectacular reduction in colour development" in 
stored JA Brand sugar from the 1966 season and messages of 
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appreciation from the Japanese for their efforts. 
Further problems emerged in 1968 with complaints from Coca 
Cola in the USA and then in Japan and Australia regarding 
beverage floe (sediment) in Fanta. Again, marketing 
implications were serious as bottlers were instructed to 
obtain sugar elsewhere. Soft drink manufacturers comprised 
about 20 per cent of the refined sugar consumers in Japan, 
with Coca Cola accounting for about one-quarter of this 
market. Intensive investigation by Sugar Research Ltd. , 
Bureau of Sugar Experiment Stations and CSR revealed no 
practicable process for eliminating or reducing floe levels. 
As an immediate measure, it was decided not to ship high-
f locoing sugar to sensitive markets. In addition, 
investigations in Japan by a senior chemist from CSR showed 
that the problem was partly due to a component of the Fanta 
essence. Although Japanese refiners and Coca Cola were well 
satisfied with the action the sugar industry had taken, they 
continued to monitor the situation and research continued 
into a permanent solution to the problem. 
In the intensely competitive marketplace of the 1960s and 
70s, international sugar standards were continually rising 
as quality became an integral part of the marketing scene. 
This was reflected in the growth of quality standards in 
contracts such as those with the USA and in careful 
assessment of quality by buyers such as the Japanese. CSR 
advised the industry that there was no such thing as a 
seller's market; in the fiercely competitive conditions 
quality was by far the most important factor determining 
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market success. Australia's willingness to meet or exceed 
international standards made her a respected long-term 
supplier to the Japanese, and indeed, the world market. 
The key to the industry's success in meeting the challenge 
of sugar quality was the partnership between its sectors, 
and the efforts of the whole industry to alter methods of 
operation, work together and provide assistance to 
customers. CSR supplied technical advice and research and 
built on the goodwill generated by its assistance to the 
Japanese in establishing bulk handling to achieve some 
tolerance towards quality problems and a willingness to 
allow time for them to be solved. Individual growers and 
millers and their Associations undertook their own 
initiatives towards solving problems and worked to ensure 
the implementation of policies and new methods. The Sugar 
Board, as the Queensland government's manager, provided the 
leadership, coordination, and, when necessary, the ability 
to enforce regulations which were essential to a change of 
attitude towards sugar quality. The government itself was 
supportive, but took little direct role; it was more 
concerned with major policy issues such as those which arose 
in the long-term contract disputes with Japan. 
THE LONG-TERM CONTRACT DISPUTE 
Problems in the implementation of the 1974 long-term 
contract emerged very quickly and provoked a bitter dispute 
which imposed exceptional strains on the economic and 
political relationships. In the crisis situation, the 
division of roles within the partnership of State and 
Federal Governments and the industry was clearly evident. 
The Queensland Government, and through it the Sugar Board, 
defined policy and strategy for implementation by CSR. The 
Commonwealth supported them by exercising high-level 
influence, while industry groups and Associations acted as a 
sounding board in the development of proposals and a means 
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of ensuring a unified approach. 
The immediate cause of the problems was an increase in 
stocks held by Japanese refiners as consumption fell and the 
industry cut back. The Japanese exercised an option to defer 
up to 150,000 tons from 1975 to 1976 and subsequently 
requested that a further 160,000 tons be deferred and spread 
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over the life of the contract. This request was refused 
by the Queensland Government and the Sugar Board. Japanese 
sugar refiners and members of the Japanese Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry visiting Australia during September 
1975 discussed the issue with Queensland Agriculture 
Minister Sullivan, the Sugar Board, CSR, the sugar 
Associations, and the Federal government. Further 
discussions took place in Japan in November/December 1975 
and in Sydney, Brisbane and Canberra in January 1976 and in 
Tokyo in February 1976. The Sugar Board and CSR were 
sympathetic to the problems of the Japanese refining 
industry, but took the view that the contract had to be 
honoured. To the "surprise and shock" of the Australian 
industry the Japanese then sought from CSR a review of the 
contract, especially its price provisions. 
As owners of the sugar the Queensland Government was the 
principal in the contract and both the Minister for Primary 
Industry (Mr. Sullivan) and to a lesser extent the Premier 
(Mr. Bjelke-Petersen) were actively involved in the progress 
of the dispute. The Premier saw the Queensland Government's 
responsibility as preserving the interests of the growers 
and millers who had accepted the long-term contract as 
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security for heavy capital investment. The contract's 
initial purpose had been to give exporters secure outlets 
and prices and importers secure supplies at predictable 
costs. The contract price had not been Australia's 
preferred minimum price with provision for indexation, but 
rather a flat figure reflecting the parties' judgement about 
the likely trends over the relevant period in what was 
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historically a very volatile market. The contract 
obviously offered no security if its basic premises were 
renegotiated so close to the outset because world prices had 
fallen. 
The partnership between the Queensland government and the 
growers and millers was evident in the handling of the 
dispute. In January 1977 Minister Sullivan led a delegation 
to Japan to investigate on the spot and exchange views on 
the continuing course of the contract. The delegation, 
including Mr. Harris, Chairman of the Sugar Board, and 
representatives of the Queensland Government, CSR and the 
sugar Associations, had talks with Japanese Ministers, the 
Japan Sugar Refiners' Association, trade houses, refiners, 
the All Japan Wholesalers' Association, unions and financial 
institutions. Mr. Sullivan made it clear the Australian 
industry itself had a cashflow problem. It had made a 
controlled expansion to meet its obligations to Japan and 
this had to be paid for. In addition, the industry was 
still repaying the amount it had to borrow from the 
Commonwealth because of the downturn in prices after the 
expansion for the Japanese market in 1963. 
Structural problems in the Japanese sugar refining industry 
were at the basis of the dispute. The industry had excess 
capacity, some refineries were small and old-fashioned, the 
domestic beet industry was protected, while imports 
attracted a duty which added to the price consumers paid for 
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sugar. The high domestic price and the tax system favoured 
sugar substitutes such as fructose glucose syrups and 
contributed to the falling consumption of sugar. The long-
term contract aggravated the problem since Mitsui and 
Mitsubishi, who had signed the contract and taken the 
largest proportion of the sugar, were at a disadvantage 
relative to the Nissho-Iwai group, C. Itoh and the Ensuiko 
Refinery who took much smaller shares. 
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The Queensland Government's approach was that the basic 
problems of the Japanese industry should be addressed prior 
to any significant review of the contract so that Japan's 
obligations could continue to be honoured, though with some 
adjustments. Details of the sugar industry's negotiating 
position were worked out between CSR, the Sugar Board and 
industry Associations during 1975-1977 and contributed to 
the unified approach to the problem and the support of the 
industry for the Sugar Board's policy. When no agreement 
could be reached with the Japanese on the proposals, Mr. J. 
Laurie, CSR's chief negotiator, walked out of the talks, 
attributing at least part of the delay to the indifference 
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of the Japanese Government. On 3 0 June 1977 Japan refused 
to accept further shipments, declaring the contract 
terminated. 
The original commercial Agreement had been reinforced by an 
exchange of Letters between the Commonwealth and Japanese 
Governments to provide strong enough backing on the part of 
Japan to minimise any risk of the agreement's falling 
through if the market turned sharply in the buyers' 
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favour. In addition, the Commonwealth Government was very 
concerned that breakdown of the Agreement would have 
important ramifications, not just for the sugar industry, 
op 
but for long-term bilateral contracts in general. Both 
the ALP and later the Liberal/National Federal Governments 
supported the aims of the Long Term Contract and worked to 
ensure its continued performance. Deputy Prime Minister 
Anthony and representatives of the Departments of Overseas 
Trade, Foreign Affairs, Primary Industry, Treasury and the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet had discussions with senior 
officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries in 
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July 1977. The dispute was the subject of correspondence 
between Prime Minister Fraser and the Japanese Prime 
Minister and discussions between them in Malaysia in August 
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1977. Some commentators have suggested that Australia's 
uncompromising stand over sugar and beef were at least 
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partly driven by the Prime Minister's firm belief that 
allowing the Japanese to break a contract so easily would 
weaken Australia's trade position at a time when she was 
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trying to exert an influence in world trade negotiations. 
In the context of a Federal election to be held in December 
1977, Mr. Fraser was also concerned with maintaining the 17 
out of a possible 18 electorates the Coalition held in 
Queensland. Public statements by the Prime Minister and the 
text of a letter to Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda indicated 
that the disputes over beef and sugar risked the whole 
Australia-Japan relationship. 
The Queensland government was inflexible in its view that 
the contract must be fulfilled to the letter, or with only 
minor modifications at the discretion of the exporter, and 
adopted a confrontationist attitude typical of the style of 
Premier Bjelke-Petersen. Japanese proposals were dismissed 
as not even approaching what might be needed as the basis 
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for an amicable settlement, and the Queensland Government 
instigated legal action to enforce the terms related to 
contracted future shipments. The Premier said the 
Government, departmental officers and industry Associations, 
the Sugar Board and CSR all agreed they could wait no longer 
to initiate legal proceedings as provided in the contract, 
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though they still hoped for a negotiated settlement. An 
English barrister was retained, preliminary notices sent to 
Japanese buyers as required under the Sugar Association of 
London Arbitration Rules and a statement of claims lodged. 
A number of different factors eventually led to the ending 
of the dispute. The conflict had brought to the fore the 
fundamental problems of the Japanese refining industry in 
much the same way as the international "crisis" of the beef 
embargo had highlighted the intransigent problems of the 
Japanese beef distribution system and put pressure on the 
government to assist in domestic restructuring as part of 
the process of resolving the international issues. Mr. 
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Fujiyama, President of Dai Nippon Sugar Manufacturing Co. 
and chief Japanese negotiator, believed that a compromise 
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could be reached with government help. Further pressure on 
Japan came from the embarrassment of 12 cargoes of sugar, 
totalling 2 00,000 tonnes, in ships in Japanese ports, 
publicised abroad as evidence of Japan's bad faith. 
Commercial interests on both sides were anxious for a 
settlement. Discussions between Mr. Fujiyama and Mr. Laurie 
of CSR arranged a price for the sugar aboard the ships which 
was approximately 12.5 per cent less than the contracted 
price but considerably more than the market price then 
89 
prevailing. The Queensland Government agreed to delay the 
scheduled departure of the first of the 1977 season's 
contracted sugar as a gesture of goodwill and cooperation. 
The total settlement package appeared to contain benefits to 
both parties. The price for the sugar still to be delivered 
was only 7 per cent lower than the previous effective price 
compared with Japanese demands that it be cut to world-price 
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levels (i.e. a drop of about 50 per cent) . The remaining 
1.8m tonnes would be shipped over 4 years instead of 3, and 
a new contract at lower tonnage rates was signed to run 
parallel with the original agreement with prices moving 
within a range and denominated in a mix of $A, $US and yen. 
The Japanese government acted to stabilise domestic sugar 
prices and to rationalise the refining industry. Part of 
the settlement was a loan of $15m. for the Sugar Board for 
storage facilities, organised by the Bank of Tokyo in yen, 
but protected against currency fluctuations by the yen 
payments from sugar sales. The loan had the full approval 
of the Loan Council under new arrangements and marked the 
first time since 1920 that the State had organised a loan 
for itself. According to Treasurer Knox, the State 
government saw the loan as security that the Japanese would 
not renege on the sugar contract lest Queensland discontinue 
loan repayments.'^ 
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The Queensland government and industry leaders felt their 
stand on the obligations imposed by a contract had been 
vindicated and that they had won a moral and practical 
victory. The dispute had generated great hostility towards 
Japanese industry on the part of the Queensland government, 
and the sugar millers and growers who had jointly agreed to 
the contract and who felt they had taken great pains to see 
that both buyers and sellers benefited from its provisions. 
There was a degree of self-congratulation that they had 
outsmarted the Japanese, and no real understanding of the 
long-term implications of the dispute. The industry 
expected that good relations would be restored and further 
contracts would be signed. But sales to Japan, and to other 
customers such as Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and New 
Zealand, reverted to the type of annual purchase that had 
been the norm in the early 1960s. 
The unsuccessful attempt to find an institutional framework 
providing longterm stability in volumes and prices called 
into question the potential and the limitations of such 
contracts with Japan for agricultural products. It focussed 
attention on the degree of fixity that contracts could or 
should provide, the effect of Japanese demand patterns and 
economic structures, and the role of governments in long-
term contracting. The Industry Review Project initiated by 
the sugar Associations and an Industries Assistance Inquiry 
in the mid-1980s indicated that the dispute acted as a 
catalyst for a wide-ranging debate about industry structures 
and marketing strategies and a renewed search for stability 
through the targets embodied in the International Sugar 
Agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
The development of the sugar trade with Japan was part of 
the process of realignment of Australia's foreign trade away 
from the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth towards Asia 
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and the Pacific. It was also part of the process in which 
Queensland came to realize that a robust and viable trade 
could be built with Japan based on products in which 
Queensland had a particular interest and which complemented 
the pattern of Japanese economic growth. Sugar's position as 
a uniquely Queensland industry, the Queensland government's 
ownership of the crop and its responsibilities under the 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement gave the regional State a role 
in the development of the trade markedly different to its 
role with respect to any other commodity. 
Sugar was the principal agricultural crop of northern 
Queensland and had been a significant export earner since 
the 1920s. The commitment of successive Queensland 
Governments, both Labor and Liberal/National, to 
decentralised development based largely on agriculture 
reinforced the sugar industry's position as part of the 
"grand vision" for Queensland progress through the 
development of its as-yet scarcely tapped potential. At the 
same time its importance for northern development and its 
ability to generate export income ensured Commonwealth 
support for its continued growth. The aims and priorities 
of Governments promoted a unity of interest between state 
and industry which underpinned the formal relationship 
provided for by State and Federal legislation. 
Changes in the international political and economic 
environment and Japanese economic growth provided both the 
opportunity and the motive for considering exports to Japan 
an important part of sugar industry development, and helped 
to determine the pace and pattern of its growth. Australia's 
political stability and her ability to deliver large 
quantities of suitable sugar at internationally competitive 
prices made her an attractive supplier to Japanese refiners. 
The actual volume of trade was determined by the economic 
situation in Japan, the level of Australian production and 
the windows of opportunity provided by the suspension of ISA 
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quotas in periods of excess world demand. 
The policy responses to the opportunities offered and the 
management of the relationship which developed illustrated 
the partnerships within the sugar industry. The partnership 
between the Queensland and Federal governments was expressed 
in the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, in the joint 
participation with industry Associations in the negotiations 
for international agreements directly affecting the 
industry, and in the joint management of major international 
issues such as the dispute over the 1974 long-term contract. 
The entrepreneurial functions of business were shared among 
the sectors of the industry. The coordinating role was 
exercised by the Sugar Board as the delegated authority of 
the Queensland Government. It developed policy positions on 
major issues and obtained industry consensus and commitment 
to the strategies adopted. It organised and implemented 
major projects such as the introduction of bulk handling, 
the development of special JA brand sugar, and the 
bonus/penalty system for the maintenance of quality 
standards. It was able to give and guarantee undertakings 
to the Japanese about quality and to speak authoritatively 
on policy issues which arose in negotiations. Commercial 
initiatives were taken by the Sugar Board's agents, CSR Ltd. 
and their broker, Czarnikow Ltd. In the early years, CSR's 
success in persuading and assisting the Japanese to adopt 
bulk handling was a crucial step in the ability of the trade 
to handle large volumes and to respond to the opportunities 
for sales to Japan. In addition, the goodwill and trust 
built up between CSR and the Japanese refiners helped to 
achieve an understanding approach to problems which might 
otherwise have outweighed Australia's advantages as a 
supplier. Both the industry collectively and the growers 
and millers individually were willing to take risks and 
innovate, to look ahead rather than cling to past 
achievements, and to make substantial outlays in 
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anticipation of market prospects. 
The interrelationships and processes evident in the 
development of the sugar trade with Japan show many 
similarities to both Lindblom's "duality of leadership" and 
to corporatism. The sugar industry seemed to have a 
privileged position stemming from its dominant role in the 
economy of northern Queensland and its major contribution to 
the State's agricultural production and exports. It was 
actively supported by the State and Federal governments in 
their efforts to negotiate agreements governing access to 
international markets and by the special legislation 
governing its domestic operations. The mechanisms for 
frequent consultation between sectors of the industry and 
the institutions of the State, and the sharing of authority 
through agencies such as the Sugar Board were consistent 
with Lindblom's model. Consultations involved more than the 
mere expression of opinion or statement of requirements; 
rather, they were negotiations between economically defined 
groups in government and business resulting in the 
development of policy in the corporatist style. But neither 
of these models takes account of the singular features of 
the State's role in the sugar industry. It was the owner of 
the crop and the regulator of the industry. Ultimately, 
decisions about expansion for the Japanese market, 
negotiating or marketing strategies, or the settlement of 
disputes rested with the Queensland government. The role of 
the State was one of a senior partner, with its own 
interests to consider and the authority to carry out its 
decisions. 
The respective roles of business and the State in the growth 
of agricultural exports such as beef and sugar to Japan 
depended on long-established understandings and 
arrangements. The trade in mining products, including coal 
and bauxite, required the development of new relationships 
involving business and State and Federal governments. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DEVELOPMENTAL NATIONALISTS 
THE BAUXITE INDUSTRY AND JAPAN 
INTRODUCTION 
The trade in rural products had provided the foundation of 
the relationship between Queensland and Japan, but it was 
the trade in minerals and energy which altered the pattern 
of Queensland's economic growth, affected her relations 
within the federal system profoundly and led to a 
reappraisal by politicians and political economists of the 
role regional state authorities could play in economic 
affairs. 
The first of the major new mining developments which would 
be tied to export to Japan followed the discovery in 1955 of 
bauxite at Weipa. Plans for its development had been placed 
before the Labor Government early in 1956, but little 
progress had been made before the ALP was defeated in 1957. 
Tsokhas argues that projects such as Weipa went ahead 
because entrepreneurial mining executives - "developmental 
nationalists" - were determined that Australian-controlled 
companies would contribute to the diversification of the 
national economy by the location and development of new 
minerals and metals, new technologies and new markets. This 
chapter suggests that the term could be extended to include 
the Queensland government whose interest in secondary 
industries and in State development led it to take 
considerable risks in its innovative and flexible approach 
in supporting the Weipa venture and in ensuring an 
integrated bauxite/alumina/aluminium industry was situated 
in Queensland. 
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Weipa was important in the development of the Queensland-
Japan relationship. Its bauxite provided one of the early 
"new" exports of the postwar period, but more importantly, 
along with Mt. Isa Mines, the development of alumina and 
aluminium industries showed that Queensland did not have to 
be merely a quarry, extracting and exporting raw materials. 
Queensland resources could be the basis for processing 
industries supplying higher-value-added products with 
sufficient comparative advantage to allow them to respond to 
international market opportunities, especially in Japan. To 
do so required good timing, and a commitment by both company 
and government to innovation and flexibility. 
THE DISCOVERY OF BAUXITE 
The search for bauxite was encouraged by the Federal 
Government because of its concern for defence reasons to 
achieve self-sufficiency in important resources such as 
bauxite, oil and iron ore. The strategic importance of 
aluminium, the rapid increase in demand and the difficulties 
of obtaining imports during World War II led to measures 
initiated by the Commonwealth government to process imported 
bauxite and to encourage the search for domestic supplies. 
The first step was the formation by the Commonwealth and 
Tasmanian Governments in 1945 of the Australian Aluminium 
Production Commission (AAPC) and the construction of a 
smelter at Bell Bay using cheap hydro-electric power to 
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process imported bauxite from Malaya, India and Indonesia. 
The Commission also undertook with the Bureau of Mineral 
Resources, Geology and Geophysics a reconnaissance survey of 
known bauxite areas of Australia. A deposit was located at 
Gove in the Northern Territory in 1952, and the Bureau 
concluded that "on geological and climatical grounds" 
further deposits were likely in north Queensland as well. 
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Encouraged by the Commonwealth, the Queensland government 
decided to make a statewide search, and to exempt any area 
to be tested from occupation by holders of Miners' Rights. 
Only the South Queensland region was actually completed, and 
some deposits were found. In 1947 officers of the AAPC 
investigated a deposit at Kingaroy but found it not 
economically viable, although early optimism had led to 
discussions with the Co-Ordinator General about the supply 
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to a possible smelter of coal and electricity. Both were 
limited, though there were suggestions of providing power 
from hydro-electric works on the Barron River or the Tully 
Falls. The State Mining Engineer urged the AAPC to organise 
a search in north Queensland as soon as possible since he 
considered it a more likely area for bauxite. The Queensland 
Government was very interested in the prospects of mining 
and processing and the Minister for Labour and Industry 
(V.C. Gair) promised Reynolds Metals, a major American 
producer, "every encouragement" of their interest in the 
State's bauxite deposits. At the same time he outlined his 
vision for processing based on electricity produced in coal-
fired power stations which would thus provide a market for 
the State's under-utilized coal resources. 
The discovery of the vast bauxite deposit at Weipa was to 
some extent a matter of luck and a by-product of the search 
for oil, but it would not have occurred without the 
expertise and foresight of Maurice Mawby, Chairman of 
Consolidated Zinc P/L who had been one of the mining experts 
whose report led to the establishment of the AAPC. He 
played a key role in committing his company and its 
subsidiaries to searching out new metals and minerals such 
as tungsten, oil and uranium, and instructed that all Field 
Geologists be told that "apart from the search for base 
metals" they should "keep an eye open for non-metallic 
minerals, particularly phosphate rock and bauxite". He 
suspected that there might be bauxite in the Gulf region 
because of the monsoonal variations in the water table and 
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geologists searching there for oil were especially vigilant 
for deposits that could be "cheaply worked and reasonably 
Q 
convenient to the coast for shipment." 
The red cliffs of Weipa had been described by Matthew 
Flinders in 1802 and "brown pisolitic ironstone" reported by 
the Assistant Government Geologist, C.F.V.Jackson in 1902, 
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though his report was not followed up. In 1947 Dr.F.W. 
Whitehouse collected good grade bauxite samples to the south 
of Weipa. Geological survey was considered, but abandoned 
when further samples sought from the Mission Stations 
happened to be low grade, and the AAPC concluded that "the 
expense of a geological investigation of this area would not 
be justified". In 1955, Harry Evans, one of a team from a 
Consolidated Zinc subsidiary searching for oil in the Gulf, 
recognised the potential of the miles of bauxite cliffs and 
at his suggestion an Authority to Prospect was sought for 
bauxite in August 1955 and granted in February 1956. The 
deposit was found to be more than 1 million tonnes averaging 
over 50 per cent alumina, with overburden of 1 metre and 
bauxite between 1 and 9 metres thick. The ore was loose and 
able to be mined with front-end loaders or hydraulic 
shovels, making it one of the largest, high-grade and 
lowest-cost bauxite deposits in the world. Sir H. Raggatt, 
Director of the Bureau of Mineral Resources, regarded it as 
"in many ways the most momentous discovery in its ultimate 
implications for the attitude to prospecting in 
Queensland. ^^ 
Exploiting the discovery raised four key problems:-
establishing a mine in a remote and undeveloped location, 
financing the development, breaking into the oligopolistic 
world market, and deciding the location and extent of 
processing. There were a number of obvious difficulties. 
Weipa is on Cape York, about 12° south of the equator and 580 
km northwest of Cairns. The area is monsoonal, with an 
average rainfall of 1650mm. Overland access was by dirt 
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road useable only in the dry; year-round transport had to be 
by sea or air. In addition, Australia was remote from world 
markets, the cost of labour substantially higher than in 
other bauxite-producing areas and major aluminium companies 
were already interested if not committed elsewhere. But 
Mawby was enthusiastic and a new Queensland-registered 
company - Commonwealth Aluminium Corporation (Comalco) - was 
formed by Consolidated Zinc and British Aluminium to develop 
the mine. The Company's Chief Executive was D.J.Hibberd, 
then First Assistant Secretary, Banking, Trade and Industry 
in the Commonwealth Treasury and a member of the AAPC. The 
combination of Mawby and Hibberd was to be vital to the 
development of Weipa and the decision to seek markets in 
Japan. 
ESTABLISHING THE MINE 
The development of the Weipa mine necessitated comprehensive 
government involvement on a scale not previously, or even at 
the time, envisaged in Queensland. Weipa's remoteness and 
lack of infrastructure, and its size and special needs meant 
it could not be accommodated within existing legislative 
arrangements. The Country-Liberal Party government in 
Queensland brought enabling legislation before the 
Parliament within a few months of the defeat of the ALP in 
1957. There was not even sufficient time for all the terms 
of the Agreement worked out between the company and officers 
of the Mines and other Departments to be dealt with at a 
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more senior level before presentation to Cabinet. The 
speed with which the Comalco Agreement Bill was prepared 
indicated the importance the new government placed on the 
development and its preparedness to share with the company 
the risks of a rapid start to production before markets had 
been assured. For the company the risks were financial, for 
the government political, as the Weipa project was closely 
associated with key components of its policies for northern 
development and the growth of secondary industries. The 
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failure of one of the biggest ventures undertaken in 
Australia at that time would have been a major setback to 
the first non-Labor State government in Queensland for 2 5 
years. 
The negotiations involved in designing the legislation and a 
division of responsibilities between governments and the 
company were complex, with no established precedent to serve 
as a guide. A huge surface area was needed, which was new 
in Australian mining history. The original discovery was of 
two ore bodies, each of 100 square miles, and they required 
extensive drilling, sampling and analysing as a preliminary 
to mining since the processes involved in bauxite treatment 
depend on the silica content and on whether the bauxite is 
monohydrate or trihydrate. For this reason, and because of 
the capital outlay on the proposed town, plant and port, a 
lease over an extensive area with more than the usual 
security of tenure was essential. 
The proposal broke new ground for relations between the 
Queensland Government and private enterprise since the 
State's experience was with small mines and firms, rural 
industries, and projects such as Mt. Isa which expanded 
gradually over a period of time. There were no mechanisms 
in place to deal with a project which would of necessity be 
large from the outset, to assess and coordinate the demands 
it created in such areas as infrastructure provision and 
environmental protection. It is doubtful that there was any 
appreciation of the extent to which the project would impact 
on the state: for example, in the Co-Ordinator-General's 
Report on the Development of East North Queensland, ^^ the 
Agreement with Comalco is dismissed as calling for little 
assistance on the part of the Government. 
The project had already been delayed by the preoccupation of 
the Labor Government with other concerns, although it had 
ascertained that the AAPC was willing to free Queensland 
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from the undertaking given many years earlier not to grant 
bauxite leases to private companies unless the deposit was 
not required by the Commission. The application for a 
franchise had been made in early 1956 when the ALP was 
embroiled in arguments between the Australian Workers' 
Union, the Trades and Labour Council, the Queensland Central 
Executive of the ALP and the Parliamentary Labor Party. 
There was a series of issues - 3 weeks' leave, the shearers' 
strike, a scandal concerning maladministration in the Lands 
Department involving its Minister, T.A. Foley, and 
contentious pieces of legislation such as the Motor Spirits 
Distribution Bill. In the background was the problem of 
industrial groups and the split in the Party at Federal 
level, in Victoria and ultimately in Queensland itself. The 
Labor Treasurer, E.(Ted) Walsh, thought the Weipa proposal 
had "nothing in it for Queensland", while others were 
fearful of its size and the idea of "giving away all these 
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assets" to one company. Little progress towards the 
Franchise was made before the Gair Government fell in June 
1957. Its conservatism, its preoccupation with internal 
strife and the complexity of the proposal held it back. The 
Nicklin Government was anxious to give the impression of new 
verve and energy, especially in the development of the north 
and the promotion of industrial growth. The Franchise over 
the Weipa bauxite deposit was seen as the first step towards 
an integrated bauxite, alumina, aluminium industry and was 
ready for debate in Parliament within three months of the 
Government's election. 
The new government continued the traditional commitment to 
development and the frontier mentality that the project 
would transform the "Cinderella state" and be the basis for 
secondary industry through linkages and externalities 
leading to the growth of other sectors of the economy. It 
was also seen as the impetus for other important mining 
enterprises which would result in "wealth . . . that will not 
be measured in pounds, shillings and pence ... but in 
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increased growth and development and the prosperity of the 
working man".^^ The rhetoric was reminiscent of earlier 
Premiers such as Theodore, Forgan Smith or Hanlon as they 
announced large projects on which hopes for future 
development were pinned. Everyone supposedly would benefit 
from the mine's development and the main interest of the 
State was to ensure that production began as quickly as 
possible so that plans could go ahead for processing. 
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Fitzgerald argues that the interests of developers took 
precedence over those of all other groups. Virtually the 
whole of the local Aboriginal reserve was alienated for 
mining and it was with great reluctance that Department of 
Native Affairs and Comalco allowed the community to remain 
in the area, after a claim for royalties was withdrawn. The 
Government and Minister Evans assumed the local people would 
automatically benefit from better housing, transport and 
communications and from additional employment opportunities, 
without taking any specific steps to ensure that potential 
benefits were realised. Neither were there any provisions 
to minimise environmental damage on land or in the 
surrounding waters and, as Fitzgerald points out, concerns 
were expressed subsequently at the mine's effect on the 
fishing grounds and at the choice of inappropriate plants 
for revegetation of mined areas. At the time there were no 
effective and organised groups to speak on behalf of the 
aboriginal people or conservation of the environment and to 
provide a counterbalance to government and company interests 
in rapid development. The ALP leadership raised concerns 
about living conditions and conservation and said it was 
"morally wrong" to just accept the company's word about the 
welfare of the aboriginal people. But the Opposition was 
in no state to be effective even if it had not believed that 
"as such great national resources have lain untapped for so 
many years it is only right that every opportunity should be 
taken to support a Bill that will mean their 
exploitation."^^ 
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The Government, however, was not so completely carried away 
by enthusiasm for the mine that it forgot its principal 
aim - the promotion of industrial development through the 
building of an alumina plant and ultimately a smelter. Its 
determination to secure these was heightened by mistrust of 
the Federal Government. The Queensland Government was 
firmly opposed to the Commonwealth's support for 
international attempts to arrive at a system of production 
controls and export quotas to stabilise a range of products 
including aluminium which, it believed, would seriously 
delay the Weipa mine. In addition, there was a suspicion 
that the Commonwealth would not support a refinery or 
smelter in Queensland. Consolidated Zinc had bought the 
Commonwealth's share in the New Guinea Resources Prospecting 
Company, established an oil exploration subsidiary, 
purchased plant in New Guinea, and promoted the idea of a 
partnership with British Aluminium for joint development of 
the Weipa and Gove (Northern Territory) deposits using New 
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Guinea hydroelectricity. In the Federal Parliament, the 
Minister for National Development had agreed that 
development at Weipa was likely to be affected to some 
extent by the Commonwealth's sale of its New Guinea 
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interests. Queensland was suspicious that the State would 
be left with just the mine, with processing located in New 
Guinea where hydroelectric power could be provided cheaply. 
The question involved also the Federal attitude to the 
smelter at Bell Bay which might become a white elephant if a 
plant were to be built in Queensland. Les Wood (Leader of 
the Opposition) summed up the suspicions: "we would be 
superoptimists if we expected the Commonwealth Government to 
assist in the development of the resources of the State in 
any way".^ ^ 
Parallel with the negotiations with the State Government, 
Comalco set about proving the size and scope of its deposit 
and making detailed preparations for access by sea. The 
State and Federal Governments assisted in various ways. In 
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June 1956, after Evans' discovery, investigations began with 
the preparation of maps to control surveying, drilling and 
sampling of mineral areas. Aerial surveys and sea mapping 
also had to be undertaken because maps available were still 
fundamentally Flinders' work of 1802. Navigational surveys 
of the sea and the Embley River/Hay River estuary were 
required to determine accessibility from seaward approaches. 
The company employed as a consultant the Royal Netherlands 
Harbour Works Ltd. for the port site, construction and 
dredging. The hydrographic survey was done with the 
assistance of the Royal Australian Navy and the Queensland 
Department of Harbours and Marine, and the government launch 
"Ferret" was sent to survey the Gulf of Carpentaria for a 
bauxite port in the Weipa, Pera Head and Port Musgrave 
areas. 
By the end of 1957 the State government had reached an 
agreement with the company which was fundamental to the 
direction of Weipa's development and to the way in which the 
company was later able to take advantage of the Japanese 
market for bauxite. Because of the new government's high 
priority to secondary industry as the means of economic 
growth, its interest lay in the development of the mine and 
subsequent processing of bauxite to alumina rather than in 
exports of the raw product. Because of the project's likely 
impact on State development, the government was willing to 
take risks and be innovative and flexible in drawing up 
special legislation to meet the needs of the project and to 
achieve its own objectives. Later, the Government was 
criticised for excessive generosity, but Evans felt he had a 
"tough fight" to ensure the alumina plant and the promise 
to investigate a smelter in Queensland. 
THE AGREEMENT - ATTRACTIVE CONDITIONS 
The Commonwealth Aluminium Corporation Pty. Ltd. Agreement 
Bill set out the major provisions under which Weipa would be 
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developed. As Galligan points out, once an Agreement is 
promulgated, the Act gives its provisions legal force and 
any variation, except for some limited discretions reserved 
to the Minister, requires agreement between the Premier and 
the companies and subsequent endorsement by parliamentary 
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resolution. This gave the company a prestigious guarantee 
to the conditions under which it would operate, though at 
the same time binding the company to its undertakings. 
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The Agreement was indicative of the State's concern to 
maximise development through very attractive conditions, low 
royalties and long lease which, Evans acknowledged, 
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"assisted materially in reaching agreement". The company 
was granted a lease for an extremely long period - 84 years 
from 1 January, 1958 - with the right of 21 years' renewal, 
over an area of 2270 square miles within the Authority to 
Prospect with the option for 3 years to include an extra 500 
square miles. Rent on the area of the treatment plant was 
to be 10/- per acre, as prescribed in the Mining Acts. But 
for the mine area, the rental was "in wide divergence to the 
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provisions of the Mining Acts" - only $4 per square mile, 
rising to $30 after 10 years, rather than the $640 per 
square mile legally imposable. Minister Evans argued that 
to charge the full prescribed rent for a large area was 
extortionate as the rate had been set in relation to 
traditional mines such as Mt. Isa which were deep rather 
than wide. Bauxite was a low-priced ore, and to ensure 
sufficient reserves to warrant amortisation of the large 
capital outlay required an immense area. To impose the full 
rates would "kill them before they start". Ensuring the 
development went ahead was more important than the amounts 
received in rent and royalties. 
Royalties were among the lowest in the world, and could be 
regarded as a contribution by the State to the company's 
ability to be competitive in finding markets and as 
compensation for the high costs of development in a remote 
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region. The importance of this concession to the industry 
became clear in 1974 when the government attempted to 
increase the royalties to $1 per tonne from the 10c per 
tonne to which they had been raised in 1965. Comalco 
threatened to relocate its smelter and challenged the impost 
in the Supreme Court as a breach of the Agreement with the 
Queensland government. The Supreme Court found against the 
company, but the High Court granted an injunction preventing 
the collection of the higher royalties. Eventually the 
Government agreed to a much smaller increase in royalties, 
and the company agreed to contribute to the running costs of 
Weipa harbour. The company's bitterness is clearly seen in 
its 1974 Annual Report: 
notwithstanding the express undertakings included 
in the Agreement related to the development of 
the Weipa deposit, the Queensland Government by 
regulations made under new legislation, has 
imposed royalties which greatly exceed the 
royalties imposed on other mining ventures 
in the State and the rates applicable to 
bauxite mining elsewhere in Australia 
The Company felt its ability to finance operations and 
expansion was greatly reduced by Government action. While 
this was undoubtedly true, the Company's high-risk 
establishment phase was already over, the Government's 
initial objective of the processing plant had been achieved 
and its confidence in negotiating with large companies had 
grown with the increased prosperity from expanding minerals 
trade. Increased royalties also reflected the growing 
importance of Treasury compared with Mines in dealing with 
an industry so central to the State's economy and the aim of 
its new Head, Leo Hielscher, to maximise revenues as well as 
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downstream processing. 
The willingness of the State to offer attractive conditions 
in the Agreement with Comalco was crucial to ensuring the 
development of Queensland bauxite and supported the efforts 
of Mawby and the company to enable the Australian product to 
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compete on world markets. The government was willing in the 
short term to do what appeared necessary to allow the Weipa 
project to become established in order to gain the long term 
benefits from downstream processing as well as from 
increased royalties once the company was profitable. 
FINANCING THE PROJECT 
Despite the government's enthusiasm, it was cautious, and 
the Company had to win the confidence of the politicians and 
bureaucrats in its ability to obtain finance and make a 
success of the project. Queensland history provided many 
examples of mining projects which had foundered for lack of 
capital to allow for adequate prospecting, research, and 
market development and whose bankruptcy had contributed to 
the downfall of public servants, politicians and 
Governments. The State's only previous postwar attempt to 
attract and develop a mine on a large scale was Hanlon's 
ill-fated venture with Blair Athol and the British Electric 
(Overseas) Supply Co. No one wished to repeat that fiasco. 
Consequently the government "told them definitely the 
capital they must have to convince us before we would 
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negotiate". Evans realised that outside capital would be 
essential, and most likely to come from the United Kingdom 
or possibly the United States. The backing of a known, 
substantial company was crucial in the process of coming to 
agreement with the government. 
The nature of the industry, with its large capital 
requirements, closely guarded technology and tied markets, 
indicated that Comalco's associate should be a major 
overseas firm with an established position in the world 
market. The best known of the international aluminium 
companies in Australia was British Aluminium, technical 
adviser to the Bell Bay plant, partner with the Commonwealth 
in New Guinea Resources Prospecting, and part-owner of 
Australuco, which had produced semi-fabricated material 
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since 1936, and was Comalco's original partner. 
The project almost foundered when British Aluminium refused 
to move toward rapid development at Weipa because of its 
interests and financial commitments elsewhere in the world. 
The combined efforts of the Company leadership and the 
Commonwealth Government were needed to ensure progress. 
Mawby, Hibberd and Robinson considered finding another 
partner such as Kaiser Aluminium and Chemical Corporation of 
the United States. The company was known through its 
involvement with the Snowy Mountains Authority and the 
Australian executives thought it probable that Kaiser would 
support local equity in the project and the production and 
international marketing of alumina and possibly aluminium. 
The partnership with British Aluminium was dissolved after 
the company was taken over by Tube International and 
Reynolds Metals who wanted "to put Australian resources on 
ice" as it doubted whether any markets could be found for 
Comalco alumina. Reynolds itself did not need supplies from 
Weipa as its smelters on the American West Coast drew their 
raw material more cheaply from the Caribbean. In any case 
Reynolds was moving independently in Australia to search for 
bauxite near areas already discovered at Gove. The idea of 
mothballing Weipa was completely unacceptable to Mawby and 
Hibberd and to the Queensland and Federal Governments. 
Mawby was one of a small group including G.R. Fisher, W.S. 
and L.R. Robinson who were characterised by Tsokhas as 
"developmental nationalists". Their experiences in World 
War II convinced them of the commercial potential of metals 
and minerals such as tungsten and bauxite as well as their 
importance as new industries for Australia's postwar 
economic growth and defence. Mawby opposed the conservative 
policies of companies which clung to traditional products 
and markets and was committed to diversification through the 
discovery of new metals and minerals, the development of new 
markets, technologies and sources of finance, even of whole 
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new industries. He would not allow the opportunity at Weipa 
to be wasted. 
Mawby's determination to develop the Weipa deposit and not 
to hold it in reserve at the whim of a foreign producer was 
supported by the Queensland and Commonwealth governments. 
The Queensland Government was anxious that concrete 
proposals for Weipa be well advanced before the next 
election due in mid-1960.'' The Prime Minister and the 
Minister for Trade (McEwen) forcefully expressed the 
Commonwealth's interest in the foreign exchange earnings 
from exports of alumina and aluminium and their strong 
disapproval of Reynolds' intentions. Both the Minister for 
Supply (Howard Beale) and Prime Minister Menzies visited 
Weipa and issued statements supporting its rapid 
development. Menzies was a consistent proponent of the 
importance of Weipa and reportedly agreed with Mawby that it 
should proceed ahead of the Gove deposits and promised to 
take up with US President Kennedy the possibility that 
Australia could be an alternative supplier to African or 
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Central American mines. In 1960 Kaiser and Consolidated 
Zinc formed an equal partnership incorporating Weipa and 
Bell Bay, ensuring the project would proceed. 
Despite its partnership with Kaiser, Comalco continued to 
have difficulty financing the size of development required 
for financial viability and appealed to Queensland Treasurer 
Hiley for assistance. On the first occasion Hiley was 
"completely discouraging", refusing to provide funds at such 
an early stage, though indicating he might help with the 
last few millions after "massive performance" by the 
Company. The Company made a second approach in July 19 61 
and received a more positive, though not particularly 
generous response. The Treasurer was influenced by the 
increase in the scale of the development from the original 
proposal. But, more importantly, bauxite had been 
discovered elsewhere in Australia and Comalco's brokers 
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advised that international investors were unlikely to fund 
both the Comalco project and the planned Alcoa plant in 
Western Australia. Hiley felt that if the Government 
decided to be "over purists" in insisting on the fulfilment 
of the technical obligations of the Agreement, Queensland 
might lose out to Alcoa and Western Australia. He recognised 
that relaxing the provisions of the Agreement to provide 
government financial support raised "a most important 
principle" which Cabinet would have to decide. What was to 
be the relationship between government and mining 
developers? Was development more important than the 
principle that the government provided community services, 
but private enterprise funded all other expenditures, 
including infrastructure, occasioned by a business project? 
His Under-Treasurer, Alan Sewell, agreed that the State 
could not afford to "see this developmental opportunity 
lapse for the sake of the last few million" and that with 
"Alcoa breathing down Comalco's neck", some flexibility was 
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justified. Hiley, however, did not consider investment in 
the mine or its infrastructure directly, but suggested using 
the Government's good offices to encourage commercial 
interests to build the shopping centre and Building 
Societies to fund the housing which could be re-sold to 
Company employees. Under-Treasurer Sewell and Hiley agreed 
that community infrastructure such as suburban roads and 
sewerage, normally provided by Local Authorities, could be 
built by the Company with loan funds obtained with the 
backing of a Government guarantee of repayment by a future 
Town Commission, though the Government had a moral 
responsibility to pay for facilities such as the school and 
police station which would be provided in any other town of 
comparable size. Hiley was anxious to avoid any drain on 
the State's debenture allocation because of the "pressure of 
electrical need" and was therefore unwilling to constitute a 
public authority to build the port, though he was willing to 
guarantee a loan obtained by the Company. The flexibility 
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of the Minister and of Cabinet in 1961 was a clear 
indication to the company of commitment to the development 
and helped to prevent delay and consequent erosion of 
Weipa's competitive position which was to prove very 
dependent on good timing. 
The Queensland government was as determined to secure the 
bauxite-alumina project for Queensland as Mawby and the 
Federal government were to ensure it went ahead for the 
benefit of Australia as a whole. The possibility that the 
Weipa project would be foregone in favour of Alcoa in 
Western Australia was a powerful incentive motivating the 
Queensland government to assist Comalco with infrastructure 
provision, though without compromising the government's 
basic position that it did not make a direct financial 
contribution to commercial ventures. Major funding was 
organised by Mawby and the company through the partnership 
with Kaiser which enabled the project to become operational. 
For Kaiser, the main attraction was a new source of bauxite 
and alumina in a much more politically stable area than 
suppliers in Africa and the Caribbean. For Comalco, Kaiser 
provided a market for alumina and "contributed generously to 
(the company's) development" by letting Comalco "draw 
heavily on its people and its experience" until able to 
stand on its own two feet. Equally important was its 
marketing know-how and its contacts in the international 
bauxite and alumina markets. 
DEVELOPING EXPORT MARKETS 
A major difficulty in developing Weipa was that world 
supplies of bauxite were plentiful and all major aluminium 
producers already had firm sources of bauxite and alumina. 
Australia had a relatively small domestic market for 
aluminium. At the time it amounted to approximately 25,000 
tons p.a., and even after consumption rose in the 1970s, it 
was insufficient to absorb the output of the rich bauxite 
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deposits. Consequently export markets were vital to the 
fulfilment of the potential of bauxite and subsequently of 
alumina and aluminium. 
TABLE 5.1 
AUSTRALIAN BAUXITE PRODUCTION/CONSUMPTION 
(million tonnes) 
Year 
Prod. 
Cons. 
1970 
9.3 
1.0 
1971 
12.7 
7.5 
1972 
14.4 
8.1 
1973 
17 
11 
1974 
20.0 
13.6 
1975 
21 
14 
1976 
24.1 
17.4 
1977 
26.7 
18.4 
1978 
24.3 
19.0 
Source: Australia, Bureau of Mineral Resources, Geology and 
Geophysics, Department of Trade, Australian 
Aluminium Industry: Supply Potential (Canberra: 
AGPS, 1979), p.17. 
Comalco had to break into a world market dominated by five 
very large, vertically integrated firms - Alcan, Alcoa and 
Reynolds in North America, Alusuisse and Pechiney in 
Europe - all jealously guarding their technology and with no 
immediate need for additional raw materials. Between them 
they controlled over 80 per cent of the western world's 
productive capacity for bauxite, alumina and aluminium. 
Getting bauxite or alumina into the mainstream of world 
consumption was an extremely difficult task. The main 
potential customers were in Europe and North America and, 
until the introduction of bulk carriers, it was unlikely 
that Comalco could land its product profitably in either of 
those locations. Australia's natural markets were in Asia 
and the Pacific, already supplied by a number of Asian and 
South East Asian producers, mainly in India and Indonesia. 
It was D.J.Hibberd's "early conviction about the importance 
of the Japanese relationship" that encouraged efforts to 
secure a market there with the large and strong aluminium 
industry and Japan was to have a major role in justifying 
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tne rapid growth of bauxite output from Weipa. Demand in 
the Japanese market was increasing, partly because new 
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technologies made aluminium a viable replacement in a number 
of industries for copper of which there was a world 
shortage. There had been inquiries from the Japanese 
regarding the export of bauxite as early as 1950, but export 
was banned as a conservation measure until after the major 
discoveries at Gove. Consolidated Zinc had been trying 
since 1956 to interest the Japanese in buying from Weipa. 
In 1958 Mr. Takata of Nippon Light Metals sought an 
interview with Minister Evans as part of a trip 
"investigating and observing the general situation of 
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bauxite mining and related matters". In 1959 a team of 
representatives from Japanese aluminium smelters visited 
Australia as part of a search for long-term supplies. Japan 
feared a possible shortage of bauxite, and intervention in 
the market by the Indonesian government made that country a 
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less attractive supplier than it had been. However, the 
Queensland industry was competing with supplies from the 
Darling Ranges in Western Australia, from which Western 
Mining Corporation made three shipments to Nippon Light 
Metals, Sumitomo Chemical and Showa Denko through Mitsubishi 
(Australia) Pty. Ltd. 
Hibberd was supported by Evans who made time available at 
Hibberd's request to meet with representatives of Japanese 
firms Mitsui and Nippon Light Metals and help smooth 
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negotiations. Evans made his own inquiries in Japan to 
satisfy himself there was a market for alumina as well as 
the large demand for bauxite. He was firmly committed to 
the export of alumina and "of the opinion that under no 
circumstances should (the) Government agree to the 
exportation of raw bauxite".^ Originally he expected that 
the participation of one of the aluminium majors would 
guarantee markets,^° but he also thought it was the duty of 
himself and the Government and "the job of anyone with any 
sense" to try to "hold" the Japanese market since it was 
unlikely that sales could be made in Europe or the United 
States. Sales would give the Company some financial 
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return for the 5 years' expenditure so far undertaken, and 
Evans recommended to Cabinet that permission be given for 
the export of raw bauxite to Japan for a 3-year period 
although the Agreement between the company and the 
Queensland government specified that no exports of raw 
bauxite were permitted. 
The first agreement with the Japanese was concluded in 1960 
by Hibberd and S. Christie after discussions with the 
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President of Showa Denko. The first trial shipments to 
Showa Denko, Sumitomo Chemical and Nippon Light Metal, 
totalling 30,000 tons, were shipped on a small vessel to 
overseas freighters standing off the coast in the Gulf of 
Carpentaria in 1961. Although the shipments were made at 
considerable financial loss, the company hoped that when 
Japanese firms had determined the processing behaviour of 
the ore, there would be substantial future sales. The ore 
was shown to be not quite suitable, but the Japanese agreed 
to modify their plants to take the Weipa ore because of 
their desire to diversify sources of supply. 
After long negotiations and trial shipments under difficult 
conditions, Hibberd's vision, Japan's interest in stable 
supplies, and Evans' willingness to allow exports to secure 
a long-term position for alumina combined to achieve a 3-
year contract with the Light Metal Smelters' Association of 
Japan for 600,000 tons to start in April 1963, when Weipa 
began permanent, full-scale operations. 
These shipments would not have been possible without the 
company's decision two years earlier to go ahead with the 
dredging of a 10-mile shipping channel and a permanent port 
at the mouth of the Embley River at a cost estimated at $4-6 
million. At the time it was "an act of faith, undertaken on 
prospects alone, but made in the belief that it was 
completely necessary if the company was to break into the 
world trade in bauxite".^^ The decision was reinforced by 
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the condition imposed by State Cabinet in return for 
permission to export bauxite that the Company begin 
immediately on the construction of the harbour and deepening 
of the channel, as well as on an alumina plant if and when a 
market for 240,000 tons of bauxite had been secured. The 
Queensland Government supported the building with an 
expenditure of $4 0,000 on surveys and supervision of 
dredging and began discussions for the later lengthening and 
deepening of the facilities to accommodate ships up to 
40,000 Dwt which would enable large ore carriers to use the 
port and substantially reduce the cost of bulk shipping. 
Weipa began full-scale operations in 1963 and in the next 12 
months up to 35 ships were expected to take 350,000 tons of 
bauxite to Japan and Bell Bay. In 1965 the company announced 
a $14m extension and expansion of production to 5 times its 
initial output, reaching 2.5m tons by 1967. Half of this 
would go to the alumina plant and half would be exported to 
Japan, Germany and France. 
The increasing demand in Japan for bauxite, and that 
country's search for diversification to ensure security of 
supplies provided the initial market for Weipa bauxite and 
the major influence on the mine's expansion. Minister Evans 
had originally expected that the involvement of one of the 
major aluminium companies in the project would assure it a 
market for its output, but the company leadership recognised 
that entry to the European and United States markets would 
be very difficult and that in the early 1960s Japan offered 
virtually the only prospect of immediate sales. Initiatives 
in the development of the Japanese market were taken by the 
company, though the willingness of the Minister to accept 
the practicalities of exporting bauxite before the alumina 
refinery was built was an important factor in the progress 
of the mine. 
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THE ALUMINA REFINERY 
Although the State government permitted the sale of bauxite 
overseas, its principal interest remained the industrial 
development and multiplier effects from the processing into 
alumina and aluminium. Provisions in the special 
legislation covering the project sought to ensure that a 
refinery and smelter would be built. 
Clauses 4,7 and 16 of the Bill provided that the company 
would erect a refinery to convert bauxite to alumina as soon 
as practicable and make periodic investigations into the 
economic possibility of an aluminium smelter of a capacity 
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of 30,000 tons or more p. a. in Queensland. If the 
refinery had not been built by 1977, the Government could 
require the company to do so on penalty of forfeiture of 
one-third of the lease. Though these undertakings were 
legally enforceable, the government imposed another 
restriction under Clause 18 to try to guarantee the 
construction of a treatment plant by prohibiting the removal 
from Queensland of the bauxite except to Bell Bay without 
the consent of the Governor-in-Council. The Company had 
been very anxious to have absolute freedom to export raw 
bauxite, but the Government saw its ability to control the 
right of sale as an additional way of ensuring the plant 
went ahead. Although it could not have been foreseen, this 
turned out to be a very wise decision when, in the 1970s, 
the oil shocks led to cutbacks of Japanese smelting and the 
consequent reduction in the market for bauxite in favour of 
supplies of the primary metal. Queensland found itself well 
placed to take advantage of the situation. 
The Company also was anxious to proceed and initially 
intended to build an alumina plant at Weipa, fulfilling a 
condition of the Agreement. A plant of the size proposed 
was too small to be viable, it needed to be much closer to a 
centre with established infrastructure if capital costs were 
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to be manageable, and the riskiness of a new venture 
outweighed the potential return if the company relied on 
open-market sales. "Lenders had shaken their heads over 
financing a Weipa refinery" so that Comalco had to "create a 
strategy with more appeal to the capital market for the 
alumina project". The Company proposed a refinery of 
600,000 long tons capacity p. a., more than twice the 
originally-intended size, giving it substantial economies of 
scale. The difficulty of finding markets for this level of 
output was the basis for the innovative financing 
arrangement which saw a consortium of world aluminium 
producers guaranteeing to take individual shares of output 
in proportion to their shareholdings. The consortium of 
customers with high credit ratings in world finance thus 
became the security on which debt was raised. The customers 
gained the benefit of low production costs from the large 
refinery, while for Comalco it was "the first big 
breakthrough in phasing Weipa into the world pattern". 
After considering a number of possible sites, and 
considerable lobbying by Local Government and business in 
potential locations, Comalco decided to place the alumina 
refinery at Gladstone because of its deepwater port, the 
town, power, road and rail links. This triggered a boom in 
population and activity in what had been a sleepy country 
town and imposed major costs on the community in terms of 
infrastructure and social welfare. The problem was 
exacerbated by other developments such as Bowen Basin coal 
and associated facilities, cement works, wheat and sorghum 
silos and an 1800 mw power station, but the relationship 
between the public and private sectors in establishing the 
refinery became the focus of criticism that Gladstone was 
synonymous with failure to manage the impact on the 
community of rapid development. 
Provision of essential infrastructure was a contentious 
issue as there was no clear dividing line in responsibility 
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between the company and the public authorities. The 
attitude of the government to the provision of urban 
infrastructure had changed only marginally from that 
outlined by Hiley in 1961. Managing the impact of the 
development on Gladstone and surrounding areas fell largely 
on Local Government which had only very limited financial 
resources and no experience of co-ordinating such extensive 
and rapid growth. The State Government eventually accepted 
more responsibility than it had originally intended because 
of its commitment to the refinery and because of the 
investment and expansion by the company. Even so, its 
contribution was largely confined to public utility services 
at Weipa and Gladstone such as harbour facilities, housing, 
sewerage, water, schools and other social services and 
roads. But there was little appreciation of the magnitude 
of the funds that would be required to provide a reasonable 
level of housing and community services at Gladstone, given 
the strict limitation on the resources of local government. 
The enormous increase in population, the widespread use of 
temporary housing at grossly inflated rents, the shortage of 
urban infrastructure all contributed to what McQueen called 
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"corporate affluence and private squalor". 
The Queensland government's interest was, and always had 
been, the building of the alumina plant as soon as possible. 
The government was neither able nor prepared to invest the 
capital sums needed to provide adequate social 
infrastructure, but at the same it would not delay the 
project by the imposition of demands for adequate housing or 
for satisfactory arrangements with local authorities. The 
government's attitude in the 1960s can be contrasted with 
the Impact Assessment requirements for a smelter and 
refinery proposed for Bowen in 1982.*^ ^ In the 1980s, 
detailed information was required in the planning stage for 
the Planning and Development Units of the Departments of 
Education and Health, and by the Departments of Primary 
Industry, Police, Main Roads, Harbours and Marine, Mines and 
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Electricity. This included plans for towns, community 
services, manpower recruitment and training, water supply 
and drainage, demographic projections, an archaeological 
survey, options for and impacts of alternative forms of 
transport, and an assessment of the broader effects of the 
project on the society, economy and environment of the 
region. Such planning takes time and money, and in the 1960s 
the Government's main interest was to hasten the 
establishment of the refinery. It is arguable that had 
there been similar requirements in the 1960s, the refinery 
might well have been delayed or at least taken much longer 
to build so that Queensland would not have been ready to 
supply alumina when the opportunity arose. 
The Queensland government's determination and its 
legislative requirement that an alumina plant be built in 
Queensland focussed the attention of the company on possible 
sites within the State. The high priority accorded to 
development as a State objective allowed the refinery 
project to proceed at a rapid pace, unimpeded by demands for 
environmental controls or the provision of urban and social 
infrastructure. The timing of the alumina plant proved to 
be of considerable importance in placing the company in a 
good position to take advantage of demand engendered by 
changes in the world economic environment. 
THE ALUMINIUM SMELTER 
Because the Weipa project was seen as the beginnings of 
large-scale secondary industry in the State, the 1957 
Agreement between Queensland and Comalco required the 
company to investigate the possibility of an aluminium 
smelter in addition to the establishment of an alumina 
refinery. However, it would be twenty years before changes 
in the world economy created opportunities for the sale of 
aluminium and the provision of electricity infrastructure as 
an integral part of development planning by the State 
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allowed the refinery to proceed. 
The key ingredient in its location was the provision of 
large quantities of cheap electricity as smelting one tonne 
of metal needs approximately 17,000 kw hours of power, or 
about one-third of the cost of aluminium at the primary 
ingot stage. ^  Comalco explored for coal on Cape York 
Peninsula with a view to a plant at Weipa and the Queensland 
government studied the economics of providing power using 
coal from Blair Athol and Collinsville. They concluded that 
a smelter could have been built in Queensland at a cost of 
$250m but it would have taken twice the current production 
of electricity in the State. There were great 
difficulties in providing for both the smelter's needs and 
those of the general community, which was already 
underserviced, within the guidelines for semi-government 
authority financing. The Company therefore considered 
building and operating its own powerhouse which the 
Electricity Commissioner saw as possibly the basis for 
providing cheap power which could be purchased for the 
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public system. Comalco also studied the possibility of an 
integrated industry at Weipa using a nuclear reactor for 
power, but it was not practicable. It was agreed by the 
Company and by the advisers to the Queensland Government 
that the power requirement could not be met at less than 
0.5d per unit for a large smelter and up to 0.7 5d for a 
smaller one, whereas hydro-electricity in New Zealand cost 
only half that amount. The Government agreed that the 
company had complied with Clause 4(2)(c) of the Agreement in 
investigating the smelter, but it was not viable at that 
time. Comalco purchased the Commonwealth's share in Bell 
Bay as a small production venue for the time being, with its 
main smelter at Manapouri in New Zealand. This facility had 
a strong orientation to the Japanese market, with Sumitomo 
Chemical and Showa Denko taking 2 5 per cent each of the 
equity. This was the first overseas investment for Japanese 
aluminium companies and, as a new venture well in advance of 
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OPEC price rises, reflected their considerable foresight. 
The provision of electricity infrastructure was to be an 
important form of State assistance and cheap electricity was 
a part of a number of incentives offered by Queensland to 
ensure future building of the smelter in the State. Under 
the terms of the 1972 Gladstone Power Agreement, Comalco had 
the right to opt for blocks of power at 0.6c/unit Kwhr, the 
cheapest rate in Australia. The Federal Treasury 
expressed its concern that such suboptimal pricing led to 
strains on the State's ability to meet the demands of other 
users, as well as on the nation's ability to accommodate "a 
balanced public sector investment program within a non-
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inflationary economic context". Queensland's view, 
however, was that satisfactory bulk supply/purchase 
arrangements were so important to the decision on the 
location of the smelter, and the smelter was so important to 
Queensland that every consideration should be given to 
aiding the Company, even to the extent of the Company and 
the public electricity supply authorities forming a joint 
enterprise for the purpose of power production. 
Alternatively, the Commissioner for Electricity Supply 
suggested that an approach be made to the Commonwealth that 
the use of Queensland open-cut coal for power generation be 
regarded as a national project similar to that which 
utilised the water of the Snowy River for hydro-electricity. 
The State Government commissioned the British consultants, 
Merz McLellan, to survey power needs for the next 20 years 
and in particular to consider the source of power for an 
aluminium industry.''^  The consultants recommended a $9 6m 
power house on or near the Callide coalfields. In 1963 
contracts were let to build the Callide Dam to provide water 
for the proposed Calcap Power Station due for completion in 
1965. Despite Commonwealth policy of expecting developers 
to pay for infrastructure, the Commonwealth agreed to 
finance that part of the station supplying electricity for 
major export-oriented industries, especially aluminium. 
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This would allow the development of an integrated operation 
and at the same time provide a demand for steaming coal. 
Evidence to the Senate Standing Committee on National 
Resources in 1981 suggested that Australia's comparative 
advantage in the production of aluminium was very slight, 
based primarily on blocks of cheap electric power, providing 
rather tenuous opportunities that might well be lost in the 
longer term. Queensland was determined not to let the 
opportunity pass it by. 
In the 197 0s a number of external developments helped to 
shift the focus from the supply of raw materials to the 
supply of aluminium. Between 1972 and 1976 Guinea in West 
Africa expanded its bauxite output and became a major 
competitor with the advantage of closer proximity to 
European smelters. The rising price of bunker fuel caused 
Australian freight costs to rise more rapidly than those of 
its competitors closer to United States and European 
markets. Even so, the high cost of Australian coastal 
shipping meant it was cheaper to ship raw metal abroad than 
to transport it from Weipa to Gladstone for processing. 
Australian efficiency in bauxite and alumina production 
remained, but its competitive position was eroded in key 
markets. The increasing price of energy caused a 
restructuring of the world aluminium industry which until 
then had broadly reflected the marketing strategies of the 
major international aluminium companies. Countries such as 
Australia had been seen largely as suppliers of raw 
materials for smelters close to major markets in the United 
States and Europe where established infrastructure and 
tariffs favoured the import of bauxite and alumina rather 
than aluminium. 
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TABLE 5.2 
ALUMINIUM SMELTING COSTS IN THE EARLY 1980S 
(c. per Kilowatt hour) 
Japan Canada USA Aust Germ. 
Lower range 15.5 1.0 3.5 3.0 5.5 
Higher range 17.0 1.5 6.0 5.0 
Source: Kimura Hidehiro,"Arumi seirengyoo no tesshu to kongo 
no kadai," choogen choosa geppo quoted in P.Sheard, How 
Japanese Firms Manage Industrial Adjustment: A Case Studv of 
Aluminium Pacific Economic Papers No.15 (Canberra: Research 
School of Pacific Studies, ANU, 1987), p.10. 
The increasing cost of oil-based electricity, rising prices 
and the opportunity cost of steaming coal and the setback to 
nuclear power combined to give a comparative advantage to 
areas such as Queensland with extensive bauxite resources 
and competitively-priced coal-fired electricity. The 
consensus in the aluminium industry was that extra capacity 
would be needed by the 1980s to meet increased demand, 
projected to grow at 5 per cent p.a. in the long-term, and 
because of minimal investment during the late 1970s. 
Aluminium exports became increasingly important in both 
volume and value by the 1980s, with the principal market 
being in Japan. There the price of electricity to aluminium 
smelters had risen by 4 times the world average rate, and 
comprised 45 per cent of primary aluminium costs. There 
were severe cutbacks in smelter capacity and thus in imports 
of bauxite and alumina as the Japanese aluminium industry 
began to restructure, officially in 1978, though a number of 
corporate rationalisations had begun in 1976. An integral 
part of Japan's adjustment policy was for overseas smelting 
projects to be accelerated and expanded to take advantage of 
the cheaper supplies. Between 1977 and 1980 Japanese 
aluminium production was over 1 million tonnes p.a.; by 1983 
it was only 300,000 tonnes. Japan therefore represented a 
substantial market opportunity for aluminium with a strong 
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position in downstream processing, new product development 
and the development of technology at all levels. 
By 1978 Comalco had effectively committed itself to the 
construction of the Boyne smelter in Gladstone, recognising 
that the shifts in world energy sources for smelting would 
increasingly favour countries such as Australia. This 
opened the way for aluminium exports at a sufficiently high 
level for a smelter to be potentially viable. Markets were 
again vital - guaranteed sales in sufficient quantities in 
the long-term were needed before finance would be available, 
as had been the case with the alumina refinery. An 
assessment commissioned from a group of economists - Prof. 
G. McColl and Dr. D. Gallagher of the University of New 
South Wales and Mr. K. McDonald and Mr. M. Copeland of the 
New Zealand Institute of Economic Resources - found that 
under the most likely conditions over 30 years the project 
would give a real rate of return of 12-15 per cent on all 
78 
resources invested. Other companies such as Alcoa, CSR, 
Pechiney, Amax, and BHP also agreed that market prospects 
were good and announced smelter developments in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. Comalco again used the consortium 
approach with partners being Sumitomo Light Metal Industries 
(17 per cent) Kobe Steel, Mitsubishi Corp., Yoshida Kogyo 
(9.5 per cent each) and Sumitomo Smelting 4.5 per cent. 
Shareholders were required to take the whole of the 
production in proportion to their holdings - which meant 
that the plant could operate at full capacity from the 
outset. Comalco itself had a 30 per cent shareholding and 
negotiated sales to Toyo Sash, Kobe Steel, Yoshida Kogyo and 
Mitsubishi Aluminium, distinct from supplies which they took 
as equity participants. 
In the 1980s Comalco again adjusted its priorities in 
response to changing market conditions at home and abroad. 
The company moved to increase efficiency, cutting costs and 
emphasising new markets for primary aluminium and aluminium 
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products, reflecting changing market structures in Japan and 
elsewhere in South East Asia. The company diversified by 
purchasing a 50 per cent interest in Showa Denko, taking 
over negotiations begun by CRA. This was seen as providing 
a foothold in the Japanese aluminium market and an interest 
in a group producing rolled, extruded and finished products, 
specialty alumina products and alumina for smelting. 
Changes in the international economy were the major 
determinant of markets for Comalco aluminium. Taking 
advantage of the market potential required innovation by the 
company, and complex changes in State planning and budgeting 
and in the financial arrangements between State and Federal 
governments. 
CONCLUSION 
The discovery of bauxite at Weipa was stimulated by the 
interest of the Australian and Queensland Governments, the 
foresight of Maurice Mawby, and the desire of international 
and local companies to find additional reserves. 
Entrepreneurial executives made the decisions that underlay 
the development of the deposit and the growth of Comalco 
into an integrated bauxite-alumina-aluminium producer. They 
acquired the new technology, planned the innovative 
financing, developed the markets, and accepted many of the 
risks. During the late 1950s their persistence and 
commitment to Australian production overcame the opposition 
and pessimism of large aluminium producers and the 
conservatism of the ALP Government in Queensland. 
During the 1960s the rapid increase in world demand for 
aluminium created a market for bauxite, and subsequently for 
alumina. Queensland had world-class deposits and the 
technology for successful exploitation. Though initial 
exploration was for Australia's national benefit and for the 
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diversification of the companies concerned, the Japanese 
market was the major factor determining the viability of the 
project and its rate of expansion. Because of the structure 
of the world aluminium industry, Japan in the early 1960s 
provided the only large potential market for bauxite. 
Restructuring of the Japanese aluminium industry 
subsequently provided a major market for alumina and 
aluminium, though the financial arrangements for the 
refinery and the smelter reduced the company's dependence on 
a single customer. That Queensland was well placed to 
satisfy these markets as they arose was a function of the 
timing of the projects as well as of the State's comparative 
advantage over competitors. 
The Queensland government's interest in Weipa was motivated 
by a desire for the establishment of secondary industries in 
the State, and for decentralisation and northern 
development. The project was to be one of the vehicles 
through which the political legitimacy of the Nicklin 
government would be demonstrated and could thus be said to 
occupy, in Lindblom's terms, "a privileged position". To 
support the project in the face of difficulties inherent in 
the area and the pessimism of some of the world's leading 
aluminium producers, the Government took considerable 
political risks. Approval was given before markets were 
assured in Japan or elsewhere although it was realised that 
the small domestic demand would provide no basis for a mine 
of viable size. The mine facilities would be a remote and 
expensive white elephant if the enterprise failed. 
At crucial decision points the attitude of the Queensland 
Government was important in allowing the project to proceed 
and ensuring that it was located in Queensland. The 
cooperation of Ministers and Department Heads in drawing up 
special legislation, assisting with initial development 
costs at Weipa, and providing cheap electricity were 
important determinants of the pace of the industry's growth. 
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Evans' decision to allow the export of bauxite once he was 
convinced of the long-term potential of the Japanese market 
supported the efforts of Hibberd to negotiate contracts and 
assisted in gaining a foothold in that market. But the 
interests of the State and the company were not identical. 
Hence the government insisted on legislative provisions 
binding the company to the building of a refinery and 
controlling the export of bauxite, and subsequent 
concessions by the government were traded-off against 
expanded production targets or additional undertakings by 
the company. 
The development of the Weipa bauxite raised important 
questions of principle regarding the proper role of the 
State in supporting such a project, and focussed on 
practical issues not previously encountered by State 
authorities and agencies. The Nicklin government intended 
to continue the long-accepted role of ad-hoc and arm's 
length support and did not envisage participation in 
planning or in providing infrastructure required solely for 
purposes of mining or processing developments. But the high 
capital costs, complex infrastructure and the demands placed 
on Local Authorities required direct involvement of 
Ministers and their Departments. The potential benefits of 
development to Queensland and competition from other States 
added impetus to a change in attitude. The government did 
not intervene directly in commercial negotiations or in the 
search for markets, but the decisions they made impacted on 
the company's competitiveness in the international 
marketplace and on the placement of the refinery and smelter 
in Queensland. 
The bauxite/alumina/aluminium industry was important in 
Queensland-Japan relations as the first new resources 
project in the State which found a market in Japan, and for 
which the changes in the Japanese market were the principal 
catalyst for mine expansion. The industry's development 
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proceeded because of the insistence and perseverance of 
executives such as Mawby and Hibberd and the determination 
of the Queensland government to secure both the mine and the 
downstream processing for the State. The needs of the 
large-scale bauxite/aluminium industry called into question 
long-standing assumptions about the largely distant, but 
generally supportive, role of the State in the mining 
industry which would be further challenged by the 
development of coal mines producing specifically for the 
Japanese market. 
The development of the export coal trade which followed 
shortly after the start of bauxite mining at Weipa 
illustrates how the State's role became more interventionist 
as the importance of mining increased. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
PARTIAL COOPERATION 
JAPAN AND THE QUEENSLAND COAL INDUSTRY 
INTRODUCTION 
Interest in the possibility of a coal trade between 
Australia and Japan dated from the late 19th century, but in 
Queensland the first inquiries came in 1921 from a 
representative of a Japanese firm visiting Blair Athol 
during an Australian tour to investigate the prospects for 
the sale of cement. He was impressed with the thickness of 
the Blair Athol coal seams and with the price at the pit 
mouth which was much less than in Japan, and he considered 
the prospects of exports to be excellent. However, no trade 
developed, and by 1934 a mission to investigate Eastern 
markets for Queensland coal saw so little prospect in sales 
to Japan that the members elected not to include it in their 
2 
schedule. The foundations for the development of the coal 
trade which began in the 1960s were not laid until the 1940s 
and 50s when Australian Governments and sections of private 
enterprise began to recognise the possibility of a market in 
Japan, and Japanese steelmakers began to see Australia as a 
potential supplier. 
Changing United States policies in the late 194 0s stimulated 
interest in the possible opportunities for sales of coal and 
other products to Japan. Up to that time, neither the 
Department of Postwar Reconstruction nor the Department of 
External Affairs considered Japan would be a likely market 
for large quantities of coal or minerals even if some heavy 
industry were permitted to redevelop. But by the early 
1950s a number of different sources identified the 
opportunities for the sale of coal to Japan. These sources 
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included H.P. Reinbach in his report to the Joint Coal 
4 
Board, the first Japanese Ambassador to Australia, and the 
Minister for National Development (Senator Spooner). The 
Senator thought there was a "rich prize" to be won in the 
very large Japanese coal market and hoped strategic 
considerations might persuade the United States to invest in 
the development of Blair Athol and Nebo which could be the 
basis for the long-promised development of Central 
Queensland. Some sales were made from mines in New South 
Wales, arranged by the Japanese with the assistance of the 
Australian Ambassador. Although, as Rix indicates, the 
Department of National Development gave only a lukewarm 
response to enquiries from Japan about coal purchases, they 
helped to put in place a foundation of understanding on 
which private enterprise would later build. 
In Queensland by the mid-1950s there was increasing 
recognition at Government and business level of the need to 
develop markets outside the State rather than depend on 
local demand which had governed production in the past. 
Throughout the 1950s coal production increased, wartime 
shortages gave way to surpluses and there was no longer a 
need for preoccupation with conservation of coal for 
railways and electricity. Premier Hanlon and Mines Minister 
Gair were anxious for large markets to be found so that coal 
production could continue to grow. The Premier actively 
sought out foreign investment, but he rejected direct 
government involvement in market development because of the 
ineffective and costly State ventures after World War I.^  
Colin Clark, Director of the Bureau of Industry, suggested 
that Asian and Pacific countries such as India, Java and 
Japan would provide longterm markets and justify the capital 
outlays required for large-scale mining. A number of 
private traders investigated the possibilities. Les Thiess' 
company, Austradus, made two shipments of steaming coal to 
Japan, though demand was limited and no further orders 
resulted. ^° The Brisbane office of Scott and English 
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negotiated the sale of Collinsville coal to the Japanese 
Procurement Agency, but only portion of the order had been 
11 filled before a strike closed the mine. In the 1950s, the 
beginnings of a production surplus and recognition of the 
need for export markets if output growth were to be 
sustained led to a tentative interest in finding those 
markets in Japan. 
Openings in the Japanese market were created by the growth 
of the Japanese steel industry, and initial steps to develop 
the export potential were taken by entrepreneurs in 
Australia and by Japanese steel companies. Japanese firms 
sought reliable supplies of large quantities of coal in the 
long term. Australian exporters initially sought outlets 
for surplus production from existing mines, and subsequently 
markets for the vast resources discovered in the search for 
coal of the right quality for Japanese steel mills. The 
Queensland government was cautious at first, but once 
convinced that its interests also could be secured by coal 
exports, the government was supportive and flexible in 
reaching agreements, in fostering a business climate 
conducive to investment, and in seeking to ensure that 
Federal policies were not detrimental to the Queensland-
Japan coal trade. The nature of government support 
reflected its own interests as well as those of exporters 
and influenced the direction of coal industry development in 
ways which ultimately led to conflict between State and 
national interests over contract pricing and foreign 
investment. As the Queensland coal industry matured, the 
State's interests moved beyond concessions to encourage the 
establishment of mines and addressed the problems of 
acquiring for the wider community a share of the benefits 
from the growth of the mining industry. 
Both State and business were anxious for the development of 
the coal trade with Japan, and the industry looked to the 
State to support and foster exploration, investment and 
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trade. On the other hand, business argued that policies 
towards rail freights, demands for infrastructure provision 
and increasing controls on the nature of mining hindered the 
ability of business to respond to changing world economic 
conditions. The relationship was one of both conflict and 
support for which Rix's term "partial cooperation" seems 
particularly apt. 
DISCOVERIES OF COAL 
All Governments in Queensland regarded themselves as 
supportive of the mining industry through the establishment 
of rules for exploration and prospecting, and by mapping, 
surveying and recording the nature and extent of coal and 
mineral resources. These functions had been key 
recommendations of the 1930 Royal Commission into Mining 
which marked the end of direct State participation in favour 
of support for private investment. Thus, the risks and 
initiatives in finding suitable coal deposits for the 
Japanese market were taken by private enterprise, especially 
by Thiess and Utah who pioneered the exploration for and 
marketing of coal to Japan "at a time when Australian 
investors were reluctant to risk their funds in coal 
projects" which were not perceived as attractive or 
profitable ventures. Their success raised the expectations 
of potential entrepreneurs and encouraged the interest of 
integrated international mining groups with technical 
expertise, financial resources and the willingness to risk 
funds in exploration. 
The first discoveries were made on the initiative of Les 
Thiess who had investigated Asian markets in 1956 and become 
convinced that sales could be made if a different quality of 
coal could be found to mix with the output of his Callide 
14 
mines to make a blend suitable for steelmaking. Thiess 
took the risks of initial exploration for suitable coal in 
the Callide and Dawson Valleys where deposits had been known 
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and worked since the 19th century but where, as in all 
Queensland coal fields, prospecting development was 
inadequate to "admit of even an approximate estimation of 
reserves". ^^ Powell Duffryn had pointed out that many 
deposits were known only in individual outcrops or 
fortuitously revealed in the search for oil or underground 
water. ^* Since then there had been a systematic drilling 
programme, as recommended by Powell Duffryn and urged by G. 
Clark, the Under-Secretary for Mines, so that by 1962 the 
Geological Survey could point to Queensland's reserves of 
black coal as a "major national asset" which had been 
delineated by drilling in a number of areas but whose size 
even then could not be validly estimated. Concern about 
the adequacy of reserves did not disappear until after a 
stocktake by the Bureau of Mineral Resources with the 
cooperation of the States and after the exploration 
programmes of private firms proved the assertion of the 
Priorities Review Staff that "reserves appear to respond to 
18 
export opportunities". For Thiess in the 1950s knowledge 
was very sketchy and much work needed to be done. 
Thiess' exploration work, led by Dr. F.W.Whitehouse, used as 
its basis earlier documentation by the Government Geologist, 
J. Reid, in 1945 and by Powell Duffryn in 1949, and resulted 
in the location of soft coking coal at Kianga in 1957. On a 
trade mission to Japan to investigate the purchase of 
equipment for the Snowy Mountains Scheme, Thiess found a 
tentative interest in good quality coking coal by Japanese 
steel mills and accepted the offer from Mr. K. Ejiri of 
Mitsui Coal Development to assist with a geological survey 
in conjunction with Dr. Whitehouse of the University of 
19 
Queensland and the State Government Geologist. As Kianga 
coal was not suitable for Japan's immediate needs, a 
search was made for hard coking coal which was discovered at 
Moura in 1959. Sampling under the supervision of the 
Queensland Coal Board Fuel Technologist and testing by the 
CSIRO showed it suitable for steel-making. Systematic grid-
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boring necessary to prove the field was done under the 
direction of Mitsui's chief geologist. Dr. Whitehouse having 
withdrawn after making "a major and significant contribution 
to the development of the mining industry in Central 
Queensland" .^^ Subsequent investigations with Mitsui were 
directed towards proving reserves as quickly as possible as 
an obvious prerequisite to a decision to establish a mine 
and to successful export. In this, the enthusiasm and 
imagination of Thiess in driving the project forward was 
complemented by the practicality of K. Ejiri in defining 
what was suitable for Japan's needs, and demonstrating these 
qualities in Queensland coals to Japanese steelmakers. 
Their collaboration was of major importance in turning 
tentative Japanese interest into definite orders. 
Utah began exploration in Australia as a result of its 
22 
"perception of an expanding global steel requirement" and 
more specifically to find iron ore and coking coal to supply 
to the Japanese steel industry as part of what Galligan 
23 
calls the company's "Pacific Rim strategy". The company 
came to Queensland because coals were known to exist, but 
the extent of the deposits was uncertain and the areas were 
not already substantially exploited as they were in New 
South Wales. Queensland was a riskier venture, but offered 
more opportunities for the company to develop large-scale 
open-cut mines. Like Thiess, Utah began on the basis of 
earlier work by the Mines Department, Powell Duffryn, and 
the Government Geologist, but with the additional advantage 
of being able to take prospecting leases around Thiess' 
discoveries at Kianga and Moura. Steaming and soft coking 
coal were found, and then prime coking coal adjacent to a 
"vast anthracite coal seam near Blackwater" which had been 
worked before World War I and drawn to the Government's 
attention in 1947. Testing in the United States and by 
the Mines Department confirmed a rich coal seam which 
justified further intensive drilling necessary for mine 
planning. By the end of 1963, Utah had taken out 
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Prospecting Authorities over all vacant areas of possible 
coal deposits m the region. 
Both Thiess and Utah began exploration specifically to 
locate suitable coal for export to the Japanese market. The 
risks and initiatives were almost entirely theirs, in an 
investment climate where there was minimal interest in 
speculative mining ventures. In this initial phase, there 
was little government support, save the assistance of the 
Geological Survey and background information from the Mines 
Department and the limited studies undertaken in earlier 
years to locate and plan the development of Queensland coal 
resources. Once some discoveries had been made, the 
negotiations for franchises and special leases were critical 
points in the development of the mines and indicate the 
changing relationship between business and government as 
Queensland priorities altered and Ministers became more 
confident in asserting the State's interests. 
ACCESS TO RESOURCES 
Access to resources is regulated by the State Government 
through the Mining and Coal Mining Acts which were initially 
an impediment to the search for coal. The proving and 
development of the large-scale mines that were to be the 
basis for export to Japan required special concessions to 
allow projects to go ahead speedily, with secure access to 
much larger areas than had previously been permitted. The 
government had to change completely its attitude to the 
scale and conditions of mining and, at least initially, run 
the risks of a very public failure before it had been in 
office long enough to prove its credentials by economic 
success. 
Like Comalco at Weipa, Thiess and Utah could not have 
proceeded with exploration and mine development under the 
existing regulations and provisions of the Mining and Coal 
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Mining Acts. These Acts provided that prospectors had to 
apply to the Mining Warden for separate Authorities to 
Prospect for each individual property. This may have been 
appropriate for isolated mineral deposits or small-scale 
operations, but it was far too cumbersome and time-consuming 
a way of determining the size and extent of a large 
coalfield and planning its future utilisation. Comalco was 
able to obtain a large area, secured from potential 
competitors, because its activities were controlled by the 
Mining Acts. These empowered the Minister to grant 
Authorities to Prospect over areas of any size at his 
discretion for the purpose of encouraging large-scale, 
expensive prospecting. The Coal Mining Acts contained no 
such provisions until they were revised in 1965, but allowed 
for Coal Prospecting Licenses over areas not exceeding 2 560 
acres (4 sq. miles) at a rental of Id/acre to be held for 1 
year, with possible extension for a further year. Thiess 
had held 26 licenses, conditioned for sale for export only, 
over 42,819 acres, which expired between February and May 
1959. On 7 of these he had sought an extension, 11 licenses 
over 15,997 acres were current, 34 applications over 63,141 
acres were under Departmental consideration and another 39 
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were about to be lodged. To avoid the interminable 
administrative delays, Thiess sought a franchise similar to 
that granted the Electric Supply Corporation (Overseas) Ltd. 
in 1947, covering approximately 700 sq.miles (448,000 acres) 
with provision for gradual release. 
Thiess' application was rejected by the Minister and Cabinet 
after advice from the Coal Board. The government was not 
convinced that Thiess' deposit could be the basis for a 
viable mining operation, given previous abortive attempts to 
develop Callide and Blair Athol and a contemporary report 
that handling costs were likely to price Queensland coal out 
28 
of keenly competitive world markets. The government was 
reluctant to allow new mines until the industry was more 
stable and existing mines were reasonably assured of 
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profitability. The Coal Board and the government also 
doubted whether Thiess' project, if successful, was in the 
interests of the State. The Coal Board advised that "it 
would not be in the public interest to grant one Company 
what would amount to a monopoly on coalfields of this size, 
29 
particularly if prospecting were generally successful". 
The government's priority was the development of secondary 
industries, preferably with overseas involvement to gain 
international acceptance. The Weipa bauxite mine fitted 
into this strategy because of the participation of 
international business and the real prospect of its leading 
to substantial industrial development in refining, 
processing and fabricating. Coal could be used as the basis 
for a steelworks, as Hanlon and Theodore had hoped, if the 
sketchily-known iron ore deposits were proven to be 
sufficiently large. Powell Duffryn had mentioned the 
possibility, an Interdepartmental Committee in 1953 had 
recommended Mines Department assessment of known iron-ore 
occurrences, and in 1958 P.Turnbull and Mitsubishi 
inquired about a steelworks using Queensland coal and iron 
ore from Papua. But at the time Thiess made his 
application for a franchise, a steelworks was not a 
realistic possibility. The Minister had "no objection to a 
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large export trade", but the government was not prepared 
to take risks to encourage further exploration since Thiess' 
plans did not complement the State's priorities and were not 
seen as the vehicle for future economic growth. 
The franchise would require a special Act of Parliament, 
providing the opportunity for public debate and discussion. 
It would also afford the new Government's opponents ample 
scope for equally public criticism if the venture failed. 
With high political stakes, the Government was unwilling to 
take the risk when reserves were unproven, markets not 
assured, and there was no backing from a large and well-
respected international company. Thiess' assurance that the 
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market potential in Japan for suitable Queensland coal was 
unlimited and that delay would lose a market worth millions 
to Queensland in favour of New South Wales went unheeded. 
There was certainly no grand vision in the attitude of the 
Queensland Coal Board and the Government. It was the 
conjunction of his own entrepreneurship and the development 
of the Japanese steel industry which allowed the project to 
go ahead, not for a steelworks, but for the export of coal. 
Despite the rejection of his first application, Thiess 
persisted, presenting his proposal again in January 1960. 
His mines had still produced only soft coking coal of which 
there had been "spot purchases due to strikes and lockouts 
in the Japanese coalfields". Evans still regarded the 
proposals as "in a rather nebulous state", but the obvious 
impossibility of keeping the Kianga mine operating in a 
"stop-start" manner, "the importance of this major 
development in Queensland", and the anxiety of the Japanese 
and Thiess to proceed quickly meant that Thiess' application 
was not rejected. A Committee consisting of the Co-
ordinator-General, the Under Secretary Dept. of Development 
and Mines, Mr. G. Clark, and Mr. A.G. Lee, Assistant 
Secretary, Commissioner's Office, Department of Railways, 
was more sympathetic than the Coal Board had been and 
recommended that: 
if and when the Company obtains a firm contract 
for the export of coal in such quantities as would 
necessitate the construction and operation of a 
privately owned railway from the coalfield to 
Gladstone, the Government would be prepared to 
discuss an Agreement ... broadly along the lines of 
the Agreement which was reached by the Government 
with the Electric Supply Corporation (Overseas) Ltd. 
in 1947. 
But first the Company would have to "provide clear proof of 
the existence of a contract and of the bonafides of the 
other party". 
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The interest of Mitsui and the company's size and stature in 
Japanese industry were important in developing Ministerial 
enthusiasm for the venture. Thiess had been introduced to 
Mitsui by the Australian Commercial Counsellor in Tokyo, 
Neville Stuart, who had been with the Joint Coal Board and 
was keen to develop the coal trade. Mitsui was interested 
in the possibility of coal imports, and company executives, 
together with those of other trading houses and steel mills 
inspected the site at Kianga and the loading facilities at 
Gladstone. Estimates by Mitsui and by the President of Fuji 
Iron and Steel that purchases could be in the range of 1 to 
5 million tons within three years convinced Thiess that 
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contracts would be available. Thiess then persuaded Mines 
Minister Evans and his Under Secretary, George Clark, to go 
to Japan, meet executives of Mitsui and visit the steel 
mills of Yawata and Fuji Iron and Steel Companies. Evans 
was convinced by steel industry executives and by MITI of 
the enormous potential markets for export coal and returned 
to persuade his Cabinet colleagues of their value to 
Queensland development. Kevin Healy, later the Deputy 
Under-Secretary of the Mines Department, regarded this as a 
crucial point in the development of the central Queensland 
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coal mines. It was Thiess' persistence and his success in 
persuading Evans to go to Japan which began to change the 
view of the Government about the potential of export coal, 
paved the way for other companies, and brought Queensland 
coal to Australian and international attention. 
By 1961 economic and political factors created a greater 
sense of urgency within the government. The credit squeeze 
imposed by the Commonwealth had affected Queensland more 
severely than the southern States. Unemployment rose and in 
the Rockhampton area was 13 per cent of the workforce. 
Politically there was a swing to the ALP. Labor's win in 
the Brisbane City Council elections, though partly 
attributable to its campaign policy of sewering the city, 
was part of this swing, as was the result in the Federal 
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election of 1961 when two Ministers lost their seats and the 
Menzies Government came within a few votes of defeat. The 
Queensland Government recognised the necessity of promoting 
economic recovery and that Central Queensland presented one 
of its greatest challenges. The Coordinator-General and the 
Director of Secondary Industry were sent to review the 
area's problems and recommend actions. Federal help was 
sought through the CSIRO for pasture research to assist with 
the development of the beef industry. Cabinet asked Evans 
to expedite negotiations with Thiess and with any other 
firms interested in coal development "in view of the present 
political situation" and to investigate the possibility of 
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a steelworks at Bowen using Constance Range iron ore . 
Political necessity, and the demonstrably large market 
opportunities in Japan combined to bring the development of 
export coal mines to the forefront of State priorities and 
made politicians and bureaucrats more responsive to Utah's 
proposals than they had been earlier. Utah's initial 
application for a franchise had been rejected on the grounds 
that they had "not prospected enough to prove sufficient 
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quantities of coal to warrant it". The Minister demanded 
more expenditure and effort and expected firm sales 
agreements to be put in place to convince him of the 
project's viability, despite Utah's experience as an 
international mining company. By 1961, the Minister and his 
Department were more willing to take risks. The Mines 
Department suggested that the start of operations could be 
expedited by Utah's applying for a Special Coal Mining Lease 
over the Proclaimed Area it had been granted in 1961 at 
Blackwater since this could be granted quickly by executive 
decision because it would involve upgrading of existing 
infrastructure rather than totally new construction. 
Meanwhile, negotiations proceeded for the extension of 
Utah's allocated areas and for the franchise required. The 
government was generous, perhaps, as Galligan suggests, 
over-generous in granting Utah, in December 1964, an 
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Authority to Prospect over approximately 2500 sq. miles of 
the best part of the Bowen Basin between Blackwater and 
Goonyella, covering areas previously included in 
proclamations. The government had temporarily set aside 
the emphasis on secondary industry; its interests now lay in 
attracting large capital investment and in the commencement 
of projects which would overcome the lethargy of the 
Queensland economy and spur a take-off to sustained economic 
growth. 
During the course of negotiations for the franchise covering 
Utah's larger areas, it became evident that further 
franchise applications were likely to follow from other 
companies. This led to a conflict between the desire of 
politicians to expedite mine development and concern, 
particularly at bureaucratic level, about the adequacy of 
Queensland's reserves. Therefore, in discussions with Utah 
and within the bureaucracy leading up to the franchise, an 
effort was made to establish a formula relating the quantity 
a company was allowed to extract to the size of its 
reserves. It was also necessary to specify whether the 
"reserves" should be only those classed as "known", as 
recommended by QERAC and the Geological Survey, or whether 
they should include those merely "indicated" and "reasonably 
definitive", as suggested by Utah. The State Mining 
Engineer was concerned to establish a quantity large enough 
to justify the franchise, but consistent with prudent 
resource management. Having obtained information from the 
Electricity Commission and the Department of National 
Development on the likely future needs for coal, QERAC 
advised against overcommitment and recommended that to 
ensure the State's future needs were not jeopardised, 
exports should be a percentage of the known reserves and 
that Utah therefore be permitted to export 100m tons, 
, . 47 . . 
subject to review in 5 years' time. At a political level 
there was more optimism and less caution, exemplified in Ron 
Camm's view -"the quality is good, the price is right, let's 
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sell it while we can". The agreement reached with Utah 
allowed for exports of 457.2m. tonnes, with special 
provisions regarding the quantity mined by open-cut - more 
cautious than the developmental ist Camm, but not so 
conservative as the bureaucrats and QERAC. The ready 
availability of such large quantities coincided with the 
needs of the Japanese and helped encourage interest in 
Queensland as a major supplier. 
The success of Thiess and Utah in finding suitable coal and 
the work in surveying and prospecting encouraged other 
Japanese and Australian companies to join the search. These 
included Mines Administration Pty. Ltd. (Minad) near Bluff 
and Dingo in conjunction with Marubeni lida, CRA and BHP 
southeast of Blackwater, Dacon Colliery at Collinsville, 
Clutha and Associated Mining at Bluff, Mt. Isa Mines and Mt. 
Morgan. The plethora of exploration companies, the 
uncontrolled selection of lease areas and the use of open-
cut rather than underground mining all posed long-term 
threats to the security of resources. As the urgency to 
commence development passed and the prosperous market was 
itself an incentive for companies to explore and invest, the 
concern for resource management began to outweigh the need 
to offer attractive concessions in the size and selection of 
areas. In 1971 the Mines Department reserved large coal-
bearing areas for the future and laid down guidelines for 
orderly development, both to protect reserves and to ensure 
that only companies with sound financial backing and 
technical and marketing skills would be granted leases. It 
is interesting to speculate whether Thiess would have 
qualified under the guidelines had they existed in 1959, 
though he headed a consortium granted the lease on one of 
these areas (Winchester South) in 1981. 
The key decisions regarding whether and on what terms mining 
companies would have access to Queensland coal resources 
clearly lay in the hands of the State and were the basis for 
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the pattern of mine development and hence of the coal trade 
with Japan. In making these decisions, politicians and 
their bureaucratic advisers were conscious from the outset 
of the need to protect Queensland's wider interests and to 
implement the Government's policy of steady growth based on 
promotion of secondary industry. Economic and political 
circumstances, together with the persistence of Thiess and 
the Japanese steelmakers, combined to change government 
attitudes to proposals for mining development. But, as we 
shall see, even the most generous Agreements with mining 
companies still sought to protect the State and its economy 
against the possible failure of what were still considered 
highly speculative and uncertain ventures. 
AGREEMENTS WITH THE GOVERNMENT 
Control over coal industry development and operations is 
vested almost entirely in the State Government which is able 
to influence the timing and competitiveness of mines through 
its control of access to resources and the provisions it 
negotiates in the Agreements with development companies. 
Given the Japanese interest in long-term stability, the 
willingness of the State Government to offer long leases on 
conditions formalised in legal agreements helped to make 
Queensland mines an attractive source of supply. 
The basic structure for all agreements with the coal 
development companies was outlined in the Thiess Peabody 
Coal Pty. Ltd Agreement Bill introduced into Parliament in 
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1962, and this in turn followed closely the arrangements 
which Hanlon had made in the Electric Supply Corporation 
(Overseas) Ltd. Agreement Bill in 1947, as Thiess had 
requested. The attitude of the Nicklin government was very 
similar to Hanlon's view that the extraction, transport and 
marketing of the coal was a commercial operation to be co-
ordinated and financed solely by the company. The 1947 Bill 
encouraged the company with a special long-term (50-year) 
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lease and a promise that the government would expedite 
aerial surveying and mapping of Central Queensland, but 
required the company to build and operate the railway, 
construct the housing, and provide and other infrastructure, 
made necessary by the venture. Both Hanlon and Nicklin 
intended to be supportive and encouraging, but not to become 
directly involved in planning or in financing mining 
development. 
After the potential of the Japanese market became clearer, 
and the scale of Queensland's coal resources became evident, 
the government was concerned to ensure the rapid, but secure 
development of what had always been a highly speculative 
industry, liable to periods of rapid boom followed by deep 
and prolonged recessions. Agreements protected the 
exclusive rights of the discoverer of a field over defined 
areas, typically very large - 350 sq. mis for Kianga-Moura, 
80 sq.mis. for Blackwater and over 1300 sq. mis. for the CQCA 
mines. When coupled with long, renewable leases, and the 
right to select the best sites for the mine itself, these 
concessions gave the companies every opportunity to prove 
and establish the mine, service long-term contracts, keep 
costs down and generate a reasonable return on investment. 
At the same time, provision was made for rearrangements if 
projects stagnated, speculation discouraged by requirements 
for minimum annual expenditures and continuous exploration, 
originally developed by Hanlon, and over-dependence on one 
company reduced by periodic surrender of part of the lease 
area. This provision served to encourage a variety of 
different investors and to promote the development of the 
maximum number of promising sites, although it had the 
unforeseen effect of creating excessive production by a 
number of mines in competition with one another for limited 
Japanese demand once market growth slowed in the mid-1970s. 
State interest in secondary industry and in development 
elsewhere in Queensland had not been forgotten. Provisions 
252 
in the Agreements with Thiess and Utah allowed coal to be 
reserved for possible domestic needs, and Utah was required 
to stockpile any steaming coal overburden for future 
government use. At the time this was not regarded as a 
significant benefit, as there was no market for the coal, 
but later, when the Gladstone power house was built and 
energy prices soared in the 197 0s, it emerged as a major 
bonus. Utah estimated that in 1980 it had supplied at 
incremental cost around 9m. tonnes of steaming coal to the 
Gladstone power station and it would continue to supply coal 
at the rate of 2m tonnes p. a. for the foreseeable future. 
Cabinet was interested in a possible steelworks using BHP's 
Constance Range iron ore deposit, and in the adequacy of 
reserves for the future needs of Mt. Isa Mines. The Thiess 
Agreement therefore contained the proviso that the company 
could be directed by the Governor in Council to supply any 
customer in Queensland who was unable to obtain coal 
elsewhere. Though this provision never needed to be 
exercised, it is indicative of the government's high 
priority at the time to the development of secondary 
industry compared with the anticipated benefits from the 
coal trade with Japan. 
Nevertheless, the anxiety of the government for mining 
development to go ahead was reflected in the very low levels 
of rent and royalties which were modelled on the provisions 
of the Electric Supply Corporation (Overseas) Act of 1947 
which Hanlon had devised to attract and assist the 
developers of Blair Athol. For Thiess-Peabody rent was just 
over $5 per sq ml for the coalfield and $20 per sq ml, 
increasing gradually to $64 under the Special Coal Mining 
Lease (Blackwater) , while for the CQCA mines, rent was 
between $6 and $8 per sq. ml. Royalties of a mere 5c per 
ton (reducing to 1.5c over Im tons for Thiess) were 
justified for Kianga-Moura on the grounds that the coal had 
proved hard to work because of the sandstone overburden, and 
high royalties would have made Thiess uncompetitive against 
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New South Wales mines which were closer to ports and did not 
have the expense of building a railway. A Committee of the 
Coordinator-General, the Under-Treasurer and the Under 
Secretary for Mines recommended the same royalties for the 
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Utah mines although the deposits were much easier to work. 
Although the low royalties attracted criticism from the 
outset, Evans was "more worried about getting coking coal, 
getting steel works, getting coal exports and providing 
employment" than in the amount of royalties Queensland would 
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receive. 
The low royalty rate was criticised from the time of the 
Thiess franchise and throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The 
Commonwealth Treasury, for example, pointed out that, in 
NSW, royalties were 15c per ton for older mines and 25c per 
ton for newer, amounting to 3.5 per cent of the value of 
output, compared with 4.6 per cent in Western Australia and 
only 1.1 per cent in Queensland. In 1974, a combination 
of public and political pressure, the apparent profitability 
of coal mining during the boom period and the influence of 
the new Under-Treasurer, Leo Heilscher, led to the Mining 
Royalties Act which abrogated the provisions of earlier 
Agreements and established royalties at 5 per cent of the 
f.o.r. value of the total tonnage of coking coal sold from 
open-cut mines and 4 per cent on underground mines. The 
result was a increase in royalties from 5c to $2 per tonne 
and a rise in royalties as a percentage of f.o.b. revenue by 
a factor of 6 between 1968 and 1981. By 1974 the most risky 
phase of coal mining development was over, markets in Japan 
were established and major companies had demonstrated that 
the export coal trade could be profitable. The market itself 
created the incentive for development and generous treatment 
by the government was no longer necessary. 
The Mines Department had begun to provide for this situation 
as early as the mid 1960s as it considered policies to be 
adopted in the longer term for the coal industry as a whole, 
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rather than policies developed on a case-by-case basis to 
meet the requirements of the first developers. It was 
evident in the Uniform Proposals for Franchises to Export 
Coal, considered in 1967, that the Department recommended a 
bargaining approach in which the government gave 
corporations the opportunity to engage in mining 
development, but insisted on conditions that provided for 
the controlled explitation of resources and for the State 
to acquire capital assets with minimum outlay. The State 
Mining Engineer recommended the policy should provide for 
proving of adequate resources of which not more than 
50 per cent should be exported 
large scale 
contribution to capital costs of the railway, port, 
power and water 
railways and ports operated by the State, perhaps with 
long-term contracts to the company 
company contribution to capital and service costs 
housing provided by the company. 
He suggested that on fulfilment of these conditions, a 
company be allowed to export 100 million tons, as long as 
this did not exceed 50 per cent of reserves, with another 
100 million tons on the establishment of an approved 
industry with a capital expenditure of $100m. These 
provisions were the basis for the new Mining Act of 1968 
which established uniform conditions for access to resources 
which remained substantially unchanged throughout the period 
under review. 
The agreements reached in the 1960s reflected the common 
interest of the government and the companies for mines to be 
established as quickly as possible to take advantage of the 
emerging Japanese market. Concessions were generous, with 
income from rent and royalties and concerns about resource 
management partially traded off against the speed of 
development. Some State interests were too important to be 
bargained away. Both the conditions of access to resources 
and the terms of agreements governing the establishment of 
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mines attempted to guard against over-dependence on one firm 
and to make provisions favourable to the eventual 
establishment of resource-based secondary industries in the 
State. The State was cooperative in response to the needs 
of the mine developers, but that cooperation was only 
partial and was reduced over time as mining companies were 
seen to be profitable and well established. 
PROVISION OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
Provision of infrastructure, especially in transport, was 
one of the most crucial elements in the development of the 
coal trade. Government and semi-government bodies and 
private enterprise worked together to provide efficient 
facilities with provision for future growth. At the same 
time, the government developed a unique system which 
provided immediate inducements to the companies, but long-
term advantages to the State, and which had substantial 
effects on trade when the boom conditions of the early 1960s 
subsided and a buyers' market emerged. 
The industrial and community infrastructure required for the 
establishment of the mines was very expensive indeed, often 
58 
as much as the cost of the basic project itself. The 
arrangements for its provision had a direct impact on the 
profitability of the mine and on the decision whether or not 
to proceed, as well as on the ability to obtain contracts 
and finance. Customers needed to be confident that 
infrastructure was adequate to handle the required 
quantities before entering into an agreement to purchase, 
and financial institutions sought evidence of secured 
markets before funds were provided. Problems of 
coordinating contract negotiations, infrastructure provision 
and mine finance posed major challenges for coal producers 
and the attitude of governments was a significant factor in 
the speed and cost of project establishment. 
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Under the Constitution, the State has the prime 
responsibility for physical and social infrastructure and 
exerts a significant influence on the provision of urban 
facilities by Local Government. In practice, the ability of 
a regional State to service infrastructure needs was heavily 
dependent on Commonwealth recurrent and capital grants and 
specific purpose payments, as well as on the Loan Council 
borrowing program. The availability of these funds depended 
on their implications for fiscal and monetary policy, 
Australian economic policy objectives, and the need to 
accommodate the borrowing requirements of other States. 
Both State and Federal governments believed that developers 
should pay for infrastructure made necessary by virtue of 
their projects, and this approach was refined by the 
Queensland government through its "bargaining" in the 
Agreements with companies. The State Government recognised 
that some infrastructure was clearly beyond the capacity of 
industry and the necessity of providing it could, as a 
Japanese Energy Mission suggested, discourage the 
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development of new mines in remote areas. The State 
Government also knew that some infrastructure could be more 
appropriately or, in the long term, profitably provided by 
the State and contribute to the pace or the attractiveness 
of development. Queensland therefore welcomed the new Loan 
Council guidelines introduced in 1978, allowing additional 
or overseas borrowings for exceptional projects, and planned 
to use this facility to fund power stations and the 
upgrading of two of the items of infrastructure most vital 
to resource development - railways and ports. 
Arrangements for the funding and construction of new rail 
and port facilities for the coal trade illustrate the way in 
which the State sought to secure its own interests while at 
the same time facilitating trade by helping to overcome 
transport problems which had long been identified as a major 
impediment to Queensland's growth. 
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(i) Railwavs 
Provision of adequate rail transport was one of the 
adjustments necessary in Queensland before business could 
take advantage of the opportunities for trade with Japan. 
Traditionally, railways in Queensland had been provided by 
the State government, but shortages of railway rolling stock 
and locomotives, inefficiency, narrow-gauge lines of 
insufficient strength to haul very heavy loads, and the 
unwillingness of governments to construct lines to service 
mining projects had been in the past a major impediment to 
the development of Queensland mining even when markets were 
available. In 1947, for example, rail problems prevented 
Queensland from supplying coal shipments for Noumea, and 
in 1950 the Chairman of Blair Athol had been forced to turn 
away southern and New Zealand inquiries. As he put it -
"markets were hungry, plant capacity available. Transport 
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sets the limit". Two American companies, Nevin Pacific 
Co. and Raymond Concrete Pile Co., withdrew their interest 
in Blair Athol when the Commonwealth government would not 
guarantee a loan of US$60m from the World Bank for a 
railway. The refusal of the Menzies government to honour 
an election promise to contribute to a Callide rail link as 
part of national development projects was bitterly resented 
by the Hanlon and Gair governments. 
In discussions with Japanese steel mills, Evans came to 
realise that the volumes the transport system was able to 
deliver would once again be a major factor inhibiting the 
scale of development of the coal export trade. A Committee 
of the Coordinator-General and representatives of the 
Departments of Mines and Railways, in consultation with the 
Land Administration Commission, the State Electricity 
Commission and the Department of Harbours and Marine, 
developed recommendations on the part to be played by the 
government in the provision of railway facilities. The 
Coordinator General confirmed the bottleneck that would be 
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created by the existing railway once shipments from Thiess' 
mines exceeded 200,000-300,000 tons p. a. and before a new 
line could be justified.*^ ^ So serious was the difficulty 
that Mr. Shimizu of Nippon Kokan, leader of a mission in 
June 1961, indicated the Japanese might "even consider 
providing finance to speed up and improve links between the 
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coalfields and the ports" and a Kianga-Moura-Gladstone 
link was discussed by Treasurer Chalk and the Managing 
Director of Mitsui Bussan Kaisha who regarded the cost as 
well as the capacity of transport as "of paramount 
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importance" in the coal trade. The railway capacity 
problem was raised again by a delegation of Japanese 
technical experts visiting Kianga-Moura in August 1961, 
since the development of the field was virtually controlled 
by the railways' ability to shift coal over the old line 
with steam engines and small wagons. Unless some 
reasonable solution could be found, the mines would be quite 
unable to provide the quantities of coal the Japanese 
needed. 
In his attitude to the provision of railways Evans was 
motivated by a number of factors. He did not want rail 
transport to remain a stumbling block to central Queensland 
mine development and to the growth of export markets for 
coal. But railways policy was that lines served new and 
expanding industries and were not built "on a developmental 
basis". In view of the impact of railway operations on the 
finances of the State, the government was already taking 
action to reduce continuing railway deficits. In 1958 a 
Committee of Accountants from the Departments of the Auditor 
General, Treasury and Railways was established to 
investigate financial operations, ^^ and the 1960 State 
Transport Act had sought to make railways efficient by 
allowing more competition from road transport. Evans did 
not want to add further to the burden. As he explained to 
Parliament: "We have had enough to do with building railway 
lines. We are losing too much on existing lines. We believe 
it is much better to leave that to private enterprise". 
259 
72 
The government therefore agreed with Thiess' original 
proposal, following the example of the Electric Supply 
Corporation (Overseas) Ltd., that he would construct a 
railway from the coalfield to the port of Gladstone. The 
railway was to be built to government standards, but to be 
operated by the company solely for transport of coal and of 
the company's employees and goods, with a government option 
to purchase after forty-two years. In the interim the 
Government assisted by upgrading the old line and 
negotiating the building of new wagons by Mitsui, their use 
to be at no cost to the State though they remained the 
property of the mining interests and were to be repaired at 
the Railway workshops at a cost related to the freight 
charge per ton. 
When the Agreement was renegotiated after Mitsui joined the 
Company (in 1965), the Minister for Transport, Gordon Chalk, 
argued forcefully that State ownership of the railway would 
retain an integrated system, provide a facility for general 
use, and generate an income stream which could be applied to 
other projects or regions. Infrastructure for mining could 
thus be provided without curtailing other development works. 
Chalk, Hiley, and senior public servants from Mines and 
Treasury persuaded the company to forego the potential 
haulage profits in return for "the same haulage of coal, 
with less responsibility for organization and a smaller 
initial outlay". To counteract the risk of the project's 
being aborted after the railway had been built, the Company 
had to make a security deposit of approximately half the 
cost of the new line. The sum was repayable in annual 
instalments subject to the shipment of a minimum tonnage. 
Freight rates were on a sliding scale, reducing for larger 
quantities, and subject to an escalation clause to 
compensate for inflation. This was the prototype for all 
subsequent arrangements for railways and marked a much 
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closer involvement by the State in planning for mine and 
market development and a major break with the policies of 
Hanlon and the early years of the Nicklin government. Rail 
transport was an integral part of planning, critical to the 
movement of large tonnages and to the timing of the 
commencement and expansion of exports. In electing to 
provide coal railways, the State government involved itself 
directly in the developing of mines and the costs and 
revenues associated with the rail lines became an integral 
part of State budgets and economic planning. 
In the CQCA Agreements the Government outlined the future 
arrangements for the provision of rail facilities, based on 
the security deposit system it had introduced in the Thiess 
Peabody Mitsui Agreement in 1965. The Company had to 
provide the whole of the capital needed for the 142 miles of 
track from Goonyella to the port, but the State built, owned 
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and operated the line. The company provided the $36m. cost 
as a security deposit for the due performance of its 
obligations and the sum was repaid in instalments with 
interest over 12.5 years with funds earned from freight 
charges. If the income from freight fell short of the sum 
required, the Company forfeited a proportion of the 
repayments. Freight charges had three components 
amortisation of capital, operating cost and profit - though 
it was not known in what proportions. The Premier said the 
profit component was "many times the royalty rate" and would 
increase substantially when the capital cost was 
liquidated.^ Utah estimated it at $3.37 per tonne in 1979, 
$4.33 over 16.4m tonnes in 1980 and $4.47 per tonne over 
20.1m tonnes in 1981, and both Utah and the Chamber of 
Mines regarded the charges as excessive. As coal prices 
boomed, the profit component was increased and the 
escalation formula broadened to provide very substantial 
revenues for the State which had not provided any of the 
capital and had taken no financial risk. Both the State and 
the coal companies regarded this profit component as a form 
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of taxation which the government at least thought was "fair 
and equitable as between the various companies 
commercially realistic, and which provided an adequate 
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return to the State". It also served to reinforce the 
close interest of the State in the success of mining 
developments which provided substantial additions to State 
funds which could then be used to promote other developments 
or to meet other calls on government expenditures. 
According to CRA, Australian internal transport posed the 
most serious and persistent disadvantage and cost to 
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Australian mining. The Queensland government through the 
security deposit system attempted to ensure that export 
developments would be provided with adequate and timely 
transport to meet their contractual obligations. This could 
have been achieved, as in Western Australia, by private 
enterprise, but the Queensland government seized the 
opportunity to strike a "bargain" which locked the companies 
into the production of large tonnages and gave the State 
windfall gains in boom periods. However, it also caused 
difficulties for the companies in adjusting output when 
Japanese demand slackened off, so that the relationship on 
which so much hope was pinned was more vulnerable to factors 
outside its control than it would have been under other 
arrangements. 
(ii) Ports 
Port facilities were provided by both private enterprise and 
semi-government authorities, and their vision and 
willingness to take risks in expanding beyond immediate need 
were important factors in supporting the pace of development 
and the competitiveness of Queensland coal. Large scale 
expansion of port facilities in line with or in anticipation 
of new export contracts poses major problems of 
coordination. Long lead times are involved in planning and 
construction and contracts for coal are unlikely to be 
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firmed without adequate assurance that loading facilities 
are available. Both Kianga-Moura and Blackwater coal were 
shipped through the established port of Gladstone and the 
determination of the Gladstone Harbour Board to secure coal 
shipments and its willingness to take risks in providing 
facilities was to be a key factor in moving large volumes of 
coal required by the Japanese. 
The Harbour Board had to overcome a history of failure and 
the pessimism of a report by a government-appointed 
committee in 1959 on the potential for Gladstone's 
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development. Gladstone had an excellent natural harbour, 
but pre- and post-war attempts to attract business by very 
low charges and approaches to potential customers such as 
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Vacuum Oil and Blair Athol Coal were unsuccessful. In the 
late 194 0s and 50s the Harbour Board had modernised 
facilities for bulk handling, installing a coal loading 
plant and conveyor belt and facilities for unloading, 
stockpiling and storage in an attempt to attract emerging 
trade and forestall the decline of Gladstone in favour of 
Port Alma. Although it had never run at anything like full 
capacity, the equipment provided the port with good 
facilities for the handling of the early shipments of 
Kianga-Moura coal was instrumental in securing the coal 
trade at Gladstone rather than Port Alma. 
The Harbour Board was determined that Gladstone would become 
the major Central Queensland coal port. Despite advice that 
possible coal exports were insufficient justification for 
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expansion, the Harbour Board was prepared to take the 
significant risk of further modernising and expanding 
facilities even before guaranteed coal contracts were 
signed. The Coordinator General confirmed that it would be 
some time before Moura-Kianga coal shipments exceeded port 
capacity, but the Harbour Board realised that the port would 
eventually need to be deepened and the capacity of the coal 
loading facilities increased. The Board therefore 
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responded positively to the request by Mitsui Bussan Kaisha 
that immediate steps be taken to allow large coal carriers 
being built by Mitsui Shipping to berth, and to speed up 
loading from 400 to more than 500 tons per hour. 
Firm orders for coal from Mitsui for the following seven 
years and the financial support of the Queensland and 
Commonwealth governments gave the Harbour Board confidence 
in its future and helped overcome the problems of 
establishing facilities adequate for the early years of 
trade. Initial difficulties arose over financing a concrete 
platform for the coal stockpile and an increased berthing 
depth at the loading jetty. Although these appear 
relatively small expenditures in the overall project, delays 
caused concern to Mitsui and could have reduced its orders. 
Evans indicated to Cabinet that Thiess felt a "growing sense 
of lack of confidence as a result of which the whole trade 
might be lost". Evans suggested that Thiess Bros, be 
allowed to construct and finance the platform, with the 
Coordinator-General's agreement that the Harbour Board would 
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be guaranteed funds from the 1961-62 program. Because of 
the benefit to the nation, as well as the urgency of the 
need, the Commonwealth agreed to pay 50 per cent of the 
cost, half as a 15-year loan and half as a grant. The 
Harbour Board borrowed the remainder under its debenture 
programme and was recompensed by the State for interest and 
redemption payments for the Federal advance. The combined 
efforts of the Commonwealth and State governments and the 
Gladstone Harbour Board allowed the first exports to go 
ahead as planned. 
The Harbour Board recognised that this was a short-term 
approach and that eventually the coal export trade would 
require a totally new facility. Planning began to establish 
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this at South Trees at an estimated cost of $6m. As 
international economic conditions became tighter, there was 
increasing pressure to keep transport costs down and in 1963 
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Cabinet was asked to help improve facilities still further 
to accommodate larger ships. Approaches had been made to 
Evans and Chalk by the Gladstone Harbour Board and by the 
Executive Vice President of Mitsui and Co., who outlined the 
need to handle larger ships to meet planned annual 
production of 2 million tons and to minimise costs. He 
further argued that with the increased living standards in 
Japan, and the likely liberalisation of trade, imports of 
sugar and other foodstuffs could be expected which would 
87 
provide additional justification for the expense. It was 
essentially the prospect of the coal export trade which 
spurred the development of the port of Gladstone which 
subsequently became the hub of shipping for sorghum, wheat 
and beef as well as for alumina and coal to Japan. 
Arrangements for the CQCA mines involved much less State 
participation. Coal was to be shipped through a new port 
built by Utah at Hay Point, It was a large, efficient, 
world-class facility, serving the company's program of 
international market development through its mines at 
Goonyella, Peak Downs, Sara j i and Norwich Park and much 
later its steaming coal mine at Daunia. The new port was 
the type of facility which the Economist Intelligence Unit 
had suggested was essential for the State's economic 
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growth - large-scale, developed well ahead of the time 
when it would be fully utilized, and therefore extremely 
risky, no matter how definite future prospects might seem. 
The company was supported by the government in the surveying 
and construction of the harbour and associated works, and 
through a financial contribution to the costs. This 
investment in highly efficient facilities, provided on the 
company's initiative, was an important element in its 
ability to market its coal not just in Japan but in more 
distant locations as well. 
The extent to which economies of scale can be achieved is 
the principal determinant of handling costs at ports and 
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Queensland's early development of ports capable of handling 
large ships, with appropriate stockpile facilities and 
loading rates gave an advantage over the smaller and more 
dated ports in NSW and thus over alternative mines which did 
not have such high infrastructure costs associated with 
isolation. The arrangements for port facilities for the 
Thiess and CQCA mines illustrate two quite different sets of 
relationships between State and business, with different 
levels of State-business cooperation, largely derived from 
the different needs of the companies involved. 
Even after the new Mining Act in 1968 removed the necessity 
for the separate negotiation and ratification of conditions 
of access to resources, the special arrangements for the 
provision of infrastructure were negotiated separately for 
each venture, using the Utah Agreements as a basis. The 
process of infrastructure provision thus became the focus of 
the evolving relationship between the State and mining 
companies. The system of separate negotiation is also a 
partial explanation of why mining capital cannot be regarded 
as a single homogeneous unit, since each company, and, 
indeed each project of particular company, was treated 
individually. The outcome of each negotiation depended on 
the relative bargaining strengths of the State and the 
company, the economic and political circumstances at the 
time, and the negotiating skills of the participants, 
especially Ministers Camm and Chalk and, particularly after 
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1974, Under-Treasurer Hielscher. Seen from the perspective 
of the 1990s it is evident that State representatives were 
extremely successful in capturing substantial benefits from 
the companies, though at the same time the system was 
devised with the objective of breaking the bottleneck to 
development caused by backward and inadequate infrastructure 
facilities. 
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FINDING MARKETS 
The opportunities for the sale of coal to Japan arose when 
developments in the Japanese economy and in the steel 
industry in particular created an interest in diversifying 
sources of supply and in suppliers who could reliably 
provide very large quantities over long periods of time. 
Turning the opportunities into sales required the 
cooperation of miners, governments and the Japanese 
themselves. 
The coal mines in the 1960s and 70s were developed 
specifically for the Japanese market, first for coking and 
much later for steaming coal. There were some suggestions 
that Thiess would find markets in the Argentine where a 
steel industry was being established with Japanese 
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capital, and Utah held out the prospect of sales in the 
USA and Western Europe, though these did not eventuate in 
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any substantial quantity until the late 1970s. The size 
and rate of growth of the Japanese market provided the basis 
for establishment and expansion of the mines. The first 
sales were made and the first contracts obtained on the 
initiative of Les Thiess and he and officials of Mitsui 
Bussan Kaisha persuaded Mines Minister Evans and, through 
him the Cabinet, of the potential of the Japanese market. 
Government and business worked together to translate this 
potential into specific sales and contracts. 
Government assistance had to be sought right from the outset 
when the accidental mixing of a trial shipment of Kianga 
coking coal with Callide steaming coal threatened a 
premature end to any possibility of a coal trade. Mines 
Minister Evans reported to Parliament that he had gone to 
Japan at the request of the Premier and after "strong 
representations from the Gladstone Harbour Board" to try to 
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sort out the problem and overcome Japanese mistrust. 
Thiess was fined $18,000 for breach of contract, later 
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reduced to $1800, and Evans gave a written undertaking that 
the Government Fuel Technologist would in future inspect 
coal being loaded. Thiess was also assisted in the 
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resolution of this problem by Roy Duncan whose long 
experience in Japanese trade and personal contacts with 
Mitsui helped to convince the Japanese to give Thiess a 
second chance. However, it was Evans' view that, despite 
this assistance, "the position would have been most 
difficult" if he had not gone to Japan with the Premier's 
authority and "Les Thiess would agree that they may not have 
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got the contract" without Government help. 
The key to the market was the Japanese steel industry which 
had begun to recover its production levels when Cold War 
tensions in the late 1940s changed American attitudes to the 
reconstruction of Japan's industrial base. The United 
States provided assistance to build a strong Asian ally and 
special procurements during the Korean War, coupled with 
rising domestic and world demand, generated the financial 
and commercial basis for modernisation of the steel 
industry. During the First Modernisation Plan, 1951-55, 
costs were reduced and production capacity increased through 
renovation and extension of existing facilities. The Second 
Modernisation Plan, 1956-60, expanded capacity through 
construction of integrated iron-steel works with new giant 
blast and basic-oxygen furnaces which reduced the dependence 
on inputs of scrap-iron whose supplies were unreliable and 
prices unpredictable. The Japanese domestic market which 
absorbed around 75 per cent of production expanded rapidly 
to meet demand generated by heavy investment in 
manufacturing, public utilities and infrastructure and 
rising consumption of durables such as autos and 
refrigerators. The consumption of steel per capita rose 
from 242 kg in 1962, the lowest in the industrialised world, 
to 500 kg in 1968, the third highest.'^ 
Queensland's export coal industry developed in response to 
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the increased demand for coking coal which resulted from the 
Japanese business boom and the implementation of plans for 
expansion of the steel industry. Trade was facilitated by 
the siting of new Japanese steel plants near the coast and 
by the construction of new ore/coal carriers built through 
cooperation between steel and shipbuilding industries and 
the Japanese government. Simultaneously, Japan's reserves 
of soft coking coal were being depleted, American supplies 
of best quality hard coking coal became more difficult and 
expensive to obtain to the levels Japan required, and the 
steel industry pressed a reluctant Government to permit an 
increase in cheaper imports. The Japanese steel industry 
began to seek long-term stable supplies of raw materials 
through investment in new mines in Malaya, India, the 
Philippines and Australia, so that Thiess expected that both 
hard and soft coking coal would be able to be sold by the 
time a new railway line was built. As the 197 0s progressed, 
the expansion of Japanese requirements beyond expectations 
made it possible to sell coals from both obviously viable 
deposits and from mines which would have been of doubtful 
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economic value in other circumstances. Long-term contracts 
rather than spot sales became the basis of planning as the 
enormous impact of rising US coal prices on the Japanese 
steel industry led to a search for security of pricing as 
well as of supplies. 
The developing trade between Japanese steel interests and 
Thiess Peabody broke new ground on both sides. Consequently, 
numbers of Japanese delegations representing steel and coal 
interests, financiers, trading houses and government visited 
Queensland during the 1960s inspecting mines, ports, 
railways and other facilities. The first major mission in 
August 1958 comprised representatives of Fuji Iron and 
Steel, Nippon Kokan Kaisha, Sumitomo Metals Industries Ltd., 
Amagasaki Steel Co. Ltd., Yawata Iron and Steel Co., and 
Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, including Mr. K. Ejiri. They had 
discussions with the Premier, Treasurer Hiley, Mines 
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Minister Evans and Mr. G. Clark, the Under-Secretary for 
Mines, the Coordinator-General, Railways Commissioner and 
the Chief Engineer of Harbours and Marine. Such visits 
helped to build up a network of contacts between importers, 
exporters. Ministers and public officials and lay the basis 
of mutual trust and understanding which was important in 
securing further sales and in handling difficulties such as 
the downturn in the Japanese steel industry in 1971 and the 
inability of Thiess Peabody to meet its initial contracts 
because of water, electricity and mechanical problems. 
Minister Evans and his Departmental Head, G. Clark, were 
particularly active in helping to smooth the way for 
contracts for Moura-Kianga coal. They made several trips to 
Japan with Thiess, for example in late 1961 for discussions 
with iron and steel industries and to assure them of 
government support and that Thiess would be granted a 
franchise. The importance of this guarantee was underlined 
by a major breakthrough in the trade shortly afterwards -
the awarding of the first contract even before confirmation 
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that Peabody would enter the partnership. 
Utah's first sales from Blackwater were facilitated by Mr. 
George Ishiyama, a Japanese-American from San Francisco, who 
had been hired as a consultant to set up initial contacts 
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With Japanese steel interests and the Japanese government. 
The process was assisted by Utah's partnership in Mt. 
Goldsworthy Mining Associates which was exporting iron ore 
to Japan and by its earlier experience selling to the 
Japanese from its mines in Canada and Peru. By 1963 
negotiations had advanced sufficiently for samples from 
Blackwater to be sent for testing, and a major contract was 
obtained with Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha for 13.5m tonnes over 
10 years, subsequently expanded to 21.2m. tonnes and then to 
28.2 m. tonnes, plus spot sales. Regular shipments began in 
January 1968 and "generated substantial cash flows while the 
more expensive CQCA mines were being built". 
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Negotiations for the Blackwater coal and the formation of 
the CQCA joint venture with Mitsubishi in 1965 gave Utah 
even greater confidence in the Japanese market and in 
prospects for long term sales. QERAC members considering 
the quantity of coal Utah would be permitted to export were 
asked to consider contracts" not for 10,15 or 20 years" but 
"of long life ... with attendant stability which should be 
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advantageous to the State". Contracts of this length had 
not previously been obtained by Queensland coal producers 
and, together with coinmitments from government, were a 
fundamental prerequisite for the raising of long-term 
finance based on predictable costs and revenues. To the new 
Premier, Bjelke-Petersen, the length and magnitude of these 
sales contracts seemed to herald "an era of unparalleled 
development" that would "unlock the industrial potential 
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of central Queensland" and give the State the 
international status it had once sought through foreign 
investment in secondary industry at the start of Coalition 
Government in the late 1950s. 
Thiess and Utah played different roles in the development of 
the export coal industry. Thiess was the pathfinder - the 
local businessman who first saw the opportunities and took 
the initial steps to take advantage of them, but who needed 
the close cooperation of the State in making the major 
adjustments required by market development. Utah was the 
model of an experienced international company, with access 
to substantial capital and with established connections in 
Japan who demonstrated the capacity of a large and 
efficient operation to be competitive in any marketplace. 
STATE-FEDERAL CONFLICT 
Just when the State's future seemed assured by coal exports 
to Japan, it appeared to be threatened by Federal concern 
over the prices at which those contracts had been 
negotiated. Early in the 1970s, public disquiet about the 
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balance between open-cut and underground mining and the 
relatively low prices for Australian compared with American 
coal led the Commonwealth government to consider the 
possibility of export controls. Groups such as unions and 
conservationists, whose views went largely unheeded in 
States such as Queensland, and interests in traditional 
mining areas, were able to exert concerted pressure at 
federal level. The Federal Minister (Mr. Swartz) told the 
Japanese that the cost-plus method of pricing did not seem 
to him "the best arrangement for the long term association 
between two countries". He indicated the Commonwealth was 
considering withholding export permits, as it had done for 
iron ore and wood chips, until fairer prices were 
negotiated. 
Open conflict developed between the Queensland and 
Commonwealth Governments after the election of the ALP in 
1972 and continued, though less bitterly, with the Fraser 
Government after 1975. Though the conflict with the Whitlam 
government was ideologically based, its proximate cause was 
the downturn in the Japanese steel industry in 1971 which 
exposed the vulnerability of the coal-based trade links and 
provided an important test of the relationship between Japan 
and Queensland in particular, and Japan and Australia in 
general. One of the bases of dispute was the divergence 
between Commonwealth concern for appropriate pricing for the 
benefit of Australia as a whole and State interest in 
maximising output and mine development. Throughout the 
1970s mining products, including coal, made a significant 
contribution to Australian exports and National Income. 
When both volumes and prices seemed undermined by cutbacks 
in Japanese steel production and by rising inflation and 
international monetary instability, the Commonwealth moved 
to develop a national resources policy. Among other 
considerations, it questioned whether contracts used as the 
basis of trade in the 1960s were appropriate to the changed 
economic conditions of the 1970s and provided an environment 
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in which rational decisions could be made regarding the 
pattern of trade specialisation. Driven by community and 
internal pressures. Party policy and by international events 
it could not control. Commonwealth attempts to lead and 
coordinate the response to changing circumstances brought it 
into conflict with States determined to pursue their own 
interests and control development within their own borders. 
Queensland mines were a focus of criticism because the 
concessional terms on which the State granted access to 
resources allowed mines to be profitable even at low prices. 
In addition, Queensland's interest in maximising mine 
development made it possible for coordinated Japanese 
purchasers to stimulate excess capacity and then act 
together to time their now-reduced purchases in such a way 
as to put pressure on the separate and competing Australian 
suppliers to accept lower prices. Utah's prices were of 
particular concern since, because of its size, the company 
dominated the Australian market, forcing other miners in 
Queensland and elsewhere to follow its lead. It was alleged 
that Utah's coal was underpriced relative to comparable 
coals imported by Japan from elsewhere because its mines 
were open-cut only, its port at Hay Point was the largest 
and most economical in Australia, it needed "massive tonnage 
contracts to offset high initial mechanisation of open cut 
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mining" and it had been so generously treated by the 
Queensland Government in its rents and royalties. 
Federal Minister Connor shared with the Queensland Premier a 
view that a future Australia would "ride not on the sheep's 
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back but in the coal truck," but they disagreed 
vehemently on whether the Commonwealth should try to improve 
Australia's bargaining position in price negotiations 
between individual Australian sellers and Japanese buyers 
combined in a monopsonistic cartel. The Labor Government's 
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policy of "benevolent surveillance" involved export 
controls on all minerals and energy resources and all 
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contract details had to be approved by the Department of 
Minerals and Energy prior to the granting of export permits. 
Mr. Connor tried to organise coal exporters into a common 
front against the Japanese steel mills, intervened directly 
in 1973 and 1975 to demand renegotiation of contract prices, 
and refused to permit exports from Norwich Park because he 
said the company should increase production by going deeper 
in its existing mines. Nor would he allow Utah to raise the 
output of the CQCA mines to 3 0 per cent of the newly-
established reserves of 6.1 billion tons and indicated that 
when the agreed 3 00 million tons had been extracted, the 
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mine could be sold to an Australian consortium. To 
capture some of the windfall profits from the resources 
boom, the Commonwealth introduced a Coal Export Levy which 
was so structured that Queensland mines, especially Utah 
projects, carried the bulk of its burden. 
TABLE 6.1 
SUMMARY OF CHANGES TO COAL EXPORT DUTY 
Date High Quality 
Coking 
per tonne 
Other 
Coking 
per tonne 
Non 
Coking 
pertonne 
10 Aug 
9 Oct 
17 Aug 
16 Aug 
16 Nov 
18 Aug 
29 Julv 
1975 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1979 
1981 
r 1982 
6.0 
6.0 
4.50 
3.50 
3.50 
3.50 
3.50 
2.0 
2.0 
1.50 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
2mpt 
2.0 
2* 
Exempt 
Exempt 
Exempt 
1.0 
Exempt 
* Exempt if ash content is less than 14% 
Source: Utah Development Co. Submission to the 
Australian Senate Standing Committee on Trade and 
Commerce. Inquiry into Australia's Coal Export Industry 
July, 1982, p.34. 
In addition, following the Fitzgerald Report, 110 the 
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Commonwealth acted to at least reduce the extent to which 
the mining industry was a net beneficiary of tax 
concessions, particularly those related to accelerated 
depreciation and the special investment allowance. In 
addition, a branch profits tax was imposed to eliminate tax 
advantages to companies such as Utah which operated in 
Australia via a branch office rather than by an Australian-
registered subsidiary. Queensland resented the 
Commonwealth's use of its controls over foreign trade to 
override the State's intentions with respect to mineral 
development within its own borders, and to remove the 
competitive advantage of Queensland mines resulting from 
their efficiency and the nature of the State's mineral 
policies. 
The Queensland Government and the coal companies, especially 
Utah, were united in opposition to the Commonwealth's 
resources policy. The companies generally sought to reach 
an accommodation within the Federal Government's policy 
boundaries so that development could proceed, although Utah 
threatened not to continue with its plans for Norwich 
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Park. The Australian Coal Association (formed by the 
Queensland Coal Owners' Association and the NSW Colliery 
Proprietors' Association) sought talks with leaders of the 
Japanese steel industry such as Mr. Tanabe of Nippon Steel 
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to develop acceptable guidelines for future contracts. A 
delegation from members of the Association - Clutha, Coalex, 
Utah and Thiess - approached Minister Connor and his 
Department Head, Sir Lennox Hewitt, reportedly with little 
result. Queensland, together with NSW and Western 
Australia, considered a legal challenge to the export levy. 
Premier Bjelke-Petersen campaigned vigorously against the 
Labor Government, drawing on long-held suspicions of anti-
Queensland bias to argue that Federal resources policies 
were motivated more by Whitlam and Connor's power base in 
the NSW Labor Party than from genuine, though misguided, 
concern for Australian mining as a whole. 
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Despite the defeat of the Whitlam government, the Queensland 
Premier was not able to ignore the fact that the 
international market situation and the climate of public 
opinion had changed since the 1960s. Towards the end of the 
1970s, ruling market prices began to re-emerge as the basis 
for coal sales and the period of apparent security of 
contracts with escalating prices drew to a close. This was 
associated with international economic changes, the 
beginnings of a restructuring in the Japanese economy and 
the oversupply of coal as many of the developments planned 
on the basis of earlier demand forecasts and encouraged by 
leasing policy came on stream. Some new developments were 
aimed at other than Japanese markets to obviate direct 
competition with existing mines, to try to end the monopsony 
position of Japanese steel mills and because some projects 
such as Nebo and Hail Creek experienced difficulty in 
obtaining contracts. As early as 1973-74 Utah had sold 
400,000 tons from its Peak Downs mine to Italian steel 
companies and the viability of its Norwich Park mine was 
based on the sale of about one-third of its output in 
Europe. In some sections of the mining industry, growing 
confidence and maturity were reflected in a wider view of 
prospective markets, and of the possibility of resource-
based secondary industries rather than simply the export of 
unprocessed resources. 
As Queensland's economic prosperity became increasingly 
dependent on the development of the coal industry, the State 
had a vested interest in supporting the commercial 
relationship between exporters and the Japanese steel 
industry. When the mining industry and therefore the 
relationship with Japan appeared threatened by Federal 
attitudes to contract prices, mining practices and foreign 
investment, Queensland's staunch defence of its interests 
raised important questions about the boundaries of State and 
Commonwealth powers, especially in relation to the terms of 
foreign trade and investment where the domestic economy of a 
276 
State was largely dependent on international trade. 
FINANCING PROJECTS 
In the dispute between the Queensland and Federal 
governments, issues of resource extraction, pricing and 
marketing were inextricably linked with policies towards 
foreign investment. The large amounts of investment 
capital, the technical expertise in large-scale open-cut 
mining and bulk transport, and the international outlook 
needed for major mining developments were predominantly 
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available offshore. McKern estimated that at the time 
perhaps as few as three Australian companies had the 
expertise to even consider financing a development such as 
Kianga-Moura. In the 1960s both State and Federal 
governments expended considerable effort to develop an 
attractive environment to encourage such investment. 
Although investment by the Japanese themselves was a 
relatively small proportion of total funds, the importance 
of Queensland resources to Japanese industry made attitudes 
to foreign investment an important aspect of the trading 
relationship. 
Both Thiess and the Queensland government recognised that 
development of the immense reserves of coal which had been 
discovered was beyond the Thiess Group's resources, despite 
its size and substance in Australian terms, and that finance 
would not be easy to arrange for such a risky venture. 
Because of the involvement of Mitsui in the development of 
the field and as a customer for the coal, Les Thiess tried 
to arrange a joint venture with Mitsui taking 40 per cent 
equity. The Japanese Ministry of Finance would not 
consent while tight monetary policy and strict controls on 
overseas investment were still in force, and it was not 
until later in the 1960s that a recommendation by the Japan 
Mining Council was accepted by the Finance Ministry and 
Mitsui joined the venture. Mitsui, however, was 
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insistent that a partnership with an experienced American 
company was necessary to provide "know-how" for the 
extraction and handling of the tonnages involved. Peabody, 
the second-largest coal company in the USA, was eminently 
suitable. Peabody was interested in working with Mitsui in 
Australia and took 50 per cent equity in the project, at the 
same time making available the world's most modern and 
powerful equipment for moving earth and coal, and arranging 
"considerable loan funds". 
To some extent the ability of Thiess to obtain finance from 
overseas and the form which it took reflected State and 
Commonwealth attitudes to foreign investment generally and 
the desire of the Queensland government for rapid 
development. McKern argues that in the 60s foreign 
investment was not an issue on which Australians placed any 
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significance. The States' main concern was to get 
projects under way as soon as possible, subject to 
satisfactory agreements on royalties and infrastructure. In 
Queensland, just as Premier Hanlon in 1947 was more 
concerned with the development of Blair Athol than with the 
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fact that the proposed developer was a foreign investor. 
Treasurer Hiley in 1963 discounted the risks of relying on 
foreign capital and was "not prepared to confine the pace of 
Australia's development within the level of the day-to-day 
savings capacity of our own people". Hiley and Hanlon 
would probably have agreed that foreign investment might be 
preferable to Australian investment from the south, turning 
Queensland into a "branch office State" in mining, as it was 
in industry and commerce. Queensland welcomed the 
Commonwealth's "open door" policy towards foreign investment 
in the 1960s since it allowed the Queensland mining industry 
to develop independently of the centres of Australian 
capital in Sydney and Melbourne and at the same time gain 
the benefit of international expertise. 
Senior State politicians and bureaucrats engaged in an 
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active programme of visits and contacts with existing and 
potential investors to maintain the impetus for foreign 
capital inflow, especially into mining. For example in 
1968, Hiley, Chalk and Evans visited Peabody in the United 
States and Camm and Healy went to Canada, Japan and the US 
to visit firms who had invested in Queensland mining "and 
those we hope will continue to support our mineral 
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exploration and development with hard cash investment". A 
Parliamentary Mission to Japan in May and the Premier in 
June 1968 met representatives of Mitsubishi and other firms 
involved in Queensland minerals and agriculture. The visits 
were designed to reassure investors of continuing government 
support, to project a progressive image of the State and to 
maintain a high level of interest overseas in Queensland 
projects. The Government indicated it would leave no stone 
unturned in the pursuit of maximum mining development 
because of the industrial projects established or projected 
which were based on mining including the Townsville copper 
refinery, salt processing, mineral sands beneficiation and 
the alumina refinery. 
With the election of the federal Labor Government in 1972, 
the climate for investment in minerals changed dramatically. 
Mr. Connor intended that existing levels of foreign 
ownership should not rise, but should be progressively 
reduced with the objective of promoting Australian ownership 
of energy resources (coal, oil, uranium, and gas) and 
Australian control of all other mines. The Commonwealth 
indicated that it would be opposed to the extension of 
Utah's leases, and when Kennecott Copper was forced by the 
United States courts to sell its Peabody interests. 
Commonwealth action ensured they were sold to Australian 
shareholders. The Queensland Premier pointed to a sharp 
drop in foreign investment in mining exploration and 
development as evidence of the ruinous effect of Labor 
policies, ignoring the importance of the collapse of the 
international commodity boom, the emergence of stagflation. 
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and the reported willingness of the Japanese to invest via 
the AIDC rather than taking equity positions. The 
Premier's response to the ALP's resources and foreign 
investment policy was to utilise the Senate to promote the 
interests of the State and its mining industry allies, to 
outsmart the Government in order to ensure the Opposition 
retained control of the Upper House and to challenge the 
constitutional security of the Whitlam Government. The 
opposition of the States, particularly Queensland and 
Western Australia, was able to frustrate many key features 
of Labor's resources policy and lead indirectly to the 
actions which precipitated Labor's dismissal. 
But the Whitlam government's policies had been a reflection 
of changed community attitudes to foreign ownership of 
Australian resources and were retained, though somewhat 
modified, by the Fraser government. Mr. Bjelke-Petersen 
continued to criticise policies which he felt were delaying 
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the expansion of Queensland mines, and the National Party 
at both State and Federal levels objected to the rejection 
of attempts by the Japan Electric Power Development Company 
to buy 20 per cent interest in Blair Athol. But foreign 
investment was clearly a Federal responsibility and, 
particularly when policy appeared to have public support, 
there was little the regional State could do but accept it. 
CONCLUSION 
Opportunities for the Queensland-Japan coal trade were made 
possible by changes in the international market for 
resources, especially by the increase in demand for coking 
coal by the Japanese steel industry. This coincided with the 
first postwar surplus of coal in Queensland and a 
recognition by business and government that overseas markets 
would have to be found or production curtailed. 
The initial impetus to take advantage of the opportunities 
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in Japan was provided by private enterprise, especially Les 
Thiess and Utah, encouraged by the Japanese themselves. 
Thiess took the risks of exploration, involved the Japanese 
in exploration and planning, and obtained the first sales 
contracts. Importantly, he was instrumental in persuading 
the Mines Minister of the possibilities in sales to Japan 
and through him begin a change in the government's attitude 
to the nature of mining and the conditions under which it 
should be controlled. Utah's ability to access substantial 
financial resources and the company's international 
experience enabled it to organise exploration and mining on 
a scale previously unknown in Queensland and reinforce the 
growing view that the coal export trade could be the 
stimulus for Queensland's economic growth. 
At the outset only Thiess' persistence and the encouragement 
of the Japanese moved the project forward in the face of 
government indifference. The government's priority was the 
development of secondary industry to broaden the State's 
economic base and it was unwilling to take the risk of 
supporting such a speculative venture which seemed of 
marginal relevance to the State's economic future. It was 
the success of Thiess and Utah in finding extensive coal 
deposits and the involvement of companies of the size and 
stature of Mitsui and Mitsubishi which led the government to 
identify a complementarity of interest in the companies' 
desire to develop coal exports and the government's aims of 
economic growth and the establishment of its own status as 
progressive and stable. 
From that time, the efforts of individuals and companies 
were supplemented by State activities to attract further 
investors and to enhance the competitiveness and 
profitability of mining companies through generous 
conditions of access to resources and work by the Mines 
Department to delineate more accurately the extent of 
Queensland's reserves. The State became involved in securing 
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early sales, and guarantees of government support were an 
important prerequisite for convincing customers of the long-
term viability of mines, obtaining long-term contracts and 
putting together large-scale financial arrangements. The 
concerted effort of private enterprise and government was 
essential in establishing the trade. 
Mining, especially coal mining, became the dominant sector 
of capital in Queensland, and the State government assumed 
the role of defending the industry against efforts of the 
Commonwealth to control foreign ownership of resources, 
capture through special taxes some of the profits of mining 
and insist on world-market prices for coal contracts. The 
resulting conflict between State and Federal governments was 
exaggerated by the styles of the participants and the appeal 
by the Premier to regional loyalties and to Queensland's 
long-standing mistrust of the south. More significantly, 
the conflict related to the boundaries of the respective 
powers of the States and the Commonwealth in dealing with an 
area of vital interest both regionally and nationally. The 
resolution of the conflict reinforced the understanding that 
State powers were severely curtailed by the Commonwealth's 
ability to use its Constitutional authority over foreign 
investment and external trade to override State policies, 
but also pointed to the need for a workable consensus on 
policy goals and the methods of achieving them. 
Despite the State's staunch defence of miners and the 
importance of mining for Queensland's economic growth, the 
interests of the companies and the State were neither 
identical nor static. Once the export coal industry became 
successful, the State's desire for development was overlaid 
by a recognition that it could bargain with the companies 
from a position of strength to obtain both capital assets 
and an income stream with a minimum of risk. Innovative 
politicians and bureaucrats such as Chalk and Hielscher 
developed the system of infrastructure financing which 
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carried initial benefits for the companies, but locked them 
into large tonnages and provided significant profit 
components to the State which could then be used to fund 
other priorities. When market conditions became more 
competitive, these arrangements reduced the flexibility of 
the companies to respond to changing circumstances. 
The State was not able to control the forces which provided 
the opportunity for the export of coal to Japan, but could 
and did decide for itself how to respond to the desire of 
the companies to take advantage of the prospects as they 
arose. In the growth of the trade, private enterprise 
recognised and responded to the opportunities presented by 
the international market, but the pace and pattern of 
development was determined by commercial considerations, 
modified by the policies of State and Federal governments 
and by the changing priorities of the community towards 
resource development. 
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Galligan argues that the Queensland-Japan coal trade was 
driven by internationally determined market opportunities 
which companies such as Utah exploited and to which 
governments responded. The complementarity between business 
and government resulted in a partnership which was able to 
overcome the obstacles to the development of trade. This 
chapter takes a slightly different view, contending that, 
from Queensland's perspective, the central dynamic was 
provided by the companies and individual entrepreneurs who 
chose the pace and extent to which they wished to respond to 
a market, admittedly one established by forces beyond their 
control. The cooperation of the State apparatus was a 
crucial factor in allowing business to develop the coal 
trade, in influencing the direction of industry growth, and 
in modifying commercial decisions. But the partnership of 
State and business, enhanced in Queensland by a traditional 
commitment to decentralised development, was only partial. 
State interests in the security of future resources, in 
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capturing some of the profits of the coal trade, and in 
maximum development caused difficulties for firms as they 
tried to adapt to changing conditions. 
A central theme of this thesis is that many opportunities 
for trade existed and were identified in the prewar years. 
However, they were not developed for a variety of reasons 
including the lack of pathfinders to take risks and lead the 
way, and because business acting on its own was not able to 
take full advantage of trade prospects without the 
cooperation of government in providing infrastructure, an 
attractive investment climate and the legislative basis for 
the State's industries to become competitive 
internationally. When opportunities arose in the postwar 
years many of them were able to be successfully exploited, 
especially in beef, s\igar, coal and minerals, because this 
time State and business v/orked together to overcome 
obstacles and to change the size and orientation of those 
industries. This cooperation, however, was only partial, as 
this chapter has illustrated with respect to the coal 
trade. 
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CX)NCLUSION 
This thesis set out to examine how government and business 
interacted in the development of Queensland's relations with 
Japan and how the State dealt with this major area of 
economic policy which formed the backbone of Queensland's 
postwar economic development, tied the State in to the 
international economic environment and became the focus for 
many of the most contentious trade and political issues 
between Australia and Japan. The analysis developed in the 
case studies of four of Queensland's major export industries 
examined the patterns evident in the key political and 
economic decisions and the major issues and turning points 
of trade growth in the context of the traditions of state-
business relations in Queensland and the general theories of 
the role of the state in a modern capitalist economy. The 
studies show that the development of the relationship was 
not a simple process of producing, mining and selling 
primary products and raw materials. It was a far more human 
and personalised outcome of interactions between 
individuals, business interests, local. State and national 
governments and the Japanese themselves over more than 50 
years. 
In general, the argument has been that changing 
international political and economic circumstances created 
opportunities for Queensland-Japan trade which private 
enterprise identified and was able to exploit with the 
cooperation of an active and interventionist State 
apparatus. The interactions of State and business followed 
a pattern consistent with Queensland traditions, but 
expanded and made more complex as the growth of trade 
changed the nature of the State's economic structure and the 
vision of its future. State and business acted both 
separately and together, within Queensland itself, within 
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the wider context of the federal system, and in 
relationships with Japanese firms and officials, forming an 
intricate network of relationships which changed over time 
according to the interests and needs of the participants and 
the changing realities of the economic and political 
environment. 
Although the focus of this thesis is on the roles of 
business and State in promoting the growth of trade with 
Japan, it is evident from the case studies that Queensland, 
like the small states analysed by Katzenstein , could not 
create the opportunities for trade, and had little impact on 
the international environment in which trade was conducted. 
Rather, the State and its businesses responded to market 
prospects established by forces beyond Queensland's or 
indeed Australia's boundaries. The principal determinants 
of potential markets were the growth of the Japanese economy 
and the changes in bilateral arrangements and in 
multilateral and regional developments, pressures and 
obligations which provided the framework for trade and 
allowed the State to capitalize on its strong comparative 
advantage in the production of agricultural goods and raw 
materials. 
In the 1960s and early 1970s the expansion of the Japanese 
steel industry created markets for coking coal and for a 
range of other mining products such as copper, zinc and 
bauxite. Restructuring of the Japanese aluminium industry 
transferred demand from bauxite to alumina for which 
Queensland was well positioned. Similarly, structural 
recession and industrial contraction were fundamental causes 
of the problems which emerged in the late 1970s and 80s as 
sections of Queensland's mining sector found themselves tied 
to industries such as steel-making which were depressed and 
had begun to decline in Japan's overall economic pattern. 
Rising levels of disposable income and changes in lifestyle 
which accompanied Japan's industrial growth underpinned the 
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demand for Queensland's rural products, although 
opportunities created by economic complementarity were 
restricted by political factors in Japan and elsewhere. 
Rural exports in particular were held back in the 1950s by 
arrangements with Britain and the Commonwealth which 
reflected the prewar dependence of Australian agriculture on 
those markets and the desire of the parties in both pre- and 
post-war periods for security of supplies, sales and prices. 
The 15-year Meat Agreement prevented Amagraze from making 
sales to Japan, while the British Commonwealth Sugar 
Agreement, as well as the ISA, limited the sales of sugar. 
The negotiation with Britain in 1956 of more flexible 
arrangements for trade with non-Commonwealth countries, the 
reduction in Commonwealth preference, and the decline in the 
political and economic importance of the United Kingdom for 
Australia were important factors allowing and giving impetus 
to trade with Japan. These changes were complemented by the 
improvement of official Australia-Japan relations which 
underpinned the establishment of commercial contacts. The 
Peace Treaty in 1951 was an essential prerequisite for the 
development of the relationship, as was the recognition by 
the Federal government and Australian business of the need 
to accept Japan into the trading arrangements under the 
auspices of GATT. The Commerce Agreement of 1957 confirmed 
the political commitment to the development of the 
Australia-Japan relationship, clarified the right of access 
for some products such as sugar, and helped to reduce 
protectionist and anti-Japanese sentiments which impeded the 
two-way flow of goods and were a legacy of the war and of 
prewar trading experiences. 
Even after changes in international arrangements removed the 
formal barriers to trade, the strength of Japanese demand 
for rural products was controlled by political factors. 
Traditional protection of Japan's domestic rural producers 
imposed barriers to trade, especially in beef, and created 
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uncertainties in the levels of demand for beef imports which 
were a severe handicap to production management. The 
problem was exacerbated in the mid-1970s by Japanese 
concerns for the security of food supplies and their 
consequent efforts at self-sufficiency, and in the 1980s by 
the growing bilateralism between Japan and the United States 
as Japan responded to US pressure to reduce the trade 
imbalance between them. The political economy of US-Japan 
trade relations became increasingly important to Australia's 
(and Queensland's) position in the Japanese market, with 
questions going beyond the restrictive and unstable 
conditions of market access which had dogged the Australia-
Japan trade in rural products. 
Queensland producers, like those of Australia generally, 
came to realise in the mid-1970s that security could not be 
provided by long-term contracts with Japan as it had been 
through agreements with Britain in the 1940s and 1950s. The 
beef and sugar disputes and difficulties over coal contract 
prices dispelled the optimistic belief which had developed 
during the years of strong market growth that Japan would 
continue to provide a profitable and ever-larger outlet for 
Australian farm and mining products into the indefinite 
future. The vulnerability of export-oriented industry to 
external market and political forces was not a new 
discovery. On the contrary, it had been well known in the 
prewar period, especially to the wool and cotton interests 
adversely affected by the trade diversion dispute, the 
mining and pearling industries caught up in Japan's 
southward advance, and the sugar industry which accepted 
tight controls in an effort to achieve stability. Fear of 
the volatility of international markets underlay the 
reluctance of the sugar industry to expand in 1963, the 
insistence on an Exchange of Letters between Governments as 
part of the 1974 long-term sugar contract, and the advice of 
the Australian Meat Board to beef producers not to 
concentrate exclusively on the production of types of beef 
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suited only for the Japanese market. The importance of 
market security had been set aside or downgraded during the 
resources and commodities boom of the 1960s and early 1970s, 
and it came as something of a shock to Queensland government 
and business to be reminded that the Japanese market could 
not be taken for granted and that there were substantial 
problems of management for an export-oriented economy, 
especially for a small State such as Queensland where market 
opportunities were created by international and political 
changes beyond its control. 
Taking advantage of market opportunities in Japan, at least 
up to the mid-1960s, required such extensive and far-
reaching adaptations that trade and industry development 
was very much a pioneering enterprise in a State which could 
be regarded, and indeed regarded itself, as being at the 
frontier. Queensland's population was sparse, its climatic 
conditions often inhospitable, especially in the northern 
and western areas which were important centres of beef 
production and the site of major mineral discoveries. Its 
social and industrial infrastructure was largely undeveloped 
and inadequate even for domestic demand; resources such as 
coal were barely tapped and only sketchily delineated; 
industries were small, under-capitalized and inward-looking, 
and even those such as beef and sugar which were accustomed 
to exporting relied on political protection as much as 
economic advantage to overcome a lack of competitiveness and 
maintain market position. 
Exploiting the market openings in Japan required the 
provision of electricity, water, and particularly transport 
infrastructure whose deficiencies were identified by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit in the 1950s, and again by 
Japanese steelmakers in the 1960s as a major impediment to 
development. Established exporters had to change their 
attitude to risk-taking and to the need for responsiveness 
to market requirements, and some, such as the sugar and beef 
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industries, had to make significant alterations to their 
production systems. Whole new industries had to be 
developed, often in harsh and remote locations lacking even 
the most basic urban and communication facilities. The 
Japanese market itself was regarded as harsh and uncertain. 
The characteristics of the postwar marketplace were largely 
unknown, but the unhappy experiences of the prewar years 
suggested that the Japanese were tough traders, willing to 
use every opportunity to further Japan's political or 
economic objectives without regard to the interests of 
trading partners. In such circumstances only the state had 
the authority and the access to financial and administrative 
resources needed to coordinate and support the funding of 
infrastructure on a large scale, to provide the economic 
climate conducive to risk-taking and adaptability, and to 
ameliorate some of the effects of the harsh conditions of 
international competition. 
In Queensland, the active involvement of the State in 
developing businesses of international standard which could 
compete in the Japanese market was nurtured by the high 
priority accorded the goals of decentralised economic 
development and relief from the economic domination of 
business interests in southern States, and by the tradition 
of willing support by governments of all persuasions for 
enterprises, including large speculative ventures, which 
gave promise of propelling the State or a particular region 
into rapid economic growth. The needs of the frontier and 
the commitment to economic growth provided a basis for close 
collaboration between State and business. It was this 
alliance which mobilized the forces necessary to change the 
Queensland economy and foster trade with Japan while still 
maintaining many continuities with the role of the State in 
economic life over the broad sweep of Queensland history. 
State actions and decisions such as its initiatives in the 
Brigalow and Beef Roads schemes, support for the upgrading 
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and expansion of the Port of Gladstone, and its insistence 
on downstream processing of bauxite in Queensland were 
consistent with Fitzgerald's argument that, at least to the 
end of the 1950s, the state was a "developmental agency". 
In this role it supported and encouraged projects of 
particular kinds in particular locations through a selective 
pattern of government expenditure, but at the same time 
attempted to ensure an equitable distribution of benefits 
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between business and the community as a whole. Through the 
1960s - the period when new mining ventures began and 
agricultural trade with Japan expanded - concerns about the 
distribution of benefits appeared to wane. Over-generous 
terms of access to resources, the encouragement of 
unrestricted foreign investment, especially in rural 
industries, and the minimal requirements for environmental 
protection and the provision of urban and social 
infrastructure suggested a belief that any development would 
automatically be of benefit to the community. The State was 
accused of "developmentalism" - acting to maximise the rate 
and scale of development and enhance the profitability of 
private enterprise, regardless of the size and 
distribution of net benefits or of long-term considerations. 
Fitzgerald sees this change in the role of the State 
essentially in Marxist terms - the State acting in the 
interests of capital, especially foreign capital, allowing 
unrestricted exploitation of resources and "deliberately 
1 • • 4 
making choices in favour of trans-national companies". 
While this thesis takes a different view, the Marxist 
perspective serves to focus attention on the way in which 
key State decisions were crucial to the success of trade 
with Japan. State actions cleared the way for projects to 
begin, enhanced the ability of business to be competitive, 
and sought to "defend" business against the efforts of the 
Federal government to alter the balance between benefits 
accruing to the community and those enjoyed by capital, 
especially that sector of capital which came to occupy the 
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superstructure of the dual economy. The marxist argument, 
however, neglects other decisions and actions which 
demonstrate a more independent stance by the State, which 
were opposed by and inimical to the interests of capital, or 
which demonstrated different interests by sectors of 
business or branches of the State in particular issues. The 
different attitudes of rural producers and mining interests 
to the benefits of foreign investment, the hostility of 
mining companies to increased royalties and to the profit 
component of rail freights are good examples. In the mining 
industry in particular, the practice of negotiating 
separately for each project served to enhance the natural 
differences between companies arising from their size, 
experience and financial resources and ensure that mining 
capital was not a homogeneous unit whose interests could 
easily be determined. The case studies rather support the 
conclusion of Tsokhas in his analysis of Australian 
business that State action was not a simple response to the 
economic interests of a dominant and unified capitalist 
class. In the alliance of State and business there were 
occasions when the State acted in ways which served the 
interests of capital, but the State could also act to serve 
its own interests, at least some of which could be achieved 
through business growth. 
The State-business relationship is closer to Lindblom's 
duality of leadership'^  in which the parties had separate, 
but interdependent roles. The sections of business engaged 
in trade with Japan led the State's take-off to economic 
growth after years of stagnation. This growth underscored 
the legitimacy of the Country (National)-Liberal Party 
government in a State where development and the rapid 
exploitation of resources were the principal criteria by 
which the success of governments was judged and where the 
desire to enhance Queensland's status within the federation 
had traditionally added a political motive to the economic 
arguments for diversification and industrial growth. The 
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pressure for growth, based on long-standing economic and 
political motivations, became more urgent when the recession 
of 1961 emphasised that the Nicklin government, elected in 
1957 after twenty-five years of Labor rule, had promised but 
had failed to achieve rapid development based on secondary 
industry. Government support for and involvement in 
managing the growth of Queensland-Japan trade was part of a 
continuing tradition of State attempts to stimulate the 
development of Queensland's latent potential. Economic and 
political imperatives in the late 1950s and early 1960s set 
the scene for these attempts to become part of a coordinated 
policy of integrating trade into Queensland's expansion and 
for the much closer cooperation of State and business. 
Within this cooperative effort, entrepreneurial functions 
were undertaken almost exclusively by business. Business 
initiatives identified the opportunities provided by Japan's 
economic growth, changes in its economic structure and in 
incomes and lifestyles. Companies such as Utah, CSR and 
MIM, and individuals like Beaver (Amagraze), Palfreyman 
(Borthwicks) and Thiess took the first steps in seeking out 
potential markets and developing the means to satisfy them, 
while "developmental nationalists" such as Mawby and Hibberd 
worked to ensure that the interests of foreign competitors 
did not keep Australian resources in the ground. 
Pathfinders were important in showing what could be done by 
Queensland firms, in developing the tentative Japanese 
interest, in convincing a sceptical government that exports 
to Japan could form the basis of Queensland's economic 
growth, and in inspiring other firms and individuals to 
follow suit. As Hielscher put it: 
They send the train off down the tracks 
with all the signals apparently green -
and then everyone else climbs aboard 
to join in the success journey they 
have started 
Timing, quality and technical superiority over competitors 
293 
were key factors encouraging the rapid growth of Queensland 
exports, and were largely the result of business 
initiatives. Timing was partly fortuitous as in the 
discovery of bauxite, and partly the result of a deliberate 
policy of positioning the industry or firm to take advantage 
of expected market growth. The sugar industry expansion of 
1963, initiated by the Sugar Board and CSR and supported by 
growers and millers, was undertaken to meet anticipated 
sales in the Japanese market. Utah came to Queensland as 
part of a strategy to use Australian resources and US 
capital to develop exports to the expanding Japanese steel 
industry. The grain-fed beef industry began in order to 
respond to increased consumption of quality beef in Japan as 
incomes rose and lifestyles began to alter and as part of a 
deliberate attempt to improve the reputation of the 
Australian product on the developing Japanese market. 
Agricultural success in particular hinged critically on 
innovation, increased productivity associated with larger 
farm size, improvements in breeding and management and the 
adoption of new technology, and on increasing attention to 
the establishment and maintenance of quality standards to 
meet Japan's demanding requirements. Many of these 
improvements depended on the initiative of rural 
entrepreneurs who pioneered innovative approaches to 
marketing and production problems. The development of 
feedlotting, changes in cutting and processing techniques, 
the invention of chilling technology and improvements in 
herd management were basic factors in the penetration of the 
Japanese beef market and represented decisions taken by many 
different producers and processors, supported by agencies of 
both State and Federal governments, especially the CSIRO. 
Innovation by sugar growers, millers and the CSR, backed by 
the authority of the Sugar Board, overcame problems of sugar 
quality by a total change in attitude and major 
modifications to methods of production, handling and 
processing. Investment by the industry in bulk handling 
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enabled the rapid movement of large quantities of sugar in 
response to sales opportunities and reduced the costs and 
delays in handling and shipping. The assistance provided by 
CSR to Japanese refiners in modernising their plants for 
bulk handling helped to establish a close relationship 
essential to the smoothing out of many of the problems which 
arose in the course of trade. 
The State recognised that the sections of business opening 
up trade with Japan were leading the way to economic growth, 
breaking through the established patterns of business and 
increasing the tempo of economic activity, and it accorded 
these sections a privileged position. Mining industry 
development was the most visible and remarkable sign of 
economic progress and its special requirements were met by a 
flexible approach to accepted practice and to the 
application of policies and legislation related to land 
leases, foreign ownership and the access to coal and mineral 
resources. Ministers and public officials nurtured the 
tentative Japanese interest in coal and bauxite, going to 
Japan, helping to sort out problems, being involved in the 
planning stages with Japanese importers and Australian 
suppliers, developing relationships with and an 
understanding of Japanese business interests. State 
officials were active in promoting a climate conducive to 
investment through understanding attitudes and visits with 
potential investors abroad, and in seeking the resolution of 
disputes in ways which attempted to ensure the continuation 
of trade and business growth. Branches of the State 
accepted some of the risks, costs and tasks of development, 
especially in the coordination and provision of urban and 
social infrastructure, electricity and water supply, and 
rail, road and port facilities which were essential 
prerequisites for financing, obtaining contracts and 
maintaining an export trade. Japan provided for Queensland 
business the market which it had tried unsuccessfully to 
find in the southern States and a replacement for markets 
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lost with the decline of British Commonwealth preference. 
For the government, the growth of Queensland-Japan trade 
stimulated the long-awaited development of the State, 
particularly the northern and eastern regions, and removed 
its "Cinderella" status within the Commonwealth. In a broad 
sense. State and business were partners, joint leaders in 
fostering trade growth and in making the political and 
economic adaptations necessary to stimulate and expand the 
relationship with Japan. 
However, neither Marxist approaches nor Lindblom's argument 
provide an adequate explanation for the diversity of 
interactions revealed in the case studies. Both are too 
restrictive in suggesting that the interests of capital or 
business are pervasive and ever-present determinants of 
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State action. If, however, we turn, as Galligan suggests, 
to a "state centred" perspective from which to view key 
decisions in the development of Queensland-Japan trade, we 
see that branches of the State and public officials had 
real, though limited, power to pursue the State's interests 
in autonomous ways not explained by Marxist theories or by 
the concept of the duality of leadership, and exhibiting 
greater complexity than a simple classification such as 
"developmentalist" would suggest. State interests included 
those traditionally important in Queensland history 
decentralised economic growth, encouragement of rural 
industries, enhancement of Queensland's status within the 
federation, and independence from domination by southern 
commercial and financial interests. These were complemented 
by regional objectives such as the establishment of 
Gladstone as the major port of Central Queensland and 
overlaid from time to time by other goals such as the 
development of secondary industry, the establishment of the 
credentials of the Coalition government, and, as Queensland 
industries trading with Japan became increasingly successful 
in providing a springboard to economic growth, the desire 
for the expansion of the relationship as an end in itself. 
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All of these factors impinged on the nature of the key 
political decisions associated with the development of 
industries exporting to Japan and the management of the 
trading relationship. 
The limits of State action were established and the 
characteristics of State-business relations influenced by 
the federal nature of the Australian state. The financial 
dependence of the State on the Commonwealth limited 
Queensland's ability to be entrepreneurial in providing 
public investment as risk capital. The Constitutional 
division of responsibilities placed the negotiation of the 
bilateral and multilateral arrangements, and the settlement 
of international disputes, regardless of their relevance to 
State development, firmly in the hands of the Commonwealth, 
except where the State's partnership in the sugar industry 
gave its representatives an accepted position as active 
participants in negotiating delegations. Control over 
exports and foreign investment was also vested in the 
Commonwealth, although it was rarely exercised with respect 
to mining or foreign capital inflow until the Whitlam 
Government came to power in 1972. After that time, the 
multiple points of access to the political agenda afforded 
by the federal system enhanced the power of interests such 
as conservationists opposed to "developmentalism" and 
allowed concerns in other States and within the national 
community about such matters as foreign investment and the 
pricing of mineral exports to be reflected in Commonwealth 
policies , setting a limit on the ability of Queensland in 
the long term to promote its interests over those of the 
wider community as interpreted by the Commonwealth. 
Within these limitations, branches of the State, Ministers 
and public officials were able to pursue what they saw as 
Queensland's interests and make choices which had a 
significant impact the process of change, the direction of 
industry development and the pace and pattern of trade. 
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Much depended on the character of the responsible 
individuals and the influence they were able to exert. 
Entrepreneurial Ministers such as Evans were active in 
exploring the possibilities for development and exports, in 
working with local and Japanese businessmen and officials, 
and in persuading more conservative and hesitant Cabinet 
colleagues to take risks and seize the emerging 
opportunities for trade. Pragmatists such as Hiley and 
Sewell refused to allow budgetary constraints to cause 
Queensland to lose the bauxite/alumina project to Western 
Australia, while innovative financial planners such as 
Chalk and Hielscher turned a potential fiscal crisis caused 
by the heavy demands for infrastructure into a distinctively 
Queensland method of earning long-term profits to finance 
government priorities elsewhere in the community and 
acquiring significant capital assets at minimal risk. The 
dominant and aggressively pro-Queensland character of 
Premier Bjelke-Petersen contributed to the bitterness of the 
sugar dispute and made it difficult to reach an amicable 
solution which would leave both sides committed to 
arrangements for long-term security of the trade. 
Key decisions examined in the case studies show many 
examples of State actions which can be explained only from a 
state-centred perspective. The persistence with the 
Brigalow scheme in the face of financial difficulties and 
rural opposition and the decision to allow the expansion of 
the sugar industry in 1963 despite severe reservations about 
market volatility was part of a vision for the State's 
future and a determination to achieve economic growth. So, 
too, was the incorporation into legislation of the 
requirement for downstream processing of Weipa bauxite which 
extended the decision of developmental nationalists such as 
Mawby to develop Australia's resources to a commitment to 
development within Queensland. In the coal industry, the 
initial refusal of Thiess' and Utah's Franchise 
applications, the bias towards a proliferation of mines, the 
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method chosen for infrastructure financing, and the 
provisions for the reservation of steaming coal all indicate 
that State interests were important considerations even when 
Government was most anxious to encourage development 
projects. The State was responsive to the needs of 
business, but not subservient to it. Public officials could 
exercise their discretion as to whether, to what extent and 
in what way the State would contribute to the needs of a 
particular industry or project. 
Within the broad framework of partnership, the precise 
nature of State-business interactions was heavily influenced 
by the structures and traditions of the industry concerned, 
and by the issues and problems which arose in the 
development of its trade. The beef and sugar industries are 
two quite different examples. In the beef industry, the 
State was supportive, but the location of the industry 
throughout Australia, the mix of products produced on farms, 
and the diversity of markets reduced the importance of a 
single State in influencing the direction of industry 
growth. In addition, the most significant issues in the 
Queensland-Japan beef trade related to bilateral and 
multilateral policies and were thus the preserve of the 
Commonwealth. The reliance on promotion by the Australian 
Meat Board, the limited functions of the Queensland Meat 
Industry Authority and the need for national policies on 
matters such as grading and disease control reinforced the 
supportive, but somewhat distant relationship between the 
beef industry and the State. 
In the sugar industry, on the other hand, the official 
partnership of the State was established in complementary 
State-Federal legislation, and no major decisions could be 
taken within State approval and involvement. The 
administration of the industry was delegated to the Sugar 
Board which shared power with officially recognised and 
functionally defined associations of millers and growers. 
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These were more than merely advisory bodies, in both theory 
and practice, since they were required to produce consensus 
views on major issues such as expansion for the Japanese 
market and had power to make decisions binding on members. 
The Associations and the Board were the vehicles for close 
two-way communication between government and industry, 
reinforced at personal level by the presence in Cabinet and 
government of members with a history of active participation 
in the industry and by the movement of politicians such as 
Mines Minister Camm, and before him Premier Forgan Smith, to 
the Chairmanship of the Sugar Cane Prices Board. This 
resulted in a shared commitment to collectively-derived 
decisions and contributed to the fierce defence of the 
industry by the government in the long-term contract dispute 
with Japan. 
The varying needs, structures and traditions of the 
different industries involved in trade with Japan led to a 
mix of formal and informal relationships between business 
and State, the interweaving of close, consultative decision-
making, and more distant, general support. Each of the four 
industries demonstrated its own pattern of State-business 
interaction, varying over time, as priorities altered and 
business confronted the ever-changing realities of the 
international marketplace. 
The case studies of the thesis suggest that both State and 
business made particular and positive contributions to the 
collaborative effort and it was this collaboration which 
fostered the growth of the Queensland-Japan relationship. 
Queensland as a regional State was active as a supporter, 
facilitator and co-ordinator, sometimes as an initiator, and 
most particularly in creating a climate conducive to 
business and to the overcoming of obstacles to the growth of 
trade. The essential dynamic of the process came from 
business itself, especially from the entrepreneurial 
individuals and companies who identified opportunities, took 
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risks and organised resources and production, paving the way 
for others to follow. No one specific role adequately 
describes the functions performed by the State in the 
development of the relationship - it fulfilled a number of 
roles which were different in each of the industries 
reviewed. What was common to all four industries was that 
the collaboration of State and business served to 
concentrate the efforts of the separate parties so that they 
were able to turn the opportunities presented by 
international changes into the reality of an expanded trade 
relationship with Japan. 
In summary, Queensland as a small regional State was unable 
to shape the forces which underlay trade opportunities such 
as those in the Japanese market. It was, however, able to 
collaborate with private enterprise in enhancing the State's 
natural advantages, to influence the nature of private 
enterprise response to trade opportunities, to pursue its 
own goals of regional development, and to capture for the 
State substantial benefits from the growth of trade. The 
key decisions in the growth of Queensland-Japan trade 
indicate that the Queensland approach to the issues of trade 
development involved an intricate and complex pattern of 
interactions in which the State pursued its own interests 
within the limitations of the federal system and the 
opportunities determined by international factors. The 
State assumed not just a single role, but a series of roles 
along a continuum from close official partnership, through 
partial cooperation, to general supportiveness of the 
entrepreneurial efforts of private enterprise. The common 
element in all these roles was the way in which the combined 
efforts of State and business made possible and gave shape 
to the development of Queensland-Japan trade and 
distinguished the tentative steps of the prewar period from 
the successes of the years which followed World War II. 
301 
ENDNOTES 
NOTES FOR INTRODUCTION 
1. Throughout this thesis, "state" is used to indicate the 
concept of the state, while "State" refers to a particular 
regional entity. 
2. For a detailed account of the resumption of Australian 
trade with Japan see A. Rix, Coming to Terms: The Politics of 
Australia's Trade with Japan 1945-57 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 
1986) . 
3. Courier-Mail 27 September 1946, p.2. 
4. For example, the statement by Mr. G.E. Humphreys, Secretary 
of the Selectors' Association and Queensland representative on 
the Australian Wool Board, quoted in Courier Mail 21 November 
1947, p.5. 
5. Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics Overseas 
Trading, various years. 
6. Australian Bureau of Statistics (Queensland) Statistics of 
Queensland 1964-65. 
7. Australian Bureau of Statistics (Queensland) Trade with 
Selected Asian Countries 1980-82; Question and Answer. 
8. K. Tsokhas, A Class Apart: Businessmen and Australian 
Politics 1960-1980 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
9. C.E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books, 
1977) . 
10. See, for example, W. Grant, The Political Economv of 
CorporatisTTi (London: Macmillan, 1985) ; A. Cawson, Corporatism 
and Political Theory.rOxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986); M. 
Castells and R.Scase, (eds) The State in Western Europe 
(London: Croom Helm, 1974); B. Galligan, Australian State 
Politics (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1986). 
11. See, for example, R. Simeon, Federal-provincial Diplomacy: 
The Making of Recent Policy in Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1973); D.V. Smiley, Canada in Question: 
Federalism in the 70s (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 
1972). 
302 
•^2, See, for example, K. Sheridan (ed.) The State as 
npveloper: Public Enterprise in South Australia (Adelaide: 
Royal Australian Institute of Public Administration, 1986); 
E.J.Harman and B.W.Head, (eds) State. Capital and Resources in 
the North and West of Australia (Perth: University of Western 
Australia, 1982); B. Galligan (ed.), Australian State Politics 
(Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1986). 
13. Courier-Mail 6 January 1949, p.l; 28 January 1949, p.l;27 
January 1949, p. 3; 22 July 1949, p.l. 
14. See, for example, J.E. Meade, Japan and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade The Joseph Fisher Lecture in 
Commerce, Adelaide, 8 August 1956.(Adelaide: Griffin Press, 
1956); W.McMahon Ball, Australia and Japan: Documents and 
Readings in Australian History (Melbourne: Nelson, 1969) ; 
J.G.Crawford, Australian Trade Policy 1942-1966 (Canberra: 
Australian National University Press, 1968) ; P. Drysdale, 
"Australia and Japan in the Pacific and World Economy" in P. 
Drysdale and H. Kitaoji, Japan and Australia: Two Societies 
and their interaction (Canberra: ANU Press, 1981), pp.418-438. 
15. E.J. Harman and B.W. Head, (eds) State. Capital and 
Resources in the North and West of Australia pp.58-9. 
16. R. Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland from 1915 to the 
1980s (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1985); M.B. 
Cribb, "Queensland Politics" Current Affairs Bulletin vol.58, 
no.5, 1981, pp.22-32. 
303 
NOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE 
1. G.J. Crough and E.L.Wheelwright, Australia: A Client State 
(Melbourne: Penguin, 1982). 
2. R. Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: 
Quartet, 1973), pp.46-50. 
3. J. Zysman, Governments. Markets and Growth: Financial 
Systems and the Policies of Industrial Change (Ithaca & 
London: Cornell University Press,1983), p.12. 
4. P. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial 
Policy in Europe (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1985) . 
5. C. Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books, 
1977), p.165. 
6. S. Encel, "The Concept of the State in Australian Politics" 
Australian Journal of Politics and History vol.6, 1960, pp.72-
3. 
7. See, for example, C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1956). 
8. C. Lindblom, Politics and Markets. 
9. N. Poulantzas, Classes and Contemporary Capitalism (London: 
New Left Books, 1975). 
10. R. Miliband, The State in Capitalist Societv. 
11. K. Tsokhas, A Class Apart: Businessmen and Australian 
Politics 1960-1980 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
12. J. O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St 
Martin's Press, 1973). 
13. J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Cheshire, 1975), 
pp.21, 34, and B. Galligan, "The State in Australian Political 
Thought", Politics vol.19, no.2, 1984, p.89. 
14. P.c. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism" in 
P.C.Schmitter and G. Lembruch, Patterns of Corporatist Policy 
Making (London: Sage, 1982), pp.7-52. 
15. p.c. Schmitter, "Reflections on where the Theory of 
Neocorporatism has been and where the Praxis of Neocorporatism 
may be going", in G.Lembruch and P.C.Schmitter,(eds) Patterns 
of Corporatist Policv Making (London: Sage, 1982), p.260. 
304 
16. P. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets p.32. 
17. J. Zysman, Governments. Markets and Growth p.299. 
18. G. Shepherd, F. Duchene, C. Saunders, Europe's Industries. 
Public and Private Strategies for Change (London: Francis 
Pinter, 1983), p.17. 
19. A. Cawson, Corporatism and Political Theory (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986), p.39. 
20. W. Grant (ed.). The Political Economy of Corporatism 
(London: Macmillan, 1985), p.177. 
21. K.C. Wheare, Federal Government (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1963), pp.32-3. 
22. R.L. Matthews, "Innovations and Developments in Australian 
Federalism" Publius vol.7. No.3, Summer 1977, p.23. 
23. B. Galligan, "Writing on Australian Federalism, the 
Current State of the Art" Australian Journal of Politics and 
History vol.43, no.2, June 1984, p.156. 
24. K. Wiltshire, "Setting State Priorities: The Role of the 
States in Public Policy" in R. Matthews (ed.). Making 
Federalism Work: Towards a more Efficient. Equitable and 
Responsive Federal System (Canberra: Centre for Research on 
Federal Financial Relations, ANU, 1976), p.101. 
25. S.R. Davis, The Federal Principle (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1978), p.148. 
26. K. Wiltshire, Tenterfield Revisited: Reforming Australia's 
System of Government for 2001. Inaugural lecture delivered at 
the University of Queensland 29 October 1990. (St. Lucia: 
University of Queensland Press, 1991), p.14. 
27. M. Painter, "Australian Federalism and the Policy Process: 
Politics with Extra Vitamins" Politics vol.23, no.2, November 
1988, pp.59-60. 
28. K. Wiltshire, Tenterfield Revisited p.15. 
29. M. Painter, "Australian Federalism" p.59. 
30. See, for example, J. Holmes and C. Sharman, The Australian 
Federal System (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1977). 
31. M. Painter, "Australian Federalism" p.60. 
32. G. Sawer, Modern Federalism (Carlton Vic: Pitman,1976), 
p.l. 
33. C.J. Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory and 
fEactice (London:Pall Mall, 1978), p.7. 
305 
34. B. Manning, "The Congress, The Executive and Intermestic 
Affairs: Three Proposals" Foreign Affairs vol.52, no. 2, 
January 1977, pp.306-24. 
35. K. Wiltshire, Tenterfield Revisited p.44. 
36. Constitutional Commission, Trade and Economic Management 
Subcommittee, Report (Canberra: AGPS, 1988). 
37. K. Wiltshire, "Setting State Priorities", p.105. 
38. B. Galligan (ed.), Australian State Politics (Melbourne: 
Longman Cheshire, 1986), p.245. 
39. B. Galligan, Australian State Politics p.8. 
40. H.J. Laski, "The Obsolescence of Federalism" New Republic. 
3 May, 1939, pp.367-369. 
41. G. Greenwood, The Future of Australian Federalism 2nd ed. 
(St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1976). 
42. G. Stevenson, Mineral Resources and Australian Federalism 
(Canberra: Centre for Federal Financial Relations, ANU, 1977). 
43. G.J. Crough and E.L. Wheelwright, Australia: A Client 
State. 
44. A. Patience and J. Scott, (eds) Australian Federalism: 
Future Tense (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1983). 
45. W.K. Hancock, Australia (London: E.Benn, 1930). 
46. F.W. Eggleston, State Socialism in Victoria (London: King, 
1932) . 
47. W. Hancock, Australia p.55. 
48. W. Hancock, Australia p.32. 
49. R.W. Connell and T.H. Irving, Class Structure in 
Australian Societv (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire,1980). 
50. G.J. Crough and E.L. Wheelwright, Australia: A Client 
State. 
51. K. Tsokhas, A Class Apart. 
52. K. Tsokhas, Beyond Dependence; Companies. Labour Processes 
and Australian Mining (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
1989) . 
53. K. Tsokhas, A Class Apart p.xiv. 
54. B.Galligan, Australian State Politics p.255-6. 
306 
55. For example: P. Loveday, "Corporatist Trends in Australia" 
Politics vol.19, no.l. May 1984, pp.46-51 ; L. Glezer, Tariff 
Pnlitics: Australian Policy-making 1960-1980 (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1982). 
56. R. Gerritsen, "The Necessity of Corporatism: The Case of 
the Hawke Labor Government" Politics vol.21, no.l. May 198 6, 
pp.45-62. 
57. K. Sheridan, The State as Developer: Public Enterprise in 
South Australia (Adelaide: Royal Australian Institute of 
Public Administration, 1986), p.224. 
58. B.W. Head, "The State as an Entrepreneur: Myth and 
Reality" in E.J. Harman and B.W. Head, (eds) State. Capital 
and Resources in the North and West of Australia (Perth: 
University of Western Australia, 1982), pp.43-69. 
59. C.A. Hughes in J. Rorke (ed.). Politics at State Level -
Australia (Sydney: University of Sydney Press, 1970), p.44. 
60. M.B. Cribb, "The Political Impact of the Games" Australian 
Studies Seminar, The 1982 Commonwealth Games: A Retrospect 
Australian Studies Centre, University of Queensland, 1984, 
pp.50-1. The commitment to development, and the four elements 
of the development ethos are also basic to Fitzgerald's 
analysis of Queensland history in R. Fitzgerald, A History of 
Queensland. 
61. QPD. vol.162, 1932, p.1731. 
62. H.C. Coombs, Trial Balance: Issues of My Working Life 
(South Melbourne: Sun Books, 1983), p.59. 
63. J. Brigden, "Economic Planning", Brisbane, 1933 No.4. A 
series of 6 talks. Held in Fryer Library. 
64. K.W. Wiltshire, "Manufacturing", in D.J. Murphy, R.B. 
Joyce, and C.A. Hughes, (eds) Labor in Power: The Labor Party 
and Governments in Queensland 1915-1957 (St. Lucia: University 
of Queensland Press, 1980), p.19. 
65. R. Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland pp.390-91. 
66. p. Blazey and A. Campbell, The Political Dice Men 
(Fitzroy: Outback Press,1974), pp.190-191. 
67. J. Bjelke-Petersen, Maiden speech, QPD vol.190, 1947-48, 
p. 128. 
68. R. Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland pp.158 n.60, 294-5. 
69. Economist Intelligence Unit, Economic Development Survey 
of the State of Queensland with particular reference to the 
Prospects for Secondary Industry (Brisbane: Queensland 
Government Printer, 1961) . 
307 
70. F. Nicklin, "The Economic and Political History of 
Queensland from 1859-1964". Mimeo. Held in Oxley Library, 
p. 15. 
71. Sir.G. Chalk, National-Liberal party Policy Speech Part 2, 
14 November,1974, p.4. 
72. F. Nicklin, "The Economic and Political History of 
Queensland from 1859-1964". p.15. 
73. A. Dewar, Address to Australian Institute of Management 
Conference "The Enigma of Queensland's Potential", Brisbane, 
14-16 March 1966, p.l. Held in Oxley Library. 
74. QPD vol.238, August 1964, Governor's Opening Speech, 
p.2. 
75. Economist Intelligence Unit, Economic Development p.70. 
76. F. Nicklin, "Economic and Political History", p.l. 
77. C. Lindblom, Politics and Markets p.173. 
78. QSA A/8335. Mines Department. Correspondence during 1959, 
1960 and 1961 relates to inquiries from Japanese firms such as 
Nissho Iwai, Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha and Marubeni lida 
concerning the availability of copper from gougers in the 
Cloncurry area. The Ore Producers' Association at Cloncurry, 
together with Mr. R. Katter, later the local M.H.R. , tried 
unsuccessfully to obtain assistance and concessions to make it 
economically viable to combine the output of separate gougers 
for sale in Japan. 
79. Harman makes this observation with respect to West 
Australia's pattern of development in E.J. Harman and B.W. 
Head, State. Capital and Resources in the North and West of 
Australia (Perth: University of Western Australia, 1982), 
p.173. 
80. A summary of the dispute between the Queensland government 
and the mining companies may be found in R. Fitzgerald, 
History of Queensland pp.3 63-4, and a more detailed account 
traced through the Courier-Mail 1964-6. 
81. R. Scott, P. Coaldrake, B. Head and P. Reynolds, 
"Queensland" in B.Galligan (ed.), Australian State Politics 
p.64. 
82. R.H. Greenwood, Comments at the Australian Institute of 
Management Conference "The Enigma of Queensland's Potential", 
Brisbane, 14-16 March 1966, p.3. Held in John Oxley Library. 
83. M. Hinchliff, Comments on paper by Prof. R. Gates at 
Australian Institute of Management Conference "The Enigma of 
Queensland's Potential", p.5. 
308 
84. K.W. Knight, "Edward Michael Hanlon - City Bushman,"in 
D.J.Murphy and R.B.Joyce, (eds) Queensland Political Portraits 
1R59-1952 (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1973), 
p.452. 
85. S. Harris, "State and federal objectives and policies for 
the use and development of mineral resources" in P. Drysdale 
and H. Shibata,(eds) Federalism and Resource Development: the 
Australian case (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985), pp.67-89). 
86. A.J. Campbell, "Memoirs of the Country Party in Queensland 
1920-1974". Mimeo, 1975. Held in John Oxley Library. 
87. P. Drysdale & K. Kojima Australia-Japan relations in the 
international context: recent experience and the prospects 
ahead (Canberra & Tokyo: Australia-Japan Economic Relations 
Research Project, A.N.U., 1978), p.9. 
88. J.G. Crawford and S. Okita.Australia,Japan and Western 
Pacific Economic Relations, a report presented to the 
Governments of Australia and Japan (Canberra: AGPS, 1976), 
p. 15. 
89. R.B. McKern, An Overview of Foreign Participation in the 
Australian Minerals Industry Australia-Japan Economic 
Relations Research Project, paper No.33 (Canberra: ANU, 1975). 
90. R. Stuart, "Resources Development Policy: The Case of 
Queensland's Export Coal Industry" in A. Patience (ed.). The 
Bjelke-Petersen Premiership 1968-1983: Issues in Public Policy 
(Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1985), p.67. 
91. A. Patience, "State Politics in Australia: Queensland and 
the Emerging Crisis in Australian Federalism", in A. Patience 
(ed.). The Bjelke-Petersen Premiership p.67. 
92. QPD vol.190, Air Navigation Amendment Bill, December 1947. 
93. QPD vol.190, October 1947, p.289. 
94. F. Mines, Gair (Canberra:Arrow Press, 1975), p.27. 
95. A. Campbell, "Memoirs", p.42. 
96. P. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets. 
97. K. Hancock, Australia, referred to in B. Galligan, 
Australian State Politics, p.249. 
309 
NOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO 
1. A. Rix, Coming To Terms: The Politics of Australia's Trade 
with Japan 1945-57 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p.19. 
2. W.K. Hancock, Australia (London: E.Benn, 1930). 
3. R. Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland from 1915 to the 
1980s (St.Lucia: University of Queensland Press,1984). 
4. R. Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland p.7. 
5. Statistics relating to Australia's trade with Japan are 
based on Statistics of Queensland and Queensland Year Book. 
6. A.C.V. Melbourne, "Queensland's Interest in Eastern Trade: 
Position and Prospects" Courier Mail 2 January 1934, p.l. 
7. QSA AGS N/57. Papers Relating to Memorandum of Agreement 
with Mr. F. Jones, Government Commercial Agent in the East, 
1904. Aplin Brown and Crawshaw Ltd. to Under-Secretary Dept. 
of Agriculture, 9 October 1905. 
8. QSA AGS/N57. Memorandum of Agreement with Mr.F.Jones, 
Government Commercial Agent in the East 1904. 
9. QSA AGS N/57. Geo. Hiron and Sons to Under-Secretary Dept. 
of Agriculture, 8 April 1904. 
10. QSA AGS N/58. Queensland Trade Commissioner to the Far 
East: Papers Relating to an Agreement with Mr. F. Jones. 
Merrimac Milk Co. to Under-Secretary Dept. of Agriculture, 21 
April 1904. 
11. QSA AGS N/58. Queensland Meat and Agency Co. to Under-
Secretary Dept. of Agriculture, 19 April 1904. 
12. QSA AGS N/57. Walkers Ltd. to Under-Secretary Dept. of 
Agriculture, 13 April 1904. 
13. QSA AGS/N57. C.S.R.Co.,Ltd. to Under-Secretary Dept. of 
Agriculture, 18 April 1904. 
14. QSA AGS N/57. R.W.Thurlow & Co. to Under-Secretary Dept. 
of Agriculture, 8 April 1904. 
15. QSA AGS N/58. G.S.Lambert to Under-Secretary Dept. of 
Agriculture, 19 April 1904. 
16. QSA AGS N/58. Dominion Milling to Under-Secretary Dept. of 
Agriculture, 27 January 1906. 
310 
17. QSA AGS N/58. New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Agency Co. 
Ltd. to Under-Secretary Dept. of Agriculture, 25 January 1906. 
18. QSA AGS N/58. Davey Halliday Co.,Ltd. (boot and shoe 
manufacturers) to Under-Secretary Dept. of Agriculture, 27 
January 1906. 
19. QSA AGS N/58. Geo. Hiron and Sons to Under-Secretary Dept. 
of Agriculture, 27 January 19 06 and note by Fred. Jones 
attached thereto. 
20. Correspondence and reports relating to the activities of 
Mr. F. Jones are contained in QSA AGS/N57 and N/58 on which 
material in this paragraph and the next are based. 
21. QSA AGS N/58. F.Jones to Under-Secretary Dept. of 
Agriculture, 3 July 19 05. 
22. QSA AGS N/58. Under-Secretary Dept. of Agriculture to 
F.Jones, 10 August 1905. 
23. J.D. Story had been Acting Under-Secretary, Department 
of Public Instruction, 1904. He became Public Service 
Commissioner in 1920, retaining this position until 1939. He 
was appointed Chairman of the Council of Agriculture in 1922, 
and member of the Bureau of Industry in 1935. From 1938-1960 
he was Vice-chancellor of the University of Queensland. 
24. UQA Senate Minutes, Correspondence Reports - 1931,1932: 30 
October, 1931. 
25. M. Thomis, A Place of Light and Learning: The University 
of Queensland's First Seventy-five Years (St. Lucia: 
University of Queensland Press,1985), p.6. 
26. QPD vol.162, 27 October 1932, p.1194. 
27. D. Fraser, "J.D. Story: His Contribution to Public Service 
Administration", in K. Wiltshire (ed.). Administrative History 
pp.3-12. 
28. c. Clark, "The Bureau of Industry", in K.W.Wiltshire 
(ed.). Administrative History in Queensland (Royal Australian 
Institute of Public Administration, Queensland Division, 
Monograph No.8, 1986), p.20. Clark asserts that the other 
members of this group were the Commissioners for Railways, 
Police, Main Roads, and Taxation and the Directors of Health, 
Education, and the Bureau of Industry. 
29. W.K. Hancock, Australia. 
30. R. Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland. 
31. UQA S2 Senate Minutes, Correspondence Reports - 1931,1932: 
30 October 1931. 
311 
32. A.C.V. Melbourne, Report on Australian Intercourse with 
.Tapan and China (Brisbane, 1932) . 
33. A.C.V. Melbourne, Report pp.58-59. 
34. Fryer Library. A.C.V. Melbourne's Papers 3/CD 1-346 Box 3 
Correspondence. Melbourne to Stewart, 9 May 193 3 and 2 
November 193 3. 
35. A.C.V. Melbourne, Report p.58. 
36. A.C.V. Melbourne, Report pp.58-59. 
37. Fryer Library. Sir Leslie Wilson's Papers MSS 36/C2. 
Wilson to His Majesty the King, 26 August 1933. 
38. Archival sources throw little light on how and why Sir 
Leslie became committed to the importance of Eastern trade. 
His view may have originated in his previous post (1923-28) as 
Governor of Bombay where he was active in trying to resolve 
the problems of the textile industry, partly the result of 
Japanese competition. 
39. Fryer Library. MSS 36/C2. Wilson to His Majesty the 
King, 5 August 1932. 
40. Fryer Library. MSS 36/C2. Wilson to Sir Isaac Isaacs, 12 
September 1932. 
41. Fryer Library. MSS 36/C2. Wilson to His Majesty the King, 
5 August 1932. 
42. K. Wiltshire (ed.). Administrative History p.18. 
43. Fryer Library. MSS 36/C2. Wilson to His Majesty the King, 
26 August 193 3. 
44. "Bureau Policy and Unemployment", Economic News vol.2, 
no.7, July 1933, p.l. 
45. QPD vol.CLXII, 1932, p.1624. 
46. K. Wiltshire (ed.). Administrative History. 
47. Fryer Library. A.C.V.Melbourne's Papers 3/CA/1-35. Brigden 
to Sir Leslie Wilson, 10 November 1933. 
48. Economic News vol.5, no.11, November 1936, p.l. 
49. Fryer Library. Melbourne's Papers 3/CA/1-3 5. Brigden to 
Sir Leslie Wilson, 10 November 1933. 
50- Journal of Commerce vol.16, no.12, May 1935, p.14. 
51. Fryer Library. MSS 36/C2. Wilson to His Majesty the King, 
5 August 1932. 
312 
52. A.C.V. Melbourne, Report. 
53. Fryer Library. MSS 36/C2. Wilson to Wigram (Private 
Secretary to the King), 6 April 1932. 
54. Fryer Library. MSS 36/C2. Wilson to His Majesty the King, 
5 August 1932. 
55. Fryer Library. Melbourne's Papers 3/CD/157. Melbourne to 
Earle Page, "Comments on the Proposals to appoint Trade 
Commissioners" 23 January 1935. 
56. W.R. Purcell, The Nature and Extent of Japanese Commercial 
and Economic Interests in Australia, 1932-1941. Australia-
Japan Economic Relations Research Project, Research paper 
No.53 (Canberra: ANU, 1978),pp.17,28. 
57. Fryer Library. 3/CD/157. Melbourne to Earle Page "Comments 
on the Proposal to appoint Trade Commissioners", 23 January 
1935. 
58. A.C.V. Melbourne, Courier-Mail 2 January 1934. 
59. Journal of Commerce vol.16, no.5,October 1934, p.14. 
60. Cable from Japanese Consul-General in Sydney to Japanese 
Foreign Ministry, 4 February 1935 quoted in D.C.S.Sissons, 
"Private Diplomacy in the 1936 Trade Dispute with Japan", 
Australian Journal of Politics and History vol.27 No.2, 1981, 
pp.143-159. 
61. Journal of Commerce vol.16, no.2, July 1934. 
62. Courier-Mail 11 March 1935, p.11. 
63. Courier-Mail 30 January 1936, p.10. 
64. Courier-Mail 11 March 1935, p.11. 
65. Courier-Mail 11 April 1935, p.11. 
66. Journal of Commerce vol.17, no.l,June 1935. 
67. UQA SBO IML Establishment. Registrar "Joint Sub-Committee 
of the Faculties" 20 April 1934. 
68. UQA SBO Courses - Asian Studies(1) 22 October 1936. 
69. UQA SBO Courses - Asian Studies(1). Premier - Notes for 
Press Statement February 1937. 
70. UQA SBS Seita R. 
71. UQA SBO Courses - Asian S tudies (2 ) . R e g i s t r a r t o ANU 13 
October 1949. 
313 
72. Queensland Cotton Board, Annual Report 1934. 
73. Courier-Mail 10 August 1933. 
74. murier-Mail 6 October 1933 and 24 December 1933. 
75. The Cotton Grower 31 July 1935. 
76. Queensland Cotton Board, Annual Report. 1934. 
77. Telegraph - Financial Supplement 20 January 1936. 
78. Courier-Mail 23 May 1936, p.15. 
79. Courier-Mail 23 May 1936, p.15. 
80. D.C.S. Sissons, "Manchester v.Japan: The Imperial 
Background to the Australian Trade Dispute with Japan, 1936." 
Australian Outlook December 1976, pp.480-502. 
81. K. Tsokhas, The Wool Industry and the 1936 Trade diversion 
dispute Between Australia and Japan (Canberra: ANU, 1988), 
p.20. 
82. K. Tsokhas, The Wool Industry and the 1936 Trade Diversion 
Dispute p.21. 
83. CPD House of Representatives, vol.97, September 1936, 
p.92. 
84. See, for example, Sissons, "Manchester v.Japan", pp.495-
499 and R. Duncan, "Imperial Preference: The Case of 
Australian Beef in the 1930's". Economic Record vol.39, 1963. 
85. Fryer Library. A.C.V. Melbourne's papers 3/Al. "Australia 
and Japan", unpublished manuscript, Ch.III, p.3. 
86. QSA PRE/82 Premier and Chief Secretary's Department. 
Under-Secretary of the Department to Geo. H. Bryant, 21 May 
1920. 
87. Courier-Mail 26 March 1936, p.17. 
88. Courier-Mail 19 May 1936, p.7 and 6 June 1936, p.15. 
89. Courier-Mail 26 June 1936, p.14. 
90. K. Tsokhas, Markets, Money and Empire: The Political 
Economy of the Australian Wool Industry (Carlton Vic: 
Melbourne University Press, 1990), p.109. 
91. John Oxley Library. Graziers' Association of Central and 
Northern Queensland. Minute Book. OM.AD/5/5. 
314 
92. John Oxley Library. Graziers' Association of Central and 
Northern Queensland OM.AD/5/5. Executive Sub-Committee 13 July 
1936, p.559. 
93. R.F. Boyer, letter, Courier-Mail 6 July 1936, p.10. 
94. "Trade and Empire Security" Courier-Mail 1 June 1936, 
p.12. 
"New Trade Policy is Defensive" Courier-Mail 6 June 1936, 
p. 12. 
"The Onward March of Japan" Courier-Mail 18 June 193 6, 
p. 12. 
95. Courier-Mail 29 December 1936, p.4. 
96. Courier-Mail 9 July 1936, p.15. 
97. Courier-Mail 1 December 1936. 
98. D.B. Copland and D.V. James, Australian Trade Policv 
(Sydney: Angus & Robertson,1937), p.320. 
99. Earle Page, Address at the 75th Annual Dinner of the 
Chamber of Commerce, Journal of Commerce vol.17, no.2, July 
1935, p.22. 
100. For a full account of the growth of Japanese numbers in 
the pearling industry see M.A. Bain, Full Fathom Five (Perth: 
Artlook Books, 1982) . 
101. Courier-Mail 4 February 1937, p.12. 
102. See M.A. Bain, Full Fathom Five p.134. "Dummying" 
referred to the situation where a Japanese entered into 
partnership with a European vessel owner in order to obtain a 
fishing licence in the European's name. 
103. M.A. Bain, Full Fathom Five p.207. 
104. Royal Commission into the Working of the Pearl Shell and 
beche de mer Industries of Queensland, Report and Minutes of 
Proceedings and Evidence. Evidence of D. Thompson, p.251. 
quoted in M.A. Bain, Full Fathom Five p.202. 
105. M.A. Bain. Full Fathom Five p.103. 
106. Northern Australia Development Committee, Pearl Shell. 
Beche-de-Mer and Trochus Industries of Northern Australia 
(Maribyrnong, 1946), p.200-1. 
107. QSA HOM J85. Department of Health and Home Affairs. 
M12/5292. 
108. Journal of Commerce vol.16, no.12, May 1936, p.3. 
109. QSA A/44700. Police Department - Commissioner's Office. 
315 
110. Courier-Mail 20 June 1936. 
111. H.P. Frei, Japan's Southward Advance and Australia: from 
the 16th century to World War II (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press,1990), p.152. 
112. This is discussed in detail in H.P. Frei, Japan' s 
Southward Advance. 
113. H.P. Frei, Japan's Southward Advance pp.150-51. 
114. H.P. Frei, Japan's Southward Advance 
115. W. Purcell, The Nature and Extent of Japanese Commercial 
and Economic Interests p.11. 
116. A. Rix, Coming To Terms p.23. 
117. External Affairs Department, "Japanese Investment and 
Enterprise in the South Seas", Japan 1935-41, A.A. CRS A951, 
quoted in Purcell, The Nature and Extent of Japanese 
Commercial and Economic Interests p.33. 
118. W. Purcell, The Nature and Extent of Japanese Commercial 
and Economic Interests p.34. 
119. W. Purcell, The Nature and Extent of Japanese Commercial 
and Economic Interests pp.3 5-37. 
120. Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates vol.97, 9 
September 1936, p.502 and 30 September 1936, p.915. 
121. CPD House of Representatives, vol.154, 31 August 1937, 
p.288. 
122. Commonwealth of Australia, Report by Dr. W.G.Woolnough. 
Commonwealth Geological Advisor on Technical Aspects of the 
Iron Ore Reserves of Australia, April 1938 (Canberra: 
Government Printer, 1939), p. 2. 
123. H.P. Frei, Japan's Southward Advance p.152. 
124. A. Rix, Coming To Terms p.23. 
125. Prime Minister's Department, Forgan Smith to Page, 2 2 
July 1937, A.A. 981, Australia 90, quoted in W.Purcell, The 
Nature and Extent of Japanese Commercial and Economic 
Interests p.39. 
126. QGMJ vol 38, no.449, October 1937, p.349. 
127. J.K. Ewers, "Yampi Sound and Its Iron", Walkabout vol.6, 
no.6, 1940, pp.12-14. 
316 
128. QSA TRE A/13838. Police Department - Commissioner's 
Office. Letter No. 2923. Police Commissioner to Minister for 
Health and Home Affairs, 19 May 1936. 
129. Smith's Weekly 3 April 1941, p.l. 
130. Fryer Library. Melbourne's Papers 3/CD/157. Melbourne to 
Earle Page, 23 January 1935. 
131. QSA TRE A/13838. Treasury Correspondence. Treasury memo 
to Treasurer 25 February 1948. See also Bowden Pearling to 
A/Shipping Master Thursday Island, 16 March and 1 June 1948. 
132. These issues are examined at length in A. Rix, Coming To 
Terms. 
133. Courier-Mail 26 June 1947, p.5. 
134. Courier-Mail 27 September 1946, p.2. 
135. Courier-Mail 19 March 1947, p. 2. 
136. Courier-Mail 12 June 1947, p.2. 
137. Fryer Library. Melbourne's Papers 3/CD/157. Melbourne to 
Earle Page 23 January 1935. 
317 
NOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE 
1. The Cattleman, vol.5, no.8, August 1981, p.l. Attempts to 
overcome this duplication included the (Commonwealth) Meat 
Inspection Arrangements Act 1964, the Administrative Review 
Committee (Bland Committee) 1976, Prices Justification 
Tribunal Report on Beef Marketing and Processing 1978, the 
Kelly Committee of Inquiry into Meat Inspection Arrangements 
1980. 
2. AMB, Report 1953-4, 1954-5. 
3. J. Longworth, Beef in Japan: Politics. Production. 
Marketing and Trade (St. Lucia: University of Queensland 
Press, 1983), pp.41, 43. 
4. J. Longworth, Beef in Japan p.47. 
5. J. Longworth, Beef in Japan pp.2, 80. 
6. J. Longworth, Beef in Japan, p.3 03. 
7. AMB, Meat Producer and Exporter vol.26, April 1972, p.6. 
8. AMB, Annual Report 1971-72 p.85, and 1975-76, p.76. 
9. National Times 3-8 October 1977, p.4. 
10. J. Longworth, Beef in Japan p.xvii. 
11. see Tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
12. see Table 3.1. 
13. Queensland Year Book, various years. 
14. AMB, Annual Report 1974-5 p.xvii, covering letter from 
Board Chairman to the Minister for Agriculture, 27 August 
1975. 
15. Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Developments in the 
Japanese Beef Market: Their Implications for Production 
Systems in the Australian Beef Cattle Industry Beef Research 
Report No.17 (Canberra: AGPS, 1975), p.l. 
16. Details of the system are contained in Longworth, Beef in 
Japan pp.50-1. 
17. AMLC, Annual Report 1978-79, p.31. 
318 
18. AMLC, Annual Report 1980-1, p.20. 
19. A. George, Japan's Beef Import Policies 1978-84: The 
Growth of Bilateralism Pacific Economic Papers No.113 
(Canberra: Australia-Japan Research Centre, ANU, 1984), p.20. 
20. A. George, Japan's Beef Import Policies pp.40-2. 
21. J. Longworth and R. Kada, Japanese food and feedstuff 
imports: background and prospects (St. Lucia: University of 
Queensland, Dept. of Agriculture, 1982), p.196. 
22. Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Situation and Outlook: 
Meat (Canberra: AGPS, 1985), p.31. 
23. Courier-Mail 9 April 1957, p.6. 
24. "Queensland Agriculture in 1953-54", Queensland 
Agricultural Journal vol.79, December 1954, p.311. 
25. "Agriculture at the National Level", Queensland 
Agricultural Journal vol.81, September 1956, p.497. 
26. Bureau of Agricultural Economics, The Beef Situation 
(Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 1955), p.2. 
27. Courier-Mail 17 April 1958, p.5. 
28. Australian Meat Board, Annual Report 1959-60, p.47. 
29. AMB, Meat Producer and Exporter vol.14 no.9, September 
1960, p.l. 
30. AMB, Annual Report 1959-60, p.47. 
31. AMB, Annual Report 1960-61, p.38. 
32. Australian Meat Board, Annual Report 1961-62, p.37. 
33. Australian Meat Board, Meat Producer and Exporter vol.17, 
December 1963, p.l. 
34. J. Longworth, Beef in Japan details the changes in 
Japanese eating habits and cuisine (pp. 8-18) and in market 
segments (pp.18-21). 
35. J.H. Kelly, Beef in Northern Australia (Canberra: ANU 
Press, 1971), pp.63-4. 
36. Details of the inauguration and conduct of this research 
is found in J.H.Kelly, Beef in Northern Australia. Kelly was 
attached to the BAE when, in 1947, at the suggestion of the 
AMB and the NADC, he was assigned the task of conducting the 
economic survey of the beef cattle industry of Northern 
Australia. 
319 
37. Queensland Agricultural Journal vol.66. May 1948, p.259. 
38. Queensland Agricultural Journal vol.66. May 1948, pp.260. 
39. Queensland Agricultural Journal vol.66. May 1948, p.259. 
40. AMB, Report 1949-50. 
41. QSA. Cabinet Decision 1788, 25 August, 1959. 
42. QSA. Cabinet Decision 3597, 24 July 1961. 
43. This report from the 1966 Policy Speech is taken from 
Australian Financial Review 24 October 1967. 
44. The need for revision of land legislation is discussed in 
a number of books and articles. See, for example, G. 
Harrison, Borthwicks: A Century in the Meat Trade 1963-1963 
(Thos. Borthwick & Sons, 1963), p.181; W.M. Gunn in C.W. 
Russell, Why Queensland Crown Land Development is Lagging 
(Brisbane: Simpson Halligan & Co. , 1960), Foreward; R. 
Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland pp.409-414. 
45. A.G. Muller, Progressive Land Settlement and Development 
in Queensland: The Amending Land Acts of 1957. 1958 and 1959 
Reviewed and Explained (Brisbane: Queensland Government 
Printer, 1960), p. 14. This is also referred to in R. 
Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland p.411. 
46. J.H.Kelly Beef in Northern Australia pp.77-79. 
47. R. Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland p.411 indicates 
that Nicklin over-ruled his Party colleagues at the 1961 Party 
Conference. Nicklin's attitude is discussed also in "Who Owns 
Rural Australia?" National Times August 23-29 1981, p. 126. 
48. W. Webster, "Beef in the Future" Speech at the Bankers' 
Residential Conference on Beef Cattle in Queensland. 
Rockhampton. April-May 1961. Contributed Papers. (Sydney: 
Reserve Bank of Australia, 1962), p.13. 
49. See note 3 6 for the establishment of this survey. This 
finding is reported in J.H. Kelly, Beef in Northern Australia 
p.16. 
50. QSA Cabinet Decision 3634, 8 August 1961. 
51. John Oxley Library. UGA OM 74-57/6. Executive Committee 
Meeting 28/29 April 1970 and Motion to Executive Committee 15 
September 197 0. 
52. R. Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland from 1915 to the 
-1980s (St.Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1985), p.421. 
In pp.418-425 Fitzgerald discusses the problem of foreign 
ownership of pastoral land and points out that there was no 
register of foreign owners of freehold land, but a register 
320 
was kept of foreign owners of pastoral leases, though this was 
not publicly known until 1981. 
53. J.H. Kelly, Beef in Northern Australia (Canberra: ANU, 
1971), p.163. See also R. Fitzgerald A History of Queensland 
p.422. 
54. John Oxley Library. UGA OM 74-57/10. Muttaburra Branch of 
Graziers' Association of Central and Northern Queensland, 
26 August 1972 and Stonehenge Branch of Graziers' Association 
of Central and Northern Queensland, 14 July 1972. 
55. Interview with Mr. Maurice Binstead, 15 August 1991. 
56. National Party of Australia, Queensland Division. Central 
Council Resolutions April 1978. Resolution 118. 
57. AMB, Report 1969-70, pp. 67-8. 
58. John Oxley Library. UGA OM 74-57/12, 13. Meeting of Bowen 
Branch of Graziers' Association of Central and Northern 
Queensland, 2 October 1970, and Alpha District Branch Meeting 
15 August 1970. 
59. J. Longworth, Beef in Japan, p.303. 
60. AMB, Annual Report 1970-71, p. 79 and Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics, Developments in the Japanese Beef 
Market p.3. 
61. The account of Thos. Borthwick's introduction of chilled 
beef into the Japanese market is based on an unpublished Paper 
entitled "Not Only for Gourmets and Geishas", prepared in 
conjunction with the Hoover Marketing Award, 1973 and on an 
interview with Mr. R. Goldup, Chief Executive, Thomas 
Borthwick & Sons (Australia) Pty. Ltd. 
62. Thos. Borthwick and Sons,"Not Only for Gourmets and 
Geishas" p.l. 
63. Thos. Borthwick & Sons, "Not Only for Gourmets and 
Geishas" p.7 and Figure 2. 
64. Thos. Borthwick & Sons, "Not Only for Gourmets and 
Geishas" p. 6. 
65. Thos. Borthwick & Sons, " Not Only for Gourmets and 
Geishas" p.19. 
66. Thos. Borthwick & Sons, "Not Only for Gourmets and 
Geishas" p.24. 
67. BAE, Developments in the Japanese Beef Market: Their 
Implications for Production Systems in the Australian Beef 
Catt]p> Tndustry Beef Research Report No. 17 (Canberra: AGPS, 
321 
1975), p.23 
68. AMB, Annual Report 1971-2. Covering letter to Minister 
for Primary Industry, September 1972. 
69. See BAE, Developments in the Japanese Beef Market and 
National Times 9-14 September 1974, p.58. 
70. The Foreign Investment Advisory Committee and its 
successor, the Foreign Investment Review Board, were not 
established until 1975 and 1976 respectively. 
71. Pastoral Review vol.84, no.l, February 1974, p.34. 
72. Australian Meat Board, Meat Producer and Exporter vol.26, 
no.12, December 1972, p. 7. 
73. Interview with Mr. Don Bridgeford, 15 July 1991. 
74. Interview with Mr. R. Hart, 5 August 1991. 
75. Interview with Mr.I. Kennedy, 6 September 1991. 
76. Details of the AMB's marketing campaigns are included in 
its Annual Report 1959-60 to November 1977. 
77. AMB, Annual Report 1963-4. 
78. AMB, Annual Report 1972-3, p.91. 
79. AMB, Annual Report 1968-9, p.61. 
80. AMB, Annual Report 1972-73, p.91. 
81. AMB, Annual Report 1974-5, pp.22-3. 
82. Department of Agriculture and Stock, Annual Report 1955-6, 
p.30. 
83. J. Longworth, Beef in Japan p.163. 
84. The Cattleman vol.6, no.3, 17 March 1982, p.12. 
85. BAE Livestock and Meat Marketing in Australia. An Economic 
Evaluation Beef Industry Monograph No.l. (Canberra: AGPS, 
1981. 
86. J. Longworth, Beef in Japan p.54. 
87. J. Longworth, Beef in Japan p.40. 
88. Details of the influence of Nokyo, and the relationship 
between farmers and political parties are outlined in J. 
Longworth, Beef in Japan pp.55-61, and pp.61-67 respectively. 
322 
89. S. Simson, "Beef Industry's Gloom", Australian Financial 
Review 18 June 1975, p.14. 
90. CPD House of Representatives, vol.91, 24 October 1974, 
p.2935. 
91. Pastoral Review vol.84, no.5, June 1974, p.70. 
92. QPD vol.273, September 1977, p.556. 
93. National Party of Australia - Queensland, National Outlook 
no.76-1, October 1976, p.2. 
94. National Party of Australia - Queensland, Urgency Motion 
to State Conference, 1977. 
95. The Cattleman vol.1, no.9, August 1977, p.16. 
96. QPD vol.266, August 1974, p.108. 
97. CPD House of Representatives, vol.91, 24 October 1974, 
p. 2812. 
98. CPD House of Representatives, vol.91, 29 October 1974, 
p.2935. 
99. CPD House of Representatives, vol.98, 25 February 1975, 
pp.635-6. 
100. CPD House of Representatives, vol.93, 24 February 1975, 
p.635. 
101. Age 18 March 1975. 
102. E.G. Whitlam in CPD House of Representatives, vol.93, 25 
February 1975, p.636. 
103. E.G. Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972-1975 (Penguin 
Books: Ringwood, V i c , 1985),p. 61. 
104. E.G. Whitlam in CPD House of Representatives, vol.91, 24 
October 1974, p.2812. 
105. W. Hayden in CPD House of Representatives, vol.107, 19 
October 1977, p.2179. 
106. QPD vol.270, 27 September 1977, p.901. 
107. QPD vol.270, 13 September 1977, p.557. 
108. QPD vol.270, 15 September 1977, p.704. 
109. The Cattleman vol.5, no.12, December 1981, p.l. 
110. D. Aitkin, "Why the Bush is in Revolt" National Times 17-
22 October 1977, pp.21-3. 
323 
111. The Cattleman vol.5, no.4, April 1981, p.l. 
112. J. Bjelke-Petersen, Letter, The Cattleman vol.1, no.11, 
October 1977, p.19. 
113. CPD House of Representatives vol.106, August 1977, p.354. 
114. E.G. Whitlam in CPD House of Representatives, vol.106, 
October 1977, p.1780. 
115. AMB, Meat Producer and Exporter vol.31, no.l, February 
1977, p.l. 
116. AMLC, Report 1 December 1977-30 June 1978, p.30. 
117. Australian Meat Board, Meat Producer and Exporter vol.31, 
no. 7, August 1977, p. 7 and vol.31 no.10, November 1977,pp. 
1,7. 
118. The Cattleman vol.6, no.l, 27 January 1982, p.l. 
119. National Party of Australia - Queensland. Motion to 
Conference, 1978. 
120. AMLC, Meat Producer and Exporter vol.33, no.6, June 1979, 
p. 1. 
324 
NOTES FOR CHAPTER FOUR 
1. J.R. Savage, Sugar Industry Working Party Report Brisbane: 
(Queensland Government Printer, 1985). 
2. C.A. Berezovsky, "The Relative Dependence of the Queensland 
Economy on the Rural Sector", Marketing Services Branch, 
Department of Primary Industries, March 1975, p.27. 
3. R.A. Powell & M. McGovern, The Impact of the sugar 
industry on the Queensland state economy (Armidale: University 
of New England, 1987). 
4. John Oxley Library. ASPA Papers and Correspondence Files 
OM.BG/2/384. Pearce to the Press Secretary to the Minister for 
Primary Industry, 20 February 1962. 
5. "tel quel" was a term used, especially in the BCSA, to mean 
the weight of sugar irrespective of polarization or net titre. 
It referred just to the dead weight of sugar and approximated 
to the term "bagged sugar". 
6. W. Brand, President of ASPA, Opening Speech to Annual 
Conference, 1953 in ASJ vol.45, no.l, April 1953, p.11. 
7. "The New International Sugar Agreement", ASJ vol.45, no. 6, 
September 1953, p.371. 
8. ASJ vol.46, no.2, May 1956, p.118. 
9. A. Rix, Coming to Terms: The Politics of Australia's Trade 
with Japan 1945-57 ( Sydney: Allen & Unwin,1986), p.147. 
10. Royal Commission into the Sugar Industry, Report J.M. 
Dixon's Evidence, 30 March 1950, p. 5. 
11. Presidential Address to the 1954 Conference of the 
Australian Sugar Producers' Association, ASJ vol.45, no.12, 17 
March 1954, p.787. 
12. A. Rix, Coming To Terms p.147. 
13. "Japan's Sugar Trade", ASJ vol.46, no.3, June 1954, p.149. 
14. Alliance Industries had been established in the late 1940s 
by the trading company Heine Bros. and A.R. Duncan, a 
businessman who had worked for Mitsui and Co. before World War 
II and was one of the first to be active in re-establishing 
trade links after private trading began in August 1947. 
Details of Duncan's role in the re-establishment of trade with 
Japan is contained in A. Rix, Coming To Terms. Duncan's role 
in the first sugar shipments is at p.147. 
325 
15. A. Rix, Coming To Terms p.148. 
16. G. Jackson, "Sugar Market in Japan", ASJ vol. 52, no.l, 
April 1960, p.108. 
17. John Oxley Library. ASPA Papers and Correspondence Files 
OM.BG/2/368. Taiyo Bussan Kaisha to ASPA n.d. 
18. G. Jackson, Address to the ASPA Conference 1951 in ASJ 
vol.53, no.l, April 1961, p.23. 
19. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/335. Circular to Mills and 
Branches G/19/1957. 
20. "The 1962-64 Period",ASJ vol.56, no.12, March 1965, p.908. 
21. A. Rix, Coming To Terms p.147. 
22. Economist Intelligence Unit, Economic Development Survey 
of the State of Queensland: With Particular Reference to the 
prospects for Secondary Industry ( Brisbane: Queensland 
Government Printer, 1961). 
23. John Oxley Library. ASPA PM.BG/2/390. G. Jackson, 
Statement on Home Consumption and Export Markets, 25 January 
1963. 
24. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/412 Sugar Industry Wage 
Claims - Final Proceedings November 1964. General Statement on 
behalf of the ASPA. 
25. see Table 4.5. 
26. ASPA, Annual Report in ASJ vol 56, no. 12, March 1965, 
p.908. 
727. ASJ vol.59, no.l, April 1967, p.61. 
28. ASJ vol.55, no.12, March 1964, p.864. 
29. ASJ vol.55, no.9, December 1963, p.575. 
30. Commission of Inquiry into Matters Concerning the Sugar 
Industry, Report (Gibbs Report)(Brisbane:Queensland Government 
Printer,October 1963). 
31. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/498. Circular to Mills 
and Branches "G"8/1974,12 June 1974. 
32. E.G. Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972-1975 (Ringwood 
Vic: Penguin Books Aust., 1985), pp.61 and 234. 
33. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/485. R.A. Patterson, 
Address to the ASPA Conference, 18 March 1974. 
326 
34. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/485. Resolutions passed 
at Annual Conference, March 1974. 
35. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/485. R.A. Patterson, 
Address to ASPA Conference, 18 March 1974. 
36. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/498. ASPA Circular to 
Mills and Branches "G"8/1974. 
37. John Oxley Library, ASPA OM.BG/2/498. Minutes of Executive 
Meeting, 19-20 November 1974* 
38. J.G. Deverell, Mgr. CSR Export Marketing Group, "Comments 
on Dr. March's Paper" in R.M. March, An Analysius of the 1976-
77 Japan-Australia Sugar Dispute Research Paper 56 (Canberra: 
Australia-Japan Research Centre, ANU, (1979), p.22. 
39. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/498. Press Statement 4 
September 1974, reprinted in Circular to Mills and Branches 
"G"22/1974. 
40. "Japan Hopes to Settle Sugar Issue with Aussies Amicably", 
Japan Times 3 September 1977, p.5. 
41. ASJ vol.54, no.5,August 1962, p.369. 
42. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/251. Holt to Pearce, 
(Secretary of ASPA) 19 March 1951. 
43. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/370. Sugar Board to ASPA 
6 February 1961. 
44. "Growth of Mechanised Handling of Sugar in Bulk". CSR 
Ltd., Annual Report 1958. 
45. S. Yoshida, Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, quoted in ASJ vol.54, 
no.5, August 1962, p.369. 
46. Report of the ASPA Conference 1957 in ASJ vol. 49, no. 2, 
May 1957, p.139. 
47. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/392. General Manager CSR 
to Pioneer Sugar Mill 28 May 1957. 
48. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/392. CSR to Pioneer 
Sugar Mill 9 May 1958. 
49. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/392. CSR to Pioneer 
Mill, 4 April 1962. 
50. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/359. Minutes of ASPA 
Executive Meeting, 16-18 June 1959. 
51. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/369. Report of the 
General Manager of the Mulgrave Sugar Mill, 30 May 1960. 
327 
52. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/371. Taito to CSR, 3 
March 1960, Daiichi Bussan Kaisha to CSR, 19 May 1958, and 
joint letter from Daiichi Bussan Kaisha and Mitsubishi Shoji 
Kaisha to CSR, 29 May 1958, in CSR Memo: "Raw Sugar Quality -
Filtrability - Is Improvement needed ?" 
53. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/371. Letter to CSR, 
April 1959 in CSR Memo:"Raw Sugar Quality." 
54. R.G.Jackson, Address to ASPA Conference 1961 in ASJ, 
vol.53, no.l, April 1961, p.23. 
55. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/359. Managing Director 
Pioneer Sugar Mills to ASPA, 22 January 1960, and OM.BG/2/362. 
ASPA to Sugar Board, 11 February 1960. 
56. R.G. Jackson Address to ASPA Conference 1961 in ASJ 
yol.53, no.l,April 1961, p.23. 
57. "Leader of Japanese Industry Reps Favours a Common Market 
in the Pacific Region", ASJ vol.54, no.5, August 1962, p.365. 
58. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/385. R.G. Jackson to 
ASPA, 17 January 1962. 
59. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/420. "Raw Sugar 
Quality" - Notes of discussions between the ASPA and the Sugar 
Board, 26 May 1965. 
60. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/421. CSR to ASPA, 29 
September 1965, and "Notes on Taito visit". 
61. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/441. Circular to Mills 
51/1967. 
62. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/427. ASPA to CSR, 5 April 
1966. 
63. John Oxley Library. ASPA PM.BG/2/419. CSR to ASPA 12 
November 1965 and 21 January 1966. 
64. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/419 ASPA to CSR, 13 May 
1965 and 21 January 1966. 
65. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/419. CSR to ASPA, 26 May 
1965. 
66. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/420. Taito to CSR, 31 
March 1965. 
67. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/427. CSR to ASPA 24 
October 1966. 
68. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/442. CSR to ASPA, 7 July 
1967. 
328 
69. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/498. CSR to Sugar Mills, 
12 June 1974. 
70. Chairman of the Sugar Board, Address to ASPA Conference 
1969 in ASJ vol.60, March 1969, p.655. 
71. Deputy Chief Manager, Sugar Marketing Division, CSR in ASJ 
vol.56, no.2, May 1964, p.28. 
72. Queensland Sugar Board, Annual Report 1976-7, quoted in 
Australian Sugar Yearbook vol.36, 1977, p.103. 
73. ASPA Annual Report 1977, pp.6-7. 
74. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/513. J.Bjelke-Petersen, 
Press Statement, 3 August 1977. 
75. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/506. V.Sullivan, 
Minister for Agriculture, quoted in ASPA Annual Report 1977. 
76. John Oxley Library. ASPA OM.BG/2/511. J.G.Campbell, CSR, 
Speech to the ASPA Conference, March 1978. 
77. ASPA Annual Report 1977. 
78. J.W. Laurie, Manager, Sugar Division CSR quoted in ASJ 
vol.69, no.l, April 1977, p.718. 
79. J.W. Laurie, Manager, Sugar Division of CSR in ASJ vol.69, 
no.l, April 1977, p.718. 
80. "Walkout at Sugar talks by Australia", Mackay Daily Mail 
30 June 1977, p.8. 
81. "Dr. Patterson Commends Industry on Domestic Agreement", 
ASJ vol.66, no.12, March 1975, p.590. 
82. Hon. I. Sinclair, Speech at ASPA Conference 1976, in ASJ 
vol.67, no.12, March 1976, p.568. 
83. J.D. Anthony. Press Statement 30 July 1977 in ASPA 
OM.BG/2/513. Circular to Mills and Branches G44/1977. 
84. ASJ August 1977, p.246 and ASJ March 1978 p.618. 
85. P. Kelly, "Why the PM opened fire". National Times 3-8 
October 1977. 
86. Courier Mail 2 September 1977, p.3. 
87. "Japan Long Term Sugar Contract", ASJ vol.69, no.6, 
September 1977, pp.301-303. 
88. Courier Mail 3 September 1977, p.l. 
89. Japan Times 27 June 1977, p.4. 
329 
90. ASJ October 1977, p.350. 
91. Australian Financial Review 21 April 1978. 
330 
NOTES FOR CHAPTER FIVE 
1. K. Tsokhas, Beyond Dependence (Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), pp.40-44. 
2. J.N. Pierce, "Comalco was away and running" Aluminium 
no.28, December 1981, pp.3-9. 
3. Bureau of Mineral Resources, Geology and Geophysics, 
Summary Report No.27 - Aluminium and Bauxite (Canberra: 
AGPS,1946), p.9. 
4. QSA A/8541. Mines Department Correspondence. Inquiries re 
aluminium and bauxite. Technical Superintendent AAPC to Chief 
Government Geologist Queensland, 3 October 1947. 
5. QSA A/8541. Mines Department Correspondence. Inquiries re 
aluminium and bauxite. State Mining Engineer to Under-
Secretary Department of Mines, 2 July 1947. 
6. Telegraph 7 October 1947. 
7. For details of Mawby's activities see K. Tsokhas, Beyond 
Dependence pp.40-44. 
8. QSA A/8 541. Mines Department Correspondence. Inquiries re 
aluminium and bauxite. Mawby to Haddon King, 17 June 1953. 
9. QSA A/8541. Mines Department Correspondence. Inquiries re 
aluminium and bauxite. Chief Government Geologist, "Notes on 
the Discovery of bauxite on Cape York Peninsula" 25 July 1957. 
10. QSA A/8541. Mines Department Correspondence. Inquiries re 
aluminium and bauxite. AAPC to Under-Secretary Department of 
Mines, 20 January 1948. 
11. QSA A/8541. Mines Department Correspondence. Inquiries re 
aluminium and bauxite. Chief Government Geologist, "Notes on 
the discovery of bauxite in Cape York Peninsula" 25 July 1957. 
12. Comalco Ltd., Aluminium no.3, 1971, p.9. 
13. "Red Riches in Northern Queensland", Economist (London) 5 
December 1959 pp.982-3. 
14. QSA Cabinet Decision 37 Submission 29, 4 November 1957. 
15. QSA Co-ordinator General's Department A/7055 Report on 
the Development of East North Queensland, December 1958. 
16. QSA A/8541. Mines Department Correspondence. Inquiries re 
aluminium and bauxite. Under-Secretary Dept of Mines to AAPC, 
23 November 1945 and AAPC to Under-Secretary Dept. of Mines, 3 
June 1957. 
331 
17. QPD vol.219, November 1957, p. 1427. 
18. QPD vol.219, November 1957, p.1440. 
19. R. Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland from 1915 to the 
1980s (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1984.), pp. 
306-7. 
20. QPD vol.219,November 1957, pp.1419-20. 
21. QPD vol.219, November 1957, p.1418. 
22. Sir D. Hibberd, "Some Reflections", Aluminium no.28, 
December 1981, p.9. 
23. CPD House of Representatives, 1 October 1957. 
24. QPD vol.219, November 1957, p.1438. 
25. QPD vol.219,November 1957, p. 1417. 
26. B. Galligan, Utah and Queensland Coal: A Study in the 
micropolitical economy of modern capitalism and the state 
(St.Lucia: University of Queensland Press,1989), p.61. 
27. Details of the Agreement are taken from Commonwealth 
Aluminium Corporation Pty. Ltd. Agreement Bill, QPD vol.219, 
November 1957. 
28. QSA A/8335. Evans to Nicklin, 28 January 1959. 
29. QSA Cabinet Decision 37, 4 November 1957. 
30. QPD vol.219, November 1957, p. 1411. 
31. Comalco Ltd., Annual Report 1974, pp.3-4. 
32. R. Stuart, "Resources Development Policy: The Case of 
Queensland's Export Coal Industry" in A. Patience (ed.). The 
Bielke-Petersen Premiership 1968-1983: Issues in Public 
Policy (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1985), pp.53-80. The 
importance of Hielscher and Treasury is discussed on pp.67-8. 
33. In 1947 the Coordinator-general of Public Works 
recommended the expansion of the Blair Athol coalfield at Peak 
Downs, with production largely for export. Premier Hanlon was 
successful in attracting the British Electric Supply 
Corporation (Overseas) Ltd. to develop the field. Despite 
controversial legislation allowing generous concessions,and 
extensions of time granted by the government, the company was 
unable to raise the necessary capital and the project fell 
through. 
34. QPD vol.219, November 1957, p.1415. 
35. Courier-Mail 29 November 1957, p.6. 
332 
36. J.N. Pierce, "Comalco was away and running". Aluminium 
no.28, December 1981, p.4. 
37. D.J. Hibberd, "Some Reflections", Aluminium no.28,December 
1981, p.9. 
38. K. Tsokhas, Beyond Dependence p.40-44. Tsokhas uses the 
term "developmental nationalists" to refer to mining 
executives who were determined to locate and develop 
Australian minerals by Australian managed and controlled 
companies for the national benefit. It is a major theme of his 
work that senior mining executives such as these did not 
simply do the bidding of large foreign companies, but were 
able to promote Australian interests in the way in which 
mining development occurred. 
39. K. Tsokhas, Beyond Dependence p.53 
40. K. Tsokhas, Beyond Dependence p.63. 
41. QSA Cabinet Decision 3631. Hiley to Sewell 25 July 1961. 
42. QSA Decision 3631. Sewell to Hiley 25 July 1961. 
43. Aluminium in Use no.3, December 1982, p.2. 
44. J.N. Pierce, "Comalco was away and running" in Aluminium 
28 December 1981, p.4. 
45. Aluminium no.28,December 1981, p.10. 
46. QSA A/8541. Mines Department Correspondence. Inquiries re 
aluminium and bauxite. Takata to Evans, 28 August 1958. 
47. Agnew to Morgan, 2 3 November 1959 quoted in Tsokhas, 
Beyond Dependence p.27. 
48. QSA A/8541. Mines Department Correspondence. Inquiries re 
aluminium and bauxite. C.A.Byrne (Consolidated Zinc) to 
Under-Secretary Dept.of Mines, 4 October 1960. 
49. QSA A/8541. Evans to Morris, 22 July 1958. 
50. Courier Mail 29 November 1957, p.6 
51. QPD vol.228, November 1960, p.1763. 
52. D.H. Jacobs, "Australia-Japan trade: Commerce Spanning a 
Century", Aluminium no.30, August 1989, p. 14. 
53. G. Agnew and F.R. Morgan quoted in K. Tsokhas, Beyond 
Dependence pp. 2 5 and 2 6 respectively. 
54. Aluminium no.3, September 1971, p.3. 
55. D.J. Hibberd in Comalco Ltd., Annual Report 1974, p. 12. 
333 
56. QSA Cabinet Decision 272, Minute,3 October 1960. 
57. T. Hiley in QGMJ. vol. LXVI,October 1965, p.496. 
58. QPD vol.219, November 1957. 
59. Provisions of the Bill in this paragraph are drawn from 
QPD vol.219, November 1957. 
60. J.N. Pierce, "Comalco was away and running". Aluminium no. 
28,December 1981, p.10. 
61. Aluminium no.3, September 1971, p.3. 
62. Senate Standing Committee on National Resources, The 
Development of the Bauxite. Alumina and Aluminium Industries 
(Canberra: AGPS, 1981), p.45. 
63. F. Nicklin in QGMJ. vol.LXV, November 1964, p.583. 
64. H. McQueen, Gone Tomorrow (London & Sydney: Angus & 
Robertson, 1982), p.119. 
65. Aluminium no.28, December 1981, p.15. 
66. QPD vol.219, November 1957, p.1409. 
67. E. Evans, "Progress at Weipa", QGMJ vol.LXIII, May 1962, 
pp. 176-77. 
68. QGMJ vol. LXIII, no.725, p.101. 
69. QPD vol.229, March 1961, p.2570. 
70. R. Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland pp.337-8. 
71. Senate Standing committee on National Resources, The 
Development of the Bauxite. Alumina and Aluminium Industries. 
(Canberra: AGPS, 1981), Treasury Submission, p.35. 
72. Commissioner for Electricity Supply. Coordinator-
General's Department, "Report on Regional Survey and 
Investigation of East North Queensland" Appendix E, December 
1958, p.54. 
73. QGMJ. vol.LXI, September 1960, p.439. 
74. R. Swartz, Ministerial Statement on Natural Resources, CPD 
House of Representatives,September 1972, p.2164. 
75. Senate Standing Committee on National Resources,The 
Development of the Bauxite, Alumina and Aluminium Industries. 
CSR Ltd. Evidence p.6. 
76. Aluminium in Use no.6,1983, p.3. 
334 
77. D.R. Gallagher, G.D. McColl, M.C. Copeland, T.K. McDonald, 
The National Economic Benefits of the Gladstone Aluminium 
Smelter. A Contract Study for Comalco Ltd. April 1981. 
335 
NOTES FOR CHAPTER SIX 
1. QGMJ vol.XXII, Jan-Dec 1921, p.360. 
2. QSA Labour and Industry Department A/36259. Queensland 
Delegation to Eastern Countries: Report on Investigations into 
the possibility of new or extended trade for Queensland. 
3. A.Rix, Coming to Terms: The Politics of Australia's trade 
with Japan 1945-57 (Sydney:Allen & Unwin,1986), p.47. 
4. A. Rix, Coming To Terms pp.152-3. 
5. QGMJ vol.LXI, October 1960, p.500. 
6. QGMJ vol.LXIX, February 1968, pp.43-5. 
7. A. Rix, Coming To Terms pp.152-3. 
8. E.M. Hanlon, "What Blair Athol coal means to Queensland" 
Mimeo, 1947, p.6. 
9. QSA Mines Department Minerals - coal A/8546. Power to 
Clark, 17 December 1951 and Clark to Power (in reply) , 19 
December 1951. 
10. A. Rix Coming To Terms. p.151. 
11. A. Rix, Coming To Terms p.152. 
12. A. Rix, Coming to Terms p.15. Rix characterises as 
"partially cooperative" the relationship between business and 
the Federal government. Business relied on the government for 
support and some market leadership, but there were policy 
conflicts between business and government and within sections 
of the government on the way in which relations with Japan 
should develop. 
13. Utah Development Co. Submission to the Senate Standing 
Committee on Trade and Commerce - Inquiry into Australia's 
Export Coal Industry July 1982, p.3. 
14. J. Priest, The Thiess Story (Brisbane: Boolarong 
Publications,1981), p.139. 
15. QSA Mines Department - Coal Resources of Queensland 
A/8341. "Coal in Queensland", a Paper prepared for the 
Standards Association of Australia, 1948. 
16. QSA Mines Department A/8341. Under-Secretary Mines 
Department to Managing Director Powell Duffryn, 30 June 1948. 
336 
17. QGMJ, vol.LXII, July 1962, p.326. 
18. National Times 18-23 February 1974, p.32 
19. J.Priest, The Thiess Story, p.143. 
20. QSA Cabinet Decision 2192, 2 February 1960. Memorandum: 
"Dawson Valley Coal Project by Messrs. Thiess Bros (Q) Pty. 
Ltd. 
21. J. Priest, The Thiess Story p.157. 
22. Utah Development Co. Submission p.18. 
23. B. Galligan, Utah and Queensland Coal: a study of the 
micropolitical economy of modern capitalism and the state (St. 
Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1989), p.20. 
24. QSA Mines Department A/8341. F.O. Nixon to Premier, 2 6 
September 194 7. 
25. B. Galligan, Utah and Queensland Coal p.55. 
26. QSA Cabinet Decision 1636, Submission 1373, 24 June 1959.. 
27. QSA Cabinet Decision 1636. Thiess to Minister for Mines, 
17 June 1959. 
28. QSA Cabinet Decision 2153, Report of the Committee 
Appointed to Investigate the Ports of Central Queensland, pp. 
18-9. 
29. QSA Cabinet Decision 1636, Submission 1373, 24 June 1959. 
30. QSA Mines Department - Suggested sites for iron and 
steelworks A/8517. Evans to C. Viertel, 7 June 1960. 
31. QSA Mines Department A/8517. Turnbull to Evans, January 
1958. 
32. QSA Cabinet Decision 1636, 24 June 1959. 
33. QSA Cabinet Decision 2191, Submission 1874, 2 February 
1960. 
34. QSA Cabinet Decision 2191, 2 February 1960. 
35. QSA Cabinet Decision 2192, Submission 1874, 2 February 
1960. 
36. QSA Cabinet Decision 2239, 22 February 1960. 
37. A. Rix, Coming To Terms p.154. 
38. QSA Cabinet Decision 2192. S. Fujisawa to Thiess, 17 
December 1959. 
337 
39. J. Priest, The Thiess Story p.158. 
40. R. Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland from 1915 to the 1980s 
(St.Lucia: University of Queensland Press,1984.), p.222. 
41. QSA Cabinet Decision 3223, 28 March 1961. 
42. QSA Cabinet Decision 3182, 13 March 1961. 
43. QPD vol.233, December 1962, pp.67-8. 
44. B. Galligan, Utah and Queensland Coal p.45. 
45. B. Galligan, Australian State Politics (Melbourne: Longman 
Cheshire, 1986), p.257. 
46. QSA Queensland Energy Resources Advisory Council A/8545. 
Chairman of QERAC to Under-Secretary Dept. of Mines, 1 
December 1967 and QERAC to Minister for Mines: Report of the 
Geological Survey of Queensland, "Central Queensland Energy 
Resources 1967", 6 December 1967. See also Wilson to Nicklin, 
October 1966. 
47. QSA QERAC A/8545. Chairman QERAC to Under-Secretary Dept. 
of Mines, 1 December 1967. 
48. QGMJ vol.LXXVII, August 1976, p.331. 
49. QPD vol.233 September 1962. The Agreement sanctioned by 
this Bill was never entered into and the Bill was subsequently 
amended when Mitsui entered the partnership. 
50. Central Queensland Coal Associates (CQCA) was a company 
85% owned by Utah, established to operate mines in a 
particular area, including those at Norwich Park, Saraji and 
Peak Downs. 
51. QSA A/8342. Mines Department. Coal Resources of 
Queensland. Speech by E.M. Hanlon, "As I See It" 2 June 1949. 
Mimeo. 
52. Utah Development Co. Submission July 1982, p.12. 
53. QSA Cabinet Decision 3142, 27 February 1961. Report on 
Potentialities of Queensland for the Establishment of an iron 
and steel works. 
54. QSA QERAC A/8545. Cabinet Decision 109745, 25 September 
1967. 
55. QPD vol.233, December 1962, p.631. 
56. Commonwealth of Australia. Department of the Treasury, 
Economic Paper No.l May 1972. 
338 
57. QSA QERAC A/8545. State Mining Engineer, "Uniform 
proposals for Franchises to Export Coal", September 1967. 
58. L. Hielscher, "Financial Implications of Resources 
Development". Speech to the Symposium "The Resources Boom in 
Queensland - Implications for Planning", Brisbane: Dept. of 
Planning and Landscape Architecture Queensland Institute of 
Technology, July 1981. 
59. S.R.Winter, Issues in Minerals Trade and Investment 
Between Australia and Japan Paper prepared for a conference 
"The Japanese Economy and the Economic Relations of Australia 
and Japan", May 17-19 1977 (Melbourne: CRA, 1977), p.15. 
60. Commonwealth of Australia. Department of the Treasury. 
Payments To or For the States, the Northern Territory and 
Local Government Authorities. Budget Paper No.7. 1979-80 and 
1980-81. 
61. Discussion between the Joint Coal Board, Queensland Coal 
Committee, Coordinator-General and Brisbane Harbour 
Authorities, 2 December 1947. 
62. Courier-Mail 13 March 1950, p.6. 
63. New York Times 28 December 1952. 
64. QSA A/8348 Under-Secretary Premier and Chief Secretary's 
Department to Burrows, 14 March 1951. 
65. QSA Cabinet Decision 2192. Memo from Coordinator-General, 
29 January 1960. 
66. QGMJ. vol.LXX, June 1961, p.284. 
67. QGMJ. vol.LXXII, April-May 1961, p.201. 
68. QSA Cabinet Decision 2192. S. Fujisawa to L. Thiess,17 
December 1959. 
69. QGMJ. vol.LXII, August 1961, p.404. 
70. QSA A/8335. Evans to Nicklin, 28 January 1959. 
71. QSA Cabinet Decision 401, 21 March 1958. 
72. QPD vol.233, December 1962, p.1475. 
73. QPD vol.240, 1964-65, p.3336. 
74. Details of the arrangements for the provision of railway 
infrastructure in this paragraph are based on CQCA Agreement 
Bill, Initiation in Committee in QPD vol.250, December 1968 
pp.1976-2024, and on B. Galligan, Utah and Queensland Coal 
pp.63-4. 
339 
75. QPD vol.250, December 19682, p.1978 and 1979. 
76. Utah Development Co. Submission, p.4. 
77. L.R. Edwards, "The Resources Boom in Queensland: Its 
Magnitude and Impacts," Address, Symposium "The Resources Boom 
in Queensland: Implications for Planning" Department of 
Planning and Landscape Architecture, Queensland Institute of 
Technology, Brisbane, July 1988, p.22. 
78. CRA Submission. 
79. QSA Cabinet Decision 2155. Report of the Committee 
Appointed to Investigate the Ports of Central Queensland, 
p.19. 
80. G.S. Lewis, A History of the Ports of Queensland: A Study 
of Economic Nationalism (Brisbane: University of Queensland 
Press, 1973), p.221. 
81. QSA Cabinet Decision 2155 Report of the Committee 
Appointed to Investigate the Ports of Central Queensland: 19. 
82. QSA Cabinet Decision 2192 2 February 1960. Memorandum from 
Coordinator-General to Minister for Mines. 
83. QGMJ vol. LXI, December 1960, p.645. 
84. QSA Cabinet Decision 3287, 18 April 1961. 
85. QGMJ vol.LXIII, August 1962, p.14. 
86. QGMJ vol.LXVI, September 1963, p.590. 
87. Economist Intelligence Unit, Economic Development Survey 
of the State of Queensland: With Particular Reference to the 
prospects for Secondary Industry (Brisbane: Queensland 
Government Printer, 1961). 
88. For a detailed account of the importance of Hielscher see 
R. Stuart, "Resources Development Policy" pp. 67-8. 
89. QSA Cabinet Decision 2193 29 January 1960. 
90. QSA A/854 5 QERAC. Memo to members of QERAC on Proposed 
Utah Franchise 22 February 1967. 
91. QPD vol.228, November 1960, p.1756. 
92. A.R.(Roy) Duncan had before World War II been the chief of 
Australian staff of Mitsui and Co. and had been involved in 
Australia-Japan trade for some 20 years. He was one of the 
first Australian businessmen to go to Japan after World War II 
and a partner in Alliance Industries and Shippers which 
arranged many of the early trade deals between Australian and 
Japanese companies. Details of his involvement with the 
340 
resumption of Australia-Japan trade after World War II are 
outlined in A. Rix, Coming To Terms. 
93. QPD vol.228, November 1960, p. 1762. 
94. K. Kawahito, The Japanese Steel Industry: with an analysis 
of the US steel import problem (New York: Praeger 
Publishers,1972), p.429. 
95. W.L. Hawthorne, "The Bowen Basin - A Stocktaking in 1970" 
QGMJ. vol.LXXI, December 1970, p.517. 
96. General Manager of Nippon Steel quoted in Hawthorne, "The 
Bowen Basin", p.528. 
97. QGMJ vol.LXXI, January 1962, p. 9. 
98. B. Galligan, Utah and Queensland Coal, p.46. 
99. B. Galligan, Utah and Queensland Coal, p.60. 
100. B. Galligan, Utah and Queensland Coal, p.67. 
101. QSA A/8545 Memo to members of QERAC on Proposed Utah 
Franchise, 22 February 1967. 
102. Canberra Times 4 February 1969. 
103. QPD vol.250, December 1968, p.1981. 
104. CPD House of Representatives, September 1972, p.2060-
2164. 
105. E.G. Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972-1975 (Ringwood 
Vic: Penguin 1985), p.242. 
106. CPD House of Representatives, April 1972, p.2073. 
107. CPD House of Representatives, November 1974, p.3303. 
108. CPD House of Representatives, April 1975, p.970. 
109. CPD House of Representatives, March 1975, p.1041. 
110. T.M. Fitzgerald, The Contribution of the Mineral Industry 
to Australian Welfare (Canberra: AGPS, 1974). 
111. Courier-Mail 21 August 1975. 
112. QGMJ vol.LXXIV, July 1973, p.253. 
113. R.B. McKern, Multinational Enterprise and National 
Resources (Sydney: McGraw-Hill, 1976) 
114. Chairman, Thiess Holdings - Report to the Annual General 
Meeting 1961 in QGMJ vol. LXII, October 1961, p.596. 
341 
115. J.Priest, The Thiess Story, p.193. 
116. L. McKern, Multinational Enterprise, p.16. 
117. QGMJ vol.LXIII. January 1962, p.13. 
118. L. McKern Multinational Enterprise, p.12. 
119. E.M. Hanlon, "What Blair Athol coal means to Queensland", 
mimeo. 4 December 1947, p.6. Held in John Oxley Library. 
120. QPD vol.235, October 1963,p. 848. 
121. QGMJ vol.LXIX, July 1968, p.284. 
122. L. McKern, Multinational Enterprise, p.20. 
123. Courier-Mail 26 October 1980. 
124. B. Galligan, Utah and Queensland Coal. 
342 
NOTES FOR CONCLUSION 
1. P. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial 
Policy in Europe (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1985) . 
2. R. Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland from 1915 to the 
1980s( St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1985). 
3. H. Sadler, Energy in Australia: Politics and Economics 
(Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1981), p.3. 
4. R. Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland p.379. 
5. K. Tsokhas, A Class Apart: Businessmen and Australian 
Politics 1960-1980 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
6. C.E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books, 
1977) . 
7. L. Hielscher, "Financial Implications of Resources 
Development" Speech to the Symposium, The Resources Boom in 
Queensland - Implications for Planning. Brisbane: Department 
of Planning and Landscape Architecture, Queensland Institute 
of Technology, July 1991, p.65. 
8. B. Galligan, (ed.) Australian State Politics (Melbourne: 
Longman Cheshire, 1986), pp. 255-7. 
APPENDIX A 
NOTES ON ARCHIVAL SOURCES 
The principal archival sources used in the preparation of this 
thesis have been:-
The John Oxley Library - a divison of the State Library of 
Queensland specialising in Queensland history. The Library 
collection of personal papers, organisational records, 
unpublished material such as conference papers, and published 
pamphlets and other documents from government Departments 
proved particularly useful in the research for this thesis, 
especially in relation to the sugar and pearling industries 
and to economic and political developments in the 1940s and 
1950s which are only sketchily recorded in other libraries. 
The Fryer Library - University of Queensland, St.Lucia. 
This Library contains theses submitted to the University, as 
well as a collection of personal papers and documents related 
to Queensland and its history. This collection provided a 
useful source of information relating to Queensland-Japan 
relations in the prewar period, and to the deliberations of 
the Bureau of Industry whose records have otherwise been 
destroyed. 
The Queensland State Archives - the official repository of 
government documents - presents a challenge to the researcher, 
in both the content and the arrangements of its records. 
In the absence of Archives legislation in Queensland until 
1992 the preservation or destruction of records was a decision 
for individual government Departments. Consequently, some 
records have been preserved only to a limited extent, and some 
have not been retained at all. In addition, some documents 
which were originally preserved have since been recalled to 
Departments and destroyed. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
large-scale destruction of documents was a routine practice if 
a change of government was felt to be imminent. 
Matters dealt with by Cabinet present a particular difficulty 
as no records of Cabinet decisions or submissions were made 
prior to the election of the Nicklin Government in 1957. The 
original copy of submissions was returned to the originating 
Department and preserved or destroyed according to its policy 
at the time. 
Materials which have been preserved are not easily accessible. 
The collection is organised around the originating Department, 
with files arranged chronologically, and sometimes by topic. 
However, records relating to a particular matter may be 
scattered through several files or the files of several 
Departments, and, in the general absence of indexing they are 
come across largely by chance. A number of references which 
were of particular interest to this thesis were located by 
searching an index entitled "Items of Interest", containing a 
miscellany of unrelated matters, filed alphabetically 
according to the name of the person involved or the name 
assigned to the particular matter or topic. The problem is 
compounded by the focus of the Archives on matters relating to 
family and local history, and the fact that the interest and 
expertise of many of its staff lie, not unnaturally, in that 
field. 
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